Month: May 2017

Categories
Economists ERVM

Poland. Nicolaus Copernicus’ contribution to monetary economics. Ca. 1526

 

 

The Rare Book Reading Room of Economics in the Rear-view Mirror proudly announces the addition of a work that was written by Copernicus sometime before April 1526. It represents an early statement of the quantity theory of money.

Copernicus, Nicolaus.  Monetae Cudendae Ratio (On the Coinage of Money).

Latin and Polish translation (1854). Beginning p. 563 in Nicolai Copernici Torunensis De revolutionibus orbium coelestium libri sex : accedit G. Joachimi Rhetici Narratio prima, cum Copernici nonnullis scriptis minoribus nunc primum collectis, ejusque vita. Warsaw: Strąbski, 1854.

Latin and French translation (1864). Traictie de la première invention des monnoies de Nicole Oresme; textes français et latin d’après les manuscrits de la Bibliothèque impeériale, et Traité de la monnoie de Copernic; texte latin et traduction française. Publiés et annotés par M. L. Wolowski.  Paris, Guillaumin et cie., 1864. Download entire book at archive.org.

Latin and German translation (1978). Die Geldlehre des Nicolaus Copernicus. Texte, Übersetzungen Kommentare. Berlin (East): Akademie-Verlag, 1978.

Latin and English translation with images of an early copy of the original (Copernican Academic Portal, Nicolaus Copernicus Thorunensis of Nicolaus Copernicus University). There exists three known such copies according to Leszek Zygner’s introductory page.  Images; transcription; translation (by Edward Rosen).

Image Source: Copernican Academic Portal

Categories
Bibliography Curator's Favorites ERVM Suggested Reading

ERVM. Curator’s Favorites from the Collection, first of a series.

 

 

The collection of artifacts here at Economics in the Rear-view Mirror has grown sufficiently large that part of my self-imposed curation duties now include adding postings to link back to some earlier postings that perhaps newer visitors and subscribers have yet to discover.

One such underused resource in my opinion is the  list of items “Recommended Teacher’s Library of Economics” put together by J. Laurence Laughlin and published in 1887.  To date, Laughlin’s List has received only 53 page visits since being posted in August, 2015. What makes the transcription a true resource for historians of economics is that nearly all the references given by Laughlin now have links. Thus in that single posting we have a virtual library of economics that would have been an economics professor’s pride at the dawn of graduate education in economics in the United States.

 

Categories
ERVM Suggested Reading

St. Petersburg. Daniel Bernoulli’s paper, Latin original. 1738

New York City Public Library reading room, ca 1911

 

Latest addition to the Economics in the Rear-view Mirror Rare Book Reading Room: a link to the Latin original of Daniel Bernoulli’s paper for his solution to the St. Petersburg paradox.

From the English translator’s note: “I am also grateful to Mr. William J. Baumol, Professor of Economics, Princeton University, for his valuable assistance in interpreting Bernoulli’s paper in the light of modern econometrics”.

Visitors must drop down this page to the comments section to enjoy the material shared by Olav Bjerkholt that he found in the Econometrica files regarding the publication of the English translation of the Bernoulli paper. Fabulous stuff!

____________________

1738

Bernoulli, Daniel. Specimen theoriae novae de mensura sortis, Commentarii academiae scientiarum imperialis Petropolitanae. Tomus V. St. Petersburg, 1738, pp. 175-192.
Repository: Natural History Museum Library, London.

German translation by Alfred Pringsheim with introduction by Ludwig Fick. Leipzig: Duncker & Mumblot, 1896.

English translation (link requires access to jstor) by Dr. Louise Sommer published as “Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk” in Econometrica, Vol. 22, No. 1 (January, 1954), pp. 23-36.

Image Source: New York City Public Library Reading Room, ca. 1911. From Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. 20540 USA.

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard Suggested Reading

Harvard. Reading period and final exams. Theory and Money. Schumpeter 1927-28

 

 

Harvard students first experienced Joseph Schumpeter’s teaching in 1927-28 in an advanced theory course (Economics 15: Modern Schools of Economic Thought)  previously taught by Allyn Young [examination questions for Economics 15 for 1921-27 have been posted earlier] and in a money and banking course. For both courses this posting provides the reading period assignments, course enrollments and  final examination questions from the end of the second term. The examination questions for the first term of Economics 15 for 1927-28 are posted here. The examination questions for the first term of Economics 38 for 1927-28 are posted here.

_________________________________________

 Course Enrollments

[Economics] 15. Professor J. A. Schumpeter (University of Bonn).—Modern Schools of Economic Thought.

Total 16: 10 Graduates, 1 Senior, 1 Junior, 4 Radcliffe.

 

[Economics] 38. Professor J. A. Schumpeter (University of Bonn).— Principles of Money and of Banking.

Total 25: 19 Graduates, 2 Seniors, 1 Junior, 2 Radcliffe, 1 Other.

 

Source: Harvard University. Reports of the President and the Treasurer of Harvard College, 1927-1928, p. 75.

 

_________________________________________

 

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
(Inter-Departmental Correspondence Sheet)

Cambridge, Massachusetts
December 6, 1927

Dear Burbank:

The question of the assignment of readings for the reading period is, of course, no easy one in the case of an audience which is so little homogeneous as mine. In both courses I have told them that what I really want is to advise them individually according to everyone’s own needs, and that I wish them to call in my consultation hours before breaking up. With this proviso, I have recommended for those who do not wish for such individual advice, and at the same time still want to take the course for credit, the following:

First, as to Money and Banking:

The looking over of the two volumes of the Senate Commission of Gold and Silver Inquiry on European Currency and Finance, serial 9, volume I and [volume] II, Washington, 1925, (not that they will read it through, all of them, but they will get out of them a quantity of ideas of the European currency situation which, after all, is both theoretically and practically important for them to know).

Second, for the course Economics 15:

I have told them that we do not want to make them read, but to make them think, and I have suggested that they should take one of the three following books and read it critically, and follow up problems or arguments which may strike them in doing so:

Allyn Young, Economic Problems
Hawtrey, The Economic Problem
Sir Alfred Mond, Industry and Politics.

Cordially yours,

[signed]
Josef Schumpeter

 

Source: Harvard University Archives.  Department of Economics. Correspondence & Papers 1902-1950 (UAV.349.10), Box 7.

_________________________________________

 

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
SPRING READING PERIOD—1928

Economics 15

  1. Students who have had a modicum of mathematical training are recommended to work up carefully either:
    A. L. Bowley: Mathematical Groundwork of Economics (1924).
    or
    A. Cournot: Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth, ed. of 1927.
  2. Others:
    A. C. Pigou: Economics of Welfare. [1932 edition]
    or  The Colwyn Report.
    [Report of the Committee on National Debt and Taxation (1927); Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee on National Debt and Taxation. Vol. I and II. (1927)]

 

Economics 38

  1. W. R. Burgess: The Reserve Banks and the Money Market, 1927.
  2. Kirsch and Elkins: Central Banks, 1928.
  3. W. S. Jevons: Investigations in Currency and Finance, ed. 1909.
    [1884 edition]
    or
    3a) Report of the Royal Comm. On Indian Currency and Finance, 1926.

 

Source:  Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003. (HUC 8522.2.1). Box 2, Folder “Economics, 1927-28”.

_________________________________________

1927-28
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
ECONOMICS 15

Modern Schools of Economic Thought

  1. Write as fully as possible on any one of the following subjects:
    1. What is the meaning and importance of the doctrine of maximum satisfaction and its relation to the concept of economic equilibrium?
    2. What do you think of the view that recurrent depressions are due to the inability of earnings to flow promptly into the hands of consumers?
    3. Describe the principle underlying Professor Irving Fisher’s method of measuring marginal utility. What do you think of it?
  2. Answer briefly two out of the four following questions:
    1. Professor H. L. Moore’s statistical demand curve for pig iron slopes up instead of down. How do you account for this?
    2. What is an indifference curve in the sense of Pareto as distinguished from the sense in which Edgeworth uses that concept?
    3. Discuss Professor Edgeworth’s proposition that equilibrium is indeterminate in the case of bilateral monopoly.
    4. What is the difference between physical and value marginal product? Which seems to you more significant, and why?

Final. 1928.

 

Source: Harvard University Archives. Harvard University. Examination Papers 1928  (HUC 7000.28, 70 of 284). Harvard University Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Papers Printed for Final Examinations: History, Church History,…Economics,…Military Science, Naval Science. June, 1928.

 _________________________________________

 1927-28
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
ECONOMICS 38

Principles of Money and of Banking

I

Discuss ONE of the following topics, devoting at least half your time to this part of the paper.

  1. A capital levy is among the measures recommended for the restoration of a disorganized currency. State the conditions under which this measure may be expected to improve the situation.
  2. The Bank of France used to defend its gold reserve by redeeming its notes in five-franc silver pieces and charging a premium if redemption in gold was insisted upon. How does this method differ from the method of protecting the gold reserve by means of an increase in the discount rate?

 

II

Discuss TWO of the following questions more briefly.

  1. It has been stated that open market operations cannot stave off credit inflation because of their comparatively insignificant amount. (Lehfeldt.) Is this correct?
  2. What is meant by saying that savings do not create deposits?
  3. The chances are that gold production will slow down in the next decade. Are we to expect a general depression on that account? (Cassel.)
  4. During the first three months of the current year there was a net outflow of more than $90,000,000 of gold from this country. How do you interpret this fact and what consequences do you expect therefrom?

Final. 1928.

 

Source: Harvard University Archives. Harvard University. Examination Papers 1928  (HUC 7000.28, 70 of 284). Harvard University Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Papers Printed for Final Examinations: History, Church History,…Economics,…Military Science, Naval Science. June, 1928.

Image source: Joseph A. Schumpeter at table with books, photograph, ca. 1930. Detail from image posted at Harvard University Archives. Joseph Schumpeter Papers. HUGBS 276.90p (38).

 

 

 

Categories
Courses North Carolina

North Carolina. Course outline and exam for mathematical economics, Hotelling. 1946 and 1950

 

 

 

Harold Hotelling continued teaching courses in mathematical economics after leaving Columbia [here an earlier posting that lists all his courses taught at Columbia] for the University of North Carolina in 1946. From two folders in Hotelling’s papers in the Columbia University archives we can piece together the week-by-week list of topics he covered for the Fall quarter of 1946 and 1950. Note that the record for 1946 begins as a typed document that then is corrected and extended by hand-written additions.

______________________________

[Begin typed]

MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS COURSE

Fall quarter, 1946. Two hours each Tuesday and Thursday.

Oct. 1. General scope of economic theory as treated mathematically. Static and dynamic economics. Greater superficial interest in dynamic economics but greater body of definite knowledge in the static field. Moreover an understanding of static theory is important for an understanding and elucidation of dynamic phenomena.

List of important mathematical writers on economic theory, especially static economic theory: Cournot, Dupuit, Walras, Edgeworth, Pareto, I. Fisher, Schultz. Also Amoroso, Pantaleoni, Slutzky. Bibliography of Hotelling writings on economic theory.

Oct. 3. Demand curves and functions. Classification of exchanges by double dichotomy according as buyer and seller are monopolistic or competitive. Indeterminacy of the case of monopoly vs. monopsony. Other cases classically regarded as determinate. But beware of assuming determinacy if there are as many as 2 monopolies in the system. Incidence of taxation on a monopolist of just one commodity (classical treatment). Proof that a tax of t per unit on monopolist leads him to increase the price.

Assignment for Oct. 8: Find 3 demand functions such that for monopoly and zero cost the increase in price will be (1) greater than t, (2) = t, (3) less than t. Be sure the functions are realistic in the sense of being monotonically decreasing, and that both price and quantity are positive.

Oct. 8: Discussion of problems assigned. (2 out of the 8 enrolled came forward with solutions.) Demand functions for 2 related commodities. The nature of cost functions for a single commodity: total cost as a function of quantity produced tends to rise stepwise in industrial production. Average cost varies in a quasi-periodic fashion, usually tending to decrease. Marginal cost usually low but with short periods of very high values as production increases.

[Handwritten insert:]

Oct. 10. Indifference loci. Utility, ophelimity, pleasure, non-measurable but ordinable.

[Last typed item:]

Oct. 15. Duopoly (“Stability in Competition,” Econ. J. 1929). Contributions of Cournot, Bertrand, Edgeworth.

[Handwritten items follow:]

Oct. 17. Bilateral monopoly, etc. Problem: Prove competitive price in Cournot’s duopoly < monopoly price with same demand function (Costs zero)

Oct. 22. Further discussion of problem. More on indifference curves & demand functions. Emphasis derived from “stability in competition” upon need for expressing quantities of cont[inuou]s functions of more than one price. Does Cournot duopoly imply a lower price than monopoly?

Oct. 24. Demand function with limited budgets.

Oct. 24. Equations of general equilibrium. Indeterminacy of price ratios.

Oct. 29. Bartlett gives proof (which the class could not find previously) that Cournot duopoly implied lower price than monopoly.
Equation of exchange: MV +M´V´= Σpq

Oct. 31. Theory of maxima & minima: 1st order conditions, including Lagrange multiplier case. Relation to Taylor series.

Nov. 5. 2nd order conditions. Definite & indefinite quadratic forms, with & without linear constraints.

Nov. 7 Application to obtaining 1st-order conditions on demand functions unlimited budget case): symmetry conditions and inequalities. (Case of soap manufacturer)

Nov. 12. Conditions on supply functions in unlimited budget case. Demand functions with limited budgets. 6-term integrability conditions.

Nov. 14. Inequalities on demand functions with limited budgets; on supply functions with limited budgets

Nov. 19. Construction of suitable utility functions for general-equilibrium illustrations. Schultz attempted verifications. Problems of demand-function fitting. (Loaned Schultz book to [illegible word]) Taxation in general-equilibrium theory.

Nov. 21 Omitted

Paper will be required in lieu of exam.

Nov. 26. Edgeworth’s taxation paradox.

Dec. 3. Rent. Site rental & capital values. Benefit. Consumers’ & producers’ surpluses.

Dec. 5. Proof (à la “General Welfare” paper) that sales should be at marginal cost; also net loss given by a quadratic form.

Dec. 10. Connection of above with pp. 606ff. of “Edgeworth’s Taxation Paradox.” Taxation of site rentals; of scarce things such as space in crowded trains; on inheritances; of incomes; of nuisances. Minimization of net loss consistently with raising a specified revenue.

Dec. 12. Discussion. Index numbers of prices.

 

Source:   Columbia University. Rare Book & Manuscript Library. Papers of Harold Hotelling, Courses Taught M-S (partial) Box 48, Folder “Mathematical Economics (2)”.

______________________________

 

Statistics/Economics 182. Mathematical Economics.
Autumn, 1950.
Harold Hotelling

September 21. General introduction. List of references. “Comparative statics,” as distinguished from study of transitional conditions. Edgeworth’s taxation paradox as a historic demonstration for need of calculus and algebra, not merely wordy or geometric arguments. Effect of tax on monopoly price with 1 commodity—the classical graphic argument. Assignment: (1) Prove that dp/dt, the rate of increase of monopoly price with tax t, is positive; (2) determine whether dp/dt has any positive limits which are the same for all monotonically decreasing demand functions having derivatives.

Sept. 26. Further discussion of taxation of monopoly. Assignment to calculate the effect on prices of 2 commodities controlled by 1 monopolist of a tax on 1 of these commodities, with a specified pair of demand functions.

Sept. 28. Preview of conditions under which Edgeworth’s taxation paradox may hold, and of nature of demand and supply functions.

Oct. 3. Duopoly. Cournot’s treatment. Duality with double monopoly (by different producers of parts of 1 final product). The 1929 “Stability in Competition” treatment. Mutual gravitation of competitors.

Oct. 5. Double dichotomy of markets, with extension to duopoly, oligopoly, duopsony, oligopsony; also to a multiplicity of commodities. Location of industry. Von Thünen, Goodrich. Problems of shape of a city; of layout of a railroad on a homogeneous plain for the purpose of bringing grain to one city.

Oct. 10. Holiday.

Oct. 12. Review of previous work. Classic supply and demand curves, with generalization to 2 commodities. illustration with linear demand and supply functions of effects of taxation of 2 commodities.

Oct. 17. Cost –total, marginal, average. Indeterminacy of average cost. Joint costs. Allocation logically impossible without consideration of demand. “Cost-finding systems” and cost accounting. Relative precision of marginal cost.

Oct. 19. Consumers’ surplus, producers’ surplus, benefits, effects of excise taxes—all for one isolated commodity; graphic and algebraic treatments. Distribution of excise taxes among independent commodities; but the necessity of replacing this result by something based on relations between commodities. The need of algebra and calculus rather than geometry for this.

Oct. 24. Demand functions for multiple commodities with unlimited budgets. Theory of maxima and minima.

Oct. 26, 31; Nov. 2, 7. Theory of maxima and minima; demand and supply functions with unlimited budgets. Symmetry-integrability conditions; inequalities

Nov. 9. Demand functions with limited budgets. Indifference curves. Utility.

Nov. 14. Further developments à la Slutsky and Hicks.

Nov. 16. Giffen phenomenon, exhibited by means of the utility function Ø = x – e-y.

Nov. 21. Equations of general equilibrium, approximately according to Irving Fisher. Need of monetary equation to fix general level of prices.

Nov. 23. Thanksgiving holiday.

Nov. 28. Assignment: Work out and bring in next time (if not too hard) solution of equations of general equilibrium for 2 groups, farmers and fishermen, of equal numbers, large and competitive, with respective utility functions Ø = x – e-y; and the smaller root of (x- Ø)(y- Ø) = 1. Calculus of variations in the small and in the large. Formulae for variations of prices and quantities in terms of excise tax rates for a group of commodities for which demand and supply maximize profits without budgetary limitations.

Nov. 30, Dec. 5, 7. Incidence and effects of taxation with unlimited and with limited budgets. Net loss from excise taxes is positive and approximately equal to ½ Σ ti δ qi. Criterion for social value of investment. Economy of making all sales at marginal cost. Index numbers of prices.

 

Source:   Columbia University. Rare Book & Manuscript Library. Papers of Harold Hotelling, Courses Taught M-S (partial) Box 48, Folder “Mathematical Economics (1)”.

______________________________

 

Final Examination
Mathematical Economics. Math./Stat. 182
December 13, 1950

I.

A monopolist sells quantities x, y of two commodities at prices p1, p2 and pays taxes t1, t2 per unit sold respectively. His costs amount to*

C = 20 – x – y

and the demand functions are

x = 5 – 2p1 + p2,

y = 10 + p1 – 3p2.

Determine as functions of the tax rates (a) the prices and (b) the quantities yielding maximum revenue.

*(This cost function is unrealistic but the students were told to use it)

 

II.

If a toll of $p is levied for each crossing of a certain bridge, the number of crossings per year is q = 10,000 (9 -3p-p2) when this expression is positive, and is otherwise zero.

(a) What toll yields the maximum revenue?

When this toll is charged, …

(b) …how many crossings will be made per year?

(c) …what is the revenue?

(d) …what is the consumers’ surplus?

(e) …what is the total benefit from the bridge?

(f) What is the maximum possible total benefit?

 

 

III.

For a class of people all having the preference function

\Phi =q_{1}^{{{\alpha }_{1}}}q_{2}^{{{\alpha }_{2}}}\cdots q_{n}^{{{\alpha }_{n}}}

prove that a suitable index number of the cost of living is a certain weighted geometric mean.

 

Source:   Columbia University. Rare Book & Manuscript Library. Papers of Harold Hotelling, Courses Taught M-S (partial) Box 48, Folder “Mathematical Economics (1)”.

Image source: From a photo of the Institute of Statistics leadership around 1946: Gertrude Cox, Director, William Cochran, Associate Director-Raleigh and Harold Hotelling, Associate Director-Chapel Hill. North Carolina State University.

Categories
Economics Programs Harvard

Harvard. Gerschenkron moves to abolish language requirement, 1959

 

 

 

In this 1960 memo to the executive committee of Harvard’s economics department, the polyglot economic historian, Alexander Gerschenkron, provided his written blessing for, indeed he initiated, the abolishment of a foreign language requirement for the graduate study of economics. Since the copy of the mimeographed memo was found in John Kenneth Galbraith’s papers, it is fitting to add his brief assent together with  his comment on Gerschenkron’s obiter dicta with respect to math requirements.

 ______________________________

 Memo to the Executive Committee
from Alexander Gerschenkron
(March 19, 1959)

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Department of Economics

Littauer Center
Cambridge 38, Mass.

CONFIDENTIAL

March 19, 1959

TO: Members of the Executive Committee

I should like to give you an advance warning of my intention to propose, at the next regular meeting of the department, a radical change in our language requirements.

I have administered our language examinations for about ten years. You may recall that in the first year of operation I proposed, and the department accepted, a considerable reform of the way in which language examinations were given. The duration of the examination was extended from one hour to two hours, and the length of the material to be translated was more than doubled. At the same time much more difficult passages began to be selected; and finally, the examination was graded much more rigorously than it had been before. At that time I had the hope that it would be possible to stimulate through the language examination an increased interest in, and a fuller mastery of, foreign languages. It is perfectly clear to me now that this hope has not materialized. It is true that the students had to work harder in order to pass the examination, but it is equally true that whatever knowledge was acquired was allowed to fall into disrepair following the examination. The long run effect, which after all is the only thing that matters, has been zero point zero.

At the same time it is perfectly clear that the opportunity cost of preparing for the language examination is extremely high. Our students are a hard-working lot and we keep them very busy. I wonder very seriously whether it can be justified to force our students to cut out of a working day of some 10 or 11 hours and hour or two in order to master a language which in all likelihood will never be used by the student in his professional career. To some extent our language requirements are in the nature of an anachronism and we might do well to admit the fact frankly. At the turn of the century reading knowledge of French and German may have been the necessary prerequisite of any well rounded economics education. This is certainly not so now. The center of gravity shifted and at the same time the interest in the history of doctrines has greatly diminished. I am fully aware of the general benefit inherent in the study of languages. But I believe that we have to think in terms of professional proficiency. I doubt that the foreign language requirement could be justified under any circumstances, least of all if one consider how negligible its effect has been.

I plan therefore to make the following motion: All foreign language requirements for Ph.D. as well as for M.A. are abolished beginning with the class entering in September 1959. An examination in mathematics becomes an absolute requirement from which there is no dispensation and to which accordingly every candidate is subject. The Chairman should appoint a committee to discuss in which way, if any, the standards for the examination in mathematics should be improved.

Sincerely yours,

[signed]

Alexander Gerschenkron
Chairman, Language Requirements

AG/jw

______________________________

 John Kenneth Galbraith’s Reply to the Memo

March 23, 1959

Professor Alexander Gerschenkron
Littauer M-7

Dear Alex:

I approve your proposal on languages with some reservations about the mathematics examination. I do not question your goal. But would it not be better — and better for secondary and college preparation — to put the mathematics requirement firmly in the requirements for admission?

Yours faithfully,

J.K. Galbraith

 

Source: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. Papers of John Kenneth Galbraith. Series 5. Harvard University File, 1949-1990. Box 526, Folder “Department of Economics, Executive Committee 5/22/56-11/29/60”.

Image Source: Alexander Gerschenkron in the Harvard Class Album, 1952.

Categories
Chicago Economists

Chicago. Simons urges the recruitment of Milton Friedman, 1945

Simons

 

 

The atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki was less than two weeks history and the declaration of the surrender of Imperial Japan only five days old. Nothing says “back to business as usual” at the university better than active lobbying on behalf of one’s preferred candidate for an upcoming vacancy, as we see in the following memo for the 33 year old Milton Friedman written by Henry C. Simons to the Chicago economics department chair, Simeon E. Leland. The copy of this memo comes from the President’s Office at the University of Chicago. Simons’ grand strategy was to seamlessly replace the triad Lange-Knight-Mints with his own dream team of Friedman-Stigler-Hart. He feared that outsiders to the department might be tempted to appoint some convex combination of New Dealer Rexford Tugwell and trust-bustin’ George W. Stocking Sr., economists of the institutional persuasion who were swimming on the edges of the mainstream of the time.

Economics in the Rear-view Mirror also has transcribed excerpts from an earlier 77 page (!) memorandum (10 April, 1945) to President Robert M. Hutchins from Simeon E. Leland entitled “Postwar Plans of the Department of Economics–A Wide Variety of Observations and Suggestions All Intended To Be Helpful in Improving the State of the University”.

____________________________

 

Henry C. Simons Urges his Department Chair to Recruit Milton Friedman

August 20, 1945

To: Simeon E. Leland           Economics

From: Henry C. Simons        Economics

 

If Lange is leaving, we should go after Milton Friedman immediately.

It is a hard choice between Friedman and Stigler. We should tell the administration that we want them both (they would work together excellently, each improving what the other did), Friedman to replace Lange, Stigler to replace Knight and to be with us well ahead of Knight’s retirement. We might also say that we want Hart to replace Mints at Mints’s retirement, and also to be with us in advance, but are happy to have him financed by C.E.D. [Committee for Economic Development] for the present.

Yntema evidently is thinking of getting Friedman shortly. We should exploit this possibility. Milton has now a great yen for a University post and would probably turn down an offer from C.E.D., even at much financial sacrifice, if a good academic post were the alternative (as it might be, at Minnesota or elsewhere). He is rather footloose—not anxious to go back either to the Treasury or to the National Bureau. We should grab him now, offering temporary joint appointment with C.E.D. and full-time, permanent appointment when he is through with C.E.D.

Friedman is young, flexible, and available potentially for a wide variety of assignments. He is a first-rate economic theorist, economic statistician, and mathematical economist, and is intensely interested over the whole range of economic policy. He has been outstanding in every organization where he has worked—here with Henry Schultz, at the National Bureau, at the Treasury, and now recently in the Army project at Columbia. Moreover, he is one of those rare cases of able young men who have enjoyed large experience and responsibility in Washington without being at all disqualified thereby for academic work.

The obvious long-term arrangement is a joint appointment with the Cowles Commission. Marschak would, I’m sure, like to have him; and Milton would like to settle into a major project of empirical research, e.g., on enterprise size and productional efficiency. Bartky may be expected strongly to support the appointment, for its strengthening of the University in statistics. The School of Business could well use Milton, to give its few advanced courses in statistics, if Yntema continues to price himself out of the University. Moreover, Milton probably would be delighted to work partly in the Law School, and be extremely useful there. In the Department, he would be available for statistics, mathematical economics, pure economic theory, taxation, and almost any field where we might need additional courses.

If University officers want outside testimony, they could get it from Randolph Paul or Roy Blough (as regards the Treasury), from Arthur F. Burns (National Bureau), from Abraham Wald, Allen Wallis, and Barky (as regards war research), and from Bunn at Wisconsin (as regards possible usefulness to the Law School)—not to mention George Stigler, Harold Groves, Wesley Mitchell, Simon Kuznets, Erwin Griswold, et al.

Perhaps the best thing about Milton, apart from his technical abilities, is his capacity for working as part of a team. He is the gregarious kind of intellectual, anxious to try out all his ideas on his colleagues and to have them reciprocate. He would doubtless be worth his whole salary, if he neither taught nor published, simply for his contribution to other people’s work and to the Department group as a whole. But he is also intensely interested in teaching, and far too industrious not to publish extensively. Our problem would be not that of finding ways to use him but that of keeping him from trying too many tasks and, especially, of leaving him enough time for his own research.

It would, I think, be good policy and good tactics to submit a major program of appointments, including [Frank W.] Fetter, Friedman, Stigler, Hart, and an economic historian (Innis or Hamilton), in the hope of getting them all within a few years, some on joint appointments with, notably, the Cowles Commission, the Law School, the School of Business (?) and, temporarily, the C.E.D. Research Staff. Such a program would serve to protect us against administration pressure for less good appointments (e.g.,  Stocking [George Ward Stocking, Sr., Ph.D. Columbia, 1925]), and from Hutchins’s alleged complaint that, while he wanted to consider major appointments in economics, the Department simply would not make recommendations. We should, in any case, err on the side of asking for more appointments than we can immediately get. Otherwise, available funds may go largely elsewhere—e.g., into Tugwell-like, lame-duck appointments, and into Industrial Relations, Agricultural Economics, and other ancillary enterprises, at the expense of the central field of economics.

There is, I trust, substantial agreement within the Department, on the men mentioned above. This fact, if fact it is, should be made unmistakably clear to the administration.

Incidentally, if we are going to explore possibilities of an appointment in American economic history (and I’m probably alone in opposing), we should do so only in co-operation with the History Department and with (from the outset) joint plans for joint appointments.

 

HCS-w

 

Source: University of Chicago Archives. Office of the President. Hutchins Administration. Records. Box 73, Folder “Economics Dept., 1943-45”.

Image Source: University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf1-07613, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard

Harvard. Final examination questions for Collective Bargaining, Labor, and Public Policy. Dunlop, 1947-48

 

 

 

The course outlines and reading lists (very extensive!) for the two-term sequence “Trade Unionism and Collective Bargaining” and “Public Policy and Labor” taught by John Dunlop at Harvard in 1947-48 have been posted earlier along with figures for the respective course enrollments. Following the memorial minute from Harvard’s Faculty of Arts and Sciences next,  the transcriptions of the final examination questions for each of these courses from the Harvard University Archives will be found.

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At a Meeting of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences May 18, 2004, the following Minute was placed upon the records.

John Thomas Dunlop

John Dunlop was an extraordinary labor economist, dean, colleague, and mentor to students and practitioners in the world of labor. He was extraordinary because he was more than an economist, and because he was driven by a moral vision of what economists and academics should do to make the world better.

John saw the world through his own eyes and experience. You might think that all good social scientists see the world in that way, but in fact economics provides a particular set of glasses that exaggerates some parts of reality and hides others. Some of us need these glasses to see. John did not put on those glasses. John could see without them.

He looked at data and made his own judgment. In doing so, he helped set a foundation stone of labor economics which is deeply empirical. John’s first major academic publication on real wages over the business cycle forced Keynes to admit that the General Theory was wrong on its assessment of this issue: Real wages fall in recessions not in booms, contrary to simple marginal productivity analysis.

Throughout his career, Dunlop followed his own vision. His book Wage Determination Under Trade Unions modeled unions as optimizing organizations. He engaged in a famous debate with Arthur Ross about treating unions as economic or political organizations. Later, John decided that the optimizing model was not a useful path to follow, and reversed direction. His book Industrial Relations Systems sought to develop a broader perspective on how labor relations fit into economics. In the 1980s, Dunlop carped at economists for failing to see what he could see in the labor market. Much of the economics profession might be marching off to “natural rate of unemployment” or to firm-specific human capital, but not John. More often than not, he was right.

Dunlop approached his work – from advising presidents and cabinet officials, to telling academics about the real world and telling practitioners about academic theory and testing of propositions – with one goal: to help solve problems. A classic example was John’s response to a 1978 request from Murray Finley, President of the Mens Garment Workers Union, to explore what might be done to increase the productivity of American apparel workers. John visited dozens of plants, investigated automation, and met with all the practitioners: academic design engineers, industry production experts, suit manufacturers, textile firms, a chemical firm, the Union, the apparel retailers, and the Federal Department of Commerce. His vast knowledge and curiosity, combined with his ability to convince people that it was in their best interest to work together, led to the formation of the non-profit firm [TC]2, designed to help the U.S. apparel industry survive, and later to the formation of the Harvard Center for Textile and Apparel Research. This was just one of John’s many extra-curricular activities that enriched both the University and the world.

His legacy in the University is immense. His legacy to labor economics is immense, both for his ideas and for his being the intellectual “father” and “grandfather” of many labor economists. His legacy in the world is immense. The moral principle that guided him – that academics should use their knowledge and skill to help solve problems faced by real people, by workers and firms, and governments – represents Harvard at its best in dealing with the world outside of academia. His legacy in labor economics and economics more broadly – to look at the world with your own eyes and experience, with direct knowledge of the institutions and practitioners – represents social science at its best in interpreting and analyzing the world.

Those of us who were close to John miss his curmudgeonly criticisms and vast knowledge. We will keep alive his legacy of applying our knowledge to the world to help understand and solve social problems. This is the greatest memorial the University can give to him.

Respectfully submitted,

Frederick Abernathy
Caroline M. Hoxby
Lawrence Katz
Richard B. Freeman, Chair

Source:  Harvard Gazette, September 16, 2004.

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Final Examination
Trade Unionism and Collective Bargaining
Associate Professor John Dunlop
1947-48
HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ECONOMICS 81a

  1. Develop what you consider to be the differences, if any, in the functions and role of trade unions in capitalist, socialist, and communist societies.
  2. The Webbs, in their “Industrial Democracy,” stated that “to competition between overlapping unions is to be attributed nine-tenths of the ineffectiveness of the trade union world.”
    A recent writer in the American Economic Review states:
    “Leadership rivalry is the lifeblood of unionism in the United States. After all, the American trade union is pragmatic to the core. It is neutral in ideology and weak in political purpose. In the absence of competition for the allegiance of workers, there would be little else to ensure its militance and guarantee its role as an agency of protest. Moreover, rivalry has been the most effective stimulus to organize the unorganized. Let the reader ask himself if the labor movement would be as far along as it is today, in terms of total membership, had there not occurred the split between the A.F.L. and the C.I.O. in the 1930’s.”
    In the light of your reading of trade union history, which of these statements do you consider more accurate?
  3. “From the point of view of the whole economy, monopoly, in business or in labor, will always result in a misallocation of resources and will usually result also in an under-utilization of resources. Business monopolies do not raise the ‘general’ rate of profits and labor monopolies do not raise the ‘general’ rate of wages. Both raise the incomes of minorities, reducing the income of the rest by more than they themselves can gain through their ‘restrictive policies’.”-Professor Fritz Machlup.
    Does this statement constitute an accurate appraisal of the impact of a trade union on the labor market?
  4. The policies developed by the parties in collective bargaining in regard to (a) seniority in layoffs and (b) methods of wage payment have been significantly shaped by the economic environment. Illustrate this generalization by reference to specific industries.
  5. Case Background:
    The Committeeman in Zone 1 of the Hyatt Bearings Division several times requested that additional time studies of particular operations be made following failure to adjust certain disputes. He further requested that he be permitted to be present at such studies on the ground that Paragraph 79 of the Agreement should permit him this privilege.Paragraph 79:
    “When a dispute arises regarding standards established or changed by the Management, the complaint should be taken up with the foreman. If the dispute is not settled by the foreman, the committeeman for that district may, upon reporting to the foreman of the department involved, examine the job and the foreman or the time study man will furnish him with all the facts of the case. If there is still a dispute after the committeeman has completed his examination, the foreman or the time study man will then reexamine the operations in detail with the committeeman on the job. If the matter is not adjusted at this stage, it may be further appealed as provided in the Grievance Procedure.

    Position of the Union    :
    While the Union did not cite a specific instance of failure of Management to abide by Paragraph 79, it was indicated that the grievance had been filed following a disagreement on an actual case. The Union claimed that Management has often refused to make additional time studies on disputed operations, and has not permitted the committeeman to be present in instances when studies have been made as part of a re-examination of a job following a dispute. The Union states that it has appealed this case to the Umpire in order to “get the correct interpretation of Paragraph 79.”Position of the Company:
    Management takes the position that Paragraph 79 of the Agreement permits the committeeman to “re-examine the operations” or to be present with the foreman or the time study man “to review the operations.” Management maintains that nothing in Paragraph 79 can be construed as giving the committeeman the right to be present when actual time studies are being made.

    1. Does the contract require the Company to permit a representative of the Union to be present when time studies are made?
    2. Would the Company be wise, as a matter of policy, to ask the Union to have a representative present?

Final. January, 1948.

 

Source: Harvard University Archives. Harvard University. Final examinations, 1853-2001. HUC 7000.28, Box 15 of 284. Harvard University Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Papers Printed for Final Examinations: History, History of Religions,…Economics,…Military Science, Naval Science. January, 1948.

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Final Examination
Public Policy and Labor
Associate Professor John Dunlop
1947-48
HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ECONOMICS 81b

  1. In Alternative to Serfdom Professor John Maurice Clark develops the problems of a modern community in terms of the conflict between competition and monopoly and between progress and security.
    1. What are the principal aspects of this conflict?
    2. What resolution of these problems does Professor Clark suggest?
    3. How do you appraise his position?
  2. Discuss the economic implications of a chronic state of “over full employment”, i.e., a situation in which the demand for labor exceeds the supply of labor, in terms of the probably effects upon
    1. the absolute and relative money wage rates
    2. the allocation of the labor force
    3. the size and composition of the labor force
  3. Contrast the National Labor Relations Act with the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, with respect to the following
    1. the right of the employer to speak to employees in favor of or against a labor organization
    2. the right of employees to go out on strike
    3. the rights of non-union employees.
  4. The following case arose under the unemployment compensation system:
    “The claimant, 72 years old and a union carpenter for 27 years, was referred to a non-union job. He refused to take the job because it would violate the rules of his union. Union rules provided for a fine for working on a non-union job. The Ohio statute disqualifies an individual who ‘has refused to accept an offer of work for which he is reasonably fitted’ and further provides that ‘…no individual otherwise qualified to receive benefits shall lose the right to benefits by reason of a refusal to accept new work if: as a condition of being so employed he would be required to join a company union, or to resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor organization, or would be denied the right to retain any membership in and observe the lawful rules of any such organization’,”

    1. State concisely the issue involved in this case.
    2. How would you decide the case, indicating the basis for your decision?
  5. In the provision for old age in the community, what are your views concerning the relative roles of a federal program a unilateral company pension system, a system of pensions negotiated in collective bargaining, and individual savings?

Final. May, 1948.

 

Source: Harvard University Archives. Harvard University. Final examinations, 1853-2001. HUC 7000.28, Box 15 of 284. Harvard University Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Examinations. Papers Printed for Final Examinations in History, History of Religions, … , Economics, … , Military Science, Naval Science. May, 1948.

 

Image Source: Museum of the City of New York, Cigar Box Label “Union Workers”.

 

Categories
Berkeley Carnegie Institute of Technology Chicago Colorado Columbia Cornell Duke Economics Programs Economist Market Harvard Illinois Indiana Iowa Johns Hopkins M.I.T. Michigan Michigan State Minnesota North Carolina Northwestern NYU Ohio State Pennsylvania Princeton Purdue Rochester Stanford Texas Undergraduate Vanderbilt Wisconsin Yale

Size distribution of graduate and undergraduate programs in economics. U.S., 1963-65

 

 

These are the last two statistical tables from the so-called “Cartel” summary report from December 1965 of leading economics departments in the U.S. intended to provide orientation for departmental chairpersons in salary negotiations. Today’s posting gives the numbers of undergraduate and graduate majors reported by 29 departments. 

Earlier postings gave the distribution for full-professors, the distribution for associate professors, and the distribution for assistant professors across departments. Two previous postings have the actual distributions for entering salaries for new Ph.D.’s for 1964-65 and 1965-66 and the anticipated range of salary offers for new Ph.D.’s for 1966-67. Those first five reports from The Cartel provide distributions of median or average incomes or ranges of salary offers by ranks across departments. Table 6c from the summary report that gives the salary distributions by rank for 335 professors, 143 associate professors and 185 assistant professors from all 27 departments.

Refer to the first posting in this series of tables for information about the compiler Professor Francis Boddy of the University of Minnesota and a list of the 30 departments belonging to the Chairmen’s Group.

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TABLE 7c
Graduate majors in Economics – 29 institutions:

 

1963-64 1964-65 1965-66
(Estimate)
300 and over 2 2

1

200-299

 0 0 2
150-199 3 4

5

100-149

 6 5 6
80-99 4 4

3

60-79

 5 7 5
40-59 6 4

4

20-39

 2 1 0
1-19 1 1

1
Number of departments reporting:

29

 28

27
Total number of students:

2,963

 3,057

3,118

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TABLE 8C
Undergraduate majors in Economics – 29 institutions

 

1963-64 1964-65
300 and over 4

4

250-299

 1 1
200-249 3

2

150-199

 4 6
100-149 8

5

80-99

 1 1
60-79 2

1

40-59

 2 3
20-39 1

1

1-19

 1

1
Number of departments reporting:

27

25
Total number of students:

4,550

4,312

 

Source: Johns Hopkins University. The Ferdinand Hamburger, Jr. Archives. Department of Political Economy, Series 5, Box 6, Folder 2 “Statistical Information”.

Image Source: quick meme website.

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Courses Harvard Suggested Reading Syllabus

Harvard. Labor and Public Policy Syllabus Dunlop, 1948

The following course outline and syllabus come from the second term of a two term course in collective bargaining and public policy offered by John Dunlop at Harvard in 1947-48.  Material for the first term was posted earlier. The final examination questions for both terms will be posted soon.

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Course Enrollment

[Economics] 81b. Associate Professor Dunlop.–Public Policy and Labor (Sp).

Total 147: 2 Graduates, 85 Seniors, 37 Juniors, 11 Sophomores, 1 Freshman, 11 Radcliffe.

Source: Harvard University. Report of the President of Harvard College and Reports of Departments for 1947-1948, p. 90.

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Economics 81b
Spring 1948

LABOR AND PUBLIC POLICY

  1. Introduction
    1. General Setting of the Problems of the Course
    2. Governmental Attitude toward Labor and Employer Organizations
    3. Organized Labor’s Relation to Government
  2. Issues of Public Policy
    1. The Extent of “Public” Encouragement to Organization
    2. The Regulation of Labor Organizations
    3. The Machinery for the Settlement of Disputes
    4. The Treatment of the Parties to a Dispute
    5. The Status of Labor Organizations under the Anti-trust Laws
    6. Minimum Wage and Hour Regulation
    7. The Risk of Unemployment
    8. Old Age Insurance
    9. The Risks of Accident and Sickness
  3. The Process of “Public Policy” Formulation
    1. The Determination of Community Values
    2. The Operation of “Pressure Groups”
    3. The Role of the Press
    4. The Legislative Sphere
    5. The Influence of Administrative Agencies; Board Members, Administrators, and Staff

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SOME FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY

  1. Does the process of collective bargaining between labor organizations and employers give assurance that the “public interest” will be best served? How do you evaluate the possibility of collective bargaining resulting in continuing warfare or “combination” against the “public interest”?
  2. “The threat of strike and lockout, and probably some work stoppages, are vital to the functioning of collective bargaining.” Do you agree? Do you have “vigorous” or “healthy” labor and management organizations where there have been no work stoppages for long periods? How can the “public” be made to understand the necessity for the social costs of voluntarism?
  3. Do you think it is possible to prohibit strikes by law? May not workers always bring equal pressure by turning out a smaller quantity of work? How do you distinguish between the right to strike and the right of an individual to refuse to work? Are the concepts identical? Are “wildcat strikes” and similar spontaneous walkouts, in part at least, a desirable social safety valve?
  4. Is it possible to have private collective bargaining when bargaining units become in effect National in scope as in the railroad and steel industries? Do you think the parties in such cases are likely to reach settlements without governmental intervention? Is it possible to keep the Government out of such disputes? If not, do you think it follows that the “government” is required to adopt some explicit wage policy in peacetime?
  5. The Department of Labor was established to “promote the interests of wage earners.” The mediation and conciliation functions of the Government were located in the Department of Labor? Do you believe employers had any valid objections to this arrangement? What should be the relation of the two assistant Secretaries of Labor, “representing” the AFL and CIO, to the administration of the Department of Labor?
  6. For the purposes of “public concern” with the “internal affairs” of a labor organization, would you regard a union more like a “private club” or a “public utility”? Does the presence of a Governmental guarantee of the right to organize affect the answer to this question?
  7. How is “public policy” in fact formulated? Contrast, for example, the mechanics used in formulating: the old age insurance program, the “cooling-off period” of the War Labor Disputes Act, the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, the Fair Labor Standards Act.
  8. What mechanism would you propose to formulate working compromises between agriculture and organized labor? Consider the interest of agriculture in industrial employment for “surplus population” and in cheap prices of industrial goods; also consider the interest of organized labor in food prices and in extending the area of organization.
  9. Where would you draw the line between “management personnel” and “labor” for the purpose of determining the rights to self-organization and protection from “unfair labor practices”? How would you constructively treat the issue of the “organization of supervisors” from the point of view of management? From the point of view of the labor movement?
  10. Do you think it possible to extend gradually the area of labor-management agreement fast enough to preclude the necessity of legislation to prescribe in detail the rights and duties of both sides? How would you speed up the process of agreement? Consider this question in the light of American experience in contrast to that in England, Sweden, Germany and Australia.
  11. How would you define the “legitimate” interests of management in the organization of its employees? What criteria would you establish to draw lines between cases of coercion on the one hand and the exercise or the expression of the “legitimate” interests of management you have defined?
  12. How would you define the area on which you would allow an employer as a matter of public policy, to deal with an employee as an individual rather than through the collective bargaining agent? Does the union have the right to insist that individual merit increases be “negotiated or bargained” with the union? May the company install a pension plan without “bargaining”?
  13. Can the Federal Government avoid having a “wage policy”? Are labor and management organized along lines which would facilitate the formulation of a national wage policy? What are the dimensions or ingredients you would suggest for a national wage policy—the rate of change of the wage level, wage rate differentials, etc.?
  14. Under a system of unemployment compensations how would you define “availability for work”? Should men on strike be allowed benefits? May one refuse to accept a lower wage rate and still draw benefits? How far away must a job be before refusal of the job is a bar to benefits?
  15. What different concepts of the labor force, employment and unemployment do you regard as essential to public policy-making?
  16. What procedures would you recommend to formulate public policy on a health program?

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Economics 81b

LABOR AND PUBLIC POLICY

I. INTRODUCTION

  1. General Setting of the Problems of the Course
    1. Conflicts of interests in a political democracy
    2. The meaning of “public policy formation”
    3. Fundamental issues of public policy in this field

Required Reading

Sumner H. Slichter, Trade Unions in a Free Society

Twentieth Century Fund, Trends in Collective Bargaining. A Summary of Recent Experience, 1945, pp. 1-33; 188-211; 215-50. (Students who have had Economics 81a need only read pp. 215-50.)

Henry C. Simons, “Some Reflections on Syndicalism”, Journal of Political Economy, March 1944, pp. 1-25. (To be read by students who have not taken Economics 81a)

Frederick H. Harbison and Robert Dubin, Patterns of Union—Management Relations, pp. 3-178.

Richard A. Lester, “Reflections on the ‘Labor Monopoly’ Issue”, Journal of Political Economy, December 1947, pp. 513-36.

Recommended Reading

Élie Halévy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, translated by Mary Morris, 1928, pp. 89-150; 249-310.

Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of Business Enterprise, Chapter 8, “Business Principles in Law and Politics”.

Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 1942.

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. 2, pp. 158-61; 177-91; (Alfred A. Knopf, 1945 edition)

Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy.

  1. Governmental Attitude toward Labor and Employer Organizations
    1. The evolution of public policy.
    2. The present status of both types of organization
    3. The role of the Department of Labor

Required Reading

Charles O. Gregory, Labor and the Law, pp. 13-82.

Pendleton Herring, The Politics of Democracy, 1940, pp. 368-90.

D. O. Bowman, Public Control of Labor Relations, 1942, pp. 3-57.

John Lombardi, Labor’s Voice in the Cabinet, A History of the Department of Labor from its Origin to 1921, pp. 15-95.

Recommended Reading

Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, Chapter 1, “Property and Society”, pp. 13-48.

Edward S. Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme Court, pp. 52-101.

Leo Wolman, “The Turning Point in American Labor Policy,” Political Science Quarterly, June 1940, pp. 161-75.

H. Samuels, The Law of Trade Unions.

Calvert Magruder, “A Half Century of Legal Influence upon the Development of Collective Bargaining”, Harvard Law Review, May 1937, pp. 1071-1117.

James M. Landis and Marcus Manoff, Cases on Labor Law, (1942 edition) Chapter 1, “Historical Introduction”, pp. 1-40.

Charles O. Gregory and Malcolm Sharp, Social Change and Labor Law.

U. S. Department of Labor, Division of Labor Standards, Federal Labor Laws and Agencies, Bulletin 79.

Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew, pp. 182- 336.

 

II. ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY

  1. The Extent of “Public” Encouragement to Organization
    1. The Wagner Act and the NLRB
    2. The Labor Management Relations Act, 1947
    3. Selected problems of policy determination

Required Reading

The Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 and The Conference Report

Herbert Unterberger and Max Malin, The Taft-Hartley Act in Operation

E. E. Witte, “Labor-Management Relations under the Taft-Hartley Act”, Harvard Business Review, Autumn 1947, pp. 554-75.

Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., “The Open Window and the Open Door”, California Law Review, Vol. 351, pp. 336-51.

C. O. Gregory, Labor and the Law, pp. 223-52; 289-33.

Carl Raushenbush and Emanuel Stein, Labor Cases and Materials, 1941, pp. 286-370.

D. O. Dowman, Public Control of Labor Relations, pp. 133-186.

Recommended Reading

La Follette Committee Reports

Lewis L. Lorwin and Arthur Warbnig, Labor Relations Boards, 1935.

E. Merrick Dodd, “The Supreme Court and Organized Labor, 1941-45”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 58, pp. 1018-71.

Joseph Rosenfarb, The National Labor Policy and How It Works.

National Labor Relations Board, Government’s Protection of Labor’s Right to Organize, Bulletin No. 1.

E. B. McNatt, “The Appropriate Bargaining Unit Problem”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1941.

Robert R. R. Brooks, Unions of their Own Choosing, 1939.

William E. Mosher and J. Donald Kingsley, Public Personnel Administration, 1941, pp. 558-85.

David Ziskind, One Thousand Strikes of Government Employees

Gordon R. Clapp, Employee Relations in the Public Service, A Report Submitted to the Civil Service Assembly, 1942.

National Labor Relations Board, Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947.

Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. The New Labor Law

Herbert O. Eby, The Labor Relations Act in the Courts.

Paul Herzog, “Labor Relations Acts of the States”, Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Sciences, November 1942.

Report and Findings of a Panel of the National War Labor Board in Certain Disputes Involving Supervisors.

Harold W. Metz and M. Jacobstein, National Labor Policy, 1947.

National Labor Relations Board, Annual Reports

  1. The Regulation of Labor Organizations

Required Reading

Florence Peterson, American Labor Unions, 1945, pp. 84-126.

Recommended Reading

Joel Seidman, Union Rights and Union Duties, 1943.

Neil Chamberlin, “Judicial Process in Labor Unions”, Brooklyn Law Review, 1940

Henry V. Rothschild, “Government Regulation of Trade Unions in Great Britain”, Columbia Law Review, 1939.

American Civil Liberties Union, Democracy in Trade Unions

Report on Certain Aspects of Labor Union Responsibility and Control

O. de. R. Foenander, Industrial Regulations in Australia, pp. 169-216.

Clyde W. Sumners, “The Admission Policies of Labor Unions”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Nov. 1946.

Ludwig Teller, A Labor Policy for America, A National Labor Code

  1. The Machinery for the Settlement of Disputes
    1. Types and characteristics of disputes related to methods of settlement
    2. Mediation, conciliation, and arbitration
    3. The railroad machinery
    4. Wartime machinery for settlement of disputes
    5. The fact-finding procedure
    6. Recent legislative proposals

Required Reading

C. O. Gregory, Labor and the Law, 378-412; 413-46.

U. S. Department of Labor, Division of Labor Standards, Arbitration of Grievances, Bulletin 82 (scan only)

Report of the Commission on Industrial Relations in Great Britain, 1938, pp. 1-25.

Twentieth Century Fund, How Collective Bargaining Works, pp. 318-80.

Paul Fisher, “The National War Labor Board and Postwar Industrial Relation”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1945, pp. 483-523.

The President’s National Labor-Management Conference, Summary and Committee Reports, (Division of Labor Standards Bulletin 77) pp. 1-71.

Report of the Governor’s Labor Management Committee, Massachusetts, 1947

Recommended Reading

T. R. Fisher, Industrial Disputes and Federal Legislation, pp. 141-53; 154-86.

Kurt Braun, The Settlement of Industrial Disputes, 1944.

Howard S. Kaltenborn, Governmental Adjustment of Labor Disputes, 1943.

Frances Kellor, Arbitration in Action, 1941.

J. J. Robbins, The Government of Labor Relations in Sweden, 1942.

J. Henry Richardson, Industrial Relations in Great Britain, 1938.

Herbert R. Northrup, Labor Adjustment Machinery.

Ducksoo Chang, British Methods of Industrial Peace.

Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 287, The War Labor Board Report of the National Defense Mediation Board.

The Reports and Proceedings of the Labor Management Conference

The Fact-Finding Reports: General Motors, Oil Companies, and the Meat Packing Companies

John T. Dunlop, “Fact-Finding in Labor Disputes”, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, May 1946, pp. 64-74.

B. M. Stuart and Walter J. Couper, Fact-Finding in Industrial Disputes.

Ludwig Teller, A Labor Policy for America, A National Labor Code.

Clarence M. Updegraff and Whitley P. McCoy, Arbitration in Labor Disputes.

Herbert R. Northrup, “The Railway Labor Act and Railway Labor Disputes in Wartime”, American Economic Review, June 1946, pp. 324-43.

C E. D. Research and Policy Committee, Collective Bargaining: How to Make it More Effective, Feb. 1947.

  1. The Treatment of the Parties to a Dispute
    1. The Injunction
    2. Boycott and Picketing
    3. The Use of Seizure

Required Reading

C. O. Gregory, Labor and the Law, pp. 83-199; 334-77.

Harry A. Millis and R. E. Montgomery, Organized Labor, pp. 613-29; 629-51.

Recommended Reading

Carl Raushenbush and Emanuel Stein, Labor Cases and Materials, 1941, pp. 5-213.

Samuel Yellen, American Labor Struggles

Felix Frankfurter and N. Greene, The Labor Injunction

  1. The Status of Labor Organizations under the Anti-trust Laws

Required Reading

C. O. Gregory, Labor and the Law, pp. 200-22; 253-88.

C. D. Edwards, “Public Policy toward Restraints of Trade by Labor Unions: An Economic Appraisal”, American Economic Review, Supplement, March 1942, pp. 432-48.

E. E. Witte, “A Critique of Mr. Arnolds Proposals”, American Economic Review, Supplement, March 1942, pp. 449-59.

Recommended Reading

Thurman Arnold, The Bottlenecks of Business, Chapter XIX

A. T. Mason, Organized Labor and the Law

Carl Rauschenbush and Emanuel Stein, Labor Cases and Materials, 1941, p. 46-62.

  1. Minimum Wage and Hour Regulation
    1. Conditions Leading to Legislation
    2. Economic Principles and Consequences
    3. Administrative Agencies and Procedures
    4. Problems of Administration and Policy-Making

Required Reading

The Fair Labor Standards Act

Harry Millis and R.E. Montgomery, Labor’s Progress and Some Basic Labor Problems, pp. 324-56.

Recommended Reading

Richard B. Morris, Government and Labor in Early America

Dorothy Sells, British Wage Boards

Paul H. Douglas and J. Hochman, “Fair Labor Standards Act,” Political Science Quarterly, LIII (491-515); LIV (29-55)

Marion Cahill, Shorter Hours, A History of the Movement since the Civil War

E. Merrick Dodd, “The Supreme Court and Fair Labor Standards, 1941-45,” Harvard Law Review, February 1946, pp. 321-73.

E. M. Burns, Wages and the State

E. J. Riches, “Conflicts of Principles in Wage Regulation in New Zealand”, Economica, August 1938.

Orme W. Phelps, The Legislative Background of the Fair Labor Standards Act

Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies.

Wage and Hour Division, Annual Reports.

Bureau of National Affairs, Wage and Hour Manual, Cumulative Edition 1944-45

US. Department of Labor, Maximum Hour Regulation in France, 1936-40

U. S. Department of Labor, Wartime Regulation of Hours of Labor and Labor Supply in Great Britain.

Bureau of National Affairs, Your Working Time Problem under the Wage and Hour Law.

  1. Labor Supply and Unemployment
    1. Characteristics of the Labor Market
    2. Definitions and Measurement of Employment, Labor Force and Unemployment
    3. Employment Exchanges
    4. Unemployment Compensation

Required Reading

E. Wight Bakke, The Unemployed Worker, A Study of the Task of Making a Living Without a Job, pp. 1-34.

S. H. Slichter, “The Impact of the Social Security Program upon Mobility and Enterprise,” American Economic Review, March 1940.

Lloyd G. Reynolds, “The Supply of Labor to the Firm”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1946, pp. 390-411.

Louis J. Ducoff and M. S. Hagood, Labor Force Definitions and Measurements, Current Issues, Social Security Bulletin, pp. 1-35.

Recommended Reading

Dewey Anderson and Percey E. Davidson, Recent Occupational Trends in American Labor

G. E. Bigge, “Strength and Weakness of our Unemployment Compensation Program,” Social Security Bulletin, February 1944, pp. 5-11.

W. S. Woytinsky, Three Aspects of Labor Dynamics

Joan Robinson, “Mobility of Labor” in Essays in the Theory of Employment

A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, pp. 488-511, 656-70.

Elizabeth Gilboy, Applicants for War Relief, pp. 31-46; 69-83; 98-122

W. S. Woytinsky, “Controversial Aspects of Unemployment Estimates in the United States,” Review of Economic Statistics, May 1941, pp. 68-77.

Henry H. Collins, Jr., America’s Own Refugees, pp. 89-180; 249-67

E. Wight Bakke, Citizens without Work, A Study of the Effects of Unemployment upon the Workers’ Social Relations and Practices, pp. 71-106, 283-306.

W. H. Beveridge, “An Analysis of Unemployment”, Economica, November 1936, pp. 357-86.

Harry Malisoff, “The Emergence of Unemployment Compensation,” Political Science Quarterly, 1939 (3 parts)

Harrison Clark, Swedish Unemployment Policy—1914-1940

Atkinson, R. C., Adencrantz, L. C., and Deming, B., Public Employment Service in the United States, Chs. 1 and 3.

Breckinridge, Sophonisba, Public Welfare Administration in the United States, Selected Documents (2nd edition)

Abbott, Edith, Public Assistance, Vol. 1, American Principles and Policies

Pilgrim Trust, Men without Work, Report

Huntington, Emily, Doors to Jobs

Matscheck, W., and Atkinson, R. C., Problems and Procedures of Unemployment Compensation in the States

White, R. C., Administering Unemployment Compensation

Kulp, A. C., Social Insurance Coordination, An Analysis of British and German Organization

F. N. Ball, Statute Law Relating to Employment, 1946 (English experience)

8,9 Security Against Accident, Ill Health, and Old Age

Required Reading

Harry Millis and Royal E. Montgomery, Labor’s Risks and Social Insurance, pp. 187-270; 353-420.

E. E. Witte, “Postwar Social Security” in Postwar Economic Problems, edited by S. E. Harris, pp. 263-77.

Bernhard J. Stern, Medicine in Industry, pp. 17-48 and 133-56.

“Union Health and Welfare Plans”, Monthly Labor Review, February 1947, pp. 191-214

Recommended Reading

J. Douglas Brown, “Economic Problems in the Provision of Security against the Life Hazards of Workers, American Economic Review, Supplement, March 1940

Twentieth Century Fund, More Security for Old Age, pp. 1-18; 69-86.

Seymour E. Harris, Economics of Social Security, pp. 161-279

Barbara Armstrong, The Health Insurance Doctor, pp 1-98

Heinrich, H. W., Industrial Accident Prevention

National Research Council, Committee on Work in Industry, Fatigue of Workers

Federal Security Agency, Social Security Board, Annual Reports

Abraham Epstein, Insecurity—A Challenge to America

Stewart, Maxwell S., Social Security

Davis, Michael M., America Organizes Medicine

William Beveridge, Full Employment in a Free Society

E. Wight Bakke, “America and the Beveridge Plan,” Yale Review, June 1944, pp. 642-57.

Social Security Bulletin, “A Basic Minimum Program of Social Security,” January 1944, pp. 3-12.

Franz Goldmann, Public Medical Care, Principles and Problems

Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 79th Congress 1st Session, Issues in Social Security.

Verne Zimmer, “New Developments in Workmen’s Compensation”, Social Security Bulletin October 1944.

 

 

THE PROCESS OF “PUBLIC POLICY” FORMULATION

(The reading in this Section is to be distributed throughout the term rather than concentrated at the end of the course. The study of the Process of “Public Policy” Formulation must be interwoven with the actual problems of public policy.)

Required Reading

Neil W. Chamberlain, The Union Challenge to Management Control, (Pages to be assigned)

R. A. Gordon, Business Leadership in the Large Corporation, pp. 67-188.

Peter F. Drucker, Concept of the Corporation, pp. 1-114 (Optional)

Paul H. Appleby, Big Democracy, 1-144.

Walter Gellhorn, Federal Administrative Proceedings, pp. 1-40

Fritz Marx, Editor, Elements of Public Administration, pp. 314-338, 365-80

John M. Gaus, Reflections on Public Administration, (Optional)

Dorwin Cartwright, “Public Opinion Polls and Democratic Leadership”, Journal of Social Issues, May, 1946, pp. 3-12.

 

Source:  Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1893-2003 (HUC 8522.2.1), Box 4, Folder “1947-48 (2 of 2)”.

Image Source: John Dunlop in Harvard Class Album 1950.