Category: Berkeley

Berkeley. Money Course, Topics and References. W.C. Mitchell, 1906

Post author By Irwin Collier
Post date 2019-09-07

When the following syllabus for Economics 8B was published at the University of California in 1906, Wesley Clair Mitchell was a thirty-two year old assistant professor of economics. He was listed in the Report of the President of the university as the instructor of the course though he is not identified as such in the syllabus itself. The 22-page syllabus that I found at archive.com is unfortunately missing its second page but is still worth posting in its present incomplete state.

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND COMMERCE

TOPICS AND REFERENCES FOR
ECONOMICS 8B
MONEY

PLAN OF THE COURSE.

Part I — Monetary Systems.
Part II — Development of Monetary Systems.
Part III — Money and Prices.

PART I— MONETARY SYSTEMS.

1—The United States.

(a) Money supplied by the government,

1a— Coin: —

Gold, silver dollars, subsidiary silver, minor coins.

The mint. Standard money; legal tender.

For statistics, see current reports of the Director of the Mint. (Bound in Finance Reports.)

For laws, see C. F. Dunbar, Laws of the U. S. relating to Currency, Finance and Banking from 1789 to 1891. Boston, 1891.

J. L. Laughlin, Report of the Monetary Commission of the Indianapolis Convention, Chicago, 1898, pp. 491-543.

Coinage, Currency and Banking Laws of the U. S., 1791-1900. Sound Currency, June, 1901. Vol. 8, No. 2.

2a— Paper money: —

Gold Certificates, silver certificates.

United States notes, currency certificates, treasury notes of 1890.

The Bureau of Engraving and Printing.

For statistics, see current Reports of the Treasurer of the U. S. (Bound in Finance Reports.)

For laws, see references above.

[Note: page 2 is missing in this copy. Appears to be missing, say, 1(b) “Money supplied by Banks”? and 2(a), 2(b)?… for “2—Foreign Countries”]

[2—Foreign Countries, from page 3]

Money and Prices in Foreign Countries. (Special Consular Reports; Vol. 13, Parts 1 and 2.) Washington, 1896, 1897.

M. L. Muhleman, Monetary Systems of the World. New York, The Spectator Company. (Numerous editions.)

J. H. Norman, Complete Guide to the World’s Twenty-nine Metal Monetary Systems. New York, 1892.

R. Chalmers, History of Currency in the British Colonien. London, 1893.

R. P. Rothwell, ”The World’s Currencies.” 2d edition.

Sound Currency, 1896. A compendium, pp. 81-98.

3 — Silver-standard monetary systems.

See references under 2.

4 — Bimetallic systems.

Historical sketches in above references, and Part II, section 6, i, below.

5 — Paper-standard systems.

See references under 2 above, and Part II, section 6, k, below.

6 — Gold-exchange standards.

Stability of International Exchange. Report on the Introduction of the Gold-exchange Standard into China and other silver-using countries. (H.R. Doc, No. 144. 58th Congress, 2d Session.) Washington, 1903.

Report on the Introduction of the Gold-exchange Standard into China, the Philippine Islands, Panama, and other Silver-using countries. Washington, 1904.

A.P. Andrew, ”The End of the Mexican Dollar.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, May, 1904.

E.W. Kemmerer, “A Gold Standard for the Straits Settlements.” Political Science Quarterly, December, 1904.

“The Establishment of the Gold-exchange Standard in the Philippines.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, 1905.

A. P. Andrew, “Indian Currency Problems of the Last Decade.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, 1901.

M. Bothe, Die indische Wahrungsreform seit 1893. (Münchener volkswirtschaftliche Studien.) Stuttgart, 1904.

PART II — DEVELOPMENT OF MONETARY SYSTEMS.

1—Bibliographies.

W.S. Jevons, Investigations in Currency and Finance. London, 1884. Pp. 364-414 (Chronologically arranged. 1568-1882).

A. Soetbeer, Litteraturnachweis über Geld-und-Münzwesen. Berlin, 1892. (Chronologically arranged. 1871-1891.)

K. Helfferich, Das Geld. Leipzig, 1903. Pp. 532-590 (Continuation of Soetbeer’s bibliography, 1892-1902).

2—Origin of Money.

C. Bücher, Industrial Evolution. Tr. by S.M. Wickett, New York, 1901. Pp. 59-71.

W.W. Carlile, The Evolution of Modem Money. London and New York, 1901. Part II, chapters I-III.

Economic Methods and Economic Fallacies, London, 1904. Ch. X.

W. Ridgeway, Origin of Metallic Currency and Weight Standards. Cambridge, 1902. Chapter II.

K. Helfferich, op. cit. Book I, ch. I.

C. Menger, ”The Origin of Money.” Economic Journal, June, 1892.

E. Babelon, Les Origines de la Monnaie. Paris, 1897.

3—Money in Antiquity.

This subject is discussed in courses History 53 and 54.

4—From the end of the Roman Empire to the Discovery of America. The barter economy. Reappearance of Money. Local coinages. Growth of the royal prerogative. Monetary policies.

W.J. Ashley, Introduction to English Economic History and Theory. Part I, 3d ed. 1894. Ch. I, sec. 6; ch. Ill, sec. 18.

W. Cunningham, Growth of English Industry and Commerce during the Early and Middle Ages. 3d ed., Cambridge, 1896. Passim.

A. Del Mar, History of Monetary Systems. London, 1895. Ch. X-XV.

G. Schmoller, Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre. 2d part. Leipzig, 1904. Sec. 164.

W.C. Hazlitt, The Coinage of the European Continent. London and New York, 1893.

A. Luschin von Ebengreuth, Allgemeine Münzkunde und Geldgeschichte des Mittelalters und der neueren Zeit. Munich and Berlin, 1904.

H. Engel and B. Lerrure, Traité de numismatique du moyenâge. Paris, 1905.

5—From the Discovery of America to the Close of the Eighteenth Century.

(a) General references.

Hazlitt, Luschin von Ebengreuth, and Engel and Lerrure, as above.

W.A. Shaw, History of the Currency, 1252-1894. London, 1895.

G. Schmoller, op. cit. See. 165.

(b) Increase in the supply of the precious metals and the consequences.

A. Soetbeer, Materialien zur Erläuterung und Beurtheilung der wirthschaftlichen Edelmetallverhältnisse und der Währungsfrage. Berlin, 1885. 2d ed. 1886. (Translation by F. W. Taussig in Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 34; 1st Session 50th Congress.)

R.H. Patterson, The New Golden Age and the Influences of the Precious Metals upon the World. 2 vols. Edinburgh and London, 1882. Chaps. VIII-XI.

W. Sombart, Der moderne Kapitalismus. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1902. Vol. I, ch. xiii, pp. 358-372, and following chs., passim.

G. Wiebe, Zur Geschichte der Preisrevolution im 16ten und 17ten Jahrhundert. (Staats- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Beiträge. Herausgegeben von A. von Miaskowski. Band ii. Heft 2.) Leipzig, 1895.

See Exercises and References for Economics 8, pp. 11, 12.

(d) Monetary difficulties and reforms in England.

W. Cunningham, Growth of English Industry and Commerce in Modern Times. 2 parts. Cambridge, 1903. Passim.

Earl of Liverpool, Treatise on the Coins of the Realm. London, 1800. (Reprinted 1880.) Passim.

S.D. Horton, The Silver Pound, London, 1887. Chaps, v-viii.

(e) England’s transition to the gold standard.

See references under d, and,

W.W. Carlile, Evolution of Modern Money, Part I.

P. Kalkmann, England’s Uebergang zur Goldwahrung im 18ten Jahrhundert (Abhandlungen des staatswirtschaft- lichen Seminars zu Strassburg). Strassburg, 1895.

(f) Monetary experiences of the English colonies in North America.

This subject is discussed in History 77. For a brief sketch see,

C.J. Bullock, Essays on the Monetary History of the U. S. N. Y., 1900. Part I, chs. i-v.

(g) Establishment of a Monetary System under the constitution.

A. Hamilton, Report on the Establishment of a Mint. 1790. ”Works,” ed. J. C. Hamilton, Vol. 3, p. 149. N. Y., 1850.

J. L. Laughlin, History of Bimetallism in the U. S. 4th ed. N.Y., 1901. Ch. ii.

A. B. Hepburn, History of Coinage and Currency in the U.S. N. Y., 1903. Chs. i, ii.

D.K. Watson, History of American Coinage, 2d ed. N. Y., 1899. Chs. iii, iv.

6—Since 1800.

(a) Production of gold and silver, 1800-1848.

Soetbeer, Materialien, and Reports of the Director of the Mint, for statistical estimates.

R. H. Patterson, op. cit. Chs. xii-xv.

J. L. Laughlin, Bimetallism, ch. iii.

W.S. Jevons, ”The Variation of Prices and the Value of the Currency since 1782.” Investigations in Currency and Finance, iii.

(b) French monetary legislation of 1803.

H.P. Willis, History of the Latin Monetary Union. Chi- cago, 1901. Ch. i.

International Monetary Conference held in Paris, August, 1878. (Senate Executive Doc. No. 58. 45th Congress, 3d Sess.) Pp. 153-157. (Monetary Laws.)

F.A. Walker, International Bimetallism. N. T., 1897. Ch. iv.

Laughlin, Bimetallism. Ch. iv.

Walker, op. cit., ch. iv.

Hepburn, op. cit., ch. iii.

Watson, op. cit., chs. v and vi.

(d) The gold discoveries in California and Australia.

R.H. Patterson, op. cit., chs. i-vi.

H.H. Bancroft, History of California, Vol. vi. San Francisco, 1888. (”Works,” Vol. xxiii.)

T.H. Hittell, History of California, Vol. ii. San Francisco, 1885. Chs. vii, ff.

T.O. Larkin and R. B. Mason, Correspondence with the Secretary of State with reference to the gold discoveries in California. House Exec. Doc. No. 1, 2d Session, 30th Congress. Pp. 51-69.

W. Westgarth, Victoria and the Australian Gold mines in 1857. London, 1857.

Soetbeer, Materialien; Beports of the Director of the Mint, for statistical estimates.

(e) Diffusion of the new gold and the economic consequences.

J.E. Cairnes, Essays in Political Economy. London, 1873.

Introductory and Essays i-iv.

W.S. Jevons, Investigations, ii-iv.

R.H. Patterson, op. cit., chs. xvii-xxi.

(f) Effect of the new gold on bimetallic monetary systems.

J. L. Laughlin, Bimetallism, chs. v-viii.

H. P. Willis, Latin Union, chs. iv-xi.

F. A. Walker, International Bimetallism, chs. iv and v.

Also see references under i below.

(g) Limitations on free coinage of silver.

Laughlin, Bimetallism, chs. vii-xi.

Willis, Latin Union, chs. xii-xiv.

Walker, International Bimetallism, ch. vi.

Watson, op. cit., chs. viii and ix.

Hepburn, op. cit., ch. xii.

Also see references under i below.

(h) Attempts to check the fall of silver.

Laughlin, Bimetallism, chs. xiv-xvii.

Willis, Latin Union, chs. xv-xx.

H.B. Russell, International Monetary Conferences. N. Y., 1898.

A.D. Noyes, Thirty Years of American Finance. 2d impression. N. Y., 1900. Chs. iv-viii.

Hepburn, op. cit., chs. xii, xiii, xvii.

Watson, op. cit., chs. xi-xiii.

F.W. Taussig, The Silver Situation in the U. S. 2d ed. revised. N. Y., 1896.

Also see references under i below.

(i) The bimetallic controversy.

1i—Brief summaries of the discussion.

W.S. Jevons, Money and the Mechanism of Exchange. London, 1875. Ch. xii.

F. A. Walker, Money. N. Y., 1877. Ch. xiii.

Laughlin, Bimetallism, ch. i.

W. A. Scott, Money and Banking. 2d ed. N. Y., 1903. Chs. xiv, xv.

D. Kinley, Money. N. Y., 1904. Ch. xiv.

2i—Best systematic discussion.

L. Darwin, Bimetallism. A Summary and Examination of the Arguments for and against a Bimetallic System of Currency. London, 1897.

3i—Books presenting different points of view. For further references see bibliographies cited on p. 4 above.

E.B. Andrews, An Honest Dollar. (Pub. Am. Econ. Assc’n., Vol. iv.) 1889. Republished Hartford, 1894.

O. Arendt, Die vertragsmässige Doppelwährung. 2 vols. Berlin, 1880.

Die Ursache der Silberentwerthung. Berlin, 1899.

F. W. Bain, The Corner in Gold: Its History and Theory. London, 1893.

L. Bamberger, Reichsgold. Studien über Wahrung und Wechsel. Leipzig, 1876.

Ausgewahlte Reden und Aufsätze über Geld und Bankwesen. (Schriften des Vereins zum Schutz der deutschen Goldwährung, Vol. i.) Berlin, 1900.

D. Barbour, The Theory of Bimetallism. London, 1885.

W. Barker, Bimetallism; or, the Evils of Gold Monometallism. Philadelphia, 1896.

A. I. Fonda, Honest Money. N. Y., 1895.

H.H. Gibbs and H. B. Grenfell, The Bimetallic Controversy. London, 1886.

Sir Robert Giffin, The Case against Bimetallism. 5th ed. London, 1898.

E. Helm, The Joint Standard. London, 1894.

T. Hertzka, Das internationale Währungsproblem und dessen Lösung. Leipzig, 1892.

O. Heyn, Kritik des Bimetallismus. Berlin, 1897.

S.D. Horton, Silver in Europe. 2d ed. N. Y., 1892.

E. de Laveleye, La Monnaie et le bimetallisme international. Paris, 1891.

H. D. MacLeod, Bimetallism. London, 1894.

E. Nasse, “Das Geld und Münzwesen.” (Schönberg’s Handbuch der politischen Oekonomie. 3d ed. Tubingen, 1890. Vol. i.)

J.S. Nicholson, Treatise on Money and Essays on Monetary Problems. 4th ed. London, 1897.

Reports of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the Recent Changes in the Relative Values of the Precious Metals. London, 1st Report, 1887 ; 2d Report, Final Report, Appendix, 1888.

A.E. Schaeffle, Für internationale Doppelwährung. Tübingen, 1881.

A.P. Stokes, Joint Metallism. N. Y., 1894.

E. Suess, Die Zukunft des Silbers, Vienna, 1892.

W.L. Trenholm, The People’s Money. N. Y., 1893.

Verhandlungen der Kommission behufs Erörterung von Massregeln zur Hebung und Befestigung des Silberwerthes. 2 vols. Berlin, 1894.

F.A. Walker, International Bimetallism. N. Y., 1897.

M.L. Wolowski, L’or et l’argent. Paris, 1870.

(j) General adoption of the Gold Standard.

K. Helfferich, Das Geld. Leipzig, 1903. Book i, ch. vi. (General.)

Die Reform des deutschen Geldwesens nach der Gründung des Reichs. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1898.

Hepburn, op. cit., ch. xviii.

F.W. Taussig, ”The Currency Act of 1900.” Quart. Jour. of Econ. May, 1900.

J.L. Laughlin, ”Recent Monetary Legislation.” Jour. of Pol. Econ., June, 1900.

Matsukata Masayoshi, Report on the Adoption of the Gold Standard in Japan. Tokio, 1899.

Also references under Part I, secs. 2 and 6, above.

(k) Paper money episodes of the Nineteenth Century.

W. Lexis, “Das Papiergeld im 19ten Jahrhundert.” Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften. Vol. vi; Jena, 1901. Pp. 28-38.

Cunningham, op, cit. Vol. iii. (See “Bank restriction” in index.)

Report, together with minutes of evidence and accounts, from the Select Committee on the High Price of Gold Bullion (ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, June 8, 1810). Reprinted in W. Sumner’s History of American Currency. N. Y., 1878.

D. Ricardo, Works, ed. McCulloch. Pp. 261-301.

T. Tooke, Thoughts and Details on the High and Low Prices of the Thirty Years from 1793 to 1822. 2d ed. London, 1824.

W.S. Jevons, Investigations, iii.

W.C. Mitchell, A History of the Greenbacks, 1862-1865. Chicago, 1903.

H. White, Money and Banking. N. Y., 1895. Part II, Bk. I, chs. iv, vi, vii.

Hepburn, op. cit., chs. viii-xi.

Noyes, op. cit., chs. i-iii.

W.A. Berkey, The Money Question. 4th ed. Grand Rapids, 1878.

J.C. Schwab, The Confederate States of America, 1861-1865. New York, 1901.

A. Courtois, Historic des banques en France. 2d ed. Paris, 1881. Pp. 256-269.

Bulletin de statistique et de legislation comparée, Vol. vii, pp. 247-254 and 310-337.

A. Wagner, Die russische Papierwährung. Riga, 1868.

H.P. Willis, “Monetary Reform in Russia.” Jour. of Pol. Econ., June, 1897.

R. Ledos de Beaufort, L’achevement et l’application de la reforme monetaire en Russie. Paris, 1899.

C. Ferraris, Moneta e corso forzoso. Milan, 1879.

M. Grundwald, “Geschichte des italienischen Zwangkurses und der Wiederherstellung der Valuta.” Finanz Archiv, Vol. xi, No. 1, 1894.

K. Kramár, Das Papiergeld in Oesterreich seit 1848. Leipzig, 1886.

G. Crivellari, “I precedenti della riforma monetaria in Austria-Ungheria” and ”La riforma monetaria in Austria-Ungheria”; Giornale degli Economisti, September, 1900, and February, 1901.

A. de Foville, “Spanish Currency.” Jour. of Pol. Econ., December, 1898.

J.P. Wileman, Brazilian Exchange: The study of an Inconvertible Currency. London, 1897.

O. Schmitz. Die Finanzen Argentiniens. Leipzig, 1895.

A. Raffalovich, ”La cours forcé et la reprise des paiements au Chili.” Journal des Economistes, November, 1897.

PART III— MONEY AND PRICES.

1—The Rôle of Prices in Modern Economic Life.

(a) The price system.

(b) The price system and production.

(d) Influence of the price system on the kind of goods produced.

(e) The price system and the selection of captains of industry.

(f) The price of business enterprises.

(g) Money-making as an economic motive.

(h) Influence of the price system on wants.

(i) The price system and the pecuniary point of view.

(j) Technical exigencies of the price system.

(k) Development of the price system.

(l) Summary.

(m) Neglect of the influence of the price system in economic theory.

2—The Problem of Changes in the Price Level.

(a) Statement of the problem.

(b) Meaning of ”price level.”

Index numbers. Methods of averaging. Weights.

D. Kinley, Money. N. Y., 1904. Ch. xii.

J. L. Laughlin, Principles of Money. N. Y., 1903. Ch. vi.

R. Mayo-Smith, Statistics and Economics. N. Y., 1899. Ch. vi.

A.L. Bowley, Elements of Statistics. 2d ed. London, Ch. ix.

L. L. Price, Money and its Relations to Prices. London, Pp. 9-36.

J. S. Nicholson, Treatise on Money and Essays on Monetary Problems. 4th ed. London, 1897. Essay vii.

T. S. Adams, ” Index Numbers and the Standard of Value.” Jour. of Pol. Econ., December, 1901, and March, 1902.

C.M. Walsh, The Measurement of General Exchange-value. N. Y., 1901.

For further references see bibliographies in Walsh, pp. 553-574, and Laughlin, pp. 221-224.

(d) Specimen index numbers.

1d—Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, March, 1902.

Course of prices at wholesale, 1890 to date. Continued in March issues of following years.

2d—Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, July, 1904, pp. 703-712.

Prices of food at retail, 1890 to date. Continued in July issue of 1905.

Fuller publication in 18th Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor.

3d—Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, July, 1904, pp. 713-932.

Relative rates of wages, 1890 to date. Continued in July issue, 1905.

Fuller publication in 19th Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor.

4d—R. P. Falkner, “Wholesale Prices: 1890 to 1899.” Bulletin of the Department of Labor, March, 1900.

5d—Dun’s index number of the cost of living, 1860 to date. Dun’s Review, passim; also Dun’s Review: International Edition, passim. Partial republication in recent issues of the Statistical Abstract of the U. S. and in Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finance.

6d— John R. Common’s index number, 1878 to 1901. Quarterly Bulletin of the Bureau of Economic Research, 1900 and 1901. Partial republication in Final Report of the Industrial Commission, pp. 29-30 and 1101-1113. For methods see Bulletin of the Department of Labor, March, 1902, pp. 210, 211.

7d—R. P. Falkner’s index number of wholesale prices, 1860 to 1891. “Aldrich Report” (Senate Report No. 1394, 52d Congress, 2d Session), Part I, pp. 27-110.

8d—Falkner’s index number of wages, 1860-1891. Ibid., pp. 110-180.

9d—A. Sauerbeck’s index number for England, 1846 to date.

Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 1886 and following years. See, also, “Aldrich Report,” Part I, pp. 229-256; and Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finance, June, 1904.

10d—Economist index number for England.

London Economist, passim. See, also, ”Aldrich Report,” Part I, pp. 220-228.

11d—Soetbeer’s Hamburg prices, 1851-1884, Materialien, etc., pp. 98-104.

Soetbeer’s prices with Heinze’s continuation, 1847-1891. ”Aldrich Report,” Part I, pp. 257-296.

12d—O. Schmitz, Die Bewegung der Warenpreise in Deutschland von 1851 bis 1902. Berlin, 1903.

(e) Characteristics of price variations shown by these tables.

Divergencies between price variations of individual goods; of raw materials and manufactured goods; of the same goods at wholesale and retail; of labor and commodities.

Similarity in movements of the price level in different countries.

Long period and short period fluctuations.

Effect of weighing on results.

(f) Reliability of tables of index numbers as measures of change in the price level.

N. G. Pierson, “Index Numbers and the Appreciation of Gold.” Economic Journal, September, 1895. “Further Considerations on Index Numbers.” Ibid., March, 1896.

F. Y. Edgeworth, “A Defense of Index Numbers.” Ibid., March, 1896.

3—Methods of Investigating Causes of Changes in the Price Level.

(a) Study of conditions of supply and demand of single articles.

Tooke and Newmarch, History of Prices, 6 vols. London, 1838-1857. Passim.

(b) Study of tables of index numbers.

J. S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy. Book iii, chs. viii and ix.

J. S. Nicholson, Treatise on Money. 4th ed. London, 1897. Part I, ch. v; part II, ch. v.

F. A. Walker, Money. N. Y., 1877. Ch. iii.

S. M. Hardy, “Quantity of Money and Prices, 1861-92.” Jour. of Pol Econ., March, 1895.

H. P. Willis, ”History and Present Application of the Quantity Theory.” Ibid., September, 1896.

W. A. Scott, ”The Quantity Theory.” Annals of the American Academy, March, 1897.

R. Mayo-Smith, “Money and Prices.” Pol, Sci, Quart., June, 1900.

J. L. Laughlin, Principles of Money. N. Y., 1903. Ch. viii.

W. A. Scott, Money and Banking. N. Y., 1903. Ch iv.

F. A. Walker, “The Value of Money.” Quart. Jour. of Econ., October, 1893.

“The Quantity-theory of Money.” Ibid., July, 1895.

W.W. Carlisle, ”The Quantitative Theory of Money.” Economic Review, January, 1898.

J. F. Johnson, ”The New Theory of Prices.” Pol. Sci. Quart., October, 1903.

J. L. Laughlin, “The Quantity Theory and its Critics, — a Rejoinder.” Jour. Pol. Econ., September, 1903.

H. P. Willis, “The Controversy over Price Theories.” Sound Currency, March, 1904.

C. A. Conant, “What Determines the Value of Money?” Quart. Jour. of Econ., August, 1904.

W. C. Mitchell, “The Real Issues in the Quantity-theory Controversy.” Jour. of Pol. Econ., June, 1904.

(d) Analysis of the process of price making.

S. and B. Webb. Industrial Democracy. 2d ed. London, 1902. Part III, ch. ii.

4—The Process of Price Making in Modern Business.

(a) Consumers.

Their disadvantages in bargaining. Their freedom to buy, what, when and where they like. Variations in the volume of their purchases.

(b) Retail dealers.

Their business position. Efforts to attract custom. Policy in fixing prices. Cost of retailing.

Pressure upon them for low prices from retailers. Danger of direct dealings between manufacturers and retailers. Effect of variations in consumers’ demands. Credit relations.

(d) Manufacturers.

Technical problems. Business risks. Pressure for low prices and methods of meeting it. Effect of variations of demand in short and long periods.

(e) Dealers in raw materials.

Commission merchants. Firms buying and selling on their own account. Dealings upon the produce exchanges—speculation.

(f) Farmers.

Business and technical aspects of farming. Competition and the possibility of avoiding it. Variations in supply of agricultural products in short and long periods. Steadiness of demand. Farmers as consumers.

(g) Other producers of raw materials.

Important classes. Business organization of extractive industries. Peculiar conditions affecting supply. Variability of demand. Relation between prices of finished products and raw materials.

(h). Production goods other than raw materials.

Character. Sources of demand. Variability of demand. Organization of trade.

(i) Transportation companies.

Technical improvements. Business organization. Competition. Effect of reduction in rates on the price level. Effect of discrimination in railway freight rates. Variability of rates.

(j) Wage earners.

Pressure for low wages. Methods of withstanding. Why wage rates vary little as compared with prices of raw materials. Effect of efficiency of labor on price of products. Wage earners as consumers.

(k) Investors.

Variations in investor’s demand. Influence on business over short and long periods. Investors as consumers.

(l) Promoters.

Their work. Influence on the price of securities and on the price of commodities produced by their companies. Underwriting.

(m) Corporation securities.

“Outside” speculators. Management of corporations for stock-market profits. Financial influences. Connections between stock-market quotations and the general price level.

(n) Banks.

Why business men borrow of banks,—to pay debts, to extend operations, to start new enterprises.

Effect of bank loans for these purposes on the price level. Dependence on consumer’s and business demands.

The banker’s point of view, — security; adequacy of reserves; problems of business crises. Effect of banks on the circulating medium.

(o) Insurance.

Varieties. Influence on banking and investment market. Connection with the price level.

(p) Domestic and professional services.

Changes in rates of remuneration. Changes in incomes. Slight direct effect on the price level. Indirect effect as consumers.

(q) Government.

Stability in price of services rendered by government. Direct influence of taxation on the price level. Monetary policy and the price level. General indirect influence on the price level.

(r) Foreign influences on the price level.

Correspondence between changes in the prices of commodities at wholesale in different countries. Retail prices. Rates of wages; of interest.

Commercial relations. Financial relations. International movements of gold.

(s) Summary.

1s—The endless chain of price relations.

From consumers’ demand round the circle to consumers’ incomes.

2s—Why the price level changes.

Non-monetary causes of variations.

3s—Interrelations of price variations.

4s—Short-period cycles of business prosperity, crisis, and depression.

Their connection with the price system.

5s—The next problem.

Where monetary factors come into the process of price making in modern business.

5—Money and changes in the Price Level.

(a) Plan of the discussion.

(b) The Production of Gold.

Two types of gold mining,—placer and quartz mines.

Factors affecting supply. Relative production from placers and quartz mines at different periods. Statistics of gold production.

Soetbeer, Materialien. (See p. 5 above.)

E. Biedermann, Die Statistik der Edelmetalle. 2d ed. Berlin, 1904.

Annual Reports of the Director of the Mint upon the Production of the Precious Metals.

I. A. Hourwich, ”Production and Consumption of the Precious Metals.” Jour. of Pol. Econ., September, 1902. Pp. 577-682.

What placer miners and mining companies do with the metal. Initial influence of changes in production on prices. Gold in the hands of refiners.

(d) The stock of gold and the supply.

Distinction between stock and supply. Elements of the current supply. Their relative importance. (For statistics, see citations under b above.)

(e) The demand for gold.

Industrial and monetary demands. Peculiarity of the latter. Circumstances under which gold is purchased for monetary uses.

(f) How the supply is divided between the two demands.

Statistics of relative importance. Distribution of money in-comes between the purchase of gold goods, and other uses. Distribution of monetary demand between gold and other forms of currency.

Conclusion.

(g) Influence of changes in the volume of gold money on the price level.

How additions to the volume of gold money are made. From the mints to the banks. Diffusion of new supplies from the banks of first deposit. Possible increase in general circulation.

How this process affects the price level. Increase in miners’ demands. Increase of gold in ”the pockets of the people.” Increase of gold in bank reserves. Effect in short-period cycles of business prosperity. Cumulative effect in the long run.

(h) International movements of gold.

International business relations. How payments are made. Reciprocal relations of price changes, interest rates and gold movement. Peculiarities of gold movements between the Occident and the Orient.

(This subject is more fully treated in Economics 8c.)

(i) Summary of the inter-relations between gold and prices.

Short periods; influence of monetary factors in the price-making process; the extension of loan-credit; business crises; the importance of bank reserves; foreign influences.

Long periods; the price level and the supply of gold; gold discoveries and improvements in methods of mining; the industrial demand; the general adoption of the gold standard; paper money episodes; development of banking methods and the increased use of banking facilities; advance of industrial technique; widening territorial area of markets; changes in the business organization of industry; international business relations; the supply of gold and the price level.

Relations between long period and short period price fluctuations.

(j) Money and prices under the silver standard.

Production of silver. Market ratio between silver and gold.

For statistics see, —

References under (b) above.

I. A. Hourwich, “Production and Consumption of the Precious Metals ii. Silver.” Jour. of Pol. Econ., September, 1903.

Industrial and monetary demand for silver. The oriental demand.

Domestic prices and wages in silver-standard countries. International business relations.

(k) Money and prices under the bimetallic standard.

Effect of increased production of either metal on the monetary circulation and on the price level. Reaction on relative prices of the metals. Reason of the breakdown of bimetallic monetary systems. Speculations regarding the influence of international bimetallism.

(l) Money and prices in countries with undeveloped banking systems.

The business world at the time of the discovery of the Mexican and Peruvian mines. Diffusion of the new supplies over Europe. Effect on the price level.

The case of backward countries in the nineteenth century.

(m) Money and prices in countries with paper standards.

How the paper money gets into circulation. Why depreciation occurs. Withdrawal of specie from circulation and its effect on prices in specie-standard countries. Factors affecting the specie value of irredeemable paper money. Effect on the price level. Methods of resuming specie payments. Effect of resumption on the price level at home and abroad.

6—Effects of Changes in the Price Level on the Distribution, Production and Consumption of Wealth.

(a) Wages.

Immediate effect on purchasing power of money wages. Attempts to readjust rates of wages. Compensating effects on regularity of employment. The ease of professional men.

(b) Interest and relations between debtors and creditors.

Immediate effect. Difference between cases of loans on long and short time. Readjustments in rates of interest. The purchasing power of the principal.

Immediate effects. Long and short leases. Renting “on shares.” Attempts to readjust rates.

(d) Profits.

Gain or loss of residual claimants resulting from loss or gain of other classes. Effect of difference in complexity of business organization. Gain or loss resulting from inequality in the price fluctuations of different commodities.

(e) Production and consumption.

Effect of above noted changes in distribution on production and consumption. How far is the world’s economic progress dependent on variations in the production of gold?

7—Conclusion.

Purpose of preceding discussion is to account for changes in the price level and their economic consequences. Difficulties attending application of the analysis; the difficulty of obtaining adequate statistical material, and the difficulty of quantitative evaluation of the various price factors. A study of the changes in the price level of the United States since 1890 is made in Economics 25.

Source: University of California, Department of Economics and Commerce. Topics and references for economics 8B. Money. Berkeley: The University Press, 1906.

Image Source: 1922 Blue and Gold. Published by the Junior Class of The University of California.

Tags Mitchell

Berkeley Exam Questions

Berkeley. Graduate Macro, final exam. Akerlof, 1992 and 1993

Post author By Irwin Collier
Post date 2019-08-21

While the internet archive “The Wayback Machine” is truly a treasure chest filled with e-artifacts, without a pirate’s map to locate the buried treasure it is not for impatient, casual users. So from time to time, I dig around to share links to economics from the recent past. For example course materials from…

Principles of Macroeconomics at M.I.T. from 1995-2006

Principles of Microeconomics at M.I.T. from 1994-2005

The following post takes us to late twentieth century Berkeley where and back when George Akerlof regularly taught a core macro course to graduate students. I have transcribed .pdf copies of his final exams from 1992 and 1993 (links to the original files provided below), trying to provide the look-and-feel of the original exams as much as possible.

For those who might not have come across George Akerlof’s autobiographical essay at the Nobel Prize website, I have just provided the Wayback Machine link to an archived copy.

_______________________

Department of Economics
University of California
Spring Semester 1992
Professor George A. Akerlof

ECONOMICS 202A
FINAL EXAMINATION

PLEASE READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE BEGINNING.

The exam is in three parts. Each part has equal weight in grading.
You have three hours for the entire exam, so spend about 1 hour on each part.
Answer all the questions using a separate Bluebook for each part.
Be sure to write your name on the cover of all of your Bluebooks.

Grades will reflect the precision, clarity and completeness of your answers as well as their correctness.

PART A (Please use a Separate Blue Book)

State whether the following are True, False, or Uncertain. Explain why in each case.

Suppose U.S. GNP is difference stationary. Suppose the 1992-1993 growth rate is expected to be .5 percent but in fact turns out to be 1.2 percent. Future expected growth rates should be adjusted upward by .7 percent.
In long-run equilibrium in Summers’ model, with a constant rate of growth of the labor supply, q is either less than or equal to one.
A country with staggered contracts commits itself to have zero growth of its money supply. It will have lower inflation and higher welfare than if it failed to make such a commitment.
Real rigidities, such as efficiency wages, fail to explain deviations of unemployment from the natural rate.
If Blanchard and Summers’ model is modified so that unions foresee shocks in demand, employment and wages will be constant over time.
According to Bulow and Rogoff the marginal value of debt in amount D is (1-F(D)), where F(D) is the probability of default with D dollars’ worth of debt.

PART B (Please Use a Separate Blue Book)

State whether the following are True, False, or Uncertain. Explain why in each case.

Consider a Shapiro-Stiglitz model where the production function is $\varepsilon$ f(k), with the variation in $\varepsilon$ due to productivity shocks. Unemployment will be invariant with changes in $\varepsilon$ because workers never shirk in the Shapiro-Stiglitz model.
Professor Charles E. Bucket found a significant correlation between the predicted component of the money supply and changes in GNP. His results are inconsistent with Taylor’s model because they imply that people do not have rational expectations.
According to Murphy, Vishny and Shleifer, if the state sector has an elastic demand for lumber and the private sector has an inelastic demand for lumber, Perestroika will result in a welfare loss, even if the state sector initially is given priority for the output of the lumber industry.
Summers’ model contradicts the observed correlation between investment and the rate of interest since in his model investment only depends on the value of q.
Workers’ beliefs about what they should be paid will have no effect on unemployment since wages are set equal to marginal products. Unemployment develops because firms must pay wages so high that workers will not shirk.
The observed variance of stock prices relative to the observed variance of the present discounted value of actual dividends is biased downwards in finite samples. Thus Shiller’s evidence is not inconsistent with efficient markets.

PART C (Please Use a Separate Blue Book)

Consider the following system motivated by Taylor

y_t= m_t– p_t (aggregate demand)
y_t= a(p_t– w_t) (aggregate supply)
w_t= p_t-1 (wage determination)
m_t= m_t-1+ $\varepsilon$ _t (money supply rule)

Find the impulse response function of a unit change in $\varepsilon$ _ton y_tand p_t.

Note: The impulse response function is the effect of a current unit shock on future values of the respective variables.

***END OF FINAL***

Source: The Wayback Machine internet archive. PDF file of the Spring 1992 Final Exam of Economics 202A.

_______________________

Department of Economics
University of California
Spring Semester 1993
Professor George A. Akerlof

Economics 202A
FINAL EXAMINATION

PLEASE READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE BEGINNING.

The exam is in 3 parts. Each of the first 12 questions has equal weight in grading.
Some questions are much more difficult than others.
Answer all the questions using a separate Bluebook for each part.
Be sure to write your name on the cover of all of your Bluebooks.
There are 70 total points for the exam.

Grades will reflect the precision, clarity and completeness of your answers as well as their correctness.

PART A (Please use a Separate Blue Book)

State whether the following are True, False, or Uncertain. Explain why in each case. Each question is worth 5 points.

1) According to Sargent unemployment is a random walk since the change in unemployment between t and t+1 depends only on an error term which is uncorrelated with prior information.

2) In Summers’ model if the investment equation is of the form:

$\frac{I}{K}=a+bQ,$

adjustment costs will be of the form:

$A=\frac{1}{2a}{{\left( \frac{I}{K}-b \right)}^{2}}K.$

3) In the Shapiro-Stiglitz model an increase in the labor supply will leave the unemployment rate constant because the nonshirking boundary depends only on the unemployment rate (which is the ratio of the number of unemployed to the total labor supply). In equilibrium this ratio will be unchanged if there is a shift in the labor supply.

4) In the Barro-Gordon model if the government’s desired level of unemployment is exactly the natural rate, there is no benefit from precommitment to zero increase in the money supply.

5) Every day Mr. and Mrs. Romer have higher income than expenses. They have the following strategy of money holding. When their bank account reaches $2,500 they purchase a $2,000 bond. On May 7, they received an unexpected bill for $1,063 for earthquake insurance. The expected level of their bank account will increase by exactly $1,063.

6) Consider an economy with perfect competitors and constant costs. Suppose the money supply changes by $\varepsilon$ . Some firms keep their prices constant. These firms will suffer losses due to their individual decisions to keep their prices constant which are proportional to $\varepsilon$ (first-order). The change in their profits due to the change in the aggregate equilibrium because many such firms kept their prices sticky, however, is proportional to $\varepsilon$ ²(second-order).

7) If workers retain their union membership even if unemployed, unemployment will not follow a random walk.

PART B (Please Use a Separate Blue Book)

Answer the following questions. Each question is worth 5 points.

8) Graph the effect of a permanent and a temporary (one-period) unexpected change in the money supply in the Taylor model. Explain your graph.

9) Two identical firms A and B have a constant certain payout x. Firm A has all equity. Firm B has debt D. The interest rate is r and the corporate profit tax rate is $\tau$ . Derive the value of firms A and B on the assumptions of efficient markets. What is the difference, if any, between the value of firms A and B?

10) The demand for real balances, when fully adjusted in the long-run, is

${{m}^{*}}=a{{y}_{t}}-b{{r}_{t}}$

The adjustment process is given by

${{m}_{t}}-{{m}_{t-1}}=\delta \left( m_{t}^{*}-{{m}_{t-1}} \right)$

What are the long-run and short-run income and interest elasticities of the demand for real balances?

(Note: y, r, and m are the logarithms of income, the interest rate and real balances).

11) Given the demand for money is of the form

$\frac{M}{p}=a-b\pi$

What is the maximum steady-state level of seigniorage?

(Note: $\pi$ is the rate of inflation, M is nominal money balances and p is the price level).

12) Debt-laden poor Country A has debt with New York banks of D dollars. It will pay off x dollars of this debt, where x is a random variable with uniform distribution between 0 and $\bar{X}$ . Industrial rich Country B kindly offers to buy (and retire) Z dollars worth of A’s debt from New York banks if Country A will leave the probability distribution of its payoffs unchanged. According to the Bulow-Rogoff model, how much must Country B pay to leave Country A with only D-Z dollars of debt? What is the “value” in terms of decreased debt payments to Country A of Country B’s kind offer?

PART C (Please Use a Separate Blue Book)

Answer one of the following two questions. Worth 10 points.

1) Derive from first principles the non-shirking boundary (in the Shapiro-Stiglitz) model.

— OR —

2) Derive from first principles the AR(1) equation for x_tin the Taylor model.

*** END OF FINAL ***

Source: The Wayback Machine internet archive. PDF file of the Spring 1993 Final Exam of Economics 202A.

Image Source: The Wayback Machine internet archive. “George A. Akerlof. Biographical” webpage at the Nobel Prize website.

Tags Akerlof

Berkeley Columbia Economist Market Economists Harvard M.I.T. Yale

Columbia. Instructors for Economics in Columbia College. Considering Okun et al., 1951

Post author By Irwin Collier
Post date 2019-08-04

This following 1951 memo by the head of the economics department at Columbia, Jamew W. Angell, to his colleagues about the relatively mundane matter of identifying potential candidates for an instructor vacancy in the undergraduate economics program in Columbia College, caught my attention with a paragraph describing the up-and-coming graduate student Arthur Okun. Five current instructors were identified by name together with three ranked potential candidates. I figured this would be as good a time as any, to see what sort of career information I’d be able to gather on the other seven names that I did not recognize.

I was least successful with Mr. George F. Dimmler whose Google traces would indicate that he had gone on to teach briefly at Wharton and then worked as an economist at the Commercial Investment Trust (CIT) Financial Corporation. But for the other six economists (as well as Okun) it was relatively easy to find obituaries!

While Arthur Okun was clearly the leading candidate considered for the position, the instructorship instead went to the Fellner student from Berkeley, Jacob Weissman. As of this post I do not know whether this means that Okun was not offered the job, or had been offered the instructorship but had a better opportunity.

___________________

MEMO REGARDING POTENTIAL INSTRUCTORS FOR UNDERGRADUATE ECONOMICS AT COLUMBIA COLLEGE

CONFIDENTIAL

May 8, 1951

To Professors Bergson, Bonbright, A. F. Burns, A. R. Burns, Clark, Dorfman, Goodrich, Haig, Hart, Mills, Nurkse, Shoup, Stigler, Wolman

From James W. Angell

Because of the prospective shrinkage of the enrollment and the greater exercise of professional option by students of Columbia College, it will probably be necessary to reduce the number of appointments as Instructor of Economics in College from the present five to two for next year. The problem is further complicated by the fact that the College is adopting a general policy of not renewing appointments to instructor ships beyond a total term of five years. None of the present instructors will be dismissed, but all of them are being encouraged and helped to find new positions. Two of them, [George F.] Dimmler and [Daniel M.] Holland, [see below] have already made other arrangements for next year; and the other three, [Lawrence] Abbott [from Prabook], [Frank W.] Schiff [see below] and [Nian-Tzu] Wang [see below, have definite possibilities for other employment. It is improbable that we will lose all five of these men, but there is a definite possibility that one new instructor will be needed, and a rather remote possibility that we will need two.

Since definite action may not be required until the summer, when most of us will be away, I am now calling the situation to your attention. Horace Taylor, as Chairman of the Departmental Committee in the College, has proposed for consideration three men whom he regards as the most promising candidates known to him for appointment as Instructor, should a vacancy develop. I give below summaries of the records of these men, based largely or wholly on material which Taylor provided (entirely so in the case of Weissman). They are listed in Taylor’s order.

OKUN, Arthur. [Brookings Memorial] A. B. From Columbia College, 1949, with honors and special distinction in Economics; first in his class of over five hundred in the College; Green Memorial Prize; Phi Beta Kappa. Entered our Graduate Department in 1949, University Scholar, 1949-50, and University Fellow, 1950-51. Has A’s in all courses he took in the Graduate School. Passed the Qualifying Examination with A on the Essay, two A’s and 3 B’s on the Specific questions. Has passed language examinations in German and in Mathematics; certified in Statistics and in General Economic History. Will take the orals this spring, offering Economic Theory, Monetary Economics, Public Utility and Public Finance. Taylor writes: “He is regarded by everyone in the College staff as one of the most gifted students we ever have had, and I believe he is well known to members of the graduate faculty. My recollection is that he made the highest score ever made on the graduate record examination. Some of his teachers in graduate school have spoken of him as the ablest of the current group of students there. He has no teaching experience, but it is going to conduct some discussion sections of Robert Carey’s course in elementary economics next Summer Session. Okun was No. 1 man in his class of over 500 in Columbia College.”

WEISSMAN, Jacob. [see below] Taylor writes: “A more mature man than Okun. Has had business and industrial experience, in the sense that he was General Manager of a steel company in which his family is interested. He resigned this $20,000 job to take up graduate study of economics at the University of California. Messrs. Davisson, Fellner, and Gordon of of U. of C. have written letters recommending him in the highest terms. One or two of them even said that Weissman is the ablest graduate student of economics at the U. of C. in some years. He is now at Cambridge, Massachusetts, to be in touch with Mr. Fellner, who is directing Weissman’s dissertation. I had Weissman to lunch when he passed through New York last summer, and was greatly impressed with his good mind, excellent training, and modesty. He is eager for a job here.”

AHEARN, Daniel. [see below] A.B. from Columbia College, 1949; Phi Beta Kappa; graduate fellowship from Columbia College for 1949-50. Entered our Graduate Department in 1949; Kazanjian Scholar, 1950-51; Master’s thesis on the business cycle fluctuation in 1932-34, now in process with Professor Hart. Passed Qualifying Examination in 1950, with a B average. Seven A’s and one B in graduate courses. Has passed the German examination and has certified in Statistics and American Economic History. Will take orals this spring, offering Economic Theory, Monetary Economics, Business Cycles and Industrial Organization. Taylor writes: “Now in graduate school, and probably well-known to most staff members. He was a classmate of Okun, and ranked third in the class in which Okun was first. A man of unusual ability, excellent personal qualities, is highly regarded by the College staff.”

There are doubtless also other men whom you would like to suggest for consideration. I shall greatly appreciate receiving such suggestions promptly, together with as much information about them as you can provide; and also your own judgment and comparative rating of the men discussed above.

Source: Columbia University Libraries, Manuscript Collections. Robert M. Haig Papers, Box 107, Folder: Haig Correspondence A, 1949-1952”.

___________________

Jacob Weissman’s initial appointment, 1951-52.

He replaced Daniel M. Holland. Appointed July 1, 1951 for one year, annual salary $3600.

Source: Columbia University Libraries Manuscript Collections. Columbiana. Department of Economics Collection, Box 4, Budget, 1945/1946-1954/1955, Folder “Budget 1951-52”.

___________________

Weissman appointment extended to a fifth year

Jacob Weissman will have served four years as instructor, but we seek his reappointment for a fifth year at his present salary [$3,800], and that permission for this be sought from the President of the University under section 60 of the Statutes. The ground for this request are that Weissman expects to submit his dissertation on “The Law of Oligopoly: A Study of the Relationship between Legal and Economic Theory” at the University of California in the Spring of 1955, when we expect to be in a better position to assess his worth. Also, Weissman has done and is doing much for the College, and it seems fair to him to let him get his degree before seeking a position elsewhere, if we have eventually to let him go.”

Source: Report of College Committee on Economics to the Executive Officer, Department of Economics (November 15, 1954) by Harold Barger, Chairman of the College Committee, Department of Economics”

___________________

Jacob I. Weissman
Obituary
(July 13, 2006)

Jacob I. Weissman, a lawyer, inveterate storyteller and Phi Beta Kappa scholar who chaired the economics department at Hofstra University before retiring to Martha’s Vineyard, died peacefully July 11 at Henrietta Brewer House surrounded by family and friends. He was 92.

Professor Weissman would often tell friends that he disagreed with the general description of economics as a dismal science and that had coined his own term: the trivial science.

He explained: “Economists don’t deal sufficiently with aspirations, and ambitions of people or other variables.”

According to his wife, Nikki Langer Weissman, this quote summarized his world view. “Despite his considerable academic achievements,” she said, “Jacob was a man who never lost sight of the fact that human beings come before statistics and that human behavior defies predictive models.” Professor Weissman was born and raised in Detroit. In 1935, he graduated from the University of Michigan Phi Beta Kappa with a degree in economics.

After graduation, he enrolled in the University of Michigan Law School, completing his J.D. degree and graduating first in class and was also editor of the Michigan Law Review. Following law school, he spent a year traveling to Japan, China, southeast Asia, the Middle East and Europe.

Prior to graduation from law school, he had been invited to work as clerk to the chief justice of the supreme court of Michigan. However, due to his father’s illness, he felt obliged to decline, as he was needed to run the family business, where he remained as president for 12 years.

After this detour, Professor Weissman decided to return to the world he loved – academia. In 1947, he enrolled at the University of California at Berkeley for a Ph.D. in economics. While completing his dissertation, he taught at Columbia University in New York until 1956, when he received his doctorate in economics. He was hired by the University of Chicago as a research associate in law and economics at the law school and later associate professor of law and economics at the University of Chicago’s Graduate School of Business.

He often attributed his love of academics to his teaching experience at Columbia “because the university used many of its faculty to teach not only in their own disciplines, but in a wonderful general education program.”

“I became very enriched by that teaching and my vision of an ideal academic life was fulfilled,” he once told a reporter. “An element of chance was involved in this path I chose, but it suited me well.”

In 1963, he was invited to join the faculty at Hofstra University in New York as professor of economics and chairman of the economics department. He also served as speaker of faculty, a post he held for two years. In 1982, he was appointed interim dean of Hofstra University’s School of Business.

At Hofstra, he met and married Shirley (Nikki) Langer, who was associate professor of psychology. They remained at Hofstra University until his retirement in 1983.

In 1969, impressed by the vitality and community spirit on the Vineyard, they became homeowners in Chilmark.Professor Weissman gave generously of his time and talents on the Vineyard.

He served on the board of directors of the Martha’s Vineyard Hospital and as chairman of its ethics committee. He was a board member and treasurer of Howes House (West Tisbury Council on Aging). He and his wife gave lessons at the various senior centers on creativity, aging and other topics.

His publications on law and economics were included in The American Economic Review, The Journal of Political Economy and The University of Chicago’s Journal of Business.

In addition to his wife, Nikki Langer Weissman of Chilmark; his son, Stephen Weissman of London; his sister, Helen Rosenman of San Francisco; his stepson, Kenneth Langer of Takoma Park, Md.; his stepdaughter, Elizabeth Langer of Washington, D.C.; six grandchildren, Max Weissman and Maisie Weissman, Ben Langer Chused, Sam Langer, Nora Langer and Amelia Langer; and two great-grandchildren, Kate and Toby Weissman.

Source: Vineyard Gazette, July 13, 2006.

___________________

Daniel S. Ahearn
Obituary
(April 6, 2016)

AHEARN, Daniel S., Ph.D. 90, of Winchester, March 30, 2016. Beloved husband of Louise (Freeman) Ahearn. Loving father of Barbara Ahearn of Arlington and the late Kathleen and JoAnne Ahearn. Born in New York City, Daniel was the son of the late Daniel and Margaret (Walter) Ahearn. A World War II veteran, he served in the 399th Infantry 100th Division from 1943 to 1946 in France and Germany. He received his bachelor’s degree from Columbia College in 1949 and his Ph.D. in economics from Columbia University in 1961. His book “Federal Reserve Policy Reappraised 1951-1959” was based on his Ph.D. thesis. Daniel spent his roughly 65-year working life in positions involving economics, investments and monetary and fiscal policy. From 1961 to 1995, he was at Wellington Management Company with positions including senior vice president, partner and chairman of the investment policy group. In 1963 he left Wellington to serve as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Debt Management until 1965. He also advised the Treasury Dept. for about 25 years as a member of the Government and Federal Agencies Securities Committee of the Public Securities Assoc. After leaving Wellington, Daniel formed Capital Markets Strategies where he continued advisory work. In Winchester, where he was a resident for 47 years, Daniel was an Investment Trustee of Winchester Hospital from 1974-2012. He is widely remembered for his reports on investments to the annual meeting of the Winchester Hospital board.

Source: Boston Globe obituary from Legacy.com.

___________________

Frank W. Schiff
Obituary
(August 28, 2006)

Frank W. Schiff, 85, who served as vice president and chief economist of the Committee for Economic Development from 1969 to 1986, died Aug. 17 at Inova Mount Vernon Hospital of complications from a back injury.

At the Committee for Economic Development, an independent organization of business executives and university administrators, Mr. Schiff coordinated statements and monographs on a wide range of national and international economic policy issues. His efforts involved tax reform, budget deficits, the federal budget process, energy independence, job training, public-private partnerships and the international monetary system.

He played a key role in the creation of local Private Industry Councils under the federal Job Training Partnership Act. He had a special interest in flexible work arrangements, such as greater use of “flexiplace” and work sharing as an alternative to layoffs or women leaving the workforce.

He said in 1983 that in situations where flexiplace — working at home or other places other than the office — had been tried, productivity improved in most cases 10 to 20 percent and sometimes substantially more.

Mr. Schiff was born in Greisswald, Germany, and fled the Nazis in 1936. He was 15 when he and his family arrived in New York, where he finished high school in New Rochelle and graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Columbia University. He also did graduate work in economics at Columbia.

From 1943 to 1945, he served in the Army in the 35th Infantry Division in France. After the war, he was an economics instructor at Columbia.

Beginning in 1951, Mr. Schiff held several positions with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Among them was head of the Latin American unit and assistant vice president of research.

He went to Vietnam in the early 1960s to advise the government on creation of a central bank.

As senior staff economist with the Council of Economic Advisers from 1964 to 1968, Mr. Schiff had responsibility for international finance, coordination of international economic policies and domestic monetary policy. He regularly represented the council at international monetary policy meetings in Paris.

He served as deputy undersecretary of the Treasury for monetary affairs from 1968 to 1969 and was involved in domestic economic policy and international monetary policy formulation and negotiations, debt management and relations with the Federal Reserve.

Mr. Schiff lived in Washington from 1964 to 1983, when he moved to Alexandria. He retired in 1986.

He was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Conference of Business Economists and served as president and chairman of the National Economists Club.

In 1990, Mr. Schiff returned to his childhood home in Germany on a trip with Sen. Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.). Vivid memories flooded his mind as he stood in the 1915 art deco apartment building where he grew up in what became a West Berlin residential area. “It was very pleasant here before the Hitler period,” he said.

Survivors include his wife, Erika Deussen Schiff, whom he married in 1974, of Alexandria; and a brother.

Source: Washington Post.August 28, 2006.

___________________

Daniel M. Holland
Obituary
(January 8, 1992)

Daniel M. Holland, professor emeritus of finance at the Sloan School of Management and a widely known expert on taxation and public finance, died December 15 at Beth Israel Hospital, Boston, while under treatment for a heart condition. Professor Holland, a Lexington resident, was 71.

A memorial service is being planned for some time in February at the MIT Chapel.

Professor Holland was an MIT faculty member from 1958 until his retirement in 1986, when he became an emeritus professor and senior lecturer. He also served as an assistant to the provost from 1986 to 1990.

He was a consultant over the years to government agencies, including the US Treasury, foreign governments and private companies.

He was editor of the National Tax Journal for more than 20 years, served as president of the National Tax Association in 1988-89, and was the author of several books on taxation and numerous articles both in professional journals and other publications. His books included Dividends Under the Income Tax and Private Pension Funds: Projected Growth, for which he received the Elizur Wright Award of the American Risk and Insurance Association.

Professor Abraham J. Siegel, former dean of the Sloan School, said, “Dan was a great colleague and friend, broadly gauged in his knowledge and interests. Those of us who have known him for over 30 years, as well as his younger colleagues, will miss him enormously.”

Professor Holland, who was born in New York City, received AB and PhD degrees from Columbia University, in 1941 and 1951, respectively.

He served three years in the Navy during World War II, mostly aboard a destroyer escort in the Pacific theater.

He was a member of the research staff of the National Bureau of Economic Research before becoming an associate professor of economics at New York University in 1957, the year before he came to MIT, also as an associate professor. He was promoted to full professor at MIT in 1962.

His professional groups included the American Economic Association, American Finance Association, Royal Economic Society, International Institute of Public Finance and the International Fiscal Association.

He leaves his wife, Jeanne A. (Ormont) Holland; two children, Andy of New York City, a scenic artist, and Laura Roeper of Amherst, Mass., a writer; two grandchildren and four nephews.

Source: MIT News, January 8, 1992.

___________________

Nian-Tzu Wang
Obituary
The New York Times (Aug. 29 to Aug. 30, 2004)

WANG-Nian-Tzu, N.T., of Larchmont, NY, died of cancer, on August 26, 2004. Loving husband of Mabel U, devoted father of June, Kay (Leighton Chen), Cynthia (Daniel Sedlis), Geraldine, and Newton, and proud grandfather of Christine, Stephanie and Lucy. In his autobiography, “My Nine Lives”, NT wrote of his lives as number one son, traditional scholar, foreign student, public servant, instructor, international servant, advisor, academician, and immigrant. NT was born in Shanghai on July 25, 1917. Initially trained to be a Confucian scholar, he received a classical education at home, where he was tutored in Chinese poetry, painting, the Classics and other literati skills. Math, science, and languages were introduced later by his father, Pai Yuan (PY) Wang, a sophisticated banker when he decided to school his four sons in Western ways when they were teenagers. In 1937, NT went abroad to study at the London School of Economics and Germany. He transferred to Columbia where he graduated Phi Beta Kappa with honors in economics in 1941, and went on to receive an M.A. and PhD in economics from Harvard. NT will be remembered throughout the international community for his dedicated efforts in advising businesses and governments around the world on ecomonic development. He made many contributions to his homeland of China, the U.S., his home since 1939, and to countless countries which he helped through his work at the U.N. Economic and Social Council. After retiring from a 28 year career at the United Nations, as the Director of the Centre on Transnational Corporations, he returned to Columbia Univ. to teach at the School of Business and the School of International and Public Affairs. He thoroughly enjoyed his time with his students, organizing seminars, creating training programs for Chinese academic and business leaders, and working tirelessly as the Director of the China-International Business Project. In his final days, he was polishing his keynote speech as part of Columbia University’s 250th anniversary celebration. He was an honorary professor of ten universities, a fellow of the International Academy of Management, and a recipient of many awards, including the New York Governor’s Award for Outstanding Asian American. In addition to his many professional achievements, his passions included dancing with his life partner of 62 years, Mabel, and playing tennis. NT exhausted his daughter Kay playing two and a half hours of tennis after celebrating his 87th birthday just one month ago. Throughout his life, he took time to compose classical Chinese poems, which his family will compile as the tenth chapter in his life, ‘The Poet’. A memorial service will be announced later. Contributions may be made to Community Funds Inc. for the N.T. and Mabel Wang Charitable Fund, which will continue the mission of the China-International Business Project he established at Columbia University, c/o Community Funds Inc., 2 Park Avenue, NY, NY 10016.

Source: Legacy.com obituaries.

Image Source: Arthur Okun. Yale Memorial Webpage.

Tags Ahearn, Holland, Okun, Schiff, Wang, Weissman

Berkeley Chicago Dartmouth Economists

Berkeley and Dartmouth. Frank Knight’s economist brothers Melvin M. Knight and Bruce Winton Knight

Post author By Irwin Collier
Post date 2019-06-13

Pairs of siblings becoming professors of economics are infrequent but hardly rare. A trio of siblings becoming professors of economics becomes easier to imagine when one considers families with nine children as was the case for Frank H. Knight and his brothers Melvin Moses Knight and Bruce Winton Knight. This post provides images and official university obituaries for Melvin and Bruce.

Seeing “salty individualist” in the first line of an obituary tells us something about Melvin, perhaps that he was not an easy-going, cheery colleague?

The previous post unearthed a ballad (The Ballad of Right Price) from the early 1920’s written by Bruce Knight who was a graduate-student quizmaster for University of Michigan professor Fred M. Taylor at the time.

The only photo I could find of the eldest of the three, Melvin, is cropped from the image of his passport application of June 1917. At the online archive of the Dartmouth Alumni Magazine one can find a few different pictures of the youngest, Bruce.

_________________________

__________________

Melvin Moses Knight, Economics: Berkeley
1887-1981
Professor Emeritus

The University of California has numbered many salty individualists among its faculty. M.M. (Melvin Moses) Knight must figure high among them. Born April 29, 1887 on a farm near Bloomington, Illinois, he was one of nine children. Three were to be distinguished economists, M.M. at Berkeley, Frank at the University of Chicago, and Bruce at Dartmouth. Life on the farm was not always easy. At age 13, M.M. found himself responsible for running the farm. A self-taught man, he never attended high school. For a time he worked as a locksmith and bicycle mechanic. He later showed skills as plumber and musician. At age 23 he managed to qualify for entrance into Milligan College, Tennessee. After two years, he transferred to the University of Tennessee, where he studied physics and economics. He took an A.B. at Texas Christian University in English in 1913, followed the next year by an M.A. in history. He studied for a while at the University of Chicago and finally earned a Ph.D. in sociology at Clark University in sociology, with a thesis, Taboo and Genetics. His studies continued at other institutions, including the New School for Social Research and the University of Paris in such fields as geology, geography, genetics, mathematics, and theology. Later his wide interdisciplinary interests showed up in his teaching and writing.

He was no stranger to war. During World War I he served as a volunteer ambulance driver with the French army and later with the intelligence section of the Air Service of the American Expeditionary Force. In 1919 he served as a volunteer with the Romanian Field Hospital, Regina Maria, in Transylvania and Hungary. He was discharged as a captain and decorated with the Romanian Cross of Merit. During World War II, by then too old for active duty, he served as Assistant Chief, Division of Economic Studies, Department of State.

M.M.’s academic career began in 1920 at Hunter College, followed by brief periods at the Universities of Utah and California. From 1923 to 1926 he was in the Department of History at Columbia University. In 1926 an Amherst Memorial Fellowship took him to Europe and North Africa to examine the French colonial system. In 1928 he joined the Department of Economics of the University of California, Berkeley, where he remained until his retirement in 1954.

In teaching, writing, and dealings with colleagues, M.M. displayed the keenly interdisciplinary character of his studies and a probing curiosity. His first publication was a Dictionnaire Pratique d’Aeronautique, prepared for the U.S. Air Service in 1918. After that came a number of articles on the contemporary economy and the political problems of eastern Europe, economic history, and colonial questions. His “Water and the Course of Empire in French North Africa” (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1925) is a masterly exposition of the millennial relation between physical changes in man’s environment and the structure of economic organization. By the mid-1920s he entered upon a spate of publication: Economic History of Europe to the End of the Middle Ages (1926), later translated into French; co-authorship of Economic History of Europe to Modern Times(1928); The Americans in Santo Domingo(1928), a condensation of a much larger manuscript, published as well in a number of Spanish editions; an English translation of Sée’s Economic Interpretation of History (1929); Introduction to Modern Economic History (1940); and numerous articles in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences.

M.M. Knight’s concerns in economics are best summarized in the tribute to him written by Giulio Pontecorvo and Charles F. Stewart in 1979 (Exploration in Economic History, 16:243-245):

The theoretical apparatus of contemporary economics is focused on general equilibrium analysis and the solution of welfare problems within that static framework. In the simplest sense, Knight departs from today’s emphasis and this line of inquiry by his deep fundamental concern with the problem of the nature of economic scarcity and society’s response to scarcity through time rather than with the determinants of real income and the social implications of alternative income distributions.

He transcends Veblen and especially Galbraith and Rostow by his concern with the evolution and the full extent of economic structures. While Veblen was concerned with the industrial economy and its linkages to other elements, e.g., finance, etc., Knight’s view is both more holistic and more focused on the evolutionary and disequilibrium properties of economic systems.

Unlike the American institutional position, as it is typically presented, Knight adds a strong sense of geography, of place, and the ecology of place. In this particular way, he reveals his links both with his rural origins and with the traditions of French economic history…

Each society is constrained by its own geographic and resource endowments. Each therefore responds to the problem of scarcity in its own way and creates its own institutions or transforms those it borrows. Regardless of the form of the response, the process of expansion works over time to use up the opportunity… Once an opportunity is used up, it requires both technological development and a reordering of social institutions to create a new set of human opportunities and this is a formidable social task of the true long run… unlike the essentially optimistic cast of Marxian inevitability, Knight has a strong sense that systems run down and because they are located in space as well as in time, systems that have exhausted themselves do not necessarily get transformed and revived but tend to be replaced, as were Egypt and Rome and North Africa.

While in Paris, Knight married Eleanor Gehmann in what proved to be a long, happy companionship in his years of active service and after his retirement in 1954. She died in February, he on June 12, 1981.

W.W. Borah M.M. Davisson C.A. Mosk

Source: Melvin Moses Knight, 1887-1981. Economics: Berkeley. University of California (System) Academic Senate. 1988, University of California: In Memoriam, pp. 76-78.

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Obituary, Bruce Winton Knight

Bruce Winton Knight, for 36 years a member of the Dartmouth economics faculty, died on May 28 at Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital in Hanover after a long illness. He would have been 88 on June 27.

Knight, who retired in 1960, was a vigorous opponent of what he called “pseudo-liberalism” and “state paternalism” in government. He was introduced to the conservative concepts he taught in courses on economic principles and the economics of international peace by his elder brother, the late Frank Knight, widely honored as the founder of the “Chicago school of economics.”

A native of Colfax County, Ill., Knight attended Texas Christian University and earned a B.A. from the University of Utah in 1920 and an M.A. from the University of Michigan in 1923.

He taught economics at the University of Michigan and the University of Wisconsin, where he met his wife, the former Myrtle Eickelberg. He joined the Dartmouth faculty as an instructor in economics in 1924 and became a professor in 1934. He was also a member of Sigma Chi fraternity and had served for a number of years on the Dartmouth College Athletic Council.

Knight wrote three books on economics and a book on peace, entitled How to Run a War, published by Alfred Knopf in 1936. Despite his authorship of these four books and a solid record of writing for scholarly journals, he opposed the academic doctrine of “publish or perish.” He felt that faculty members should only write when they wished, not simply to gain recognition and status. He was cited by the Freedom Foundation of Valley Forge, Pa., for an article he wrote in the Dartmouth Alumni Magazinein December 1949 entitled “Our Greatest Issue,” which he identified as “pseudo-liberalism.”

During World War I, he served with the U.S. Army infantry for two-and-a-half years, including more than a year in the Philippines.

Knight had also been an avid baseball fan ever since his days as a pitcher in college, and he rarely missed a Dartmouth varsity baseball game.

He is survived by his wife, a son, a daughter, three brothers,aand two sisters.

Source: Dartmouth Alumni Magazine June 1980, p. 93.

Image Sources:

Die Drei von der Tankstelle, classic German film from 1930.

Melvin Moses Knight from National Archives and Records Administration (NARA); Washington D.C.; Roll #: 366; Volume #: Roll 0366 – Certificates: 54301-54700, 31 May 1917-06 Jun 1917.

Bruce Winton Knight from Dartmouth Alumni Magazine, February 1954, p. 18.

Tags Knight, KnightBW, KnightMM

Berkeley Dartmouth Funny Business Illinois Michigan

Three Ballads on price theory, macroeconomics, and political economy by Bruce W. Knight, Kenneth Boulding, and David Felix

Post author By Irwin Collier
Post date 2019-06-12

I stumbled across the following three ballads by accident. My search began with an obituary search for Frank Knight’s elder brother Melvin Moses Knight and his younger brother Bruce Winton Knight, both of whom were professors of economics, at Berkeley and Dartmouth, respectively. I came across a few lines quoted from the first of the three ballads below (on price theory) and was able to locate a copy of what turned out to be a pair of ballads, the second (on macroeconomics) by Kenneth Boulding. One damn thing led to another and I next discovered a third ballad (on political economy more generally) explicitly inspired by the first two. The least well known of the three balladeers was David Felix, a Berkeley economics Ph.D. and later professor at the University of Washington in St. Louis. I include his university obituary in this post.

Incidentally, the University of Michigan undergraduate textbook that is referred throughout to was written by Fred Manville Taylor, e.g., Principles of Economics. 8th edition, 1921. In a nice essay about the life of Fred M. Taylor written by Z. Clark Dickinson and published in 1952 (Quarterly Review: A Journal of University Perspectives, Autumn, pp. 48-61), I discovered that Bruce Knight’s contribution (The Ballad of “Right Price”) was written in the early 1920s when he was a graduate-student quizmaster for Taylor’s course at the University of Michigan.

__________________

Obituary:
Felix, professor emeritus of economics, 91
By Melody Walker August 12, 2009

David Felix, Ph.D., professor emeritus of development economics and economic history in the Department of Economics in Arts & Sciences, died June 13, 2009, in Bangor, Maine. He was 91.

Born in New York City, Felix graduated magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1942 before enlisting in the U.S. Navy. He served as a lieutenant in the Pacific during World War II.

After the war, he returned to Berkeley, where he earned a master’s degree in history and a doctorate in economics. Before joining the faculty at Washington University in 1964, he was an economics professor at Wayne State University from 1954-1964.

Felix retired from Washington University in 1988. His research interests included economic development, history and international trade and finance.

Felix served as an economic consultant to the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund. He had research appointments at Harvard University, the University of Sussex, England, and the London School of Economics. He received fellowships from the Fulbright, Rockefeller, Ford and other foundations for research in Latin America.

Steve Fazzari, Ph.D., professor of economics and a member of the department since 1982, has fond memories of Felix.

“I respected him for his intellectual integrity,” Fazzari said. “I admired him for his strong work ethic and professional accomplishments. And I will miss him as a teacher, colleague and friend.”

Felix is survived by his wife of 63 years, Gretchen (Schafer) Felix of Orono, Maine; two daughters; and two grandsons.

Donations may be made to the ACLU, 125 Broad St., 18th Floor, New York, NY 10004 and to The Chamber Music Society, University of Maine, 5746 Collins Center for the Arts, Orono, ME 04469.

Source: Washington University in St. Louis. theSource website, August 2o09.

__________________

Economics in Two Lessons

I. The Ballad of “Right Price” [early 1920s]

by Bruce Knight
Professor of Economics,
Dartmouth College

Great Whoopla, King of Hoomhomho,
In Privy Council deeply swore,
Some nineteen hundred years ago,
That Profiteering made him sore.
“Egad, it gets my goat,” he said:
“Two bits is too darn much for bread!

“Not only that my Kingdom cracks
Beneath these Robber Barons’ tolls:
The Lord perceives their heartless tax
And marks for Doom their greedy souls.
What think ye, Gents of High Renown —
Shall we revise this tariff down?”

The Council thought: “To buck a king
At best were misdirected gall:
Those prone to such a silly thing
Were never Councilmen at all.”
Their verdict was unanimous:
“What, ho! that sounds like sense to us.”

East and West and North and South
The heralds rode throughout the land,
With simple speech and ample mouth,
That Profiteers might understand:
“Hear ye!” they roared, with voice intense:
“The Price of Bread is Thirteen Cents!

“His Royal Nibs doth eke proclaim
That whoso charges more for Bread,
To brand his economic shame
Shall lose his ears from off his head:
Beware the Most Imperial Shears —
Charge Thirteen Cents, and keep your ears!”

The bakers, just a bit abashed,
So hearing, reasoned somewhat thus:
“Though wheat is scarce, and we’ll be dashed
If this won’t mean a loss to us,
We loathe to run the risk of Hell
And jeopardize our ears as well.”

The price was Thus in every town;
And South and North and West and East
The proletariat swarmed down
Like locusts to th’ Egyptian Feast:
The price of wheat dropped half a plunk,
And farmers would not plant the junk.

The days took flight, and fortnights sped:
Vox Populi exclaimed, “Immense!”
“Sic semper Profiteers!” they said,
And praised their Monarch’s Common Sense.
One dinner-time, along with roast
Whoop ordered up his usual Toast.

The Waiter blushed a crimson hue
Quite unbecoming such a lout,
And stammered forth: “Would Crackers do?
The Bread Supply has plumb run out!”
Roared Whoop: “Hast tried the nearest store?”
“Yea,” wept the knave: “There ain’t no more!”

Then waxed the King exceeding wroth,
As hungry kings are wont to do,
And, swearing by his doubtful Troth,
Ordered his land searched through and through.
This was the net result that night:
The stock of Bread had vanished quite.

Quick summoned Whoopla to his side
His meek Comptroller of Supplies:
“WHEAT! and AT ONCE!” the Monarch cried;
The wretch rejoined, with gusty sighs:
“There ain’t no wheat! And, worse, I fear,
There’s none been planted for next year.”

Last, to his Minister of State,
Sage Laran Gitis, Whoopla flew:
“Larry, thy brain, at least, hath weight:
What in the Heck are we to do?”
The latter, ex cathedra, spoke:
“Give heed, thou thick and regal Bloke:

“Next time your Cabinet and You
Contemplate fixing price, please look
At Sub-Head Three, page Fifty-two
Of Freddy Taylor’s well-known book:
You got yourselves in all this fix
By being Economic Hicks.

“Why, any college Soph would know,
Who took Ec One, and pulled a “D,”
That prices, if you let them go,
Will guide our conduct prop-er-lee —
Increase supply, curtail demand
When Wheat is scanty — understand?

“When every Jehu stocks his shelf
With Bread that’s cheap, but should be dear,
Important Persons, like Yourself,
May go without it, do you hear?
And Competition, don’t forget,
Will fix a Price that’s Right— you bet!

“Then, — there’s the Farmer — don’t you see?
The only Wheat that he will grow
Will be what he can eat; and he
Acts sensibly in doing so.
The Long Run, Whoopla — there’s the rub!
And, Broadly Speaking, you’re a dub.”

And thus and thus, and so and so
Into the regal ears was dinned,
Till Whoopla rose at length to go,
Quite vanquished by superior wind.
The chances are, when he withdrew,
He knew as much as Soph’mores do.

At any rate, he styled himself
A Proselyte of Lay-Say Fare.
Forthwith, his Empire, as to Pelf,
Beheld no equal anywhere.
And this became his proudest boast:
“I never fail to get my Toast!”

MORAL:— (Heh, heh!)

If you would see your land wax fat,
Don’t Meddle with the Thermostat!

II. The Busted Thermostat [early 1950s]

Kenneth Boulding
Professor of Economics,
University of Michigan

Protected by the hidden hand
Of moderate laissez-faire
King Whoopla’s happy little land
Lay prospering many a year,
As prices, neither low nor high,
Equate demand with its supply,

And Butcher, Baker, Soldier, Sailor,
Rich Man, Poor Man, Beggerman, Thief,
Rejoiced in Truth as taught by Taylor,
And no misfortune brought them grief,
(Knowing that evils only come
From price disequilibrium).

But now alas a cloud arose
As you will often find,
For lo! although production grows,
Consumption lags behind:
The consequent Accumulation,
Producing signs of sharp deflation.

So while King Whoopla takes his ease,
(The crops are good, the weather fine)
As smitten by a strange disease
Down creeps the trend-of-business line,
And round the factory corners lurk
Long lines of people wanting work.

At first the monarch flat denied
That anything could be amiss,
For was not laissez-faire the guide
To every economic bliss?
No need to call the system busted —
It’s just a little maladjusted!

But as distress and trouble grew
The king called in his learned sages
(Those dignified professors who
Transmit the wisdom of the ages)
And asked them all to diagnose
These quite unprecedented woes.

They talked of costs, they talked of prices,
Of disproportions and of lags,
And various economic vices
That make for turns and dips and sags,
But all agree, the answers come
In Long-Run Equilibrium.

But then a rash youth spoke — Who gains
From this poor status quo upholding?
I learned my¹Ec from Maynard Keynes,
Interpreted by Kenneth Boulding.
Silence more eloquent than words
Fell on those shocked and learned birds.

Mistaking silence for consent
(As intellectuals often do)
As if on self-destruction bent
The youth went on to air his view,
Maintaining, with an unbowed head,
That in the long run all are dead!

With pert remark and airy stance
He then proceeded to expound
The charms of deficit finance
In words more flippant than profound,
In Daniel Webster’s words professing
How Public Debt is Private Blessing.

It’s wrong to save too much, he said,
(Turning the theme in all its facets)
Income is from expenses bred
And public debt is private assets
And so (I hope you catch the drift)
Extravagance is really thrift!

Said Whoopla — if I feel the urges
To spend as freely as I like,
“Then²my extravagance, or splurges,
Will other money incomes hike?
Why! said the youth — Great ball of fire,
You Understand the Multiplier!

Fine, said the king, start public works,
Build me a large expensive palace!
In such extravagance there lurks
No hint of wickedness or malice,
For from my tendency to sin comes
A rise in other people’s incomes!

On every side the buildings reared,
Harems sprang up throughout the nation;
Soon unemployment disappeared,
Succeeded by a wild inflation,
And pretty soon our poor King Whoop
Was in a different kind of soup.

People of every rank and sort
Complain about the rising prices;
The country finds its dollars short
And has an economic crisis,
And through the miserable nation
Rises the talk of abdication!

A brief revolt among the scholars,
Forced the unhappy king to flee;
He, having kept his funds in dollars,
Became a prosperous refugee,
Enjoying the succeeding era
In basking on the Riviera.

The moral of this sorry tale
Is much too obvious to mention
Don’t trim your craft to every gale
Of intellectual invention,
And think, no matter what you try
In every ointment there’s a fly.

____________

¹”by” in original, corrected by hand to “my” in University of Michigan library copy.
²”That” in original, corrected by hand to “Then” in University of Michigan library copy.

Source: Economics in Two Lessons, Michigan Business Review, Vol. IV, No. 6 (November 1952), pp. 24-26.

__________________

[III.] The Ballad of the Sad Economist, or
Who’s the Fairest Model of Them All? [1952]

David Felix
Lecturer, School of Business Administration
University of California, Berkeley

A Regency Council was quickly appointed,
With praise from the propertied classes anointed,
To govern the hapless country pro tem,
Unrest and inflation to ruthlessly stem.
“Right men and right thoughts,” the Regency vowed,
“Will guide back Hoomhomho to normalcy proud.”

But what is this normalcy, if one may ask?
And how will the Council proceed with its task?
With Keynesian cries hushed in prison captivity,
Committed for Un-Hoomhomhonian activity,
Along with yet more Un-Hoomhoms of the trade,
The answer would have to be Taylor-made.

“Balance the Budget! Turn off the Pumps!
All must be willing to absorb their lumps.
Out with the Parities! The Wage-price Ratchets!
Tariffs, Pork Barrels, and similar gadgets!
Up with the Bank Rate! With will there are ways.
Come all aboard for the Happy Old Days!”

“But hold!” cried the Farm Bloc, “You’re going too far!
Surely Ag Parities are not on a par
With unwarranted aids and the dishonest pleas
Of Gold-grasping Business Monopolies!
And what of our low supply elasticity?
And industrial prices with scanty plasticity?”

But Business replied, “Such Populist impudence!
When National Unity most needs forbearance,
And an end to such rabble-rousin’ and scorchin’.
Have ye not even glanced at Life, Time, and Fortune?
The Invisible Hand in its moribund hour
Has passed on the torch to Countervailing Power.”

Then a chorus of voices was heard through the land.
“You fellows can laugh, but if over our strand
Passed foreigner’s goods un-tariff blockaded,
We’d never survive such a contest unaided.”
From the Tower, “The long-run adjustment . . .” “Absurd!
In the long run we’re dead. Or hadn’t you heard?”

From the depths of the Dungeon a thin voice arose,
“Let planning and subsidies cushion the blows.”
The voice died away . . . the impersonal force
Of the Price Mechanism rolled over the source.
But then from the Workers the querulous phrase,
“What’s all this talk of the Happy Old Days?”

And a crisp, booming voice was heard to sound off,
“Our appropriations are barely enough.
We could hardly survive any budget incisions,
And still keep intact a full hundred Divisions.
With no might in sight, oh, dismal our plight!
In our fight ‘gainst the Doctrine that Might Makes the Right.”

Approbational noises applauded these facts,
Most loudly from those with Armed Forces contracts,
And from those who remembered the lack of enjoyment
In the bitter old days of Mass Unemployment.
So for various reasons ’twas widely agreed
A Defense Budget cut could scarce be decreed.

“But what shall we do?” the Council now shouted.
“All our specifics are brutally flouted.
Tell us, oh, Taylor, what means to be had?
Or is there no balm in all Gilead?
If citizens dare not to forego their coddling,
It’s no help at all to show them your modeling.”

Then Taylorites answered, “Gaze ye at the World.
The Price Mechanism lies rusted and spurled.
There stalks o’er the earth a Great Disequilibrium
That keeps us from reaching our Mobile Millenium.
Check it! Or else all our plans are disasters,
And buried the rules of our Laissez-Faire Masters.”

”We’ll call a world meet,” the Council orated.
“Immutable Laws we will get reinstated.
Call Statesmen, Advisers, and Academicians.
We’ll get to the roots of our present conditions.”
“Normalcy’s indivisible,” said Taylorites, beaming.
“How true,” said the Council, and pondered its meaning.

So from East and from West the Experts all came,
From countries too numerous to mention by name.
All ideas were free to be talked of in forum,
Provided they met current rules of decorum —
Ricardo’s, and Smith’s, and the elder John Clark’s,
Though one had to be careful in making his Marx.

As befitted the host of this glittering Cabal,
The Hoomhomhos played with their Free Market Model.
But to their surprise this gambit was spurned
By others with backgrounds equally learned.
“Technical errors,” “too static,” “unreal,”
“Class bias,” “unstable,” “no sex appeal.”

“The problem is structural,” said Abdul Al Mism.
“We’ve starved long enough with your Price Mechanism.
Send us more funds and we might try your scheme.”
“But that will just make our inflation extreme,”
Was the Taylored reply, “Attempt first our scheme.”
Said Abdul, “That’d just make our poorness extreme.”

“What I cannot swallow,” said Viscount D’Abords,
Up from the Dockers to Chamber of Lords,
“Is bread at this twenty-five pennies a loaf,
Merely to nourish some kingly old oaf.
That’s scarcely fair shares and, dash it, not cricket!
This unequal right to a bread ration ticket.”

“But come now, M’Lord, you forget the supply.
You won’t get the wheat.” “In the pig’s eye!”
Retorted the Lord, “With proper control,
The supply will come forth, I’ll wager my soul!
Haven’t you heard that most income is rent?
It’s not hard to keep the supply curve unbent.”

“But Walras has shown the result’s a delight
When unknowns and equations total up right.”
Then forth came the haughty Econometricians,
“You fail to consider stability conditions.
Equational counting is hardly enough.
In dynamic relations things can get rough.

Inflation is only a manifestation
Of some inconsistent structuralization.”
Spake Senor Garbanzo of southernmost Chile,
“To bow to the world market forces is silly.
What our countries need is Diversification,
Or else we continue as low-income nations.

Political Strength means Industrialization
To cushion the impact of Boom and Deflation.”
The Historian spake, “You Laissez-Faire Boys
Are much too enchanted with outmoded toys.
Your model concerns but a brief passing phase,
Of which, by the way, it just points up the glaze.”

And so they continued in whisper and scream,
Shifting assumptions in the midst of the stream,
Till a Child, the one who with infantile crudity
Had shown up the emperor stark in his nudity,
Piped up with “But all your polemical flair
Conceals not the fact that you’re knowledge-wise bare.

Your Curves and Equations, your scholarly canting,
Do not give the Council the answers they’re wanting.”
Then all rose indignant at this Child’s presumption.
As one they rejected the youngster’s assumption. ”
Of course we have knowledge, profound and pervasive.
There’s really no reason to be so derisive.

But to say what it is, if that’s your suggestion,
Is in general form a nonsensical question.”
But now some declared that Truth’s praxiologic,
And were quickly denounced for illogic hodge-podgic.
And so Unity broke with a suddenness tragical
On serious issues and points methodological.

Despairing, the Council cried, “Give us a policy!
How do we wend our way back unto normalcy?”
With patience one uses for children sub-normal,
The theorists explained that their knowledge was formal.
“Give us your goals, arranged in a scale,
And we’ll give you the points toward which you must sail.

And if you can tell what it is that you’ll find,
That is different from that which you’re leaving behind,
We can give you the rules couched in language most terse
For finding out which is the better or worse.”
With this, all adjourned — it was getting much later,
And each went his own way to gather more data.

Said the Child to the Councilmen, still in a coma,
Having been overcome by the learned aroma,
“The Truth is an elephant; they each hold a part,
But to piece all together is still quite an art.”
Then up woke the Council and looked round the hall,
“But that doesn’t solve our dilemma at all!”

Said the Child, “When I’m older and go off to college,
I’ll explore sociologic roots of our knowledge,
And political aspects of modern economy,
And what is the source of society’s anomy.”
Soft from up high in the empty hall’s rafters
Sounded the echo of something like laughter.

Moral

Graduate students and hair-splitting profs
Can expound the moral to credulous sophs.
It carries at least the following sting:
A little model is a dangerous thing.

Source: Current Economic Comment, University of Illinois, Bureau of Economic and Business Research, 1952, pp. 51-54.

Image Sources: From left to right…
Bruce W. Knight in Eleven Professors to Retire. Dartmouth Alumni Magazine, June 1960, p. 19.
Kenneth Boulding at the University of Michigan Faculty History Project.
David Felix from Tourist Card for Brazil, dated 17 December 1962, copy at the ancestry.com website.

Tags Boulding, Felix, KnightMM

Berkeley Carnegie Institute of Technology Chicago Cornell Duke Economics Programs Harvard Illinois Indiana Iowa Johns Hopkins M.I.T. Michigan Minnesota Northwestern NYU Ohio State Pennsylvania Princeton Stanford UCLA Vanderbilt Wisconsin Yale

Economics Departments and University Rankings by Chairmen. Hughes (1925) and Keniston (1957)

Post author By Irwin Collier
Post date 2019-04-09

The rankings of universities and departments of economics for 1920 and 1957 that are found below were based on the pooling of contemporary expert opinions. Because the ultimate question for both the Hughes and Keniston studies was the relative aggregate university standing with respect to graduate education, “The list did not include technical schools, like the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the California Institute of Technology, nor state colleges, like Iowa State, Michigan State or Penn State, since the purpose was to compare institutions which offered the doctorate in a wide variety of fields.” Hence, historians of economics will be frustrated by the conspicuous absence of M.I.T. and Carnegie Tech in the 1957 column except for the understated footnote “According to some of the chairmen there are strong departments at Carnegie Tech. and M.I.T.; also at Vanderbilt”.

The average perceived rank of a particular economics department relative to that of its university might be of use in assessing the negotiating position of department chairs with their respective university administrations. The observed movement within the perception league tables over the course of roughly a human generation might suggest other questions worth pursuing.

Anyhow without further apology…

______________________

About the Image: There is no face associated with rankings so I have chosen the legendary comedians Bud Abbott and Lou Costello for their “Who’s on First?” sketch. YouTube TV version; Radio version: Who’s on First? starts at 22:15

______________________

From Keniston’s Appendix (1959)

Standing of
American Graduate Departments
in the Arts and Sciences

The present study was undertaken as part of a survey of the Graduate School of the University of Pennsylvania in an effort to discover the present reputation of the various departments which offer programs leading to the doctorate.

A letter was addressed to the chairmen of departments in each of twenty-five leading universities of the country. The list was compiled on the basis of (1) membership in the Association of American Universities, (2) number of Ph.D.’s awarded in recent years, (3) geographical distribution. The list did not include technical schools, like the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the California Institute of Technology, nor state colleges, like Iowa State, Michigan State or Penn State, since the purpose was to compare institutions which offered the doctorate in a wide variety of fields.

Each chairman was asked to rate, on an accompanying sheet, the strongest departments in his field, arranged roughly as the first five, the second five and, if possible, the third five, on the basis of the quality of their Ph.D. work and the quality of the faculty as scholars. About 80% of the chairmen returned a rating. Since many of them reported the composite judgment of their staff, the total number of ratings is well over 500.

On each rating sheet, the individual institutions were given a score. If they were rated in order of rank, they were assigned numbers from 15 (Rank 1) to 1 (Rank 15). If they were rated in groups of five, each group alphabetically arranged, those in the top five were given a score of 13, in the second five a score of 8, and in the third five a score of 3. When all the ratings sheets were returned, the scores of each institution were tabulated and compiled and the institutions arranged in order, in accordance with the total score for each department.

To determine areas of strength or weakness, the departmental scores were combined to determine [four] divisional scores. [Divisions (Departments): Biological Sciences (2), Humanities (11), Physical Sciences (6), Social Sciences (5)]….

… Finally, the scores of each institution given in the divisional rankings were combined to provide an over-all rating of the graduate standing of the major universities.

From a similar poll of opinion, made by R. M. Hughes, A Study of the Graduate Schools of America, and published in 1925, [See the excerpt posted here at Economics in the Rear-view Mirror] it was possible to compile the scores for each of eighteen departments as they were ranked at that time and also to secure divisional and over-all rankings. These are presented here for the purpose of showing what changes have taken place in the course of a generation.

The limitations of such a study are obvious; the ranks reported do not reveal the actual merit of the individual departments. They depend on highly subjective impressions; they reflect old and new loyalties; they are subject to lag, and the halo of past prestige. But they do report the judgment of the men whose opinion is most likely to have weight. For chairmen, by virtue of their office, are the men who must know what is going on at other institutions. They are called upon to recommend schools where students in their field may profitably study; they must seek new appointments from the staff and graduates of other schools; their own graduates tum to them for advice in choosing between alternative possibilities for appointment. The sum of their opinions is, therefore, a fairly close approximation to what informed people think about the standing of the departments in each of the fields.

OVER-ALL STANDING
(Total Scores)

1925			1957
1.	Chicago	1543	1.	Harvard	5403
2.	Harvard	1535	2.	California	4750
3.	Columbia	1316	3.	Columbia	4183
4.	Wisconsin	886	4.	Yale	4094
5.	Yale	885	5.	Michigan	3603
6.	Princeton	805	5.	Chicago	3495
7.	Johns Hopkins	746	7.	Princeton	2770
8.	Michigan	720	8.	Wisconsin	2453
9.	California	712	9.	Cornell	2239
10.	Cornell	694	10.	Illinois	1934
11.	Illinois	561	11.	Pennsylvania	1784
12.	Pennsylvania	459	12.	Minnesota	1442
13.	Minnesota	430	13.	Stanford	1439
14.	Stanford	365	14.	U.C.L.A.	1366
15.	Ohio State	294	15.	Indiana	1329
16.	Iowa	215	16.	Johns Hopkins	1249
17.	Northwestern	143	17.	Northwestern	934
18.	North Carolina	57	18.	Ohio State	874
19.	Indiana	45	19.	N.Y.U.	801
			20.	Washington	759

ECONOMICS

1925			1957
1.	Harvard	92	1.	Harvard	298
2.	Columbia	75	2.	Chicago	262
3.	Chicago	65	3.	Yale	241
4.	Wisconsin	63	4.	Columbia	210
5.	Yale	42	5.	California	196
6.	Johns Hopkins	39	5.	Stanford	196
7.	Michigan	31	7.	Princeton	184
8.	Pennsylvania	29	8.	Johns Hopkins	178
9.	Illinois	27	9.	Michigan	174
10.	Cornell	25	10.	Minnesota	96
11.	Princeton	23	11.	Northwestern	70
12.	California	22	12.	Duke	69
13.	Minnesota	20	13.	Wisconsin	66
14.	Northwestern	18	14.	Pennsylvania	45
15.	Stanford	17	15.	Cornell	32
16.	Ohio State	15	16.	U.C.L.A.	31

According to some of the chairmen there are strong departments at Carnegie Tech. and M.I.T.; also at Vanderbilt.

Source: Hayward Keniston. Graduate Study and Research in the Arts and Sciences at the University of Pennsylvania (January 1959), pp. 115-119,129.

Berkeley Exam Questions Suggested Reading Syllabus

Berkeley. Syllabus and exams. Regulation and Antitrust. Woroch, 1996

Post author By Irwin Collier
Post date 2019-04-05

Every so often I plunge into the Wayback Machine to search for “ancient” economics course materials from as far back as the 1990’s. Today I return with a syllabus, suggested readings for presentations and for paper topics, and some final examination questions for what has/had been the traditional second course in the field of industrial organization that covers regulation and competition policy.

The course instructor at UC Berkeley was Glenn Woroch who had received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of California, Berkeley in 1983. According to his August 2013 homepage he taught that graduate course “Regulation and Antitrust” three times (Spring 1994, 1996, 1997).

__________________

Glenn Woroch: Short Bio

Dr. Glenn Woroch is Adjunct Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, and Executive Director of the Center for Research on Telecommunications Policy. Dr. Woroch is an internationally recognized expert in the economics of the telecommunications industry, and has served as a consultant to governments and the private sector on a wide range of telecommunications issues.
Dr. Woroch has published numerous articles on industrial organization, regulation, antitrust, corporate strategy and intellectual property. He served on the editorial boards of Information Economics & Policy, the Journal of Regulatory Economics, and Telecommunications Policy and was a founding member of the International Telecommunications Society.
Dr. Woroch is regularly retained as an economic expert witness on litigation matters involving monopolization claims, mergers, intellectual property infringement, and economic damages. Besides his expertise in telecommunications, Dr. Woroch has extensive experience in the broadcast and cable television, computer software, personal computer, computer networking, ecommerce, electric power and food and beverage industries. Dr. Woroch has been an economic advisor to government agencies including the U.S. Departments of Energy and Justice and the Office of Technology Assessment. In addition to his U.S. engagements, he has consulted to private and public sector clients in Latin America, the Pacific Rim and Western Europe.
Previously, Dr. Woroch taught economics at the University of Rochester and Stanford University, and was Senior Member of Technical Staff at GTE Laboratories. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics and M.A. in Statistics from Berkeley.

Source: Short bio of Glenn Woroch linked to his August 2013 webpage. Archived copy at the Wayback Machine internet archive.

__________________

Department of Economics
University of California
Economics 220B, Spring 1996
REGULATION & ANTITRUST
Glenn Woroch

Description. This is the second of two graduate courses in industrial organization. It will cover regulation and antitrust policy, concentrating on control of natural and artificial monopoly in theory
and in practice. Emphasis will be on theoretical developments although an occasional empirical study or case study will illustrate key points.

Instructor. Glenn Woroch, 669 Evans, 642-4308, glenn@econ.berkeley.edu.

Office hours: Wednesday, 2:30-4:00 PM.

Textbooks. No textbook is assigned for this course, but several books cover large portions of the material and have been put on reserve:

Sandy Berg and John Tschirhart, Natural Monopoly Regulation, Cambridge University Press.
Alfred Kahn, The Economics of Regulation, volumes I and II, (2nd edition) John Wiley, 199?.
Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, 1993.
William Sharkey, The Theory of Natural Monopoly, Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Daniel Spulber, Regulation and Markets, MIT Press, 1991.
Kenneth Train, Optimal Regulation, MIT Press, 1991.

Assignments. Students will select a paper, either one of the optional readings or a paper that we agree upon, and present it to the class. Each student will also write a paper of moderate length on a topic
related in some manner to the economics of regulation. I will distribute a list of suggested topics shortly. Lastly, there will be a final exam.

READING LIST

* – required, in reader. + – recommended for presentation.

I. NATURAL MONOPOLY AND ITS REGULATION

1. Natural Monopoly

* Panzar, J., “Technological determinants of firm and industry
structure,” Chapter 1 in Handbook of Industrial Organization, (Vol.
1) North-Holland, 1989.
* Faulhaber, G., “Cross-subsidization: pricing in public enterprises,”
American Economic Review, 1975.
Baumol, W., “On the proper cost tests for natural monopoly in a
multiproduct industry,” American Economic Review, December 1977.
Faulhaber, G., and S. Levinson, “Subsidy free prices and anonymous
equity,” American Economic Review, 1981.
+ Evans, D. and J. Heckman, “Multiproduct cost function estimates and
natural monopoly tests for the Bell System,” in Breaking Up Bell,
edited by David Evans, 1983.

2. Efficient Pricing

* Baumol, W. and D. Bradford (1970), “Optimal departures from marginal
cost pricing,” American Economic Review, June.
* Willig, R., “Pareto-superior nonlinear outlay schedules,” Bell
Journal of Economics, 1979.
Baumol, W., E. Bailey and R. Willig, “Weak invisible hand theorems on
the sustainability of prices in a multiproduct monopoly, American
Economic Review, 1977.
Braeutigam, R., “Optimal policies for natural monopoly,” in Handbook
of Industrial Organization, (Vol. 2) 1989.
+ Brock, W., and W.D. Dechert, “Dynamic Ramsey pricing,” William Brock
and W. D. Dechert, International Economic Review, October 1985.
+ Braeutigam, R., “Optimal pricing with intermodal competition,”
American Economic Review, 38-49, 1979.
+ Panzar, J., “The Pareto domination of usage-sensitive pricing,” in
Proceedings of the 6th Telecommunications Policy Research
Conference, H. Dordick (ed.) 1979.

3. Reality Check: Alternative Explanations of Regulatory Policy

* Stigler, G., “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” The Bell Journal of
Economics, 1971.
* Peltzman, S., “The economic theory of regulation after a decade of
deregulation,” Brookings Papers: Microeconomics, 1989.
* Joskow, P., “Pricing decision of regulated firms: a behavioral
approach, Bell Journal of Economics, 1973.
Peltzman, S., “Towards a more general theory of regulation,” Journal
of Law & Economics.
Noll, R., “Economic perspectives on the politics of regulation,” in
Handbook of Industrial Organization (Vol. 2) 1989.
Posner, R., “Taxation by regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics,
1971.
+ Winston, C., “Economic deregulation: days of reckoning for
microeconomists,” Journal of Economic Literature, September 1993.

II. REGULATION IN PRACTICE

1. Rate of Return Regulation

* Baumol, W. and A. Klevorick, “Input choices and rate of return
regulation: an over of the discussion,” Bell Journal of Economics,
1970.
* Averch, H. and L. Johnson, “Behavior of the firm under regulatory
constraint,” American Economic Review, December, 1962.
* Spence, A.M., “Monopoly, quality and regulation,” Bell Journal of
Economics, Autumn 1975.
+ Petersen, C., “An empirical test of regulatory effects,” Bell Journal
of Economics, Spring 1975.
+ Bailey, E., “Regulation and innovation,” Journal of Public Economics,
December 1974.

2. Contracting vs. Administration

* Demsetz, H., “Why regulate utilities?” Journal of Law & Economics,
1968
* Goldberg, V., “Regulation and administered contracts,” Bell Journal
of Economics, 1976.
* Williamson, O., “Franchise bidding for natural monopoly: in general
and with respect to CATV, Bell Journal of Economics, 1976.”
+ Zupan, M. “The efficacy of franchise bidding schemes in the case of
cable TV: Some systematic evidence,” Journal of Law and Economics,
October 1989.

3. Price Cap and Benchmark Regulation

* Brennan, T., “Regulation by capping prices,” Journal of Regulatory
Economics, 1989.
* Brauetigam, R., and J. Panzer, “Effects of the change from rate of
return to price cap regulation,” American Economic Review, 1993.
* Shleiffer, A. “A theory of yardstick competition,” Rand Journal of
Economics, 1985.
Vogelsang, I., “Price cap regulation of telecommunications services:
a long-run,” Rand Report, 1988.
+ Cabral, L. And M. Riordan, “Incentives for cost reduction under price
cap regulation,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1989.
+ Sappington, D., and D. Sibley, “Strategic nonlinear pricing under
price-cap regulation,” Rand Journal of Economics, Spring 1992.
+ Armstrong, M., S, Cowan and J. Vickers, “Nonlinear pricing and price
cap regulation,” Journal of Public Economics, September 1995.

III. DESIGN OF OPTIMAL REGULATORY MECHANISMS

1. Iterative and Dynamic Mechanisms

* Vogelsang, I. and J. Finsinger, “A regulatory adjustment process for
optimal pricing by multiproduct monopoly firms, Bell Journal of
Economics, 1979.
* Sappington, D., “Strategic firm behavior under a dynamic regulatory
adjustment process,” Bell Journal of Economics, Spring, 1980.
Salant, D., and G. Woroch, “Trigger price regulation,” Rand Journal
of Economics, Spring 1992.
+ Gilbert, R., and D. Newbery, “The dynamic efficiency of regulatory
constitutions,”Rand Journal of Economics, Winter 1994.
+ Blackmon, G., and R. Zeckhauser, “Fragile commitments and the
regulatory process,” Yale Journal on Regulation, 9:1, Winter, 1992.
+ Logan, J., R. Masson and R. Reynolds, “Efficient regulation with
little information: reality in the limit?” International Economic
Review, 30:4 November 1989.

2. Agency Approach

* Loeb, M., and W. Magat, “A decentralized method for utility
regulation,” Journal of Law & Economics, 1979.
* Baron, D., and R. Myerson, “Regulating a monopolist with unknown
costs,” Econometrica, July 1982.
* Laffont, J.-J., “The new economics of regulation ten years after,”
Econometrica, 1994.
Laffont, J.-J., and J. Tirole, “Using cost observation to regulate
firms,” Journal of Political Economy, 1986.
Baron, D., “Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions,” in
Handbook of Industrial Organization, (Vol. 2), 1989.
+ Lewis, T., and D. Sappington, “Regulating a monopolist with unknown
demand,” American Economic Review, December 1988.
+ Wolak, F., “An econometric analysis of the asymmetric information
regulator-utility interaction,” draft.

IV. DEREGULATION

1. Regulation with Horizontal Competition

+ Auriole, E., and J.-J. Laffont, “Regulation by duopoly,” Journal of
Economic Management and Strategy, 1993.
+ Riordan, M., “Regulation and preemptive technology adoption,” Rand
Journal, Autumn 1992.
Biglaiser, G., and A. Ma, “Regulating a dominant firm: unknown demand
and industry structure.” Rand Journal of Economics, Spring 1995.

2. Regulation with Vertical Competition

* Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole, “Optimal bypass and creamskimming,”
American Economic Review, 1990.
* Panzar, J., “Sustainability, efficiency and vertical integration,” in
Regulated Industries and Public Enterpirse, edited by Paul
Kelindorfer and Bridger Mitchell, 1979.
Vickers, J., “Competition and regulation in vertically-related
markets,” Review of Economic Studies, January 1995.
Baumol, W. “Some Subtle Pricing Issues in Railroad Regulation,”
International Journal of Transport Economics, August 1983.
+ Gilbert, R., and M. Riordan, “Regulating complementary products: a
problem of institutional choice,” Rand Journal of Economics, 1995.
+ Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole, “Access pricing and interconnection,”
European Economic Review, 1994.

VI. ANTITRUST POLICY

1. Predation

* McGee, John, (1958), “Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil
(N.J.) Case,” Journal of Law and Economics, pp. 137-169.
* Ordover, J., and G. Saloner, “Predation, monopolization and
antitrust,” chapter 9 in Handbook of Industrial Organization,
(Vol. 2) 1989.
Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts, “Limit pricing and entry under
incomplete inforamtion: an equilibrium analysis,” Econometrica,
1982.
Ordover, J., and R. Willig, “An economic definition of predation:
pricing and product innovation,” Yale Law Journal, 1981.

2. Merger to Monopoly

* Department of Justice, “The Merger Guidelines.”
* Farrell, J., and C. Shapiro, “Horizontal mergers,” American Economic
Review.
+ Baker, J., and T. Bresnahan, (1985), “The Gains from Merger or
Collusion in Product Differentiated Industries,” Journal of
Industrial Economics, 33:4, pp. 427.

3. Exclusion and Foreclosure

* Krattenmaker, T., and S. Salop, “Anticompetitive exclusion: raising
rivals’ costs to achieve power over price,” Yale Law Journal, 1986.
* Ordover, J., G. Saloner, and S. Salop, “Equilibrium Vertical
Foreclosure,” American Economic Review, 1990.
Ordover, J., A. O. Sykes and R. Willig, “Nonprice Anticompetitive
Behavior by Dominant Firms toward the Producers of Complementary
Products,” in Antitrust Regulation: Essays in Memory of John J.
McGowan, Franklin Fisher (ed.), 1985
Whinston, M., “Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion,” American Economic
Review, 1990.
+ Salinger, M., “Vertical mergers and market foreclosure,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 1988.
+ Economides, N., and G. Woroch, “Interconnection and foreclosure of
network competition,” draft, 1995.

Source: Spring Semester 1996 syllabus archived at the Wayback Machine.

________________________

Department of Economics
University of California
Economics 220B, Spring 1996
ADDITIONAL READINGS FOR PRESENTATIONS
Glenn Woroch

Lawrence Pulley and Yale Braunstein, “A Composite cost function for multiproduct firms with an application to economies of scope in banking,” Review of Economics & Statistics, 1992.

Besanko, David and Donnefeld, Shabtai, and Lawrence J. White, “The Multiproduct Firm, Quality Choice, and Regulation,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 1990, vol. 36, pp. 411-429.

Ma, Ching-to Albert and James Burgess, “Regulation, Quality Competition, and Price in the Hospital Industry,” mimeo, 1991.

Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole, “‘A Signal-Jamming’ Theory of Predation,” Bell Journal of Economics, 1986, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 366-376.

Ordover, Janusz and Robert Willig, “Antitrust for High Technology Industries: Assessing Research Joint Ventures and Mergers,” Journal of Law and Economics, 1985, vol. 28, pp. 311-333.

Guerin-Calvert, Margaret, “Vertical Integration as a Threat to Competition: Airline Computer Reservations Systems,” in L. White and J. Kwoka Jr. (eds.), The Antitrust Revolution, (pp. 338-370). 1989.

Sappington, David, and David Sibley, “Regulating without cost information: the incremental surplus subsidy scheme,” International Economic Review, 29:2, May 1988.

Frank Matthewson and Ralph Winter, “An economic theory of vertical restraints,” Rand Journal of Economics.

Ralph Bradburd, “Privatization of natural monopoly public enterprises: the regulation issue,” Review of Industrial Organization, 1995, 247-67.

Michael Whinston, “Tying foreclosure and exclusion,” American Economic Review, Sept 1990.

Paul Joskow and Richard Schmalensee, “Incentive regulation for electric utilities,” Yale Journal on Regulation, 4:1, Fall 1986.

Baron, David, “Price regulation, quality and asymmetric information,”American Economic Review, March 1981.

Harris, R., and E. Weins, “Government enterprise: an instrument for the internal regulation of industry,” Canadian Journal of Economics, February 1980.

Source: Additional Readings for Presentations from the Spring Semester 1996 archived at the Wayback Machine.

________________________

Department of Economics
University of California
Economics 220B, Spring 1996
SUGGESTIONS FOR TERM PAPER TOPICS
Glenn Woroch

The miscellaneous topics listed below are intended to get you thinking about a term paper. Most are applications to specific industries or specific regulatory policies. There are many more possibilities for research in theoretical aspects of regulation.

Problems of erecting incentives for efficient investment and operation of natural monopoly facilities placed under common ownership in a specific case such as an electric power grid or an internet backbone.

Efficient design of auctions to assign rights to common property resources such as radio spectrum or mineral/grazing rights.

Compare the trend toward re-emergence of end-to-end monopoly in telephone with the vertical divestiture in electric power in terms of the tradeoff between vertical economies and anticompetitive behavior.

Efficient design of duopoly policy in markets that are potentially natural monopoly (e.g., cellular telephone)

The increased concentration of hospitals and HMOs through mergers and joint ventures and the implications for the price and availability of health services.

Potential of labor and management sharing in the rents that accrue in trucking, railroad or other regulated industries.

Motivation and long-run sustainability of bypass in the natural gas distribution industry under different regulatory regimes.

Winners and losers from price ceilings, rationing and strategic reserves in the market for oil and gas.

Effectiveness of different ratemaking practices (e.g., ROR vs. price caps) to encourage adoption of new technologies in a specific industry (e.g., electric power, telephone, health care).

Apply principles of economic models of regulation to understand the passage of a particular piece of legislation that regulates, deregulates or re-regulates an industry (e.g., Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Cable Act of 1992, Telecom Act of 1996).

Cross country comparison (e.g., U.S. vs. Japan) of policy formation on a specific regulatory issue (e.g., regulation of nuclear power or deregulation of telephones), and the relation between the outcome and the possibilities for rent seeking under the different political systems.

Policy alternatives toward a dominant firm that achieves a de facto standard in an industry exhibiting strong complementaries among component products (e.g., Microsoft and Intel).

The use of structural separations or Chinese walls to guard against leveraging market power into complementary product markets.

Compare performance of public enterprises relative to regulated private firms within or across industries (e.g., water, electric power, cable TV, airlines) and relate to management incentives and/or regulatory policies.

Success of regulatory policy that uses a government-owned firm to compete against a dominant private firm.

The relative effectiveness of alternative regulatory mechanisms to elicit relevant information, e.g., yardstick vs. iterative mechanisms.

Success of privatization initiatives based on the nature of the post-privatization regulatory scheme especially with regards to rate regulation and the ease of competitive entry.

Creating efficient incentives for disposal of nuclear and other kinds of hazardous waste.

Tradeoff between efficiency and anti-competitiveness of mergers/alliances/joint ventures among local/long distance/cable/wireless companies aimed at exploiting multimedia opportunities.

Comparison of solutions to pricing interconnection sold to competitors across different industries (e.g., phone v. electric power) or for a single industry across different countries.

________________________

Department of Economics
University of California
Economics 220B
Glenn Woroch

TAKEHOME FINAL EXAM
Spring 1996

INSTRUCTIONS: Answer each of the first four questions and then choose just one of the last two questions In each case keep you answers concise. Due the end of business on Friday, May 17th.

Suppose that all firms have available the technology characterized by the cost function:

C(y1, y2) = a y1 + b y2 + c max {y1, y2}

where y1 and y2 are quantities of the two goods, 1 and 2. Further suppose that the market demand for y1 exceeds that for y2 at all relevant output prices.

(a) For y1 > y2 > 0, determine whether this cost function exhibits economies of scope, economies of scale over the entire product set, economies of scale specific to good 1 or economies of scale specific to good 2.

(b) Find the first-best output price for the industry to charge for the two goods. Determine the configuration of firms in the industry that products the corresponding industry wide outputs at least cost for the industry.

(c) Prove that the industry configuration and prices given in you answer to part (b) satisfies the requirements of sustainability

(d) Describe in words what kinds of circumstances might lead to cost functions like this one.

A regulated firm produces two products: A and B. The firm is required by regulators to earn no more than is necessary to cover its operating costs plus a competitive return on invested capital.
Assume that product B exhibits constant marginal cost of production equal to cB.

(a) Describe the solution to the Ramsey pricing problem. In the process be certain to make explicit whatever demand and cost assumptions you need to support your answer.

(b) Now suppose that an unlimited number of unregulated firms can enter into the market for product B at a constant marginal cost of cE where cE > cB. How does this affect the regulated firm’s pricing, and what is the effect on consumer welfare?

(c) Now suppose that cE < cB. Demonstrate that the regulated firm might gain by selling product B at a price (slightly) below cE.

(d) Since, in general, the regulator does not know the relative sizes of cB and cE , what are the pros and cons of allowing the regulated firm to produce B?

Many schemes for regulating natural monopolies have been tried, and many more have been proposed. Listed below are some the schemes studied in this class.

(i) Rate-of-return regulation
(ii) Vogelsang-Finsinger iterative mechanism
(iii) Yardstick regulation
(iv) Price cap regulation
(v) Demsetz-type franchise auction

Choose two off of this list, and compare their relative merits in terms of each of the following criteria:

(a) short-run allocative efficiency,
(b) speed and likelihood of achieving first/second best outcomes over the long run,
(c) cross subsidization across products
(d) the rents that accrue to producers,
(e) vulnerability to political influence by producers and/or consumers,
(f) incentives to invest in cost-reducing innovations,
(g) informational requirements for implementing the mechanism.

[WARNING: THIS PROBLEM HAD SPECIAL CHARACTERS THAT DID NOT SURVIVE THE ASCII FORMAT SAVE. WHERE YOU SEE A “z”, I HAVE ONLY GUESSED.] Consider the application of the Baron-Myerson Bayesian incentive mechanism to the following special situation. Suppose that production requires an unknown constant marginal cost and a
known fixed cost: C(y, z) = z y + F, where z is distributed uniformly over the unit interval [0,1]. Let demand for the single product be linear: D(p) = a – bp. Assume that a/b > 1. Finally, assume that the weight attached to consumer surplus, V(p(z),t(z)), is one and the weight attached to firm z’s profit is � where 0 < � < 1.

(a) Find the optimal two-part pricing rule: p(z), t(z). What values do they take on at the extreme of least cost z = 0 and at highest cost z = 1?

(b) At the optimal solution compute the consumer surplus and the firm’s profit as a function of . Again find the values they take on at the extreme of least cost = 0 and at highest cost = 1.

(d) Compute the profit-maximizing uniform price p(z). Find values for z and for which this unregulated monopoly price is less than the regulated price.

Choose one of the following industries and periods:

(i) Electric power generation and distribution in the 1960s
(ii) Long distance telephone service in the 1970s
(iii) Passenger air transportation in the 1980s
(iv) For-profit hospitals in the 1990s

In that case describe what economic research has to say about the presence of economies of scale and scope, vertical economies and the prevalence of transactions costs. Describer the predominant form of regulation in that industry during that period in the U.S. Evaluate the match between the cost conditions and the form of regulation based on efficiency criteria.

Intense debate has broken out over the years over whether certain industry practices represent an efficient response to market conditions, or an expression of anti-competitive behavior. Identify one of the following practices:

(i) predatory pricing
(ii) exclusive dealing
(iii) product bundling or tying
(iv) resale price maintenance

For the practice that you chose, describe the current antitrust treatment based on court decisions and policies of antitrust authorities. (These may not be unambiguous.) Report the positions of the different sides of the debate, especially the arguments that view the practice as efficiency enhancing and as competitively harmful. Make a persuasive argument for one of these two positions, or for a third position.

Source: Takehome Final Exam from the Spring Semester 1996 archived at the Wayback Machine.

________________________

Department of Economics
University of California
Economics 220B
Glenn Woroch

FINAL EXAM
Spring 1994

INSTRUCTIONS: The exam has FOUR parts. Please answer each one. To
guide your time allocation, a total of 100 points is distributed as
follows:

Part I: 24 points (= 6 x 4 points)
Part II: 30 points
Part III: 28 points
Part IV: 18 points

Answer TRUE or FALSE and EXPLAIN with 2 or 3 sentences.
1. If an industry configuration is sustainable, then
  production is cost efficient.
2. A Ramsey price vector is necessarily subsidy free.
3. In Peltzman’s private interest model applied to monopoly
  regulation, price obeys an inverse elasticity rule typical
  of efficiency but income distribution may be skewed.
4. In Joskow’s behavioral model of rate-of-return regulation,
  rate reviews do not occur when unit costs are rising.
5. Producer and consumer surplus increase with the HH Index in
  a Cournot oligopoly.
6. The so-called “double markup” that results from monopoly
  power at both the manufacturing and the retail levels can
  be eliminated with a two-part tariff.

Two schemes that are designed to regulate natural monopoly
are:

(i) Rate-of-return regulation
(ii) Vogelsang-Finsinger iterative mechanism

Evaluate each of the schemes relative to the unregulated
outcome in terms of their effects on:

(a) short-run allocative efficiency,
(b) the rents that accrue to producers,
(c) the welfare of consumers.

Auctioning off monopoly franchises has often been proposed
as a way to inject some competition into natural monopoly
markets.

1. In terms of economic efficiency, compare the following two
  rules for awarding the franchise: give it to the bidder
  with the most attractive price-service-quality package, or
  give it to the bidder that offers the largest cash payment
  for the franchise.
2. What are the informational requirements needed to implement
  the schemes proposed by Demsetz and by Loeb and Magat?
3. What difficulties arise over the course of the franchise
  contract that hamper the performance of this scheme?
4. Under what conditions will the outcome be improved as the
  length of the firm-regulator relationship becomes infinite?

Consider the Baron-Myerson approach to regulating a firm
with private cost information. For concreteness, let the
cost function of the firm be C(y,b) which is increasing
in output of the good y and a cost parameter b.

1. What is meant by an “information rent”? How is it paid to
the firm in the Baron-Myerson scheme?

2. In what sense does a cross subsidization occur across
different cost realizations?

3. What additional features do Laffont and Tirole build into
their model of regulation that generalizes Baron-Myerson?
How does their pricing optimum differ?

Source: Wayback Machine Archived copy June 1, 2002.

Image Source: Glenn A. Woroch’s Berkeley webpage (modified 13 Jan 1999). Archived copy at the Wayback Machine internet archive.

Tags Woroch

Berkeley Carnegie Institute of Technology Columbia Economist Market Modigliani Ohio State Salaries

Columbia. Economist salaries below market. Examples of Modigliani and James W. Ford, 1956

Post author By Irwin Collier
Post date 2018-10-28

The following letter provides interesting testimony to Franco Modigliani‘s market value in 1956 as well as how A. G. Hart hoped to offer Modigliani’s other offers together with an offer extended to James William Ford (Harvard economics Ph.D., 1954) by Ohio State University as evidential ammunition in the economics department plea for a significant increase in Columbia University salaries to remain competitive.

_________________

COPY

[Stamp: Office of the Vice President, July 13, 1956, Columbia University]

July 8, 1956

Prof. Carl S. Shoup
Executive Officer
Department of Economics
503 Fayerweather

Dear Professor Shoup:

This is to give further background on the scrap of evidence about the adequacy of Columbia University salary scales that is offered by Franco Modigliani’s comment on our offer of a visiting professorship for next year. As your note points out, the interpretation hinges largely on his professional status.

Against our offer of $10,000 for a one-year visit, as I read Modigliani’s letter with its gentlemanly absence of specific figures, he was offered $12,000 for a year as visiting professor at Harvard and at least $12,500 as permanent professor at Berkeley, and settled for (I take it) $12,000 to stay at Carnegie Tech. His age is 37 or 38, I believe, and he has been professor for two or three years at Carnegie Tech.

Modigliani’s reputation is established, but not very wide. He has published several distinguished articles, and has important work in progress; but his only book publication to date has been a collaboration with Neisser. Furthermore, he has lacked the backing of the major graduate schools (being an immigrant with a doctorate from the New School), and has thus tended to be undervalued by the market. Besides, he suffered a setback because he had the misfortune to be in the thick of the fracas at the University of Illinois. When working conditions there became intolerable, he felt such an unconditional urge to leave that he sacrificed the bargaining power of his tenure there as associate professor. At the time he went to Carnegie Tech, he could not command a tenure appointment but went on a term arrangement which however it took them only a few months to convert to an appointment with tenure.

In short, here is the kind of man we will want when next we have an appointment to make—and undervalued rather than overvalued on the national economics market—and our salary scale is at least $2500 below what he can command at good centers with about our teaching load, and with a lower cost of living. Another interesting comparison has come in meanwhile. James Ford, whom we let go from a Columbia instructorship to be assistant professor at Vanderbilt, writes that he has refused a post at Ohio State as associate professor at $8100. This is for a man of about the caliber and stage of development we think suitable for an assistant professorship at Columbia. We must be a good $1500 below the market at that level, if this is evidence.

Very truly yours,
/s/ Albert Gailord Hart
Professor of Economics

Source: Columbia University Archives, Rare Book and Manuscript Library. Central Files, 1890-, Box 400. Folder “Shoup, Carl Sumner (2/2); 1/1956—6/1948”.

Image Source: Franco Modigliani, from MIT Museum website.

Tags FordJW, HartAG, Modigliani, Neisser, Shoup

Berkeley Chicago Columbia Cornell Economics Programs Economists Harvard Illinois Johns Hopkins Michigan Minnesota Northwestern Ohio State Pennsylvania Princeton Stanford Toronto Wisconsin Yale

Economics Graduate Programs Ranked in 1925

Post author By Irwin Collier
Post date 2018-09-14

Filed away in the archived records of the University of Chicago’s Office of the President is a copy of a report from January 1925 from Miami University (Ohio) that was based on a survey of college and university professors to obtain a rank ordering of graduate programs in different fields. The following ordering for economics graduate programs 1924-25 is based on two dozen responses. I have added institutional affiliations from the AEA membership list of the time and a few internet searches. The study was designed to have a rough balance between college and university professors and a broad geographic representation. What the study lacks in sophistication will amuse you in its presumption.

_____________________

This rating was prepared in the following way: The members of the Miami University faculty representing twenty fields of instruction were called together and a list of the universities which conceivably might be doing high grade work leading to a doctor’s degree in one or more subjects was prepared on their advice. Each professor was then requested to submit a list of from forty to sixty men who were teaching his subject in colleges and universities in this country, at least half of the names on the list to be those of professors in colleges rather than in universities. It was further agreed that the list should be fairly well distributed geographically over the United States. [p. 3]

ECONOMICS

Ratings submitted by: John H. Ashworth [Maine] , Lloyd V. Ballard [Beloit], Gilbert H. Barnes [Chicago], Clarence E. Bonnett [Tulane], John E. Brindley [Iowa State], E. J. Brown [Arizona], J. W. Crook [Amherst], Ira B. Cross [California], Edmund E. Day [Michigan], Herbert Feis [ILO], Frank A. Fetter [Princeton], Eugene Gredier, Lewis H. Haney [N.Y.U.], Wilbur O. Hedrick [Michigan State], Floyd N. House [Chicago], Walter E. Lagerquist [Northwestern], W. E. Leonard, L. C. Marshall [Chicago], W. C. Mitchell [Columbia], C. T. Murchison [North Carolina], Tipton A. Snavely [Virginia], E. T. Towne [North Dakota], J. H. Underwood [Montana], M. S. Wildman [Stanford].

Combined Ratings: (24)

	1	2	3	4-5
Harvard	20	4	0	0
Columbia	11	9	2	1
Chicago	9	7	3	2
Wisconsin	8	7	4	2
Yale	3	3	9	3
Johns Hopkins	2	4	8	3
Michigan	0	6	4	5
Pennsylvania	0	3	6	8
Illinois	0	5	4	4
Cornell	0	2	7	5
Princeton	2	1	4	4
California	0	3	4	5
Minnesota	0	2	4	6
Northwestern	0	2	3	6
Stanford	0	1	4	6
Ohio State	0	1	2	8
Toronto	0	2	2	3

Staffs:

HARVARD: F.W. Taussig, E.F. Gay, T.N. Carver, W.Z. Ripley, C.J. Bullock, A.A. Young, W.M. Persons, A.P. Usher, A.S. Dewing, W.J. Cunningham, T.H. Sanders, W.M. Cole, A.E. Monroe, H.H. Burbank, A.H. Cole, J. H. Williams, W.L. Crum, R.S. Meriam.

COLUMBIA: R.E. Chaddock, F.H. Giddings, S.M. Lindsay, W.C. Mitchell, H.L. Moore, W. Fogburn, H.R. Seager, E.R.A. Seligman, V.G. Sinkhovitch, E.E. Agger, Emilie J. Hutchinson, A.A. Tenney, R.G. Tugwell, W.E. Weld.

CHICAGO: L.C. Marshall, C.W. Wright, J.A. Field, H.A. Millis, J.M. Clark, Jacob Viner, L. W. Mints, W.H. Spencer, N.W. Barnes, C.C. Colby, P.H. Douglas, J.O. McKinsey, E.A. Duddy, A.C. Hodge, L.C. Sorrell.

WISCONSIN: Commons, Elwell, Ely Garner, Gilman, Hibbard, Kiekhofer, Macklin, Scott, Kolb, McMurry, McNall, Gleaser, Jamison, Jerome, Miller, S. Perlman.

YALE: Olive Day, F.R. Fairchild, R.B. Westerfield, T.S. Adams, A.L. Bishop, W.M. Daniels, Irving Fisher, E.S. Furniss, A.H. Armbruster, N.S. Buck.

JOHNS HOPKINS: W.W. Willoughby, Goodnow, W.F. Willoughby, Thach, Latane.

MICHIGAN: Rodkey, Van Sickle, Peterson, Goodrich, Sharfman, Griffin, May, Taylor, Dickinson, Paton, Caverly, Wolaver.

PENNSYLVANIA: E.R. Johnson, E.S. Mead, S.S. Heubner, T. Conway, H.W. Hess, E.M. Patterson, G.G. Huebner, H.T. Collings, R. Riegel, C.K. Knight, W.P. Raine, F. Parker, R.T. Bye, W.C. Schluter, J.H. Willits, A.H. Williams, R.S. Morris, C.P. White, F.E. Williams, H.J. Loman, C.A. Kulp, S.H. Patterson, E.L. McKenna, W.W. Hewett, F.G. Tryon, H.S. Person, L.W. Hall.

ILLINOIS: Bogart, Robinson, Thompson, Weston, Litman, Watkins, Hunter, Wright, Norton.

CORNELL: W.F. Willcox, H.J. Davenport, D. English, H.L. Reed, S.H. Slichter, M.A. Copeland, S. Kendrick.

PRINCETON: F.A. Fetter, E.W. Kemmerer, G.B. McClellan, D.A. McCabe, F.H. Dixon, S.E. Howard, F.D. Graham.

CALIFORNIA: I.B. Cross, S. Daggett, H.R. Hatfield, J.B. Peixotte, C.C. Plehm, L.W. Stebbins, S. Blum, A.H. Mowbray, N.J. Silberling, C.C. Staehling, P.F. Cadman, F. Fluegel, B.N. Grimes, P.S. Taylor, Helen Jeter, E.T. Grether.

MINNESOTA: G.W. Dorwie, J.D. Black, R.G. Blakey, F.B. Garver, N.S.B. Gras, J.S. Young, A.H. Hansen, B.D. Mudgett, J.E. Cummings, E.A. Heilman, H.B Price, J.J. Reighard, J.W. Stehman, H. Working, C.L. Rotzell, W.R. Myers.

NORTHWESTERN: Deibler, Heilman, Secrist, Bailey, Pooley, Eliot, Ray Curtis, Bell, Hohman, Fagg.

STANFORD: M.S. Wildman, W.S. Beach, E. Jones, H.L. Lutz, A.C. Whitaker, J.G. Davis, A.E. Taylor, J.B. Canning.

OHIO STATE: M.B. Hammond, H.G. Hayes, A.B. Wolf, H.F. Waldradt, C.O. Ruggles, W.C. Weidler, J.A. Fisher, H.E. Hoagland, H.H. Maynard, C.A. Dice, M.E. Pike, J.A. Fitzgerald, F.E. Held, M.N. Nelson, R.C. Davis, C.W. Reeder, T.N. Beckman.

Compiled with the assistance of J.B. Dennison, associate professor of economics.

Source: Raymond Mollyneaux Hughes, A Study of the Graduate Schools of America. Oxford, OH: Miami University (January 1925), pp. 14-15. Copy from University of Chicago. Office of the President. Harper, Judson and Burton Administrations. Records, Box 47, Folder #5 “Study of the Graduate Schools of America”, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago.

Image Source: Four prize winners in annual beauty show, Washington Bathing Beach, Washington, D.C. from the U. S. Library of Congress. Prints & Photographs. http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/cph.3b43364

Berkeley Chicago Economists Germany Harvard New School Princeton

Harvard. Curriculum vitae submitted by Albert O. Hirschman, ca. 1942

Post author By Irwin Collier
Post date 2018-08-06

One of those serendipitous finds in rummaging through a department’s correspondence in search of one thing (curricular material in my case) is the artifact transcribed for this post, a c.v. submitted to the Harvard department of economics by a 27 or 28 year old Rockefeller Foundation fellow, O. Albert Hirschmann. It is written in a narrative, autobiographical style as was the custom in Europe of the time. Because I had the great pleasure of having worked as Albert O. Hirschman’s assistant at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton during the 1980-81 academic year, I photographed his early c.v. in an act of filial piety. Of course all this and more can be found in the prize-winning biography written by Jeremy Adelman: Worldly Philosopher: The Odyssey of Albert O. Hirschman. Princeton University Press, 2013. Nonetheless, the c.v. possesses the charm of being the original words chosen by Hirschman to market himself back when he was just one of dozens of European economist émigrés looking for steady work.

Thanks to Adelman’s book I learned (p. 203) that one of my Yale mentors, William Fellner, taught a general seminar on the principles of economics at Berkeley that Albert Hirschman took during his Rockefeller Foundation fellowship. Historically speaking, it’s a small world!

__________________

O. Albert Hirschmann
1751 Highland Place
Berkeley, Calif.

CURRICULUM VITAE

I was born on April 7^th, 1915, in Berlin. My nationality is Lithuanian. In 1932 I began to study law and economics at the University of Berlin. In April, 1933, I left for Paris, where I registered at the École des Hautes Études Commerciales (H.E.C.) and at the Institut de Statistiques de l’Université de Paris at the Sorbonne. In 1935 I had obtained the diplomas of both these institutions.

At the end of 1935, I went to England, in order to study for several months at the London School of Economics and Political Science under a scholarship granted to me by the International Student Service, which had already granted to me by the International Student Service, which had already helped me during my former studies. I had courses with Professors Robbins [1898-1984], T. E. Gregory [1890-1970] and B. A. Whale [Philip Barrett Whale, 1898-1950]. I worked in particular under Mr. Whale on French monetary policy since the stabilization of the Franc.

At the end of 1936, after a short stay at Paris, I applied for, and obtained a place as an assistant at the Institute of Statistics of the University of Trieste. I remained there until the middle of 1938, when I was compelled to return to Paris because of the anti-foreign and anti-semitic policy of the Fascist government. At Trieste, I worked under Professor P. Luzzatto-Fegiz [1900-1989]. I became much interested in Population Statistics and a part of my researches in this field was published in an article in the Giornale degli Economisti, January, 1938: “Nota su due recenti tavole di nuzialità della popolazione italiana.” (“A note on two recent nuptiality tables of the Italian population”.) I worked also on several problems of economic statistics and in particular on the statistics of the national income and of family budgets. At the same time I studied for my Doctor’s degree, which I obtained with the grade 120 points in a total of 120, in June, 1938. My thesis was a continuation and an expansion of the work on French monetary policy which I had begun at the London School of Economics. The thesis was to be printed in the Annals of the University, but this was rendered impossible by the subsequent political developments.

While still in Italy, during the first months of 1938, I tried to acquaint myself thoroughly with the Italian financial and economic situation. I finally sent an extensive report to Paris, which was published as a separate booklet, without naming the author, in June, 1938, by the Bulletin Quotidien de la Société d’Études et d’Informations Économiques, under the title: “Les Finances et l’Économie Italiennes – Situation actuelle et perspectives.” This report attracted some attention in Paris because by combining data from various sources I had thrown some light on the Italian economic and financial development which was surrounded by official secrecy. It was upon this report that Professor Charles Rist [1874-1955] offered me to collaborate in his Institut de Recherches Économiques et Sociales. Italy was my special field and from July, 1938, to April, 1940, I wrote regularly three-monthly reports on Italian economic development in L’Activité Économique, which was the publication of the Institute.

I also wrote a small booklet for the above named Bulletin Quotidian on the subject: “L’Industrie Textile Italienne et l’Autarcie.”

In November, 1938, Professor J. B. Condliffe [1891-1981], who was then acting as the director of studies for the International Studies Conference at Bergen, and in this capacity was organizing an international inquiry into the national systems of exchange control, entrusted me with the preparation of a report on the exchange control system of Italy. I also worked on other problems in connection with the Conference and, in particular, devised a new method of measuring the tendency toward bilateralism as completely distinct from the tendency towards equilibrium of foreign trade. Professor Condliffe encouraged me to write a small paper on this idea, and thus I presented two reports at the international Studies Conference at Bergen in 1939: (1) “Le Contrôle des Changes en Italie”—a report of ninety mimeographed pages by the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, which for various reasons was not signed, (2) “Étude Statistique de la Tendance du Commerce International [extérieur] Vers l’Équilibre et le Bilatéralisme”—a shorter paper also mimeographed and signed. A recent publication of the U.S. Tariff Commission on “Italian Commercial Policy (1922 – 1940)” has made an extensive use of my report on Italian Exchange Control, whereas Professor Condliffe has quoted my figures on bilateralism in his book “The Reconstruction of World Trade”.

I had registered as a volunteer for the French Army in case of war, in April, 1939. I was called as early as August, 1939. The stationary character of the war gave me the opportunity to prepare still two reports on the Italian economy, the necessary source-material being sent from Paris. After the armistice, in July, 1940, I was demobilized at Nîmes, in Southern France. From there I went to Marseilles, where I met Mr. Varian Fry [1907-1967], who had been sent to Marseilles by the Emergency Rescue Committee in order to evacuate political and intellectual refugees from France. I collaborated with him from August to December, 1940, when, upon the recommendation of Professor Condliffe, I obtained a Rockefeller fellowship, and thereupon the American visa. I arrived in this country on January 14, 1941.

After a short stay in the East, I went to the University of California at Berkeley to work in connection with a research project on Foreign Trade, directed by Professor Condliffe. Soon after my arrival at Berkeley, I met my wife and we were married in June 1941.

My original research plan was to give a statistical analysis of recent quantitative trends in world trade and my first months were spent in working out the specific problems which I intended to study. I wrote several papers on the measurement of concentration and related subjects in descriptive statistics which I hope to publish either as appendices to my main manuscript or as separate journal articles. The next step in my research was to apply the statistical methods which I had worked out to the foreign trade statistics. This required extensive calculations for which Professor Condliffe put an assistant at my disposal. I also participated in several graduate seminars and took a course in the theory of probability.

Upon the renewal of the Rockefeller fellowship for another year and after a two months illness during the winter of 1941-1942, I began to work at the theoretical and historical aspects of the problems which I had first studied from a purely quantitative point of view. The result of my research has now been embodied in a manuscript of 300 pages entitled “National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade”, of which only the concluding section remains to be written.

Professors Howard S. Ellis [1898-1992] and Condliffe have given me the assurance that the manuscript would be published by a series edited by the newly established Bureau of Economic and Business Research of the University of California. One chapter of the manuscript giving a new statistical analysis of the composition of world trade according to commodity groups, is somewhat loosely connected with the rest and it has been suggested to me to have it published as a separate article. The Rockefeller Foundation has granted me the expenses for a trip to the Middle West and East on which I have just had the opportunity to discuss my manuscript with Professor Viner [1892-1970] at Chicago, Professors Haberler [1900-1995] and Staley [Eugene Alvah Staley (1906-1989) was at Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy] at Harvard, Professors Staudinger [1889-1980] and Lowe [1893-1995] at the New School of Social Research and with Professor Loveday [1888-1962] and Mr. [Folke] Hilgerdt [1894-1956] of the Economic Intelligence Service of the League at Princeton.

As a result of my training, I have acquired a certain specialization in statistical methods on the one hand and in the field of international economics on the other (theory and history of international trade, international monetary problems, exchange control, foreign trade statistics, etc.) Through my work in Europe I am well acquainted, in particular, with the economic problems of Italy and France.

Having studied for prolonged periods in Germany, France and Italy, I speak and write with complete fluency the languages of these countries. I also have a reading knowledge of Spanish.

Source: Harvard University Archives. Department of Economics, Correspondence & Papers 1902-1950. Box 5, Folder “H”.

Image Source: Albert O. Hirschman before he was dispatched to North Africa, circa 1943. From Michele Alacevich’s Introduction to “Albert Hirschman and the Social Sciences: A Memorial Round-Table” posted July 25, 2015.

Tags Condliffe, Ellis, Fellner, GregoryTE, Haberler, Hilgerdt, Hirschman, Loveday, Lowe, Rist, Robbins, Staley, Staudinger, Viner

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND COMMERCE

TOPICS AND REFERENCES FOR ECONOMICS 8B MONEY

PLAN OF THE COURSE.

PART I— MONETARY SYSTEMS.

PART II — DEVELOPMENT OF MONETARY SYSTEMS.

PART III— MONEY AND PRICES.

Department of Economics University of California Spring Semester 1992 Professor George A. Akerlof

ECONOMICS 202A FINAL EXAMINATION

Department of Economics University of California Spring Semester 1993 Professor George A. Akerlof

Economics 202A FINAL EXAMINATION

MEMO REGARDING POTENTIAL INSTRUCTORS FOR UNDERGRADUATE ECONOMICS AT COLUMBIA COLLEGE

Jacob Weissman’s initial appointment, 1951-52.

Weissman appointment extended to a fifth year

Jacob I. Weissman Obituary (July 13, 2006)

Daniel S. Ahearn Obituary (April 6, 2016)

Frank W. Schiff Obituary (August 28, 2006)

Daniel M. Holland Obituary (January 8, 1992)

Nian-Tzu Wang Obituary The New York Times (Aug. 29 to Aug. 30, 2004)

Melvin Moses Knight, Economics: Berkeley 1887-1981 Professor Emeritus

Obituary, Bruce Winton Knight

Obituary: Felix, professor emeritus of economics, 91 By Melody Walker August 12, 2009

Economics in Two Lessons

I. The Ballad of “Right Price” [early 1920s]

II. The Busted Thermostat [early 1950s]

[III.] The Ballad of the Sad Economist, or Who’s the Fairest Model of Them All? [1952]

From Keniston’s Appendix (1959)

Standing of American Graduate Departments in the Arts and Sciences

OVER-ALL STANDING (Total Scores)

1925

1957

ECONOMICS

1925

1957

Glenn Woroch: Short Bio

Department of Economics University of California Economics 220B, Spring 1996 REGULATION & ANTITRUST Glenn Woroch

READING LIST

I. NATURAL MONOPOLY AND ITS REGULATION

1. Natural Monopoly

2. Efficient Pricing

3. Reality Check: Alternative Explanations of Regulatory Policy

II. REGULATION IN PRACTICE

1. Rate of Return Regulation

2. Contracting vs. Administration

3. Price Cap and Benchmark Regulation

III. DESIGN OF OPTIMAL REGULATORY MECHANISMS

1. Iterative and Dynamic Mechanisms

2. Agency Approach

IV. DEREGULATION

1. Regulation with Horizontal Competition

2. Regulation with Vertical Competition

VI. ANTITRUST POLICY

1. Predation

2. Merger to Monopoly

3. Exclusion and Foreclosure

Department of Economics University of California Economics 220B, Spring 1996 ADDITIONAL READINGS FOR PRESENTATIONS Glenn Woroch

Department of Economics University of California Economics 220B, Spring 1996 SUGGESTIONS FOR TERM PAPER TOPICS Glenn Woroch

Department of Economics University of California Economics 220B Glenn Woroch

TAKEHOME FINAL EXAM Spring 1996

Department of Economics University of California Economics 220B Glenn Woroch

FINAL EXAM Spring 1994

ECONOMICS

Combined Ratings: (24)

Staffs:

CURRICULUM VITAE

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND COMMERCE

TOPICS AND REFERENCES FOR
ECONOMICS 8B
MONEY

Department of Economics
University of California
Spring Semester 1992
Professor George A. Akerlof

ECONOMICS 202A
FINAL EXAMINATION

Department of Economics
University of California
Spring Semester 1993
Professor George A. Akerlof

Economics 202A
FINAL EXAMINATION

Jacob I. Weissman
Obituary
(July 13, 2006)

Daniel S. Ahearn
Obituary
(April 6, 2016)

Frank W. Schiff
Obituary
(August 28, 2006)

Daniel M. Holland
Obituary
(January 8, 1992)

Nian-Tzu Wang
Obituary
The New York Times (Aug. 29 to Aug. 30, 2004)

Melvin Moses Knight, Economics: Berkeley
1887-1981
Professor Emeritus

Obituary:
Felix, professor emeritus of economics, 91
By Melody Walker August 12, 2009

[III.] The Ballad of the Sad Economist, or
Who’s the Fairest Model of Them All? [1952]

Standing of
American Graduate Departments
in the Arts and Sciences

OVER-ALL STANDING
(Total Scores)

Department of Economics
University of California
Economics 220B, Spring 1996
REGULATION & ANTITRUST
Glenn Woroch

Department of Economics
University of California
Economics 220B, Spring 1996
ADDITIONAL READINGS FOR PRESENTATIONS
Glenn Woroch

Department of Economics
University of California
Economics 220B, Spring 1996
SUGGESTIONS FOR TERM PAPER TOPICS
Glenn Woroch

Department of Economics
University of California
Economics 220B
Glenn Woroch

TAKEHOME FINAL EXAM
Spring 1996

Department of Economics
University of California
Economics 220B
Glenn Woroch

FINAL EXAM
Spring 1994