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Harvard. Labor Organization and Collective Bargaining. Dunlop, 1947.

 

 

John T. Dunlop’s course reading lists go on for pages. He mediated, arbitrated and advised besides teaching courses in labor relations including this post of material for his undergraduate course on unions and collective bargaining. His New York Times’ obituary closes with a nice 1973 quote published in Fortune Magazine: “Unless you can work out a consensus on a problem, it’s not a very good solution.” I guess we just now live in an age of diminished solutions. Material for next semester’s course 81b “Labor and Public Policy” has been posted as well.

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Course Enrollment for Economics 81a, Fall Term 1947

[Economics] 81a. Associate Professor Dunlop.–Trade Unionism and Collective Bargaining (F).

3 Graduates, 80 Seniors, 64 Juniors, 25 Sophomores, 15 Radcliffe: Total 187.

Source: Harvard University. Report of the President of Harvard College and Reports of Departments for 1947-48, p. 90.

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OUTLINE
Economics 81a
Fall, 1947

LABOR ORGANIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

I.  Labor and Management Organization

    1. The Institutional Setting
      1. The Beginnings of Organization
      2. The Relation of Labor Organization to “Capitalist” Society
      3. The Characteristics of the Labor Market
    2. Development of the American Labor Movement
      1. Comparisons with other Countries
      2. Theories of Labor Organization Development
      3. Relation to the Growth of the American Economy
      4. Role of Community Values, Ideas, Legal Concepts, and Politics
    3. Structure and Government of Labor Organizations
      1. Constitutional Government of the AFL and CIO
      2. Relations of Locals to International Bodies
      3. Labor Leadership
      4. Administrative Aspects of Labor Organizations
    4. Management Organization in Industrial Relations
      1. The Locus of Policy Making Affecting Industrial Relations
      2. Management Organization for Bargaining
      3. Management Leadership

II.  Operation and Results of Collective Bargaining

  1. The Bargaining Process: Mechanics
    1. The Collective Bargaining Agreement
    2. The Scope and Area of Bargaining
    3. Techniques of Bargaining
  2. The Results on the Social Structure of a Work Community
  3. The Results on the Conditions of Employment
    1. Status of Union Members
    2. Division of Work Opportunities
    3. Procedures for Settling Disputes
  4. The effects on Wages, Prices and Employment
    1. Wage Determination under Collective Bargaining vs. the “Free Market”
    2. Effects on the Shares of Real Income
    3. Effects on Income and Employment Over Time
  5. The Problem of Wage and Price Policies at Full Employment
  6. The Impact on the Social Structure and the Political “Balance of Power” in the Nation

III.  Public Policy Issues Raised by Labor and Management Organization and Collective Bargaining

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Economics 81 a
Questions

  1. How do you account for the emergence of labor organizations? What are the distinctive features of the American labor movement?
  2. To what extent is the American labor movement devoted to changing or preserving “capitalist” institutions?
  3. What standards would you establish to appraise the extent to which a particular labor organization was “democratic”?
  4. What are the possibilities of “peace” within the labor movement? What are the principal obstacles to effective unity?
  5. What are the principal changes introduced into a work community by a labor organization? What changes typically take place in the management of the company?
  6. What is collective bargaining? What is its scope? What problems and rights question, if any, are exclusively “prerogatives” of a union or a management?
  7. What are the effects of collective bargaining on wages, prices, national income and the share of income going to various groups?
  8. To what extent can the opposition of interest between employees and unions be relied upon to protect the public interest?
  9. What scope would you give to the principle of seniority in layoff? In promotion?
  10. Can union support be elicited to improve methods of production and to reduce costs? If so, how?
  11. The area of bargaining has been growing. What are the consequences of industry-wide bargaining?
  12. How would you appraise the following as principles of wage determination: the cost of living, ability to pay, productivity, wage rates in “comparable” firms and operations?
  13. What should a “theory of wages” attempt to do? What do you understand by marginal productivity?
  14. Is collective bargaining compatible with economic stability? May wages and prices be pushed up, of necessity, so rapidly as to result in instability in output and employment?
  15. In view of long-term tendencies at work in our society, what kind of economic institutions and labor relations to you foresee 50 years from now?
  16. The influence of labor organizations in the American social or political life has increased very materially in recent years. Why?

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Required and Recommended Reading

I.  LABOR AND MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

  1. The Institutional Setting

Required Reading:

Bakke, E. Wight, Mutual Survival, The Goal of Unions and Management, pp. 1-82

Golden, C., and Ruttenberg, H., the Dynamics of Industrial Democracy, pp. 1-47

Leiserson, W. L., “The Role of Government in Industrial Relations,” Industrial Disputes and the Public Interest, pp. 35-51, (Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California)

Simons, Henry C., “Some Reflections on Syndicalism,” Journal of Political Economy, March, 1944, pp. 1-25

Slichter, Sumner H., The Challenge of Industrial Relations, pp. 1-28

Recommended Reading:

Brooks, R. R., As Steel Goes, pp. 1-20

Halevy, Elie, The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism

Hammond, J. L., and B., The Town Labourer, 1780-1832, Chap. 2, 10-15

Hobson, John A., The Evolution of Modern Capitalism

Hovell, Mark, The Chartist Movement, pp. 1-98

Lenin, V. I., What Is To Be Done?, pp. 31-93

Lester, R. A., Economics of Labor, pp. 3-49

Perlman, Selig, A Theory of the Labor Movement

Pound, Roscoe, Social Control Through Law

Schumpeter, Joseph A., Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy

Shaw, George B., An Intelligent Woman’s Guide to Socialism

Veblen, Theory of the Business Enterprise, Chapter 8

Wadsworth, A. P., and Mann, Julia, The Cotton Trade and Industrial Lancashire, 1600-1780, pp. 311-408

Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, Industrial Democracy

Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, The History of Trade Unionism, pp. 1-112

Whitehead, A. N., Adventures in Ideas

  1. The Development of the American Labor Movement

Required Reading:

Harris, Herbert, American Labor, pp. 1-95

Commons, John R., and Associates, History of Labor in the United States, Vol. II, pp. 332-429

Millis, H. A., and Montgomery, R. E., Organized Labor, pp. 76-242

The United Steelworkers of America, The First Ten Years

Recommended Reading:

Bimba, A., The Molly Maguires

Brissenen, Paul, The I.W.W.

David, Henry, The History of the Haymarket Affair

Dunlop, John T., “The Changing Status of Labor,” The Growth of the American Economy, Edited by H. F. Williamson, pp. 607-31

Fine, Nathan, Labor and Farmer Parties in the United States, 1828-1928

Foner, P. S. History of the Labor Movement in the United States

Foster, William Z., From Bryan to Stalin

Frey, S. P., Craft Unions of Ancient and Modern Times

Galenson, Walter, Rival Unionism in the United States

Gluck, Elsie, John Mitchell, Miner

Gompers, Samuel, Seventy Years of Life and Labor

Grossman, Jonathan, William Sylvis, Pioneer of American Labor

Hollander, J. H., and Barnett, G. E., Studies in American Trade Unionism

Hoxie, Robert F., Trade Unionism in the United States

Jamison, Stuart, Labor Unionism in American Agriculture, Bulletin 836, Bureau of Labor Statistics

Lorwin, L. L., The American Federation of Labor

McCabe, D. A., National Collective Bargaining in the Pottery Industry

Morris, Richard B., Government and Labor in Early America

Perlman, S. and Taft, P., History of Labor in the United States, 1896-1932

Powderly, T. V., The Path I Trod

Roberts, Bryn, The American Labour Split and Allied Unity

Stolberg, Benjamin, Tailor’s Progress

Ware, Norman, Labor in Modern Economic Society

White, Kenneth, Labour and Democracy in the United States

Wolman, Leo, Ebb and Flow of Trade Unionism

Suggested Reading on Foreign Labor Movements

Cole, G. D. H., A Short History of the British Working Class Movement

Foenander, O. R, Towards Industrial Peace in Australia

Marquand, H. A., Laborer on Four Continents

Norgren, Paul, The Swedish Collective Bargaining System

Robbins, J. J., The Government of Labor Relations in Sweden

Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, Industrial Democracy

Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?

Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, The History of Trade Unionism

Ehrmann, H. W., French Labor From Popular Front To Liberation

Wunderlich, F., German Labor Courts

Cole, G. H. and Postgate, R. W., British People, 1746-1947

Wunderlich, Frieda, Labor Under German Democracy, Arbitration 1918-33

Gualtieri, H. L., Labor Movement in Italy

Fitzpatrick, B. C., Short History of the Australian Labor Movement

Snow, H. F., Chinese Labor Movement

Hubbard, L. M., Soviet Labor and Industry

  1. Structure and Government of Labor Organizations

Required Reading:

Herberg, Will, “Bureaucracy and Democracy in Labor Unions,” Antioch Review, Fall 1943, pp. 405-17

Millis, H. A., and Montgomery, R. E., Organized labor, pp. 243-320

Mills, C. Wright, “The Trade Union Leader: A Collective Portrait,” Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer, 1945, pp. 158-75

The Constitutions of the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations

Slichter, Sumner H., The Challenge of Industrial Relations, pp. 99-123

Taft, Philip, “Opposition to Union Officers in Elections,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, 1944, pp. 256-64; “Judicial Procedure in Labor Unions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, May, 1945, pp. 370-85; “Dues and Initiation Fees in Labor Unions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1946, pp. 219-32

Boyer, Richard O., “Profiles, Union President” in The New Yorker, July 6, 1946, pp.22-30; July 13, 1946, pp. 30-42; July 20, 1946, pp. 26-35

Recommended Reading:

Brazeal, B. R., The Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters

Brown, L. C., Union Policies in the Leather Industry

Carsel, Wilfred, A History of the Chicago Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union

Chicago Joint Board, The Clothing Workers of Chicago, 1910-1912

Christenson, Collective Bargaining in Chicago; 1929-30

Green, Charles H., The Headwear Workers

Henig, Harry, The Brotherhood of Railway Clerks

Hill, Samuel E., Teamsters and Transportation

Hoxie, Robert F., Trade Unionism in the United States, pp. 177-87

Jensen, Vernon H., Lumber and Labor

LaMar, Elden, Philadelphia Clothing Workers

Levine, Louis, The Women’s Garment Workers

McCaleb, Walter F., Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen

Minton, Bruce and Stuart, John, Men Who Lead Labor

Mulcaire, Michael A., International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

Northrup, Herbert, Organized Labor and the Negro

Northrup, H. R., Unionization of Professional Engineers and Chemists

Northrup, H. R., “The Tobacco Workers International Union,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1942

Painter, Leonard, Through Fifty Years with the Brotherhood Railway Carmen of America

Powell, Isona M., The History of the United Typothetae of America

Rubin, Jay and Obermeier, M. J., The Life and Times of Edward Floro

Ryan, Frederick L., Industrial Relations in the San Francisco Building Trades

Seidman, Joel, Labor Czars

Seidman, Joel, The Needle Trades

Soule, George, Sidney Hillman

Stolbert, Benjamin, Tailor’s Progress

Strong, Earl D., Amalgamated Clothing Workers

Wechsler, J. A., Labor Baron, Portrait of John L. Lewis

  1. Management Organization in Industrial Relations

Required Reading:

Roethlisberger, F. S., Management and Morale, pp. 88-134

Twentieth Century Fund, Trends in Collective Bargaining, pp. 22-33

Hill, L. H. and Hook, C. R., Jr., Management at the Bargaining Table, pp. 56-138

Pigors, Paul and Meyers, Charles A., Personnel Administration, (pages to be assigned)

Recommended Reading:

Baker, Helen, The Determination and Administration of Industrial Policies

Barnard, Chester I., The Functions of the Executive

Gardiner, Glenn, When Foremen and Stewards Bargain

Gordon, R. A., Business Leadership in the Large Corporation

National Research Council, Fatigue of Workers, Its Relation to Industrial Production

Riegel, John W., Management, Labor and Technological Change

Scott, Walter D., Clothier, Mathewson, Spriegel, Personnel Management, Principles, Practices, and Points of View

Yoder, Dale, Personnel Management and Industrial Relations

II. OPERATIONS AND RESULTS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

  1. The Bargaining Process: Mechanics

Required Reading:

Peterson, Florence, American Labor Unions, pp. 187-210

Selected Agreements

Settling Plant Grievances, Bulletin 60, Division of Labor Standards

Recommended Reading:

Block, Louis, Labor Agreements in Coal Mines, pp. 71-124.

Hamburger, L., “The Extension of Collective Agreements to Cover Entire Trades and Industries,” International Labour Review, August, 1939, pp. 166-94

Lieberman, Elias, The Collective Labor Agreement, pp. 3-34

National Foremen’s Institute, How To Handle Collective Bargaining Negotiations

National Labor Relations Board, Written Trade Agreements, Bulletin No. 4

Pipin, Marshall, “Enforcement of Rights under Collective Bargaining Agreements,” University of Chicago Law Review, June, 1939

Updegraff, C. M., and McCoy, W. P., Arbitration of Labor Disputes

  1. The Results on the Social Structure of a Work Community

Required Reading:

Mayo, Elton, The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization, pp. 59-112

Selekman, Benjamin M., “When the Union Enters,” Harvard Business Review, Winter, 1945, pp. 129-43

Selekman, Benjamin M., Labor Relations and Human Relations, (pages to be assigned)

Golden, Clinton S., and Ruttenberg, H. J., The Dynamics of Industrial Democracy, pp. 190-291

Recommended Reading:

Mayo, Elton, Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization

Moore, W. E., Industrial Relations and the Social Order

Robinson, G. Canby, “The Patient as a Person, The Social Aspects of Illness,” in Modern Attitudes in Psychiatry, pp. 43-60

Roethlesberger, F. J. and Dickson, W. J., Management and the Worker

Warner, W. Lloyd and Low, J. O., The Social System of the Modern Factory The Strike: A Social Analysis

Whitehead, T. N., Leadership in a New Society

  1. The Results on the Conditions of Employment

Required Reading:

Slichter, Sumner H., Union Policies and Industrial Management, pp. 1-8, 53-136, 164-200, 241-81, 282-310, 572-79

Kennedy, Van Dusen, Union Policy and Incentive Wage Methods, pp. 50-104

National Industrial Conference Board, Job Evaluation, Formal Plans for Determining Basic Pay Differentials, pp. 1-12, 21-24

Twentieth Century Fund, How Collective Bargaining Works, pp. 227-79, 450-507

Recommended Reading:

Barnett, G. C., Chapters on Machinery and Labor

Drake, Leonard A., Trends in the New York Printing Industry

Haber, William, Industrial Relations in the Building Industry

Hill, Samuel E., Teamsters and Transportation

Jensen, Vernon H., Lumber and Labor

Lahne, Herbert J., The Cotton Mill Worker

Lytle, Charles W., Wage Incentive Methods, pp. 67-135

Morton, Thomas L., Trade Union Policies in the Massachusetts Shoe Industry

Ober, Harry, Trade Union Policy and Technological Change, (W.P.A., National Research Project)

Palmer, Gladys, Union Tactics and Economic Change

Patterson, W. F. and Hodges, M. H., Educating for Industry, Policies and Procedures for a National Apprenticeship System

Randall, Roger, Labor Relations in the Pulp and Paper Industry of the Pacific Northwest

Roberts, Harold S., The Rubber Workers

Ross, Murray, Stars and Strikes, Unionization of Hollywood

Seidman, Joel, The Needle Trades

  1. The Effects on Wages, Prices and Employment

Required Readings:

Boulding, Kenneth, Economic Analysis, pp. 485-511

Slichter, Sumner H., Basic Criteria Used in Wage Negotiation

Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve Bulletin, July 1947 “Consumer Incomes and Liquid Asset Holdings”

Slichter, Sumner H., “The Responsibility of Organized Labor for Employment,” American Economic Review, May 1945, pp. 193-208

Dunlop, J. T., Wage Determination Under Trade Unions, pp. 8-27, 45-73, 95-121 “American Wage Deterination: The Trend And Its Significance”

Clark, J. M., “The Relation of Wages to Progress” in The Conditions of Industrial Progress (Wharton School of Finance and Commerce), pp. 22-39

Recommended Reading:

    1. Wage and Employment Relations

Bissell, R. M., “Price and Wage Policies and the Theory of Employment,” Econometrica, June 1940, pp. 199-239

Cannan, Edwin, “The Demand for Labor,” Economic Journal, 1932

Carlson, Sune, A Study on the Pure Theory of Production

Douglas, Paul H., The Theory of Wages, pp. 113-58

Douglas, Paul H., “Wage Theory and Wage Policy,” International Labour Review, March 1939

Fellner, William and Haley, B. F., Editors, Readings in the Theory of Distribution

Hansen, Alvin H., Economic Policy and Full Employment

Hicks, J. R., Theory of Wages, pp. 1-38, 58-110

Keynes, J. M., The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (especially Chapter 19)

Lederer, Emil, “Industrial Fluctuations and Wage Policy: Some Unsettled Points,” International Labour Review, January, 1939.

Lester, Richard A., “Shortcomings of Marginal Analysis for Wage Employment Problems,” American Economic Review, March 1946, pp. 63-82

Mendershausen, H., “On the Significance of Professor Douglas’ Production Function,” Econometrica, October 1939

Machlup, Fritz, “Marginal Analysis and Empirical Research,” American Economic Review, September 1946, pp. 519-54

Pigou, A. C., The Economics of Welfare, 4th edition, pp. 451-61, 531-71, 647-55

Pigou, A. C., The Theory of Unemployment, pp. 1-108

Pigou, A. C., Lapses from Full Employment

Pool, A. G., Wage Policy in Relation to Industrial Fluctuations

Reynolds, Lloyd G., “Relations between Wage Rates, Costs, and Prices,” American Economic Review, Supplement, March 1942, pp. 275-89

Robertson, D. H., “Wage Grumbles,” in Economic Fragments

Robinson, Joan, Essays in the Theory of Employment, pp. 1-104

Stigler, George J., Production and Distribution Theories, The Formative Period

Walker, E. R., “Wage Policy and Business Cycles,” International Labour Review, December 1938

Wermel, Michael T., The Evolution of the Classical Wage Theory

    1. Wage Movements and Productivity

Ahearn, Daniel J., The Wages of Farm and Factory Laborers, 1914-1944

Bell, Spurgeon, Productivity: Wages and National Income

Bowden, Witt, “Wages, Hours and Productivity of Industrial Labor, 1909 to 1939” Monthly Labor Review, September 1940, pp. 517-44

Douglas, Paul H., Real Wages in the United States, 1890-1926

Ducoff, Louis J., Wages of Agricultural Labor in the United States, Technical Bulletin 895, Department of Agriculture

Fabricant, Solomon, Labor Savings in American industry 1899-1939

Lederer, Emil, Technical Progress and Unemployment

Lester, Richard A. and Robie, Edward A., Wages Under National and Regional Collective Bargaining

    1. Share in National Income

Dunlop, J. T., Wage Determination Under Trade Unions, pp. 141-91

Kalecki, Michael, Essays in the Theory of Economic Fluctuations

Kuznets, Simon, National Income and Its Composition, 1919-38, Vol. I, pp. 215-65

Pigou, A. C., Economics of Welfare, pp. 619-41

Survey of Current Business, June 1947 (Supplement)

    1. Size Distribution of Income

Bowman, Mary Jean, “A Graphical Analysis of Personal Income Distribution in the United States,” American Economic Review, September 1945, pp. 607-28

Clark, Colin, The Conditions of Economic Progress, Chapter 12

Mendershausen, Horst, Changes in Income Distribution During the Great Depression

National Resources Committee, Consumer Incomes in the United States

Staehle, Hans, “Short Period Variations in the Distribution of Incomes,” Review of Economic Statistics, 1937

    1. The Annual Wage

Latimer, Murray W., Guaranteed Wages, Report to the President by the Advisory Board, OWMR (See Appendix F for economic analysis by Hansen and Samuelson)

Snider, Joseph, Guarantee of Work and Wages

Leontief, Wassily, “The Pure Theory of the Guaranteed Annual Wage Contract,” Journal of Political Economy, February 1946.

  1. The Problem of Wage and Price Policies at Full Employment

Recommended Reading:

Leontief, W., “Wages, Profit and Prices,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, 1946, pp. 26-39

Fellner, W. J., Monetary Policies and Full Employment

Lange, Oscar, Price Flexibility and Full Employment

Dunlop, John T., “Wage-Price Relations at High Level Employment,” American Economic Review, Proceedings, May, 1947, pp. 243-53

  1. The Impact on the Social Structure and the Political “Balance of Power” in the Nation

 

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003. (HUC 8522.2.1) Box 4, Folder “Economics, 1947-48 (2 of 2)”.

 

Image Source: Cigar box label from the collections of the Museum of the City of New York.

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Curriculum Exam Questions Harvard Suggested Reading Syllabus

Harvard. Advanced Economic Theory. Franco Modigliani, 1957-8

During the academic year 1957-58 Wassily Leontief was on academic leave from Harvard and Franco Modigliani of the Carnegie Institute of Technology took a leave of absence to accept a visiting professorship filling in for Leontief. From Modigliani’s papers in the Rosenstein Library of Duke University I have been able to piece together outlines and readings for the two semesters of advanced economic theory that he taught.

For the Summer session and Fall semester of 1957 it is possible to construct a topical outline for the first semester of Harvard’s Economics 202 from Modigliani’s own handwritten notes. We see that the outline matches that of the corresponding course “Advanced Economics I” that Modigliani taught in the spring semesters of 1957 and 1959 at his home university, i.e. before and after his year at Harvard. We note some additions and deletions in the readings for Modigliani’s Carnegie Tech courses, but since the outline was not significantly changed, it is reasonable to assume that his Fall Semester reading list at Harvard was some “average” of these two Carnegie Tech courses. A copy of Modigliani’s exam questions for the first semester of Advanced Economic Theory (January 25, 1958) completes the material for the first semester.

For the Spring semester of 1958 we have a cover page to his lecture notes indicating four broad topics to be covered. For three of the topics I found short mimeographed reading lists in another folder in a different box of Modigliani’s papers. For the topic “Money and Keynesian Economics” there is a two page handwritten outline that precedes his lecture notes. I cannot explain why the first semester covers parts I-IV and the second semester apparently begins with part VI.

 

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Course Enrollment

[Economics] 202. Advanced Economic Theory. Professor Modigliani (Carnegie Institute of Technology). Full Course.

(F)      1 Junior, 1 Senior, 29 Graduates, 4 Radcliffe, 3 Other: Total 38
(S)      1 Junior, 1 Senior, 27 Graduates, 3 Radcliffe, 4 Other: Total 36

 

Source: Harvard University. Report of the President of Harvard College and Reports of Departments, 1957-58, p. 82.

 

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Modigliani Outline for Fall Semester, 1957 (Handwritten)

Ec. Analysis I
Summer & Fall 1957 Harvard

Outline

Part I. Methodology.

(A) Subject matter and the areas

(B) The methodology of positive economics and of Welfare economics

(C) Discussion of types of model and sequence of presentation

Part II. Theory of Demand and application

II(a) Partial Equilibrium Analysis-Demand function and application

(A) The law of demand and the description of demand functions

(1) The law of demand
(2) Cournot formulation. The notion of functions and some mathematics
(3) The slope of demand functions and responsiveness
(4) Criticism of slope as measure of responsiveness
(5) The notion of demand elasticity and its computation
(6) The behavior of total outlays and its relation to η

(B) Application to problem of random supply. Price and income variation and stabilization.

(C) Application to the elementary theory of Monopoly.

(1) Nature of the model
(2) The case of no costs. Total curves
(3) Graphical computation of MR
(4) η and MR
(5) Fixed costs. Comp. Statics
(6) Effect of Taxes
(7) Introduction of costs. Equilibrium Analysis
(8) Comparative Statics and Taxation

II (b) Utility Analysis

(A) Introduction

(1) Utility and M.U. The Marshallian approach
(2) Shortcoming. The alternative approach.

(B) Indifference Approach

(1) The fundamental postulates
(2) Graphical Representation of tastes
(3) Indifference map and utility function
(4) Slope of I.C.—m.r. of s. and expression in terms of m.u.
(5) Generalizations and the role of two commodities
(6) Types of indifference maps.
(7) The opportunity set. The case of perfect markets
(8) Pathological cases and the law of d.m.r. of s.
(9) Effect of variation in income. Engel curves
(10) Effect of variations in prices. The demand curve
(11) The case of two commodities; income derived from the commodities. Demand and supply.
(12) Generalization to n commodities; complementarity and substitution

(C) Applications of utility analysis

(1) Consumers surplus
(2) Elements of Index number theory

II (c) General Equilibrium of Exchange.

(A) Nature of Problem and approach.

(1) What we wish to explain
(2) Nature of model’s assumptions.

(B) The two person, two commodity case.

(1) The Edgeworth Box.
(2) The offer curves
(3) The behavior of excess demand as function of p and competitive equilibrium (normal case) [illegible] market
(4) The relation between Ex and Ey. Walras law.
(5) Multiple intersection of offer curves. Stable and unstable equilbria. The correspondence Principle.
(6) The pure monopoly solutions.
(7) Comparison of competitive and monopoly solution. Welfare maximization.
(8) The Pareto locus and the Weak Welfare ordering.
(9) Necessary and sufficient condition for max. welfare under individualistic welfare function. The [illegible word] feasibility function. Every point on Pareto locus achievable by perfect market, lump sum taxes and subsidies.
(10) Comparative statics.
(11) Uses of Edgeworth Diagram in the study of barter and bilateral monopoly

(C) General Equilibrium of Exchange

III. Theory of supply and production

(A) Introduction

(1) Nature of production and relation to consumption and exchange model.
(2) The organization of production and the nature of the firm in the model.
(3) Factors of production; general notions and the classical dichotomy[?]
(4) Profit maximization and the definition of profit.

(B) Production functions and cost functions.

B(I). One output and two inputs.

(1) Three dimensional representation.
(2) A single variable factor. Product curve.
(3) The cost curve

B(II). Two variable inputs

(1) Determination of equilibrium can be broken up into two parts. Cost minimization, and choice of best output along the minimized cost function.
(2) Cost minimization.

[(C) Supply function]

(1) Long run cost functions and returns to scale
(2) The long run supply curve
(3) Short run costs and supply curves

IV. Market Structures.

(A) Classification of Markets

(B) Monopolistic competition.

(1) Equilibrium for the firm
(2) Simultaneous equilibrium of the group.
(3) Essential characteristics of equilibrium in relation to monopoly and perfect competition, welfare aspects.
(4) Relaxation of the pure model.
(5) Forces making for [illegible] higher prices

(C) Oligopoly with homogeneous selling and no free entry

(1) Duopoly, Cournot solution
(2) Oligopoly and the limit solution as n goes to infinity

 

Source: Duke University, Rubenstein Library. Franco Modigliani Papers. Box T6. Folder “Economics 1956-57”

 

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Mimeographed Course Outline,
Carnegie Institute of Technology 1957

February, 1957

GI-581—Advanced Economics I
Course Outline and Major References (Provisional)

I. Methodological issues:

(1) Kaufman — Methodology of the Social Sciences
(2) Friedman — Essays in Positive Economics — Part I
(3) Robbins — The Nature and Significance of Economic Science

II. Theory of Demand and Applications

(A) Partial equilibrium approach — Marshallian Demand functions and applications to simple monopoly.

(B) General equilibrium approach — Utility analysis and indifference curves

(C) General equilibrium of exchange: (i) the two person, two commodity case; (ii) the general case

(1) Marshall — Principles of Economics, Book III, Ch. III and IV; Mathematical Appendix, Notes II and III
(2) Cournot — The Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth, Ch. IV, V, VI
(3) Bowley — The Mathematical Groundwork of Economics, Ch. I
(4) Hicks — Value and Capital, Part I (pages 12-52) and Part II, ch. IV and V.
(5) Mosak — General Equilibrium Theory in International Trade, Ch. 1 and 2
(6) Samuelson — Foundations of Economic Analysis, Ch. 1, 5, 6, 7
(7) Slutsky — On the Theory for the Budget of the Consumer, Readings in Price Theory
(8) Hicks — Revision of Demand Theory

III. Theory of supply and costs under competitive conditions

(A) Partial equilibrium approach — theory of Rent

(B) General equilibrium approach — production functions and marginal productivity

(C) General equilibrium of production and exchange

(D) Some welfare implications

(1) Viner — Cost Curves and Supply Curves, Readings in Price Theory
(2) Stigler — The Theory of Prices
(3) Hicks — Value and Capital, Ch. VI and VII
(4) Mosak — Ch. V
(5) Lerner — The Economics of Control

IV. Imperfect Competition Theories and Market Structures

(A) Theory of monopoly

(B) Small numbers and imperfect competition

(1) Cournot — Ch. 7
(2) Chamberlin — Theory of Monopolistic Competition
(3) Robinson — Economics of Imperfect Competition
(4) Readings in Price Theory, Part V, Imperfect Competition
(5) Hall and Hitch — Price Theory and Business Behavior, Oxford Economic Papers, 1939
(6) Stigler — Notes on the Theory of Duopoly, JPE, 1947, page 521
(7) Fellner — Competition among the Few
(8) Bain — A Note on Pricing in Monopoly and Oligopoly, AER, 1949, page 448
(9) Hurwicz — The Theory of Economic Behavior, Readings in Price Theory
(10) Henderson — The Theory of Duopoly, QJE, December, 1954
(11) Harrod — Economic Essays, The Theory of Imperfect Competition revised
(12) Hicks — The Process of Imperfect Competition, Oxford Economic Papers, 1954
(13) Paul — Notes on Excess Capacity, Oxford Economic Papers, 1954
(14) Hahn — Excess Capacity and Imperfect Competition, Oxford Economic Papers, 1955

Source: Duke University, Rubenstein Library. Franco Modigliani Papers. Box T8. Folder “(Notes on Advanced Monetary Theory III , 1953-1960”.

 

____________________________________

 

Mimeographed Course Outline, Carnegie Institute of Technology 1959

February, 1959

GI-581—Advanced Economics I
Course Outline and Major References

I. Methodological issues:

(1) Kaufman — Methodology of the Social Sciences
(2) Friedman — Essays in Positive Economics — Part I
(3) Robbins — The Nature and Significance of Economic Science

II. Theory of Demand and Applications

(A) Partial equilibrium approach — Marshallian Demand functions and applications to simple monopoly.

(B) General equilibrium approach — Utility analysis and indifference curves.

(C) General equilibrium of exchange: (i) the two person, two commodity case; (ii) the general case

(D) Basic concepts of Welfare Economics. Index number theory.

(1) Marshall — Principles of Economics, Book III, Ch. III and IV; Mathematical Appendix, Notes II and III
(2) Cournot — The Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth, Ch. IV, V, VI
(3) Samuelson — Foundations of Economic Analysis, Ch. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6
(4) Hicks — Value and Capital, Part I (pages 12-52) and Part II, ch. IV and V.
(5) Slutsky — On the Theory for the Budget of the Consumer, Readings in Price Theory
(6) Hicks — Revision of Demand Theory Parts I and II
(7) Bowley — The Mathematical Groundwork of Economics, Ch. I
(8) Mosak — General Equilibrium Theory in International Trade, Ch. 1 and 2
(9) Boulding — Welfare Economics in Survey of Contemporary Economics, vol. II.

III. Theory of supply and costs under competitive conditions

(A) Partial equilibrium approach — theory of Rent

(B) General equilibrium approach — production functions and marginal productivity

(C) General equilibrium of production and exchange under competitive conditions

(D) Some welfare implications

(E) Stability of equilibrium — comparative statics and dynamics.

(1) Viner — Cost Curves and Supply Curves, Readings in Price Theory
(2) Stigler — The Theory of Prices
(3) Samuelson — Foundations chs. 4, 9
(4) Lerner — The Economics of Control chs. 15, 16, 17
(5) Hicks — Value and Capital, Ch. VI and VII
(6) Mosak — Ch. V
(7) Cassel — The Theory of Social Economy Vol I. ch. 4, pp. 134-155

IV. Imperfect Competition Theories and Market Structures

(A) Classification of market structures

(B) Theory of monopoly

(C) Monopolistic competition, large group

(D) Oligopolistic competition

(E) The role of the conditions of entry.

(1) Cournot — Ch. 7
(2) Chamberlin — Theory of Monopolistic Competition
(3) Robinson — Economics of Imperfect Competition, Book V.
(4) Readings in Price Theory, Part V, Imperfect Competition
(5) Hall and Hitch — Price Theory and Business Behavior, Oxford Economic Papers, 1939
(6) Stigler — Notes on the Theory of Duopoly, JPE, 1947, page 521
(7) Fellner — Competition among the Few
(8) Hurwicz — The Theory of Economic Behavior, Readings in Price Theory
(9) Henderson — The Theory of Duopoly, QJE, December, 1954
(10) Bain — Barriers to New Competition. Esp. ch. 1, 3, 4, 6.
(11) Modigliani — New Developments on the Oligopoly Front. JPE June 1958, pp. 215-232.
(12) Cyert and March — Organizational Structure and Pricing Behavior in an Oligopolistic Market. AER March 1955, pp. 129-139
(13) Cyert and March — Organizational Factors in the Theory of Oligopoly. QJE Feb. 1956, pp. 44-64

Source: Duke University, Rubenstein Library. Franco Modigliani Papers. Box T8. Folder “(Notes on Advanced Monetary Theory III , 1953-1960”.

Final Examination for GI 581 in 1959 and 1960 has been posted!

 

____________________________________

Final Examination Economics 202, Fall Semester (1957-58)

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Department of Economics
ECONOMICS 202

Answer questions 1, 2, and two of the remaining three. Question 1 will be given double weight.

  1. Assume that the government fixes by law the price of a commodity and hands out to the public ration coupons equal in number to the number of units of the commodity produced. Assume throughout that the supply is perfectly inelastic.

a) Show graphically the opportunity locus of an individual consumer, in terms of the usual indifference diagram, with one of the axes representing money. Under what condition would a consumer not use all of his coupons?

b) Show that consumers would be better off if they were free to buy or sell their ration coupons in a free market.

c) Supposing now that coupons could be bought and sold in a free market, explain how one could derive an individual consumer’s demand curve for coupons. (Hint: the situation is analogous to the consumer being forced to buy his ration of the good at the legal price and then being allowed to sell it or buy more of it on a free market.)

d) Explain the formation of the equilibrium market price of coupons.

e) What can be said as to the relation between the legal price, the price of coupons, and the price which would prevail in the absence of price control and rationing? Under what condition would the sum of the first two be equal to the third?

  1. Wicksell states two alternative conditions under which entrepreneurial profits would be zero:

“…either that large-scale and small-scale operations are equally productive, so that, when all the factors of production are increased in the same proportion, the total product also increases exactly proportionately; or at least that all productive enterprises have already reached the limit beyond which a further increase in the scale of production will no longer yield any advantage.”

Explain the reasoning behind Wicksell’s statement of these conditions. Is either of them sufficient, or must other conditions be added?

  1. Discuss the significance of free entry to the relation of the long-run equilibrium size of the firm to its optimum size.
  1. A profit maximizing monopolist buys factors of production in a perfect market.

a) Discuss the long-run effect on his demand for each of the factors he uses and on his selling price of a tax on one of the factors. (Give a graphic treatment for the case of two factors.)

b) Suppose that one of the two factors is fixed in the short run. Contrast the change in the long-run and short-run demand for both factors when a tax is placed on either.

  1. Evaluate the methodological positions of Friedman and Koopmans. Would an agreement with one as against the other make any difference as to the direction of economic research?

January 25, 1958

 

Source: Duke University, Rubenstein Library. Franco Modigliani Papers. Box T8. Folder “(Notes on Advanced Monetary Theory III , 1953-1960”.

 

____________________________________

 

[Handwritten cover page to course lecture notes]

 

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS II
Harvard—Spring 1958
Outline

I. Welfare Economics and Critique of Laisser faire

II. Dynamics with Certainty

III. Theory of Choice Under Uncertainty

IV. Money and Keynesian Economics

 

Source: Duke University, Rubenstein Library. Franco Modigliani Papers. Box T6. Folder “Economics 1956-57”.

 

____________________________________

 

[Two mimeographed sheets of course outline and readings]

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Department of Economics
Economics 202

Spring, 1958

VI. Economics of Welfare

Readings:

Lerner, A. P., The Economics of Control, Chap. 1-14 (as a review)

Hicks, J. R., “The Foundations of Welfare Economics,” Economic Journal, Dec. 1939.

Scitovsky, T., “A Reconsideration of the Theory of Tariffs,” Review of Economic Studies, Volume 9, 1941

Samuelson, P., “Evaluation of Real National Income,” Oxford Economic Papers, Jan. 1950

J. de V. Graaf, Theoretical Welfare Economics

Baumol, William J., Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State (omit Ch. 8)

Ruggles, N., “The Welfare Basis of Marginal Cost Pricing,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. XVII, 1949-50.

Vickrey, W., “Some Objections to Marginal Cost Pricing,” JPE, June 1948

*Burk (Bergson) A., “A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 52, 1938

*Samuelson, P., Foundations of Economic Analysis, Chapter 8

*Koopmans, T. C., Three Essays on the State of Economic Science, I—Allocation of Resources and the Price System.

VII. Dynamics under Certainty

Temporal theory of consumer choice — the notion of interest — inter-temporal equilibrium without production — temporal theory of production and capital — growth

Readings:

Fisher, The Theory of Interest, Chapters II, X, XI, XVI, XVIII.

Hicks, Value and Capital, Chapters IX, X, XI, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII.

Lutz and Lutz, The Theory of Investment of the Firm, Chapters I-X, XII, XV, XX.

Lindahl, Studies in the Theory of Money and Capital, Part III, Ch. 2, 3.

Samuelson, “Dynamics, Statics and the Stationary State,” in Clemence, Readings in Economic Analysis, Vol. I

Modigliani and Brumberg, “Utility Analysis and the Consumption Function,” in Kurihara, Post-Keynesian Economics.

*Mosak, General Equilibrium Theory, Ch. VI, VII.

*Koopmans, Three Essays on the State of Economic Science, Essay I, part 4, (Pp. 105-126).

VIII. Some Approaches to the Theory of Choice under Uncertainty.

Readings:

Arrow, “Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice under Uncertainty in Risk-taking Situations,” Econo metrica, 1951.

Modigliani, “Liquidity and Uncertainty,” (Discussion paper) AER, May 1949

Hart, Anticipations, Uncertainty and Dynamic Planning

Marschak, “Probability in the Social Sciences,” in Lazarsfeld, Mathematics 1 Thinking in the Social Sciences.

Friedman and Savage, “The Utility Analysis of Choice Involving Risk,” in Readings in Price Theory.

Strotz, “Cardinal Utility,” AER, May 1953.

Hart, “Risk, Uncertainty, and the Unprofitability of Compounding Probabilities,” in Readings in the Theory of Income Distribution.

*Herstein and Miller, “An Axiomatic Approach to Measurable Utility,” Econometrica, April 1953.

 

Source: Duke University, Rubenstein Library. Franco Modigliani Papers. Box T6. Folder “Economics 1956-57”.

 

____________________________________

 

[Handwritten outline preceding notes for fourth part of second semester]

Money and Keynesian Economics
Outline

I. Introduction of uncertainty and money in dynamic general equilibrium framework

II. The supply and demand for money

(A) Supply side. The banking system and bank balance equation

(B) The demand side

(1) The transaction demand. Cambridge and Fisher equations.
(2) The formal closing of system with dichotomy and neutrality. Criticism. No connection between demand for money and demand for anything else. No [illegible] formal money market
(3) The role of interest rate on transaction demand
(4) Liquidity preference and the connection of Money and Bond market. The formal model of these markets in which funds are acquired or disposed of against bonds.
(5) Preservation of dichotomy under certain assumptions: the role of money in real system. Its disappearance with pure bank money and η =1.
(6) Sources of non-transaction or asset demand for money:

(a) Transaction costs on short funds.
(b) The so called speculative demand.

The case of a single short rate [for the supply of money to equal the demand for money] provided r01 >0.
Liquidity trap. No carrying cost, r cannot be negative.
The case of multiple rates. Speculative demand.

(7) The breakdown of the system. The Pigou effect. its implications on extreme fluctuations of price level.
(8) The consequence of price rigidity.

III. The Economics of rigid prices (rigid wages)

(A) Description of labor market and the [illegible]of rigidity.
(B) The emergence [consequence?] of the notion of Income. Capitalism. Property and non-property income
(C) Nature of demand and supply. Consumption and Investment.
(D) Why wage rigidity [illegible]a solution even when r of full employment is negative. Supply falls faster than demand
(E) The four quadrant analysis and its interpretation.

 

Source: Duke University, Rubenstein Library. Franco Modigliani Papers. Box T6. Folder “Economics 1956-57”.

Image Source: Franco Modigliani page at the History of Economic Thought Website.

Categories
Chicago Exam Questions Fields

Chicago. Ph.D. Exam for Money, Banking and Monetary Policy, 1946

This transcribed Ph.D. examination for Money, Banking and Monetary Policy comes from a copy of the exam in the papers of Norman Kaplan at the University of Chicago archives. According to the Course Announcements, this field was covered by four quarter courses: both Money (330) and Banking Theory and Monetary Policy (331), and either The Theory of Income and Employment (335) or Business-Cycle Theory (432). In 1945-46 the first two courses were taught by Lloyd Mints. Jacob Marschak and Oscar Lange were scheduled to teach Economics 335 and 432, respectively, but I believe Lange was away that year in Washington, D.C. In any event the questions reveal emphasis on the material covered by Mints.

_________________________

 

MONEY, BANKING AND MONETARY POLICY
Written examination for the Ph.D.

Autumn Quarter, 1946

 

Time: 4 hours. Answer all questions.

 

  1. Discuss the effect of tax reduction on employment.
  2. Discuss the comparative advantages of fixed and flexible foreign exchange rates.
  3. A newspaper story of Jan. 21, 1946, on President Truman’s budget message, had the following headlines and first two paragraphs:

“TRUMAN MAPS FIRST DEBT CUT SINCE 1930
CASH ON HAND TO OFFSET ’47 DEFICIT.

“Washington—President Truman’s first budget proposes to spend $4,300,000,000 more that the government will collect, but for the first time since 1930, it won’t increase the national debt.
“Mr. Truman proposes to withdraw from the Treasury sufficient funds no only to offset this deficit but also to reduce the debt by $7,000,000,000.”

Discuss the monetary effect of this budget proposal. Would one expect the proposed debt cut to be deflationary or inflationary? Why? How would the effect compare with such alternatives as refunding the debt? Borrowing more to add to cash balances?

  1. The average amount of money (deposits plus hand-to-hand currency) in circulation in 1929 was $55 billion. At present (1946) the stock of money is $170 billion, or approximately three times the $55 billion of 1929. If we assume that the volume of transactions would normally (with a continued high level of employment) increase at the rate of 4% per annum, the volume of transactions in 1947, with a high level of employment, would then be approximately twice that of 1929 (1 compounded annually at the rate of 4% for 18 years amounts to 2.03). If we then assume that velocity will be the same in 1947 as it was in 1929, and that the stock of money will be the same in 1947 as in late 1946, we have approximately the following index numbers for 1947, using 1929 as a base:

M = 3.0
V = 1.0
T = 2.0

Therefore      P = 1.5

Discuss the reasonableness of the various assumptions made in this analysis and of 1.5 as the possible index of the price level in 1947. Is there any good reason for using 1929 as the base year rather than, say, 1940?

  1. The following statement, made in a recent CED [Committee for Economic Development] monograph, refers to the high post-war level of holdings of cash and government bonds by the public as compared with pre-war holdings:

“It is sometimes implied that the liquid assets will disappear as they are used. But money is not extinguished by use; it simply passes from the hand of the buyer to the hand of the seller. The use of liquid assets by some members of the public to buy goods, services, or securities from other members of the public will not reduce total liquid-asset holdings but only transfer their ownership.”

Suppose the liquid assets were used to such an extent as to bring on a substantial rise in the price level. Does the fact that they are not extinguished by use imply that the danger, from this source, of a further rise in prices would be unchanged?

 

Source: University of Chicago Archives. Norman M. Kaplan Papers, Box 3, Folder 5.

Image Source: 1936 Social Science Research Building. University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf2-07476, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.

Categories
Economic History Exam Questions M.I.T.

MIT. Final Examinations for European Economic History. Kindleberger, 1970/74

The M.I.T. graduate economics program of my day (mid-1970s) still offered three courses in economic history: Peter Temin‘s American Economic History, Evsey Domar‘s Russian Economic History and Charles Kindleberger‘s European Economic History. I will confess here that little value-added from his lectures has survived the intervening decades for me  (I did read plenty!). That said, my personal take-away from Kindleberger’s class was that he represented the ideal balance of scholar-gentleman-economist. I suspect he felt as much a dinosaur when he taught us in the mid-1970s as I certainly do now when I eavesdrop on the conversation of graduate students when they mimic their elders, who are now sometimes a full generation younger than me. 

I posted a few of his favorite stories from his days at Columbia University. Here an outline biography of Charles Kindleberger at the MIT economics department.

__________________________

December 12, 1974
8:30-10:30

Informal Final Examination
14.733
European Economic History

 

Answer any three questions (forty minutes each), but be certain that not all your answers refer exclusively to Great Britain or the Continent of Europe.

 

  1. It was said that the Holy Roman Empire was neither Holy, Roman nor an Empire.
    to what extent was the Industrial Revolution a) Industrial? b) a Revolution?
    Explain at some length, and indicate which Industrial Revolution, if there are more than one, you are referring to.
  1. Compare and contrast one pair, at least twenty-five years apart, from the following list:
    1. financial crises in Europe
    2. economic booms
    3. recoveries from war
    4. reparation transfers
  1. Evaluate the role of tariff policy in the economic growth or the economic development of one or more countries of Europe over some period of time which you specify.
  1. Compare the profiles of economic development over the nineteenth century of one of the pairs of countries below, and account for the major differences:
    1. Netherlands — Britain
    2. Britain — Germany
    3. France — Germany
    4. Italy — other country of your choice

__________________________

14.733 FINAL EXAMINATION
December 23, 1970 9AM
Three hours

 

Answer any four questions […illegible…] but at least one from each group.

 

Group I

  1. Describe the course and causes of the Industrial revolution in one country in Europe.
  2. Compare and contrast Rostow’s Stages and Gerschenkron’s discontinuity in economic growth, illustrating your answer with material from European history.
  3. Discuss the role in the early industrialization of one country of Europe of a) labor; b) capital; or c) technology.

 

Group II

  1. To what do you ascribe the business cycle in the 19th century Europe? Explain.
  2. Argue for or against the advantage of backwardness and the penalty of the head start, illustrating your argument with 19th century economic data from Europe.
  3. How do you account for the limited movement toward free trade in Europe after 1869. what did it accomplish, and why did it end?

 

Group III

  1. Did Europe grow rich on imperialistic exploitation of the rest of the world in the last quarter of the 19th century? Support your answer fully.
  2. Compare German recoveries after World War I and after World War II.
  3. Discuss the role of Europe in the 1929 depression.
  4. Compare and contrast the role of London in world finance before and after 1913.

 

Source: Personal copies of Irwin Collier.

 

Categories
Exam Questions M.I.T.

MIT. Final Examination in 2nd Core Microeconomics. Martin Weitzman, 1974

The theory core at MIT in the mid-1970s consisted of four half-semester courses in microeconomics and four half-semester courses in macroeconomics. For reasons unknown to me, Microeconomic Theory I (A) taught by Martin Weitzman was scheduled to follow Microeconomic Theory II (A) taught by Robert Bishop for the First Term of 1974-75. I guess I should really say, there was no good reason not to simply reverse the numbering of the courses since Weitzman’s course was in most respects the more advanced of the two. The course featured the economic intuition behind some “quick and dirty bankers’ calculations”, an introduction to linear models, and the first essay of Koopmans’ Three Essays on the State of Economic Science.

_______________________

Microeconomic Theory I (A)

14.121 December 1974                 Final Exam                M. Weitzman

Instructions:

  1. Be sure you have picked a number and identify yourself by that number only on each blue book you use.
  2. Try to answer any three out of the following six questions.
  3. Complete answers on all three questions are not required for passing. Two well answered questions would easily be enough to pass, for example.
  4. Total time: one and a half hours.
  5. Answer each question in a separate blue book.
  6. Try to be concise and to the point. Wordiness is not going to help anyone.

 

  1. Explain carefully why the following three features of the American economy lead to productive inefficiency. Say what might be done to rectify the inefficiency.
    1. water pollution
    2. existence of “free” fishing grounds.
    3. the fact that the price of certain raw materials (Like natural gas) is artificially suppressed.
  1. Suppose there are a total of I tasks to be accomplished. A limited number of labor saving machines are available to help out. Task i can be performed by using ai units of labor alone, or bi (< ai) units of labor along with ei machines, or the appropriate combination. There are a total of M machines available.
    1. Formulate the problem of using the available machines to minimize the amount of labor required to perform the tasks.
    2. Describe the optimal solution.
    3. What is the value or shadow price of an extra machine? Show directly that minimizing shadow costs at shadow prices yields the right answer.
  1. A particular “two-armed” model of a drill-press can be worked by either one or two operators. With one operator it produces U units of output per unit time; with two operators it produces V units per unit time.
    1. With L laborers and M machines available, describe precisely how to calculate how many machines should be operated by one worker and how many by two in order to maximize output. What is the marginal rate of substitution between machines and laborers? (Hint: Try to get an answer using “common sense.” If that doesn’t work, draw isoquants.)
    2. Suppose total output is fixed in the long run. As many machines can be rented and workers hired as desired at the going rates. How do you decide whether it is better to operate machines with one or with two laborers?
    3. In the short run the number of machines is fixed but as many workers as desired can be hired at the going wage rate. The output is variable. How is the short run supply of output schedule determined?
  1. There are two farm plots, A and B. Both have identical production functions. If x units of labor is applied to A (or to B) it results in f(x) units of output. A total of L units of labor is available for application to both farm plots.
    1. Formulate the planning problem of allocating labor to A and to B so as to maximize total output from both farms when a total of L units of labor are available.
    2. Assuming f’(x) > 0, f”(x) < 0, characterize exactly the solution to problem (a) above and show why it is optimal.
    3. Show directly that there is an efficiency price of labor relative to output which supports the optimal solution of (b).
    4. Assuming f’(x) > 0, f” > 0, characterize exactly the solution to problem (a) above. Does (c) hold now? Why or why not?
  1. A firm or economy consists of a number of divisions or subsectors. There are no externalities. From first principles, prove rigorously the following result: If each subsector is maximizing profits at the same positive prices, the firm’s overall mixture of inputs and outputs is being efficiently produced.
  1. Suppose modern low-cost shell housing is made according to the following production formula:

H = (A + T)αL1-α

A,T,L ≥ 0

Where H is housing, A is aluminum, T is tin, and L is labor. Tin is produced by a perfect competitor, so there is free entry into the tin industry. One unit of labor produces a unit of tin. Aluminum, on the other hand, is a monopolistic industry which can charge any price it wants to, and can restrict entry. One unit of labor produces b > 1 units of aluminum. The aluminum, tin, and housebuilding industries have competitive labor supplies. For simplicity, suppose that the total budget of all the housebuilders is fixed and aluminum has no other uses.

a. What will be the competitive price of tin? The monopoly price of aluminum? Why?

b. What input mix will the home builders select and why?

c. Referring to question (b), are houses being produced efficiently? Why or why not? Give as precise an answer as you can. If you find that houses are produced inefficiently, give the efficient way to produce them.

 

Source: Personal copy of Irwin Collier.

Image Source: Detail from 1976 MIT economics department group picture.

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard Suggested Reading Syllabus

Harvard. Economy of Russia. Leontief, 1947-48

We are used to seeing professors restricting their teaching to their research comfort zones. We see here that Wassily Leontief also taught courses from his broad interests. Here the syllabus and final exam for a course on the “Russian” [“Soviet” would have a better word choice] economy.

During the following Fall term Alexander Gerschenkron taught a graduate seminar (Economics 212b) on the subject which was attended by only three graduate students, but the reading list was much more extensive. Leontief offered this undergraduate course (Economics 112b) in the Spring of 1949.

________________________________________

Course Enrollment

[Economics] 12b. Professor Leontief. — The Economy of Russia (F).

Total 35: 16 Graduates, 5 Seniors, 7 Juniors, 2 Sophomores, 4 Radcliffe, 1 Other.

 

Source: Report of the President of Harvard College and Reports of Departments for 1947-48, p. 89.

________________________________________

Economics 12b
The Economy of Russia
Fall Term, 1947-48

 

I.        From the Emancipation to the Revolution

1.       Agricultural development and reforms
2.         First stages of industrialization

Reading assignments:

Bowden, Karpovich, and Usher, An Economic History of Europe since 1750, Ch. 29, pp. 598-615.
Hubbard, L. E., The Economics of Soviet Agriculture, Chs. 1-8, pp. 1-63.
Maynard, J., The Russian Peasant, Chs. 1, 2, pp. 13-62.

II.      War and Revolution

1.         War economy up to the October Revolution
2.         Agrarian revolution and the nationalization of industries

Reading assignments:

Maynard, Ch. 6, pp. 63-81.
Baykov, A., The Development of the Soviet Economic System, Chs. 1, 2, 3, pp. 1-48.

III.     War Communism

1.          Industrial collapse
2.         Agricultural contraction

Reading assignments:

Dobb, M. Russian Economic Development since the Revolution, Chs. 3, 4, pp. 66-128.

IV.     The New Economic Policy

1.          Private enterprise and the socialized sector
2.         Agricultural recovery
3.         Industrial reconstruction

Reading assignments:

Maynard, Ch. 10, pp. 148-182.
Baykov, Chs. 4-9, pp. 49-152.

V.       The Economics of High Pressure Industrialization

1.         Capital accumulation
2.         Structural change

Reading assignments:

Yugow, A., Russia’s Economic Front for War and Peace, Ch. 2, pp. 30-42, and Ch. 9, pp. 198-219.
Baykov, A., Ch. 10, pp. 153-158.
Dobb, M., Ch. 8, pp. 177-208.

VI.     Socialist Agriculture

1.         The process of socialization (collectivization)
2.         The Kolkhoz
3.         The Sovkhoz and machine-tractor station
4.         Development of agricultural output and its allocation

Reading assignments:

Baykov, Ch. 13, pp. 189-311; Ch. 17, pp. 309-334.
Yugow, Ch. 3, pp. 43-81.
Maynard, Ch. 15, pp. 279-309.
Bienstock, Schwarz, and Yugow, Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture, Chs. 10-17, pp. 127-179.

VII.    Industrial Expansion

1.         The three Five-Year Plans
2.         Industrial organization
3.         Labor and unions

Reading assignments:

Yugow, Ch. 2, pp. 13-30; Chs. 7 and 8, pp. 149-197.
Bienstock…, Chs. 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, and 9.
Baykov, Ch. 11, pp. 159-187; Ch. 13, pp. 212-233; Ch. 16, pp. 277-308; and Ch. 18, pp. 335-363.
Bergson, A., The Structure of Soviet Wages, Chs. 1, 2, pp. 3-25; Chs. 11, 12, 13, and 14, pp. 159-210.
Report of the C.I.O. Delegation to the Soviet Union, 1947.
Dobb, M., Ch. 16, pp. 407-453.

 

VIII.   Functional Structure of the Economic System

1.         Prices, wages, taxes, and profits
2.         The governmental budget as an instrument of economic policy
3.         Methods of planning
4.         Principles of planning

Reading assignments:

Baykov, Ch. 15, pp. 251-276; Ch. 20, pp. 423-479.
Yugow, Ch. 4, pp. 82-95; Ch. 10, 11, pp. 219-243.
Bienstock…, Ch. 4, pp. 47-57; Ch. 6, pp. 66-90; Introduction, pp. xiii-xxxii.
Lange, Oscar, The Working Principles of Soviet Economy, American-Russian Institute.
Dobb, M., Chs. 13 and 14, pp. 313-348.

 

IX.     War and Post-War

1.          Soviet war economy
2.         The new Five-Year Plan
3.         Soviet econmy and world economy

Reading assignments:

Schwartz, Harry, Russia’s Postwar Economy
Gerschenkron, A., Economic Relations with the U.S.S.R.
Yugow, Ch. 5, pp. 96-122.
Dobb, M., Ch. 12, pp. 290-312.

General reading:

Gregory, J., and Shave, D. W., The U.S.S.R., A Geographical Survey, Part I, pp. 1-250.
Scott, John, Behind the Urals.

 

Source: Harvard University Archives , Wassily Leontief Papers (HUG 4517.45), Course Material Box 2, Folder “The Economy of Russia—1949”.
also: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003. Box 4, Folder “Economics 1947-48 (1 of 2)”

 

Reading Period
January 5-15, 1948

Undergraduate students:

E. Varga: Two Systems: Socialist Economy and Capitalist Economy, 1939
or
Manya Gordon: Workers before and after Lenin.

Graduate Students

Studies in Income and Wealth, Volume Eight, Part 8: Methods of Estimating Naitonal Income in Soviet Russia, Paul Studenski, from Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1946. or
Review of Economic Statistics, November, 1947 – Articles on Russia’s National Income.

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003. Box 4, Folder “Economics 1947-48 (1 of 2)”

________________________________________

1947-48
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
ECONOMICS 12b

Answer any FIVE of the following SIX questions:

  1. Describe and appraise the general economic significance of the methods of income payments and income allocation in Soviet agriculture.
  2. Describe the methods which the Soviet Government used (a) to secure and (b) to allocate funds for capital investment.
  3. Compare the role of the trade unions in the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.
  4. Characterize the successive Five-Year Plans by their principal distinguishing features.
  5. Indicate the reasons and analyze the implications of the recent Soviet monetary reform.
  6. Describe the organization and discuss some of the principal problems of Soviet economic planning.

Final, January, 1948.

 

Source: Harvard University Archives, Wassily Leontief Papers (HUG 4517.45), Course Material Box 2, Folder “Economics 12b”.

________________________________________

March 30, 1948
W.W. Leontief

Make-Up Examination for Economics 12b—Final Exam

Answer FIVE Questions Including Questions 1 and 2

  1. Describe the nature and the function of the turnover tax.
  2. Describe and interpret the organization and the role of foreign trade in the Soviet Economy.
  3. Describe and appraise the general economic significance of the methods of income payments and income allocation in Soviet agriculture.
  4. Describe the methods which the Soviet Government used (a) to secure and (b) to allocate funds for capital investment.
  5. Compare the role of the trade unions in the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.
  6. Characterize the successive Five-Year Plans by their principal distinguishing features.

Source: Harvard University Archives, Wassily Leontief Papers (HUG 4517.45), Course Material Box 2, Folder “Economics 12b”.

 

Image Source: Harvard Album 1949.

 

Categories
Courses Economists Exam Questions Harvard

Harvard. Economics of Corporations. Dewing and Opie, 1929

 

Professor Arthur Stone Dewing (1880-1971) and Dr. Redvers Opie taught the course Economics of Corporations at Harvard that was given in the second semester of the academic year 1928/29.  In an earlier posting I transcribed a student review of the course that was published in the Harvard Crimson (December 11, 1929).

Dewing was born (April 16, 1880) and died (January 19, 1971) in Boston. His academic degrees were awarded by Harvard (A.B., 1902; A.M., 1903; Ph.D. in Philosophy, 1905). Dissertation title: “Negation and Intuition in the Philosophy of Schelling.” He also studied at the University of Munich. Dewing taught philosophy from 1902 to 1913 and in economics and finance from 1911 to 1933.  He was one of the founders of the Harvard Business School. For a memorial see Cornelius Vermeil, “Arthur Stone Dewing”, Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Third Series, Vol. 83, 1971, pp. 165-167.

Incidentally Arthur S. Dewing was a distinguished numismatist, his collection of nearly three thousand ancient Greek coins was considered “one of the most outstanding in the hands of a private collector in the world.” Here a fascinating article about the theft and recovery of much the Dewing collection.

Redvers Opie (1900-1984) was a Harvard economics Ph.D., best known as the translator of Joseph Schumpeter’s The Theory of Economic Development (1934). From the “Company Info” page of Ecanal (Economic Analysis for Company Planning in Mexico) with information added by me regarding the dates of Opie’s academic degrees:

Ecanal was founded in 1976 by the British economist, Dr Redvers Opie, who was educated at Durham University [B. Com., 1919]. He taught at Oxford University and became the Bursar of Magdalen College. Later on he received a PhD from and taught at Harvard University [A.M. in 1927. Ph.D. in 1928. Thesis: “John Stuart Mill: a Reexamination”]. On the recommendation of John Maynard Keynes, he became the UK Treasury representative in Washington DC, and later on one of the five members of the UK delegation to the Bretton Woods Conference, which gave birth to the IMF and the World Bank. He started Ecanal upon becoming a naturalized Mexican as the source of critical analysis of the economy and government policy useful for business.

Cf. the 1933-34 Additional Readings for General Examination Corporations for Harvard.

Note: In the Course Announcements for 1928-29 (second edition), p. 122, Dr. C. E. Persons was originally scheduled to teach this course.

The information for this course comes from the course notes taken by later University of Chicago and Columbia University economist, Albert Gailord Hart. Hart’s handwriting defies encryption though I am proud to say that all but two or three words in what follows has been successfully deciphered. The course reading assignments are followed by the final examination questions.

__________________________________

Economics 4b
Assignments

Buy Jones—Trust Problem

[Jones, Eliot. The Trust Problem in the Unites States. New York: Macmillan, 1929. For the 1921 edition]

Choose one[:]

Pollock & Maitland—Law – Vol. I 586-518

[Pollock, Sir Frederick and Frederic William Maitland. The History of English Law before the Time of Edward I, 2nd ed. Cambridge (England): Cambridge University Press, 1923.]

[Illegible name, “Bold—-“?] 1st ed 362-376 [;] 3rd ed 469-490

J. P. Davis Corp. 1, 7 (2 & 8 optional)

[Davis, John P. Corporations; A Study of the Origin and Development of Great Business Combinations and of their Relation to the Authority of the State. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1905. Volume I, probably Chapter I (Introduction, pp. 1-12) and Chapter II (The Nature of Corporations, pp.13-34) intended; Volume II, probably Chapter VII (Legal View of Corporations, pp. 209-247) and Chapter VIII (Modern Corporations, pp. 248-280) intended]

Baldwin Mod Pol Inst

[Baldwin, Simeon Eben. Modern Political Institutions. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1898]

Buy one[:]

Dewing A. S. Cor. Finance (simplified) omit 8, 17-19, 21

[Dewing, Arthur Stone. Corporation Finance. New York: Ronald Press, 1922]

Lyon, Hastings—[Cor. Finance] (specialized) omit I 6,8, II 4

[Lyon, Hastings, Corporation Finance. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1916
Part I: Capitalization. Part II: Distributing Securities, Reorganization.]

Hour exam in mid-March, another early April

Jones 1-5, 9, 11-2, 14-6

Watkins Indust Combin & Pub. Pol. 11 (R 223-47)
Not held for cases except big ones.

[Watkins, Myron Webster. Industrial Combinations and Public Policy: A Study of Combination, Competition and the Common Welfare. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1927.

Jones 17-18

Take one.

1 Indust Conf Bd “Trade Associations”

[National Industrial Conference Board, Trade Associations; Their Economic Significance and Legal Status, 1925.  Reviewed in Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 35, No. 3, June, 1927. pp. 428-30.]

2 [Indust. Conf. Bd.] “Public Reg. of Competitive Practices”

[(Myron W. Watkins), National Industrial Conference Board, Public Regulation of Competitive Practices, 1925. Revised and enlarged edition, 1929. Third edition, 1940.]

3 [Illegible word] the Law plus Watkins

4 Kirsch—“Trade Ass’ns.

[Kirsch, Benjamin S. Trade Associations: The Legal Aspects. New York: Central Book Co., 1928. Review in Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 38, No. 2 (April, 1930), pp. 238-240.]

Ad lit. A. Smith V, ch. I, Pt III, article I, 211-245.

Geneva Economic Conference of 1927. Publications on Cartels.

[Paul de Rousiers, Cartels, Trusts, and Their Development; D. H. MacGregor, International Cartels. Geneva, 1927]

 

Source: Albert Gailord Hart Papers. Box 60, Folder “R Opie 1929 Monopoly etc”.

__________________________________

 

1928-29
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
ECONOMICS 4b

PART I

(About one hour)

Write an essay on one of the following topics:

(a) Public Policy and Business Standards.
(b) Trade Association Activities and the Competitive System.
(c) The Rule of Reason.
(d) Government Control of Combination and Consolidation To-day.

 

PART II

Answer not more than FOUR questions.

  1. What significance has a study of “laws of return” for an understanding of the problems connected with industrial combinations?
  2. “Certainly the implication of the Webb Act is that enforced competition is too weak, too inefficient to meet monopolistic combination. The question may be fairly asked, what does this admission entail in regard to our domestic trust policy?” Defend, refute or modify.
  3. Does the establishment of the Federal Trade Commission reflect any changes in the relation of Government to industry? What have been the most important activities of the Commission since its inception?
  4. What are the chief causes and purposes of corporate reorganization? Describe the usual procedure adopted, paying particular attention to the methods of protecting the interests of the various parties involved.
  5. “The trust dissolutions have not resulted in a spectacular and instant rescue of the consumer from the evils of monopoly, but that was hardly to have been expected.”
    Do you agree?
    What has been accomplished by trust dissolutions?
  6. “The stockholder has a right to receive the earnings of the corporation as dividends; and the existence of a large surplus simply shows that the stockholder has been deprived of his rightful income.” Does this indicate an intelligent understanding of corporate surplus?

Final. 1929.

 

Source: Albert Gailord Hart Papers. Box 60, Folder “Exams: CHI Qualifyin[?]”.

Image Source: (Dewing, left) Harvard Album 1925; (Opie, right) Harvard Album 1932.

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard

Harvard. Government Regulation of Industry. A.B. Correlation Examination, 1939

Today’s posting is a transcription of the “correlation examination” questions for government regulation of industry given at Harvard in May 1939.  

Concentrators in Economics will have to pass in the spring their Junior year a general examination on the department of Economics, and in the spring of their Senior year an examination correlating Economics with either History or Government (this correlating exam may be abolished by 1942), and a third one on the student’s special field, which is chosen from a list of eleven, including economic theory, economic history, money and banking, industry, public utilities, public finance, labor problems, international economics, policies and agriculture.
Courses in allied fields, including Philosophy, Mathematics, History, Government, and Sociology, are suggested by the department for each of the special fields. In addition, Geography 1 is recommended in connection with international policies or agriculture.
[Source: Harvard Crimson, May 31, 1938]

A printed copy of questions for twelve A.B. examinations in economics at Harvard for the academic year 1938-39 can be found in the Lloyd A. Metzler papers at Duke’s Economists’ Papers Project. 

Economic Theory,
Economic History Since 1750,
Money and Finance,
Market Organization and Control,
Labor Economics and Social Reform.

  • Six Correlation Examinations given to Honors Candidates.

Economic History of Western Europe since 1750,
American Economic History,
History of Political and Economic Thought,
Public Administration and Finance,
Government Regulation of Industry,
Mathematical Economic Theory.

______________________

If you find this posting interesting, here is the complete list of “artifacts” from the history of economics I have assembled. You can subscribe to Economics in the Rear-View Mirror below. There is also an opportunity for comment following each posting….

 

______________________

DIVISION OF HISTORY, GOVERNMENT, AND ECONOMICS

CORRELATION EXAMINATION
Government Regulation of Industry

(Three hours)

Answer either FOUR or FIVE questions, including TWO from each group. If you answer FOUR questions, write about an hour on ONE of them and mark your answer “Essay.” This question will be given double weight.

A
Use a separate blue book for the questions in this part

  1. Discuss (a) the political and (b) the economic problems that must be met if cyclical fluctuations are to be moderated by a great public works program.
  2. “Despite popular misconceptions the courts have failed to nullify the antitrust laws.”
  3. “The trouble with the large corporation is not its size nor any lack of efficiency but rather its lack of social responsibility.” Is there any way short of out-right government ownership for meeting this problem?
  4. “The existence of cartels vastly facilitated the penetration of political power into the economic sphere in the Fascist countries.”
  5. “The foremost mandate to those who wish to avoid the expansion of public ownership and operation, is to bring about the adoption of a rational method for determining base values of public utilities for regulatory purposes.”
  6. “Although the mixed undertaking has points in common with the public corporation such as its corporate form and monopolistic position, the two organizations are strikingly different.”
  7. “At present the United States does not have a democratically administered radio. The present system is subject to the pressure of groups interested in economic advantage. Are the evils of a private-profit radio greater than those of a nationalistic radio?”
  8. “The fiscal system cannot serve as an engine of social control unless it is very materially redesigned and remodeled. It can become a means of social control only by becoming itself the object of control.”
  9. “The public utility problem, in whatever form it is found, is primarily a question of distributing controls. The locus of ownership is merely an incidental aspect of the whole problem.”

 

B
Use a separate blue book for the questions in this part

  1. “Perhaps the most acute of our present problems is that of preserving the democratic control of an increasingly centralized government power over economic life, rather than the avoidance of further extension of centralized government control.”
  2. Compare briefly commission regulation and government competition (as alternative methods of controlling market results) with respect to their most important political, administrative, and economic aspects.
  3. “The experience of the last ten years in ‘solving’ the farm problem leads to one conclusion only—that it can never be solved by government.”
  4. “Experience since 1920 demonstrates that the only way we can get desirable consolidation of railroads, which would yield great economies, is to allow the carriers to consolidate as they wish free from legal restrictions.”
  5. Discuss the administrative tasks and methods of the National Labor Relations Board.
  6. “Many of the bad effects of monopoly could be eliminated simply by amending the antitrust laws to prohibit the practices of price leadership and sharing the market.”
  7. “If price fixing according to the criterion laid down in the National Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 were extended to a large number of major industries wages and profits would be higher all ‘round.”
  8. Discuss some of the economic and administrative problems presented by the Robinson-Patman Act.
  9. Explain why you would favor or oppose the establishment of a Bureau of Industrial Economics to collect and publish basic industrial statistics and engage in continuous study of the problems of industrial organization and business policies.

May 12, 1939.

 

Source: Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library. Lloyd Appleton Metzler Papers. Box 7. [Harvard University], Division of History, Government and Economics. Division Examinations for the Degree of A.B., 1938-39.

 

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard

Harvard. Public Administration and Finance, Correlation Exam, 1939

Today’s posting is a transcription of the “correlation examination” questions for public administration and finance given at Harvard in May 1939.

Concentrators in Economics will have to pass in the spring their Junior year a general examination on the department of Economics, and in the spring of their Senior year an examination correlating Economics with either History or Government (this correlating exam may be abolished by 1942), and a third one on the student’s special field, which is chosen from a list of eleven, including economic theory, economic history, money and banking, industry, public utilities, public finance, labor problems, international economics, policies and agriculture.
Courses in allied fields, including Philosophy, Mathematics, History, Government, and Sociology, are suggested by the department for each of the special fields. In addition, Geography 1 is recommended in connection with international policies or agriculture.
[Source: Harvard Crimson, May 31, 1938]

A printed copy of questions for twelve A.B. examinations in economics at Harvard for the academic year 1938-39 can be found in the Lloyd A. Metzler papers at Duke’s Economists’ Papers Project. 

Economic Theory,
Economic History Since 1750,
Money and Finance,
Market Organization and Control,
Labor Economics and Social Reform.

  • Six Correlation Examinations given to Honors Candidates.

Economic History of Western Europe since 1750,
American Economic History,
History of Political and Economic Thought,
Public Administration and Finance,
Government Regulation of Industry,
Mathematical Economic Theory.

______________________

If you find this posting interesting, here is the complete list of “artifacts” from the history of economics I have assembled. You can subscribe to Economics in the Rear-View Mirror below. There is also an opportunity for comment following each posting….

 

 

______________________

DIVISION OF HISTORY, GOVERNMENT, AND ECONOMICS

CORRELATION EXAMINATION
Public Administration and Finance

(Three hours)

Answer either FOUR or FIVE questions, including TWO from each group. If you answer FOUR questions, write about an hour on ONE of them and mark your answer “Essay.” This question will be given double weight.

 

A
Use a separate blue book for the questions in this part

  1. “A marked tendency of modern legislation is to deal with regulatory problems by setting forth less frequently in the legislation itself the particular rules that shall control. More commonly the administrative agency is given power to prescribe governing regulations in certain spheres of activity.”
  2. “One factor that has received little attention is the need for administrative agencies to give adequate and effective publicity to their achievements. In the field of policy determination, effective publicizing of the policy and of the reasons that underlie it is essential.”
  3. “Although the U. S. Civil Service Commission has accomplished much in the way of reducing the patronage evil and in introducing competition as a means of recognizing merit, the full implications of the merit system have not been realized.”
  4. “The ultimate test of an administrative agency regulating business is the policy that it formulates; not the fairness as between the parties of the disposition of a controversy on a record of their own making.”
  5. “The development of American administrative law involves a potential conflict between the legislature and the judiciary. In humble realization by each of their respective functions lies in large measure the trembling hope for the maintenance of our democracy.”
  6. “A serious charge against the grant-in-aid from the point of view of concern for our dual system, is that it breaks down state initiative and devitalizes state policies. The exact contrary appears to be the case in actual practice.”
  7. “An old, established rule of statecraft is that ad hoc agencies should be kept at a minimum. Every agency that wants to be free from the integrated structure of the government and the control of central staff agencies must be able to make out a case for itself, showing that the advantages considerably outweigh the disadvantages.”
  8. “The concept of efficiency can be made the basis of a comprehensive and flexible framework for the evaluation and appraisal of government. It is a powerful tool for analyzing relationships of legislature and administrator.”
  9. “In the lack of cooperation between the President and Congress, is to be found the most serious weakness in the national fiscal system.” Discuss with reference to the Bureau of the Budget and the Treasury Department as agencies for financial planning, accounting and control.

 

B
Use a separate blue book for the questions in this part

  1. “You cannot run a war without inflation, so the government must finance it by borrowing or issuing paper money instead of by increasing taxation.”
  2. Explain the purposes and the principal activities of the Farm Credit Administration, or the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
  3. “People who talk about the ‘burden’ of the public debt fail to see that it is simply a matter of taxing Peter to pay Paul, or sometimes Peter.”
  4. Discuss the more important financial, administrative, and political problems which would be involved in a government program for extensive slum clearance.
  5. “Few people seem to realize that the Tennessee Valley Authority is socialism, and socialism of the worst sort characterized by fairyland economics, academic ideology, and absentee control.”
  6. “The chief result of the pernicious system of federal grants to states is that the people of those states with the smartest politicians get part of the bills for their own schools and highways paid by people in other states.”
  7. Discuss the possibilities of achieving a reduction in the costs of federal government or state government without diminishing the output of government services.
  8. “Our tax system needs to be revised in such ways as to discourage saving and encourage investment.”
  9. “The unplanned character of public spending by state and local governments must bear a considerable part of the blame for fluctuations in employment and the national income.”

 

May 12, 1939.

 

Source: Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library. Lloyd Appleton Metzler Papers. Box 7. [Harvard University], Division of History, Government and Economics. Division Examinations for the Degree of A.B., 1938-39.

 

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard Undergraduate

Harvard. History of Political and Economic Thought, A.B. Correlation Exam, 1939

Today’s posting is a transcription of the “correlation examination” questions for the history of political and economic thought given at Harvard in May 1939.

Concentrators in Economics will have to pass in the spring their Junior year a general examination on the department of Economics, and in the spring of their Senior year an examination correlating Economics with either History or Government (this correlating exam may be abolished by 1942), and a third one on the student’s special field, which is chosen from a list of eleven, including economic theory, economic history, money and banking, industry, public utilities, public finance, labor problems, international economics, policies and agriculture.
Courses in allied fields, including Philosophy, Mathematics, History, Government, and Sociology, are suggested by the department for each of the special fields. In addition, Geography 1 is recommended in connection with international policies or agriculture.
[Source: Harvard Crimson, May 31, 1938]

A printed copy of questions for twelve A.B. examinations in economics at Harvard for the academic year 1938-39 can be found in the Lloyd A. Metzler papers at Duke’s Economists’ Papers Project. 

Economic Theory,
Economic History Since 1750,
Money and Finance,
Market Organization and Control,
Labor Economics and Social Reform.

  • Six Correlation Examinations given to Honors Candidates.

Economic History of Western Europe since 1750,
American Economic History,
History of Political and Economic Thought,
Public Administration and Finance,
Government Regulation of Industry,
Mathematical Economic Theory.

______________________

If you find this posting interesting, here is the complete list of “artifacts” from the history of economics I have assembled. You can subscribe to Economics in the Rear-View Mirror below. There is also an opportunity for comment following each posting….

 

______________________

DIVISION OF HISTORY, GOVERNMENT, AND ECONOMICS
CORRELATION EXAMINATION
HISTORY OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC THOUGHT

(Three hours)

 

            Answer either FOUR or FIVE questions, selected from TWO or THREE groups. If questions are taken from only TWO groups, at least TWO questions must be answered in each group. If you answer FOUR questions, write about an hour on ONE of them and mark your answer “Essay.” This question will be given double weight.

 

A
Use a separate blue book for the questions in this part.

  1. “The greatest contribution of the Hellenistic Age in the field of political thought was the idea of cosmopolitanism.”
  2. “Dante’s De Monarchia represents both the culmination and the close of medieval political theorizing on international relations.”
  3. “Luther accepted the medieval conception of the social order, while at the same time rejecting all its sanctions.”
  4. “The Leviathan of Hobbes is the best philosophical comment on the Tudor system.”
  5. Who in your opinion is more typical of the eighteenth-century French thought: Montesquieu, Voltaire or Rousseau?
  6. “In a historical discussion of Romanticism, the term should be used in the plural, not in the singular.”
  7. “Hegel’s philosophy, with its emphasis on the historical continuity and collective nature of society, contributed to the growth of various types of political and social thought.”
  8. Discuss the impact of the theory of Evolution on the idea of Progress.
  9. “The Dictatorship of the Proletariat is a modern version of the Enlightened Despotism.”
  10. “It is highly significant that the present-date dictatorships, while frankly admitting they are anti-liberal nature, all pretend that they are more democratic than the old democracies.”

B
Use a separate blue book for the questions in this part.

  1. To what extent are the classifications of types of governments given by Plato and Aristotle useful at the present day? What amendments or additions would you suggest?
  2. The theory of popular sovereignty in the Middle Ages.
  3. “When Machiavelli based his instruction for Princes on the freedom from restraint, it seemed to the men of his day and unheard-of innovation, a monstrous crime.”
  4. “What is called totalitarianism is really the rediscovery of the doctrine of sovereignty, well-established in the 16th century, by nations which have more recently come to national life and the realization of it. Nothing has been added to the doctrine except the confusion of legal omnipotence with a practical omnicompetence.”
  5. “It was in truth a revolutionary act when Rousseau struck out the contract of rulership from the contractual theory; but it was not wholly without preparation that this stroke fell.”
  6. “It is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with nationalities.”
  7. How would you explain the weakness and inadequacy of American political thought in the period since the early years of the 19th century?
  8. “The idea of the totalitarian State was born in the last world war, which became a totalitarian war.”
  9. “The Fascist state is not legal but social; it deals with men as they are, not with legal patterns or abstractions. It does not recognize the “rights of citizens”; it offers men, services.”

 

C
Use a separate blue book for the questions in this part.

  1. “For a modern student, seeking to understand and to judge the medieval doctrines about ‘usury’, both the theoretical arguments supplied by Aristotle, and the religious attitude of the Church, are less important than certain medieval economic conditions.”
  2. “The basis of mercantilism was not confusion of the ideas, money and wealth, but a set of conditions which made the policy inevitable and right in that era.”
  3. “Few writers in history have exerted an influence upon the policies of any nation, equal to that of Adam Smith over British fiscal and commercial policy throughout the nineteenth century.”
  4. “The two parts of Ricardo’s system of economic theory were inconsistent; his theory of value or exchange implied, given free markets or free competition, a perfect harmony of all individual interests with one another and the public interest; but his theory of distribution, or wages, profits, and rent, implied a conflict of class-interests, in which Capital robs Labor while the Landlords Rob both.”
  5. “The classical tradition of economic theory is not responsible for the economic interpretation of history; for Marx was led to the latter, not at all by the ideas he borrowed from the classical economists, but wholly by Hegel’s philosophy of history, which he converted from ‘dialectical idealism,’ into his own theory of ‘dialectical materialism.’”
  6. “The ‘marginal utility’ and ‘productivity’ theories were invented in the late 19th century by the Austrian economists, J. B. Clark, and others, in an effort to refute Marx; and they failed to do this, because Marx had written about actual capitalism, while these new theories assumed an economic system that never did, or could, exist.”
  7. “The history of economic theory, in relation to that of the public policies discussed by economists, shows how small a part reason plays in the conduct of human affairs. To take only one example; although all economists have agreed, for a century, that Free Trade is beneficial, and Protection is harmful to every nation, only England heeded them for a little while, and they are now ignored on this issue, thru-out the world.”
  8. “The majority of the nineteenth century economists scarcely recognized, and their present-day successors are still far from understanding, the worst disease of the modern economic system, i.e., that which has caused it, ever since the outset of the industrial revolution, to break down every tenth year or so, in a world-wide depression.”
  9. “The ‘trust-busting’ era in American history had behind it the over-simple theory of business competition and monopoly, of the 19th century economists. But economists now possess a more realistic theory of ‘monopolistic competition,’ which may lead in time to public acceptance, and regulation of monopolies, replacing futile efforts to suppress them.”
  10. “The early, classical economic theory properly emphasized the ‘long-run’ effects of disturbing changes in economic conditions, which if allowed to work themselves out, usually correct the distressing, immediate effects that public opinion always wants governments to correct at once. But as more recent economic theorists have turned to ‘short-run’ analysis, they have fallen a prey, themselves, to the popular fallacies exploded by their predecessors.”

May 12, 1939.

 

 

Source: David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Duke University. Lloyd A. Metzler Papers, Box 7; [Harvard University], Division of History, Government and Economics, Division Examinations for the Degree of A.B., 1938-39.