Categories
Exam Questions M.I.T.

M.I.T. General exams in money and banking, 1952 and 1956

 

 

In this post we find transcriptions of three exams from the M.I.T. economics department for 1952 and 1956. The date of the second of the three is somewhat uncertain, with only a handwritten note “Spring 1956 (?)” at the top indicating the likely date. Since the question involving changes in bank balance sheets is identical with that in the September 1956 exam, it seems plausible that the dates of the second and third exams were close.

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GENERAL EXAMINATION IN MONEY AND BANKING

Monday, May 12, 1952
9:00-12:00 m.

  1. “We have arrived at a fairly deflation proof monetary framework.” What does this statement mean?
  2. Explain the gold standard as it functioned prior to World War I and discuss this standard as a practical policy for our times.
  3. Explain briefly the credit control instruments available to the federal reserve authorities and indicate how their control may be modified by political and other institutional conditions.
  4. “There must be some quantity of cash assets which would just suit each household and business firm in the economic system.” What determines this quantity? What happens when the actual cost [sic, should read “cash”] held does not match this quantity?
  5. Explain the proposal for 100 per cent money. What is the purpose of the plan and its shortcomings?
  6. Write a short exposition of what you consider to be the proper goal of monetary policy.

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General Examination in Money
[handwritten note:  “Spring 1956(?)”]

Total Time:  3 hours.

I

60 minutes

Compare the essential features, similarities and differences in so far as they relate to the setting of Central Banking policy of

(1) The Bank of England, as set up under the Bank Act of 1844;
(2) the National Banking system prior to the Federal Reserve Act;
(3) the Federal Reserve system as initially enacted, and
(4) The Federal Reserve system as amended in its present form.

Show how the essential changes in the structure of the Central Bank reflected the development of and changes in the underlying theories of Central Bank policy and of the role of money in the economy.

II

30 minutes. Answer both questions.

  1. Define what is meant by the “expansion coefficient” of the banking system. Using your definition, estimate this coefficient for the U.S. banking system. Note: In defining your coefficient, you will also have to define what you mean by “banking system”.
  2. Suppose that over a given period, the following changes are noted:
Increase in Federal Reserve Credit 1000
Decrease in Float 50
Increase in Money in Circulation 200
Increase in Commercial Bank Capital 150
Decrease in Treasury Currency outstanding 100
Increase in Currency holdings of Commercial Banks 80

What is the resulting change in member bank reserves? Assuming commercial banks to be loaned up, with a reserve ratio of 20%, what is the resulting change in money supply held by the public? Show how each of the itemized changes enters into the picture.

III

30 minutes. Write briefly on two out of the following three questions.

  1. Consider the main issues involved in U.S. experience with legislation against concentration in the field of commercial banking.
  2. Consider the main issues involved in bank examinations.
  3. What are the main fields of Federal credit policy now conducted outside the Federal Reserve system? Should they be placed under the Federal Reserve? Why or why not?

IV

30 minutes. Write on one of the following two questions.

  1. Forgetting about the politics of debt management, consider some of the essential problems of a theory of debt management, conceived as part of a broader framework of liquidity and monetary theory.
  2. Much has been said and written in recent years about the “rebirth” of monetary policy. Discuss and appraise the factors behind this development, allowing for both theoretical and policy aspects.

V

30 minutes. Write on one of the following two questions.

  1. “Looking back over the development of monetary theory, the three outstanding landmarks are Wicksell’s concept of the natural rate, Fisher’s treatment of velocity and Keynes’ concept of liquidity preference. All three are necessary parts of a complete system of monetary theory and need be considered if one wishes to understand the role of money in the economy.” Explain and discuss. Do you agree with the statement?
  2. Discuss the issues involved in the controversy between the “liquidity preference” and the “loanable funds” approach to interest theory. Do you think that the two can be reconciled? If so, how?

_____________________

GENERAL EXAMINATION IN MONEY AND BANKING

September 12, 1956

Answer any five questions.

  1. Describe and contrast the “Cambridge cash balance” approach to the “quantity theory of money” with that of Fisher. What have been the historical trends of economists’ views toward the quantity theory? Interpret and evaluate the cause behind these trends, giving the present status of that theory.
  2. Evaluate the current weapons of American monetary policy in terms of their importance and effectiveness. Illustrate by concrete experiences.
  3. “Debt management is part of fiscal policy and also of monetary policy. It involves the interrelations of asset theory with income flow theory, and can only be understood in terms of various theories of liquidity and loanable bonds.” Comment on this theme.
  4. What have been the important evolutionary changes in the American banking system and related financial institutions? Contrast with the U.K. or other countries.
  5. Synthesize the “pure-theory” aspects of capital and interest with the “monetary, effective demand, uncertainty” aspects of the problems. Resolve controversies where you can.
  6. Suppose that over a given period, the following changes are noted:
Increase in Federal Reserve Credit 1000
Decrease in Float 50
Increase in Money in Circulation 200
Increase in Commercial Bank Capital 150
Decrease in Treasury Currency outstanding 100
Increase in Currency holdings of Commercial Banks 80

What is the resulting change in member bank reserves? Assuming commercial banks to be loaned up, with a reserve ratio of 20%, what is the resulting change in money supply held by the public? Show how each of the itemized changes enters into the picture.

  1. Write a half hour essay on the interrelations of fiscal and monetary policies.

 

Source:  Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library. Economists’ Papers Archive. Paul Samuelson Papers, Box 33, Folder “Teaching Exams 1952, 1956”.

Image Source: M.I.T. Technology Review, March 1914.

Categories
Funny Business M.I.T.

M.I.T. Economics Christmas skit with basketball theme, 1961

 

Spoiler alert: you are about to encounter one of the least funny economics skits in the history of the genre, so this artifact is regrettably low on entertainment value.  Still the six acts have a certain seven-acts-of-man structure: Act I (the department recruits), Act II ( advising the first-year student), Act III (graduate student complaints), Act IV (choosing guest speakers), Act V (general examinations), Act VI (job market). 

After reading the skit, you might need a palate cleansing or better: for that purpose here are a few links to the key word “Funny Business” at Economics in the Rear-view Mirror that take you to some of the greatest hits of economics skits.

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ANOTHER TWO POINTS FOR THE FACULTY,
ANOTHER FOUL ON THE STUDENTS

A Christmas Drama (with suggestions for a cast), December 15, 1961

ACT I

(The curtain rises on a scene of [Edgar Cary] Brown, [Franklin Marvin] Fisher, [Charles Poor] Kindleberger and [Abraham J.] Siegel seated around a table reading applications.

SIEGEL: Here’s a guy who may be OK…No…the place is no good. A cow college. They average only 50 points a game.

BROWN:  Here’s a good one.

FISHER: What’s his record?

BROWN: Pretty darn good. Worth at least tuition plus $500. Maybe $750.

FISHER: What’s his record?

BROWN: Pretty darn good. He’s from Podunk. And they’re pretty good. He was the best they had.

FISHER: How did he score, for crying out loud?

BROWN: He’s six-feet-five, weighs 195 pounds, and fast; he averaged 23.7 points a game. He has a great set shot, never misses from the foul line, and superb off the backboard. He’s just what we need in Graduate Economics at M.I.T.

 

ACT II

(An office: Siegel is advising a student.)

SIEGEL: For the first year I would take pretty standard fare: theory, history, statistics, finance, and international, plus of course the workshop. There’s no use trying to take too much. Pace yourself.

STUDENT (perhaps [Stephen Herbert] Hymer?): I don’t have much math. Why do I need to take statistics?

SIEGEL: Ando is very good. He doesn’t always make things completely clear, but you have to take statistics if you want to be able to handle averages, to work out the point per game and point per shot records; and you need probability to help compute odds on all the league games. Statistics is a must.

STUDENT: Why the history, finance and international?

SIEGEL: International is important. You ought to know how to schedule the Harlem Globetrotters, and who has the best chance in the Olympics. One of our best graduates played on the Oxford team against Poland and Czechoslovakia. That was Chuck Cooper, and it got him a job as Walter Heller’s assistant at the Council. Finance is important. When the gamblers start bribing players you need to know how to invest the funds. And history is vital. On the general exams they always ask who was James Naismith, the man who invented basketball. That’s for every student. The good students they ask when it was invented…of course 1891. And the very best students they ask where…past, Springfield, Mass. Remember, it’s not Springfield, Illinois. That’s Abe Lincoln.

STUDENT: OK. But tell me about the last one.

SIEGEL: Theory isn’t much. [Paul Anthony] Samuelson teaches about how to make inputs for two points, and when to dribble.

STUDENT: Samuelson teaches drivel?

 

ACT III

(A group of students, griping.)

STUDENT 1 (Francis Michel Bator?): This place is no good. It’s theory, theory, theory all the way. Anyone knows that the way to win at basketball is to practice. Practice makes perfect. Theory makes perfect fools. All you do is study and take exams. “Who was James Naismith? Who was Adam Yea-Smith? When do you chop down the tree?” Bah! I say we ought to study policy. With a two-point lead and three minutes to go, should you freeze the ball or plop in an input for an output of two points?

STUDENT 2 ([Paul Narcyz] Rosenstein-Rodan?): They tell me [Robert Merton] Solow has been converted from theory to policy. He is no longer interested in questions like whether the best set shot is an inverted rectangular parabola, but real issues, like the queuing problem: how many substitutes does a team need to field five men for an hour, with one personal foul every six minutes and four personal fouls per man disqualifying. If you have too many players on the bench you get unemployment. The team needs growth. Maybe you ought to add a man and play six.

STUDENT 3 ([Robert] Evans?): What’s bad is to have to play far away from the Sloan building. Those workshops on top on Walker and over in the Armory are OK, but they are too far away. We need the Ford Foundation to give us a workshop right here.

STUDENT 1: Haven’t you heard? The talk is that the new building to go up in the back lot is a library. But as I see its dimensions unfold- 90 feet by 50 – and transparent backboards and netting and grandstands, I can’t believe it’s a library. It must be a basketball court.

 

ACT IV

(A meeting of the G.E.A.)

RALPH BULL (played by [Robert Lyle] Bishop?): Do any of you fellows have suggestions for speakers besides Cousy, Russell, Jungle Jim Lusketoff, and that 6.8 outstanding economist, [John Kenneth] Galbraith, who can stand with his head coming up through the basket?

STUDENT B: What about Milton Friedman? He is under the five feet which some say is the minimum allowable in a monetary theorist, but he sure is good at the far-fetched shot.

STUDENT B: Why not get Clifford Odets?

RALPH BULL: Clifford Odets? Why him?

STUDENT B: Don’t you remember the famous line in “Awake and Sing”? “My brother Sam joined the Navy. He don’t know from nothin’, that dumb basketball player.” I want to know whether the emphasis is “that dumb basketball player” or “the [sic] dumb basketball player”. Are there any smart basketball players?

 

ACT V

KINDLEBERGER: As chairman of this exam, let me tell you that you have the right to pick the order of your exam. Do you want to start with Theory, or Statistics?

STUDENT (Samuelson?): I think I’ll start by jumping against Fisher, your professorship, sir. Ando’s the smaller, so I’ll take him last when I’m tired.

KINDLEBERGER: All right. (Student and Fisher face each other. Kindleberger blows whistle and throws imaginary ball. Cheers of amazement from faculty.)

FISHER: Very well. I have decided to let you combine Theory and Economic History.

STUDENT: Hey, Ref, your Ph.D.ship, sir, I’m not responsible for History. Isn’t that a foul?

KINDLEBERGER: I didn’t see nuthin’.

FISHER: Consider the population explosion of the last 150 years. Discuss the relative roles of (a) men and (b) women in this affair.

ANDO [Albert Keinosuke] : Good shot. That’s two points for our side.

STUDENT: I don’t know that, your cap-and-gownship, sir, but I know the roles are neither reflexive, symmetric, or transitive.

KINDLEBERGER: (blows whistle) Foul. You used big words in a generals. That’s only permitted the faculty.

FISHER: I’ll give Albert my free throw.

ANDO: (taking the foul shot) Please discuss the role of the nearly decomposable take-off in the application of a priori oligopoly theory to the A&P case.

STUDENT: Hey! You guys are ganging up on me.

ANDO: Well, you outnumber us in class.

STUDENT: (driving hard for basket) It can be set up as a nine-dimensional matrix problem and the latent roots dispensed with. I think the take-off is fine if done along the turnpike, watching out for model changes in passing cars.

ANDO: Fantastic! (Faculty huddle.)

KINDLEBERGER: That was a good answer. We’ve decided to give you an Excellent minus for being a good scorer, but to ask you to leave the Institute for fouling out on personals.

KINDLEBERGER, ANDO, FISHER: Rah, team!

 

ACT VI

DOMAR [Evsey David]: Well, you have the degree wrapped up, and now want a job. Not bad. You got a good grade on the orals, and would have gotten a top grade if you hadn’t thought that Stilt Chamberlain played for the Celtics and failed to distinguish Slippery Sam Jones from Casey Jones. Your thesis was entirely satisfactory, on a good topic: How to Get to the Boston Garden from Madison Square Garden: An Application of the Turnpike Theorem. And you even did languages: basketball communication in the Ivy League, or basketball with a broad A. Now the job. What do you think? Big Ten? Ivy League? Small liberal arts? Girls’ rules like Wellesley or Vassar? Or maybe the real big time: Kentucky, Long Island University, St. Joseph’s in Brooklyn, Notre Dame. L.I.U. is to economics like M.I.T. was to economics.

STUDENT (perhaps [Max Franklin] Millikan?): I don’t now if I’m ready for the Big Time.

DOMAR: What about applying some of your basketballmetrics for the government? They need our graduates. Or for an oil company. Maybe you would like to take a ball and a whistle and go abroad, demonstrating technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. There are jobs like that.

STUDENT: No. I guess I’m fussy. What I’d like is just what all the gang would like, to stay here at Cambridge with Harvard and the Celtics, and to referee like you and [Robert Lyle] Bishop and Samuelson, always blowing off your whistle and shouting foul, going first class to conferences, and shouting foul, foul, foul at the students.

 

Source:  M.I.T. Archives. MIT Department of Economics records, Box 2, Folder “GEA 1961-67”.

Image Source:  Boston Celtics players Tom Heinsohn, Bill Russell, Bob Cousy, Bill Sharman and Frank Ramsey in 1960. “Twelve of the greatest Celtics players of all time”  from Boston.com website (March 18, 2018)

 

Categories
M.I.T. Regulations

M.I.T. No general foreign language requirement in MIT Economics PhD program, 1969

 

While the general foreign language requirement for an economics PhD was officially abolished at M.I.T. in 1969, at least Charles Kindleberger (European Economic History) and Evsey Domar (Communist Economies) were free to require their thesis writers to demonstrate competency in a foreign language as needed for research.

________________

Carbon copy of letter from E. Cary Brown to William F. Bottiglia

May 14, 1969

Professor William F. Bottiglia
Head of Department
Modern Language
14N-207

Dear Bill:

The following statement describes our new language requirement. As you see, we hope that your Department will police it when it is needed.

*   *  *   *   *  *   *   *

“The Department has no general foreign language requirements. When a foreign language is essential for full access to the literature in the field of the student’s major interest (e.g., European Economic History, Communist Economies) or to his thesis research, a language requirement will be imposed by the Department upon the recommendation of the Thesis Superviosr or the Graduate Registration Officer. Such a requirement will be administered by the Department of Foreign Literatures and Linguistics, and can be met by satisfactory course work at M.I.T., at other schools, or by examination.”

Sincerely yours,

E. Cary Brown, Head
Professor of Economics

ECB/mr

Source:  M.I.T. Archives. Department of Economics Records, Box 2, Folder “Grad Curriculum”.

Image Source: Technology Review, February 1914.

Categories
Economists M.I.T.

Italy. Terror victim, economics professor Ezio Tarantelli (1941-1985)

 

While skimming the oral history interview of Berkeley economist Lloyd Ulman (Harvard PhD, 1950), I learned that he was in Rome the day that his Italian colleague, Professor Ezio Tarantelli, was assassinated by two members of the Red Brigades in a parking lot outside of the building where he had just lectured. 

I met Ezio during my first year of graduate school at M.I.T. in 1974-75 through my classmate Francesco Giavazzi. While I probably had discussed economics and politics with him only a few times and probably less than for a couple of hours, he impressed me with a combination of intelligence, warmth, and humility that I was to discover to be relatively rare, and not just in a university setting. 

When I read the news that this mild-mannered professor of political economy in Rome had been murdered by political terrorists, I was utterly dumbfounded. Clearly having a name and a face for the victim of an act of senseless political violence made all the difference. Today I decided to add this post, a minor tribute to the memory of a most decent man and fellow economist.

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About Ezio Tarantelli

Red Brigades Kill Rome Economics Professor,  by Sari Gilbert. Washington Post, March 28, 1985.

Chapter 2, “Ezio Tarantelli: Sketches of an Intellectual Biography” in Giovanni Michelangoli, Ezio Tarantelli—Economic Theory and Industrial Relations. Springer, 2012.

Italian Documentary by Monica Repetto:  Ezio Tarantelli, La forza delle idee.

___________________

Excerpt from Oral History Interview with Lloyd Ullman

Uhlman: …I became heavily involved with Bob Flanagan and David Soskice, whom I had met in Oxford, on a Brookings project which ultimately materialized in Wage Restraint: A Study of Incomes Policies in Western Europe (1983). While working on this project, David Soskice and I were invited to give back-to-back talks to Ezio Tarantelli’s class in labor economics in Rome. My topic was the role played by collective bargaining as a second-best choice when employers were confronted by an existential threat to the capitalist order. It just so happened that Italy was experiencing considerable unrest and inflation at the time. Furthermore, Tarantelli, our host, was attracting a good deal of attention as an advocate of moderating the Scala Mobile, the national system of wage escalation which was regarded at the time by many as an important generator of inflation. Which made him a prime target of the Red Brigade on the far left.

Koya: Was the Scala Mobile between the laborers or employers or was the state also involved?

Uhlman: Laborers and employers.

Koya: No state intervention here in Italy?

Uhlman: More of a neo-corporatist arrangement.
Ezio Tarantelli was a very accomplished and very intelligent, imaginative fellow. So he invited David and me to give twin seminars in a single meeting of his class one day. I spoke about the threat of radicalism as an employer inducement to bargain collectively. He regarded it as very provocative, as he put it. That evening he took Lassie and me out to dinner. David had something else to do. And so in the usual Italian style, we ate at about ten o’clock. The restaurant was quite empty. There was a couple across the room and Lassie noticed they were looking at us all the time. Later, Tarantelli said, “Look,” he said, “when I was a student, I was a guide, a tour guide, and I’m now going to drive you through Rome in the moonlight.” It was an enchanted, lovely ride. We said goodnight and spoke about getting together soon again.
The next morning I had a meeting with the head of the non-communist labor federation at the time, the CISL [Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori or Italian Confederation of Workers’ Trade Unions]. Someone broke into our discussion and then left. The CISL head said, “Excuse me, but a friend of mine has just died and I have to see some television people.” Then we learned that Tarantelli had been killed by members of the Red Brigade[s]. That morning when he came to class, somebody shouted, “Professor Tarantelli!” He turned around, and they shot him. That was the most horrendous episode in my life, I can say.

Koya: So the provocation?

Uhlman: What? The provocation was that he was on the wrong side. That’s the provocation. That evening a small group of us had a meeting. David’s friends in the academic community met at the home of Ida Regalia, a well-known labor economist. We all brought over some bottles of wine and we sat around talking all evening and that was that.
Everything has a comic side to it, I guess. The next morning I had to get a haircut. My previous barber was an Oxford product, of course. The Italian barber took a look at me, walked all around me, my head, and said, “Atsa a bad haircut.” Later I walked back and Lassie and I met with David. I said, “David, sit down. I must tell you something.” I told him the story. It was just a horrible thing.

 

Source: Lloyd Ulman: An Oral History. Riyad Koya interviewer (Audio File 16, Interview October 20, 2011) pp. 233-234. University of California, Berkeley. Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library.

Image Source: Screen shot from Monica Repetto’s  Ezio Tarantelli, La forza delle idee.

 

Categories
Funny Business M.I.T.

MIT. The Wizard of E52-383C. Grad Student Skit, 1976

 

Today’s addition to the skits written and performed by my cohort of M.I.T. economics graduate students (we joined the program in 1974-75)  was performed in early 1976.  It is a parody of the classic Judy Garland movie The Wizard of Oz.  As coincidence would have it, the faculty’s own contribution to the skit party was a Wizard of Oz parody too. There are so many obscure references in the script that I’ll perhaps prepare an annotated version later. Not to brag, but Paul Samuelson was reported to have said after seeing my performance as the cowardly lion words to the effect “I think that guy might be in the wrong business.”

A parody of Alice in Wonderland set in the Wonderland Institute of Technology in 1975 was written and performed in 1975. In addition to the script I posted a list of my classmates with links to some biographical information where I was able to find something. 

In 1978 many of same people were involved in Casablank, a parody of the movie Casablanca. That script has likewise been transcribed and posted here at Economics in the Rear-view Mirror.

_________________

Cast of characters [corresponding Professor]
in order of appearance with actor’s name when known

Wizard of Mit [Paul Samuelson] played by Paul Krugman
Dorothy [Representative graduate student] played by Margaret Feiger (neé Agnew)
Mailman
Del [Del Tapley, Department Administrator]
Munchkin Labor Force Kid [Robert Hall]
Munchkin Mayor [Evsey Domar] played by William Krasker
Munchkin Adelman [Morris Adelman]
Wicked Witch of the East 
Scarecrow [Robert Solow] played by Jay Helms
Tin Man [Franco Modigliani] played by Dick Startz
Oil Can [Stanley Fischer] played by Jeffrey Frankel
Lion [Jerry Hausman] played by Bud Collier
Narrator
Housewife

_________________

THE WIZARD OF E52-383C

by Messrs. B. Collier, J. Frankel, J. Helms, R. Hill, P. Krugman, D. Startz.

 

Act I
Scene I

Wizard (offstage) Good Evening, Ladies and Gentlemen. I am the Great and Powerful Wizard of Mit. Tonight the Second year class presents a tale of the supernatural—The Wizard of E52-383C. Any resemblance between faculty members and characters in this skit is purely coincidental. Pay no attention to the identifying initials worn by the actors! Our action begins in Kansas where Dorothy, a college senior, has received a series of troubling letters.

 

Dorothy: (picking up and reading letters): I don’t understand it. I’ve been rejected by every grad school I applied to. Chicago…Stanford…Slippery Rock State Teacher’s College…University of Southern North Dakota…Southwestern Virginia College for Small Women…What did I do wrong? I wonder if I should have mentioned on my applications that I have an NSF fellowship?

(FANFARE)

enter Mailman (running): Special delivery! I have a piece of registered mail for Occupant.

Dorothy: That’s me! (opens letter) Why, it’s a letter from MIT. (begins reading)

Mailman (to audience): Dorothy’s letter says: “Dear Sir, Madam, or otherwise: We hear you have received an NSF and are delighted to admit you to our graduate economics program. This acceptance is, of course, based solely on our evaluation of your academic promise and be sure to fill out and return the enclosed financial form immediately.”

Dorothy: Hey, how do you know what it says? Did you get the same letter?

Mailman: Why not? Nobody said that it had to be a one-to-one correspondence.

Dorothy: Well, I guess I’d better go to MIT. But I don’t know how to get there. Excuse me, sir, (turning to Mailman), but can you tell me how I can get to MIT?

Mailman: (solemnly) Study!

 

Scene II

Dorothy: Somehow, I have a feeling we’re not in Kansas anymore.

Del: Hi! What witch are you?

Dorothy: Which what? Who? Huh? Oh! Why, I’m not a witch at all. As a matter of fact, I’ve never even seen a witch, I went to a state university.

Munchkins: Hee hee.

Dorothy: What’s that?

Del: They’re laughing because I am a witch. I’m Del, the good witch of the North.

Dorothy: Oh, I beg your pardon. But who are they?

Del: Those are Munchkins, the little people who live in this land. And you are their national heroine, for you have killed the Wicked Witch of the East Campus. Come out, every one, it’s safe now!

Dorothy: Hello!

Del: Munchkin Hall, from the second floor, would like to give you a present.

Hall (singing and dancing on one foot):

I represent the Labor Force Kids
The Labor Force Kids, The Labor Force Kids,
And on behalf of the Labor Force Kids
I wish to welcome you to Munchkin Land

The Labor Force Kids are honored to present you with a copy of my latest Brookings paper on the Phillips curve (holding paper upside down)

Dorothy: Aren’t you holding that journal upside down?

Hall: Well, most people think it slopes the opposite way, but they’re wrong, as you can tell by looking at the 454 model, which is empirically fitted on one observation.

Dorothy: But are you sure your paper is right?

Hall: Well, there are actually a few—actually, I—uh –as a matter of fact, I’d better warn you that some of the things I told you last term aren’t quite true. But here (taking another BPEA) is my latest Brookings paper on inflation, and I promise that this is my absolute last word on the subject…until next Fall.

enter Domar: On behalf of all the Munchkins, I, the Mayor of the Munchkins, welcome you to our land.

Dorothy: I’m pleased to meet you. But, please, sir, what exactly is a Munchkin?

Domar: Oh, a Munchkin is a sort of peasant. Actually, some Munchkins are workers, but most are peasants. I am the Mayor because I love to talk about peasants.

Dorothy: Why do the Munchkins need a Mayor? Is it hard to keep law and order?

Domar: Oh no, it’s no trouble at all. Munchkins are a friendly, peaceful folk who live in harmony and concord, except for a few who live in Lincoln. The only reason they need a mayor is because Munchkinland is a Mayoritocracy. Why, all the Munchkin laws are in this little book (hands Dorothy a book)

Dorothy: It’s awfully heavy for such a little book.

Hall: That’s because they’re all iron laws.

A Munchkin: Now let us all rejoice and tell happy stories!

Hall: 14.454!

(laughter)

Adelman: 14.124!

(laughter)

Dorothy: I don’t get it.

Domar: Oh, around here all you have to do is mention some course numbers and everyone thinks it’s funny.

Dorothy: Can I try it?

Domar: Be my guest.

Dorothy: 14.383

(everyone starts crying)

Domar: Why did you tell such a sad story? You’ve upset everyone!

(shrieks, rumbles)

Wicked Witch: Who killed my sister?

Dorothy: I thought you said she was dead!

Del: This is her sister, the Wicked Witch of the West.

Dorothy: You have two wicked witches?

Hall: O yes, you wouldn’t believe the trouble we’ve had around here because of doubles witching!

Wicked Witch: Who killed my sister? Was it you?

Dorothy: But I didn’t mean to.

Wicked Witch: I’ll get you, my pretty, and your little dog too!

Dorothy: What little dog?

Wicked Witch: You’re supposed to have a little dog!

Dorothy: Well you can’t expect us to reproduce the movie in Toto!

Del: You are in great danger, my dear, and you had better go and seek out help.

Dorothy: Who can help me?

Del: Perhaps the great Wizard of Mit can.

Dorothy: Can he pull a rabbit out of a hat?

Del: Well, he’s no Hal Varian, he can only do half a rabbit at a time.

Dorothy: Sounds like hare-splitting to me. But how do I find him?

Hall: It’s easy: just follow the gray cement.

Dorothy: (looking at ground) Follow the gray cement…follow the gray cement…(bumps into wall) Hey! Your were wrong, this path doesn’t lead anywhere.

Hall: Yes, I realized it wasn’t true as soon as I said it, but I decided not to tell you.

Adelman: Before you go, I, as the chief Munchkin expert on the oil industry, will make a prophecy: you will go safely to Mit and he will return you to Kansas.

Dorothy: Why does being an oil expert mean that you can see the future?

Adelman: Everyone knows there’s lots of prophets in the oil industry.

Dorothy: I sure hope this turns out better than some of your other predictions.

Del: Now my dear, you’d better start on your way to Mit.

Dorothy: How do I get there? And no funny business this time!

Del: Let’s see. I know I have it written down here somewhere (rummaging on table; picks up envelope, looks on back) Oh yes, here it is. All you must do is follow the yellow brick road…to Government center, change for the Green Line to Park Street, then take the Red Line to Kendall.

Dorothy: Follow the yellow brick road…follow the yellow brick road…

All: (singing)

Follow the yellow brick road
Follow the yellow brick road
Follow the, follow the, follow the, follow the,
Follow the yellow brick road

You’re off to see the Wizard,
The Wonderful Wizard of Mit
We hear he is a wonderful WizThough most of his stuff is—ahem!

If ever oh ever a Wiz there was
The Wizard of Mit is one because,
Because, because, because, because….

(everyone looks around in confusion, shrugs shoulders, and walks off stage).

 

ACT II
Dorothy Meets the Scarecrow

(Scarecrow is standing as if held up by a pole, his arms stretched out. Enter Dorothy)

Dorothy: Follow the yellow brick road…follow the yellow brick road…? But there’s a fork in the road! Where do I go now?

Scarecrow: You could go down the golden rule path. (He points left.)

Dorothy: (startled) What was that? There’s no one here but a scarecrow!

Scarecrow:  Or, you could go down the turnpike. (He points right.)

Dorothy: (to the audience) Wasn’t he pointing the other way?

Scarecrow: Of course, some people just can’t differentiate between the two. (He points both ways.)

Dorothy: You did say something, didn’t you? (Scarecrow looks silly pointing both ways:) Are you doing that on purpose or can’t you make up your mind?

Scarecrow: That’s just the trouble—I can’t make up my mind—I haven’t got a brain…only straw. (He says sadly.)

Dorothy: How can you talk if you haven’t got a brain?

Scarecrow:  I don’t know (thoughtful pause). But you’ll find there’re lots of people around here without brains who do an awful lot of talking.

Dorothy: What do you mean by that?

Scarecrow:  I may not have a brain, but I have enough sense not to answer that question. Besides, it’d be tasteless, and we’re leaving that sort of stuff to Perloff and the fourth year class.

Dorothy: But won’t they get into big trouble for that?

Scarecrow: Maybe so, but at least they can run away—I’m stuck here on this pole.

Dorothy: Oh, that must be very uncomfortable—what do you do up there all day?

Scarecrow: Well, everything I see reminds me of sex, but I’m trying to keep it out of this skit.

Dorothy: Here. (She walks over to him.) Maybe I can help you (Scarecrow acquires a lecherous grin.)…get down, that is.

Scarecrow: If you could bend the nail down I might fall off. (She does so, and the scarecrow falls down and flops around a bit.) Oh, thank you! Thank you! You really know how to knock down a straw man—you’ll do fine here. But I’m still a failure because I haven’t got a brain.

Dorothy: What would you do with a brain if you had one?

Scarecrow: (aside) I think that’s a cue for a song.

Dorothy: But you can’t sing—I heard you in rehearsal.

Scarecrow: You’re not kidding! But neither can anyone else in this skit, so people had better just get used to it. Besides, the audience seems pretty juiced up anyway.

I could wile away the hours
Reading Robert Clower
Or even J. M. Keynes

It would be no enigma
When things grew at rate sigma
If I only had a brain.

I could put down Milton neatly
And Franco quite discreetly
They’d suffer boundless pain

I could do a lot of thinkin’
I could be like Don Patinkin
If I only had a brain.

Oh I
Could tell you why
Growth theory’s such a bore
And what god made grad students for (?)
And then I’d sit
And think some more.

I could solve for optimality
With primal and duality
And never feel the strain

I could normalize the vector
That describes the public sector
If I only had a brain.

Dorothy: (running off) …oh my god…

Scarecrow: Wait! (shouting, running after her) You didn’t even introduce yourself!

Dorothy: Oh, yes …I’m Alice…I mean Dorothy.

Scarecrow: What are you doing here?

Dorothy: I’m going to see the Wonderful Wizard of Mit to ask him to help me get home.

Scarecrow: Where’s your home?

Dorothy: It’s one of those places where ivy doesn’t grow—you’ve probably never heard of it.

Scarecrow: (slowly, with tone of contempt) Oh, yes… but how did you ever get here from there ?…Well, no matter…Hey, do you think this Wizard of yours could help me get a brain?

Dorothy: Probably not. No one around here seems to have nearly enough brains for himself—much less enough to give away.

Scarecrow: But isn’t it worth a try? Hey, look—maybe he has one but he’s just not using it very much—then he’d never miss it if he gave it to me.

Dorothy: You’re right! (excitement builds!) Come along then!

Scarecrow: Hooray! We’re off to see the Wizard!

(Dorothy and Scarecrow exit, skipping and singing, “We’re off to see the Wizard….)

 

ACT III
Tin Woodsman Scene

(Tin man on stage, Dorothy & Scare crow walk in

Tin Man: (with mouth closed) Oil can.

Dorothy: What was that?

Tin Man: (more clearly) Oil can.

Scarecrow: I think he said “oil can”.

Dorothy: Where would we find an oil can in the middle of the forest?

(Oil can hops in: harmonica fanfare)

Dorothy: What a coincidence!

Oil Can: Not really, I was out in Chicago waiting for this to happen. You see, we left the Tin Man in a seminar room all by himself…

Dorothy: …and he was so lonely he cried and rusted shut?

Oil Can: He kept right on talking and was bored stiff.

(Oil Can and Dorothy loosen up the Tin Man)

Tin Man: …yes by the way it works in my model…

Dorothy: (interrupts) I have a question.

Tin Man: Yes?

Dorothy: You look very peculiar for a Tin Man. Everyone else in the room uses at least two axes and you don’t even have one.

Tin Man: Well the reason I can do that is I find an axe isn’t so good. No, a two man saw is much more efficient.

Oil Can: The truth is he can’t cut down a tree without a co-author.

Dorothy: (to Oil Can) You have a very interesting accent. You sound just like someone I know but I can’t quite place it. Hmmm…I know who it is! You sound just like Jeremy Bulow.

Tin Man: I promise from now on I’m going to be witty and entertaining and I will try to maintain a high rate of interest.

Scarecrow: That doesn’t tell us much. You promising to set a high rate of interest is like the young man who swears to lead a virtuous life. You still don’t know what he’s going to do with his hands.

Tin Man: I’d like to tell you a few more characteristics of my life’s story, but I see it’s five o’clock and we’re out of time.

Oil Can: That’s ok, this skit goes until 5:30.

Dorothy: You do that one more time and we’re sending you back to Chicago.

Tin Man: The reason I keep talking about my model is because I haven’t got a heart.

Dorothy: Do you mean that when the tinsmith made you he left out a heart? How sad.

Tin Man: Oh no, I had one originally. But you see I thought Milton needed one a lot more than I did, so I gave it to him. Then he sold it to the University of Chicago Art Gallery.

Dorothy: Huh?

Oil Can: Both the gallery and Uncle Milton have always wanted to hang a Modigliani.

Dorothy: Why do you keep on talking about your model when you should show a little restraint?

(into song sung by Tin Man except where indicated)

There’s a money demand equation
a free reserve relation
difficult it ain’t.

Class attention I’d be keepin’
And there’d be nobody sleepin’
If I only showed restraint.

I do model simulation
of disintermediation
the notion’s really quaint.

I could talk to Kenneth Arrow
or even Robert Barro
If I only showed restraint.

Riddle me
economy
above a voice cries low

(Dorothy) Wherefore art thou, Franco?

I estimate!
(thump, thump)

(Scarecrow) I integrate!

I’d forget about consumption
study peasants like the Munchkin
be quiet as a saint.

(Oil Can) I’d have time to teach you theory
Students wouldn’t get so weary
If I only showed restraint.

Dorothy: Are you always around to take care of the Tin Man?

Oil Can: What do you take me for, a one night Stan?

Dorothy: Which way to Mit?

Tin Man: (In Italian) I think it’s that way. (point)

Scarecrow: Sheer madness.

Dorothy: Yes, that way would be better.

Scarecrow: Sheer madness and a Talmudic argument.

Dorothy: Well then, how about that way?

Scarecrow: Sheer madness, a Talmudic argument, and if God had intended us to go that way. She would have put up a sign post.

Oil Can: Never mind, Mit lies that way.

Dorothy: How can you be so sure that road will converge to Mit?

Oil Can: Elementary, it’s the perfect foresight path.

 

ACT IV
Cowardly Lion Scene

Dorothy: Oh my, the path leads us into this forest. Do you think that there are any wild animals there?

Scarecrow: Maybe a lion or two, nothin’ to get worried about.

Dorothy: Lions! Do you think we’ll meet any?

Tin Man: Don’t worry Dorothy, we’ll protect you.

Scarecrow:  (to Tin Man) But who will protect us?

Tin Man: Shhh. Besides, the only lion that lives around here is the economist’s best friend—the regression lion.

Dorothy:  A regression lion? I’ve never heard of one of those before. Are you sure they won’t attack us?

Scarecrow: I don’t know for sure but there’s a pretty harmless one called OLS, it’s BLUE.

Tin Man: That’s a lion of a different color.

Scarecrow: Of course, there is always the GLS…, it’s ferocious.

Dorothy:  What color is GLS?

Scarecrow: Blue.

Dorothy:  So how will we be able to tell them apart?

Scarecrow: Sometimes they’re the same thing.

Tin Man: But the meanest and baddest lions in the forest are (pause, then whisper) FIML.

Dorothy: OLS?

Scarecrow: (nodding his head) GLS.

Tin Man: FIML.

Dorothy: Oh my!

All: OLS, GLS, FIML…

Dorothy: Oh my!

All: OLS, GLS, FIML…

Dorothy: Oh my!

(Repeat the above chant with Dorothy’s ‘Oh my!’ several times, faster and faster. Go around in circles so that the three are facing the entrance/exit and they are heading towards the entrance when out pops the lion roaring, Dorothy screams.)

Lion: RRRRRROOOAR!!! (to Tin Man) Hah, so you’re trying to hold the money workshop in the forest without inviting me.

Tin Man: But, but….

Lion: Just don’t let it happen again, hey Tin Man who’s the chick with the clown?

Dorothy: (scared) I’m not a chick, and he’s not a clown, he’s a scarecrow. And he’s smart too, so you’d better be careful.

Lion: So ya think you’re smart do ya’? (Scarecrow shakes his head “no”.) Oh yeah, well put ‘em up, wanna see who can prove that three stage least squares is asymptotically efficient? (Scarecrow is shaking and on his knees, begging, and shaking his head) See, he’s scared. Hah! Com on ya dummy, I’ll let you prove it in thirty lines, I’ll do it in less than ten. Ah, come on scarecrow, I’ll let ya use my colored chalk, I’ll use white chalk, I’ll even erase the board for myself. (Scarecrow is on the ground paralyzed with fear. To Dorothy…) See, he ain’t so smart.

Tin Man: You really shouldn’t act this way…

Lion: Don’t criticize my acting. Will you shut up or do I have to turn you into a sculpture for the East Campus? I wonder what you would look like with your head put on backwards?

Dorothy: (running behind and pulling his tail) Don’t hurt Tin Man, he just can’t restrain himself, it’s not his fault. You shouldn’t make fun of Scarecrow’s scarcity of wit either. Do you think you’re perfect?

Lion: (starts crying) Ah why’d you have to go and pull my tail, I wasn’t trying to hurt nobody. I was just having my own sick, perverted, disgusting fun (bawls some more).

Dorothy: My goodness, what a fuss you’re making. You’re nothing but a big coward.

Lion: You’re right, I am a coward. Just look at the circles under my eyes, I haven’t slept in weeks.

Tin Man: Why don’t you try reading Patinkin?

Lion: I can’t, I’m afraid the suspense would kill me.

Scarecrow: Maybe the Wizard could help you. He’s going to give me a brain and him restraint and he’ll help get Dorothy out of here.

Lion: (To Dorothy) You think he could do it?

Dorothy: He’s a Wizard isn’t he? Oh, do come with us, it’s worth a try, come on.

Lion. OK, it would really be terrific if the Wizard could give me courage (he lapses into song….)

“IF I ONLY HAD MORE NERVE”

When I’d speak I wouldn’t mumble,
I would seem so meek and humble.
All that you would observe.
And I’d answer all your queries
When I’d lecture on time series,
If I only had more nerve.

I’m afraid there’s no denyin’
that this regression lion
Can’t even draw a curve.
But I know that this kitty
Could give lectures truly witty,
If he only had more nerve.

Oh I…..’d be King of Mit,
My realm the whole third floor,
Editor of Econometrica,
And then I would teach
Three-eighty-four!

I would humbly beg your pardon
If I’d seem to come too hard on,
Decorum I’d observe.
And I’d be just like your brother,
No longer a mean mother-…
If I only had more nerve.

Dorothy: I wouldn’t worry if I were you, it took a lot of nerve to sing that song.

Scarecrow: Shall we go to see the Wizard?

Tin Man: Let’s go!

All: (Arm in arm, they go off singing)  We’re off to see the Wizard….

 

(break for commercial)

Narrator: We will return to the Wizard of Mit after station identification.

Housewife: Mothers! You may have compared guns to butter, but are you uncertain what brand of butter to choose? Try new Scotch brand mean-preserving spread. Scotch brand sticks to your bread. Just a wee bit removes the uncertainty as to which side your bread is buttered on. In 9 out of 10 families, it produces a higher level of margarine utility. And, as part of a budget-constrained diet, Scotch brand mean-preserving spread can help preserve your means.

Narrator: Preserve my means of what?

Housewife: Your means of payment.

Narrator:(Snorts) I don’t know what means of payment! I don’t have any bread.

Housewife: So remember mothers, all brands of butter are not indifferent. Next time you are at the supermarket, try Scotch brand mean-preserving spread. You can differentiate it by the little Scotch on the rooks. (Pointing to package.)

Narrator: And speaking of Scots, don’t forget to get your tickets for the Adam Smith Roast, April 12, commemorating the 200thanniversary of the publication of the Wealth of Nations. Join us for an Eve with Adam.
We now return to the Wizard of Mit, already in progress.

 

ACT V
“Waiting for the Wizard”

Scene 1.

Man at door: (Wizard with a Groucho Marx disguise of glasses, nose, and moustache) I’m sorry, but the Wizard is busy, you’ll have to wait here.

Lion: If I had more nerve, I’d tell him a thing or two. He wouldn’t dare talk to the King of Mit like that.

Dorothy: Your majesty, if you were king, you wouldn’t be afraid of anybody?

Lion: Not nobody, not nohow, nuthin’.

Scarecrow: What of non-linear estimation?

Lion: I’d do it on my vacation.

Tin Man: How ‘bout a grad student with a question?

Lion: Wouldn’t even affect my digestion.

Dorothy: Not even errors in variables?

Lion: That wouldn’t be so terriable.

Scarecrow: But what of a fixed-point theorem?

Lion: I wouldn’t even fear ‘em.

(Dorothy, Scarecrow, and Tinman look at each other confused and together say)

All (but Lion): How?

Lion: How?…..Courage.

What makes Jim Tobin cool in inflation?
Courage.
What makes Ken Galbraith so ready to ration?
Courage.
What makes Frank Fisher insulting
Though he’s never here and always consulting?
Courage.
What makes Scarf so easily able
To prove his equilibr’um stable?
What makes Diamond’s neoclassical fable?
Courage.
What makes Domar so concerned with the serf?
Courage.
What lets Lance Taylor know wheat from the turf?
Courage.
What gives Eckaus the decision on money?
What gives Bob Bishop the right to be funny?
Courage.
What makes Hatanka hot?
What puts the “P” in Hall’s P-dot?
What do they got that I ain’t got?

Others: (loud) Tenure!

Lion: You can say that again.

(Out pops Wizard’s head in disguise again)

Man in disguise: You may come in, but please don’t make so much noise.

 

Scene 2.

(Dorothy, Scarecrow, Lion, Tin Man, and Oil Can meet the Wizard

Scarecrow: There’s the wizard!

Dorothy: Oh Wizard can you help us? Can you send me home?

Scarecrow: Can you give me brains?

Lion: Can you give me courage?

Tin Man: Can you give me restraint?

Wizard: (In deep voice) I am the great Wizard of Mit. Of course I can grant your requests for I am faster than hyperinflation, more powerful than an explosive cycle and able to leap tall nonnegativity constraints in a single Cramer-Rao bound.
But first you, Dorothy, must capture a set of the bluest coefficients from the Wicked Witch of the West—and you, Scarecrow, Lion, and Tin Man, must help her.

(Dorothy, Scarecrow, Lion, Tin Man, Oil Can exit, talking with one another about what they are to do)

 

ACT VI
The Castle of the Wicked Witch

(Dorothy, Tinman, Scarecrow, Lion, Oil Can on stage)

Tin Man: This is Harvard, so the Wicked Witch’s castle must be around here somewhere.

Scarecrow: But we haven’t seen any building named Bronwyn Hall.

Dorothy: Oh, this is terrible. We’ll never be able to get those coefficients, and I’ll never be able to go home. (sobs)

Lion: Wait a minute! There’s a computer. I’m sure it will be more than happy to solve our problem for us.

Dorothy: Yes, but how can we use it without an account? Oh, if only someone would give me some computer money! (pause) I said: Oh, if only someone would give me some computer money!

enter Del: Hi! Did I hear you calling for something?

Dorothy: Please, can I have some computer money?

Del: How much do you want?

Dorothy: Twenty-five should be enough.

Del: Oh, that’s alright then. If you want more you’ll have to go see Professor Eckaus. Here you are (opens change purse and gives Dorothy a quarter) (leaves)

Tin Man: Well, now you can run the equation, although I must admit I am rather skeptical about your getting any results. In the last 17 papers I have co-authored on this subject I have failed to find any significant influence of…

Dorothy: (interrupting) Don’t you think we’d better get this over with?

Lion: Now Dorothy, it’s not nice to interrupt someone like that.

Oil Can: You know, Dorothy, if the Regression Lion has to give you lessons in tact, you’re in real trouble.

Dorothy: Well, anyway, let me see what comes out. (Puts quarter in machine, rips off sheet of paper.) Hey this is gibberish! That’s very peculiar.

Lion: Oh, I don’t think it’s peculiar. It fact, it’s quite normal.

Scarecrow: Why is it normal?

Lion: Because I’ve seen it happen lots of times, and anything becomes approximately normal after about 25 observations.

Dorothy: All that it says on this printout is “Error 1039”. Does anyone know what that means?

Lion: No, but we can look it up in the version 2.7 manual.

Dorothy: Well, you do that. I’ll go see if I can find Bill Dellafar (starts to walk offstage, shrieks, is yanked off)

Scarecrow: Error 1039, error 1039, let’s see: it says, “I’ll get you, my pretty, and your little dog too.”

(all look around)

Tin Man: The Wicked Witch must have taken Dorothy!

Scarecrow: But where?

Wicked Witch: Ha ha ha! You know I’m here somewhere, but you’ll never find enough restrictions to identify me!

Lion: Now what are we going to do?

Tin Man: If I knew you were going to ask that question, I would have put it in my model, which I have to believe in, because if I don’t, who will?

Scarecrow: Now look, I don’t have any brains, so I don’t know any econometrics, and I wouldn’t believe it if I did. But I have an idea. What we have here is an identification problem. Now what does that make you think of?

Oil Can: Money!

Scarecrow: Everything you hear makes you think of money. Everything I hear makes me think of sex, but I’m still trying to keep it out of the skit.

Dorothy: (offstage) you’re not trying had enough!

Scarecrow: I mean Frank Fisher.

Lion: But we can’t afford him. He charges 100,000 bucks to testify against witches.

Scarecrow: Yes, but the second year students have never had Fisher, and don’t know him from Irving. If you (pointing to Lion) go around humiliating students and saying incomprehensible things, nobody will know the difference.

Lion: All right, I’ll do it. I’m gonna go in and set the system of equations (1) in the normalized form (4) after deleting the columns corresponding to the a priori known elements of beta and gamma, which will allow us to use equation (14) to derive the Fiml estimator delta-hat in instrumental variable form. And there’s only one thing I want you guys to do.

All: What is it?

Lion: Talk me out of it!

Scarecrow: Okay, let’s go!

(Dorothy comes running out)

Tin Man: Come on Dorothy!

Wicked Witch: You won’t escape me!

(Dorothy trips over wire)

Wicked Witch: What have you done? You’ve pulled my plug! I’m going down, I’m going down…

Tin Man: The Wicked Witch is dead; but now how are we going to get the coefficients?

Scarecrow: Well, since I don’t have a brain, I always cars this HP 55 with me, since it’s the next best thing. Maybe we can calculate them on this.

Dorothy: But will it do everything we need?

Scarecrow: Not by itself, but we have all sorts of special accessories. (While this happens, computer begins moving into audience, saying “Mommy”, “Where’s Browyn Hall?”, etc.)

Lion: For example, we can test for cereal correlation with this (pulls out a box of cereal)

Oil Can: And correct for it using the special CORC attachment! (pulls cork out of bottle, passes bottle around)

Tin Man: We can take t-statistics with these (tea bags)

Lion: And we can perform Chow tests with this! (dog food)

Scarecrow: We can use Almon Lags (almonds), and it will be no problem to scramble the variables (eggs).

Dorothy: Stop! We’ll never get them unscrambled! But can we get a variance?

Oil Can: You’ll have to go to the zoning board for that.

Scarecrow: And this will be only too glad to do hill-climbing for us (climbing gear)

Dorothy: It sure looks like a lot of work.

Scarecrow: That’s true, but it may be what God made graduate students for. Presumably she had somethingin mind.

(computer now speaks to Bronwyn Hall)

Computer: Good evening, Mrs. Hall. Here’s something you thought you’d never see: the very last bug from TSP (gives her bug).

 

ACT VII
Dorothy, Scarecrow, Lion and Tin Man return to the Wizard

 

Dorothy: (places coefficients before Wiz) Are they blue enough? Will they get me back home?

Wizard: That depends on whether the Lerner-Lewis-Leontief-Lousy operator meets the Bishop-Bowley-Bentham-Bogus condition on top of the Samuelson-Savage-Slutsky-Silly contour integrals.

Lion: But the coefficients—will they give me courage?

Wizard: (absent-mindedly) This reminds me of what Cournot said to Bernoulli when they were ruining gamblers in St. Petersburg…

Scarecrow: Please Wizard! Tell us if the coefficients are good enough to give me a brain!

Wizard: Or am I thinking of the time Edgeworth trampled on Pareto’s bordered Hessian and Villy came after him swinging a Markoff chain?

Tin Man: (knocking over poster of wizard to expose man reading Newsweek) Hey, this is no wizard—he’s a fake!

Wizard: Yes I admit—I get all my economics from Newsweek—I don’t understand those things I say any more than anyone else does.

Dorothy: You mean you don’t know what Shephard’s lemma is?

Wizard: I’ve never even seen a sheep.

Lion: You don’t understand the Wong-Viner envelope?

Wizard: I’ve never even been in a Chinese stationery store.

Dorothy: Then you can’t get me back home!

Lion: You can’t give me courage!

Scarecrow: Or me a brain!

Tin Man: Or me restraint!

Dorothy: I can’t believe that all the Munchkins have been saying how great you are when you’re a complete phony.

Wizard: I’m sorry, my dear, but it’s true. I’m an exact, pure humbug with or without the social contrivance of Munchkins. Now, Scarecrow, Lion, and Tin Man. Don’t get excited. There’s one thing that will help you all—when you have it the lack of brains, courage, and restraint doesn’t matter at all.

Scarecrow, Lion, Tin Man: (together) What is it?

Wizard: (sings)

I’m a dullard and a coward
and my math’s not so high-powered
my column’s not so wise.
Though I made a lot of money
No one thought my jokes were funny
‘Til I won the Nobel prize.

Though my thought is quite as narrow
as that of Kenneth Arrow
my ego’s twice his size.
Though I make a silly blunder
No one ever seems to wonder
How I won the Nobel prize.

refrain:

Koopmans, Kantorovich, Frisch
Tinbergen—I’m better than them all.
Next to me they scarcely count at all
I love me so
And you should know…

If you want a commendation
Just give me a small donation.
I’ll tell all sorts of lies.
So you see you can be winners
even though you’re just beginners
When you win your Nobel prize.

Scarecrow, Lion, Tin Man: (together) Oh, thank you Wizard!

Wizard: It was nothing. But Dorothy, how are we going to get you back to Kansas?

Dorothy: Kansas? What’s all this about Kansas—I want to go back to Australia.

THE END

Source: Personal copy of the script of Irwin Collier.

Image: Left to right: Paul Krugman as the Wizard of Mit, Jeffrey Frankel as Oil Can, Margaret (Feiger) Agnew as Dorothy, Irwin Collier as Lion, Dick Startz as Tin Man.  From Irwin Collier files (photographer unknown).

Categories
Economists Gender Germany Irwin Collier M.I.T. Yale

Farewell lecture of Irwin Collier, FU-Berlin. July 4, 2018

The ceremonial bookends to a professorship in a German university consist of an inaugural and a farewell lecture. I spoke before a public that included the six disciplines represented in the John-F.-Kennedy Institute for North American Studies (besides economics: political science, sociology, history, cultural studies and literature) as well as colleagues from the economics and business faculty of Freie Universität Berlin. Those attending included first-year undergraduates through the oldest cohorts of emeritus professors. I needed a lecture to keep the filled hall alert for 45 minutes on a particularly warm Berlin summer afternoon. I chose the fourth of July because there was no World Cup soccer on the day to compete with.

The ceremony began with an introduction by the Institute’s director, Professor Christian Lammert, who provided a comparative analysis of the twitter activity of President Donald Trump and me. It is a great way to get laughs and a gentle way to roast an honoree. Try it at your next official function, you’ll be glad you did.

Next a local American folksinger, John Shreve, warmed up the crowd for me with two songs, after which I took to the lectern and presented the following remarks. 

________________________

“Reflections on academic communities, clans, and clubs”

Abschiedsvorlesung of Prof. Irwin Collier, Ph.D.

John-F.-Kennedy Institute for North American Studies
Freie Universität Berlin
4 July 2018

One of the self-granted privileges of age, is to talk about oneself under the altruistic guise of sharing experience. And for this I beg your indulgence. On the other hand this is a farewell lecture, what else could you really expect? Now you needn’t worry that I am about to spew the cumulated bile of an underappreciated, unfortunate scholar bitter at the prospect of sealing his academic obscurity with a ceremony where others are about to celebrate his exit. While as delightful as it would be to speak long-repressed truth to the powers-that-be, this occasion lends itself to thoughtful reflection. No, instead I’ll offer from my own experience a few simply illustrative stories that most of you can relate to either through direct personal experience or have heard within your personal information bubbles.

Before getting started, let me make one thing pedantically clear: when I use the words “community”, “clan”, and “club” in what follows, but especially those latter two words, they are only to be understood as short-hand, metaphorical labels. I trust there is no need for attempting Über-precision in what is after all only offered as a series of personal reflections. My intention in speaking of communities, clans, and clubs is to offer you a simple alliterative triad that has a better chance of surviving into long-term memory than, say, “communities, tribes, and networks”, though that is what I actually mean, to be honest.

When I say academic both as adjective and noun, it is in the sense of having to do with individual membership in “the Academy” broadly understood.  I have always liked how the words “scholar and scientist” fit comfortably within the single German word “Wissenschaftler” and the Academy for me has its foundation in the Humboldtian dual mandate of research and instruction. We, the scholars and scientists of universities, have answered the call to follow that dual mandate. Of course knowledge gets produced outside the hallowed halls of the university and there are plenty of institutions that exist with the sole mission of advanced instruction. As an economist I have mostly good things to say about such division-of-labor and specialization.  But personally, I have spent about a half-century studying or working within a university setting, and half that time here at Freie Universität, so my preference is clearly revealed to serve that dual mandate.

Having a career-long interest in the history of economics, I have often had occasion to consider the life of scholars among scholars. While the filiation of ideas typically takes center stage in histories of economics (by this I mean the chronicle of how Adam Smith’s ideas begat those of David Ricardo and Thomas Robert Malthus, that in turn begat the ideas of John Stuart Mill, that begat innovations by William Stanley Jevons, on to the synthesis by Alfred Marshall and so on up to the present day), sometimes historians of economics explore the ideas of economists within particular historical contexts (e.g., the Progressive Era, the New Deal or the Thatcher-Reagan revolution) or within the specific policy debates of their times (protectionism, industrial policy, social insurance, monetary policy rules). This afternoon I will be guilty of thinking aloud about the social context of the creation and diffusion of scientific methods and knowledge generally. Since I am an economist, presumably what I have to say fits my home discipline best. Nonetheless I would wager at least one free lunch that the structures and mechanisms I have identified are present at least in some modified form elsewhere in the Academy.

Now somewhere in my unordered college papers that have followed me from New Haven to Cambridge, Massachusetts down to Princeton, then Houston and finally a transatlantic trip to Berlin in 1994, followed by three moves within the greater Berlin area there must be the original acceptance letter I received from Yale in the Spring of 1969.  One phrase in that letter has been etched into my memory, namely, that I was thereby welcomed into the “community of scholars”. I can smile now when thinking about the enthusiasm and naiveté of that boy turning man about to embark on his journey of academic life. A “community of scholars” turns out to have been what I had sought and what I was convinced I found in the undergraduate life of Yale College. When I first explored the stacks in the tower of Sterling Memorial Library and argued about philosophy and politics in beer-fueled bull-sessions into the night with my roommates and classmates, I felt at one with a much larger academic community, not merely that of the Yale microcosm but one extending to the authors of century-old books with uncut pages waiting to be discovered in the stacks. As far as the larger academic community in that thin slice of the historical present, well, I felt cosmopolitan to a fault. I saw no higher calling than that of the scholar/scientist. Excellence was not about winning a phi-beta-kappa key for display, it was about serving a higher purpose within that greater community of scholars. I believed that the true academic freely contributed and imbibed from the ever growing pool of human knowledge and was free from lesser motives. Life-work balance could not be an issue, the life and work of an academic were simply an identity.

Two modifications of my scholar’s life plan resulted from changes in scenery: an internship in Washington DC and later graduate school along the Charles River in Cambridge, Mass.

During my early undergraduate years I had little concern for applying knowledge for good, it seemed too much like engineering. Two spells in Washington, D.C. as an intern at the Council of Economic Advisers during the highpoint of the Watergate crisis taught me much about the importance of the work of policy wonks, a concept that only gained currency decades later during the Clinton Administration. My respect grew for the leaves of absence for public service or earlier work in the war effort (WWII) that I found was quite common among my professors.  Had plan A, serving the university dual mandate, not have worked, I probably would have pursued my personal happiness with a plan B, working as a government economist perhaps in the Department of the Treasury, the Bureau of Labor Statistics or Bureau of the Census and this afternoon’s ceremony would most likely be taking place in some office building in the District of Columbia. But it was still clear under either Plan A or Plan B, I would need further training.

Graduate School at M.I.T. marked a transition to a higher concentration of economics than I would have ever considered possible and looking back can hardly believe I survived with any dignity. Graduate coursework was not conceived according to the tenets of liberal arts to broaden the mind. Quite to the contrary, the graduate coursework at M.I.T. was an intellectual boot-camp, where the brain got trained without ever so much as a doubt on the part of the drill-sergeants or the recruits themselves whether this was a good way to educate a professional economist.  You want to be a Navy Seal, OK, it’s your choice…and if it turns out to be too much for you to handle, ring the bell, take your M.A. and leave honorably. Of course I am exaggerating, but I do recall a West-Point graduate in my class who declared that graduate school was the most academic freedom that he had ever enjoyed. Incidentally, that M.I.T. classmate turns up in Michael Lewis’ The Big Short as having been the chief risk officer for Morgan Stanley during the financial meltdown in 2008. I’ll add here that another classmate was a principal in Long-Term Capital Management when that famous hedge fund crashed and burned in 1998. I became an expert on the East German economy and we all know what happened there in 1989. You can see the pattern, but I digress…

Clearly I wouldn’t be standing here before you today had I not survived the rigors of graduate school. In a meantime that spans not quite a half-century I have come to the realization that a “community of scholars” is actually only a Platonic ideal, something as unreal yet appealing as the Garden of Eden, the legend of King Arthur’s court in Camelot or the utopian socialisms that fired the imaginations of radical progressives in the second half of the 19th century. And yet, my experience from dealing in an academic setting, having had contact with many permutations of human natures and across a few societies, has not at all discouraged me from the quixotic quest of building or becoming a part of a genuine community of scholars. The fundamental question we all face is how to get nearer there from here. Plot spoiler: this is my farewell lecture so that can gets kicked down the road for you young folks here.

My thesis is that real existing research and instruction take place in a world spanned by two basic types of institutional frameworks, that we can call clans and clubs for short. Just as there is a spectrum of virtuous behavior along which we, our friends, rivals, and enemies can be placed, clans and clubs differ in the degree to which they help meet the criteria of a “community of scholars”.

So what constitutes an ideal or a genuine community of scholars? (1) Inclusivity. There is no frontier between us and them with respect to the search for knowledge and understanding other than a sharp boundary separating magical thinking from those in the community for whom the collection and honest interpretation of evidence and logical thinking constitute the supporting pillars for science and scholarship.  (2) Meritocratic. There is not a fixed caste system within the community of scholars. It is not a hive with a queen, drones and worker bees. Results from the mixture of individual genius, creativity, good fortune, insight, and discovery are recognized, appropriated, and honored by the community. The demographic fact of overlapping generations results in a natural ordering of junior to senior, but the filial piety of Confucianism must yield the right-of-way to the Wunderkinder in the community of scholars. (3) Self-critical. By this I mean members of a community of scholars share a categorical imperative with respect to criticizing our own work as we criticize that of others. This is important because the accumulation of knowledge and understanding is but an imperfect ratchet. Any one of us, repeat…anyone, has the capacity to pursue dead-ends, and even to forget lessons once learned.  (4) Team spirited. Yet even with all that humility we still have a capacity to cry Eureka upon discovery and other members of the community rejoice at the sound of that cry.

Undoubtedly I have missed a few items in my proposed check list of criteria. But it is easy to see their necessity to be included in any such list by considering what a university would look like when the polar opposite cases occur, where (1´) exclusivity (2´) impermeable stratification (3´) immunity from doubt and/or criticism (4´) Schadenfreude are the rule. Sounds a bit like a sequel to A Handmaid’s Tale without the dramatic costuming doesn’t it?

The essence of club and clan is captured in the Groucho Marx quip “I wouldn’t want to be a member of any club that would have me as a member” and the familiar expression, “You can choose your friends but not your family”.  While I grant that there is a process of selection and self-selection to graduate schools that bears a resemblance to the formal admission procedure for joining a club, there is a good reason to distinguish between the two. In the case of a club you are accepted or rejected for who and what you are.  When you enter, you are a member, a peer. In contrast for a clan, the selection criteria can be quite distinct from the requirements to attain full clan membership.  The network from club membership is valuable to you as a member, but the clan becomes a part of your identity.

But before we talk about this psychological transformation of identity, allow me a brief historical word here.

My research over the past several years has focused on the evolution of graduate training in economics. Both from my own experience but also from listening to colleagues as well as reading random biographical and autobiographical accounts, I became convinced that the critical transmission of the tools of research and the ultimate values that provide the background for the selection of “interesting” questions takes place in graduate schools and there the formation of scholarly character embedded within a network of graduates becomes recognizable as a “school”.  This interest led to an inaugural grant from the Institute for New Economic Thinking for me to begin exploring university archives for documentary material that would prove useful for marking the evolution of economic theories and methods actually acquired by successive cohorts of professional economists in different universities. The research question was to identify the forces that have contributed to the convergence of economics into a contemporaneous mainstream of common scope and methods.

It was in Germany where the modern university seminary for science and scholarship emerged and it provided the ultimate model for research training at the graduate level. And that academic DNA from those seminaries was carried across the Atlantic to the emerging great universities of the United States. Johns Hopkins, Harvard, Columbia, Chicago and points west all profited from the ambitious young scholars and scientists who had been “made in Germany”. The leading role played by Germany will come again when we turn to clubs.

The clan or tribe has played an enormous role in the history of economics. Just to name a few instances, there was the grand Methodenstreit between Carl Menger of Vienna and Gustav von Schmoller of Berlin in the late 19th century on the relative merits of deduction vs. induction (sort of chicken-or-the-egg debate). The debate was ultimately won in a scientific sense by Menger but the academic street-fighter Schmoller had much greater success in occupying the professorial chairs in the German-language areas of Europe for several generations.

Other notable debates between “schools” of economics include the capital debate between the “two Cambridges” of the 1950s and 1960s, Keynesian fiscalism vs. Chicago monetarism, especially in the 1960s, fresh- vs. salt-water macroeconomics more recently, and there is the always evergreen controversy between Austrian economics (which I note in its present form is neither Austrian nor economics) and wherever the mainstream happens to find itself.   There have been cases in economics where Saul turns into Paul well along in the career. But such late breaks, such as that from the Keynes critic hired by Harvard to the man who brought Keynes to America, Alvin Hansen, or from neo-classical darling to radical economist, Stephen Marglin in the 1960s, have been rare. These are news stories much as “man bites dog” is news, because “dog bites man” is considerably less newsworthy.  The correlation between where and how you have been trained and your research style/policy positions is strong and robust. But of course you ask, is it really causation or a case of post-hoc-ergo-propter-hoc inference when there is really a background factor responsible for both?

So what leads me to assert the strong identification of scholar with the school? My pop-psychological explanation is that the intense training and focus of a graduate education brings a young scholar up to humanity’s frontier of knowledge for the first time. That frontier advances rapidly and only a few, certainly not all Ph.D.’s, will move fast enough or long enough to remain on that frontier. Nonetheless that moment of arrival at the hilltop and looking out on the vast, uncharted landscape before you for the first time is a profound life-altering experience in adulthood and there is a warm-fuzzy object that you bond with — it is not a parent, rather it is the collectivity of the professors from whom you have learned and been guided and the authors of the books and papers you have digested in the course of your studies. Sure, later we all pass through a form of intellectual puberty and develop a hypersensitivity to all our professors’ faults. I think back: God there were some really awful teachers, I have witnessed examples of narcissism unchained! Etc.  One of my dearest professors upon hearing that Herbert Simon was awarded a Nobel prize in economics actually said “He can’t be any good, I haven’t read anything he has written.” Later in our careers we might have our own Mark Twain moment: “When I was a boy of 14, my father was so ignorant I could hardly stand to have the old man around. But when I got to be 21, I was astonished at how much the old man had learned in seven years.”

OK, time for a quick summary of what I have been rambling on about thus far. It appears that I had the enormous good fortune to have stumbled into what seemed a virtual academic heaven on earth.  Following that formative period when I acquired my scholarly/scientific values together with a box of analytical tools, it was time for Hänschen-klein to march off into the real world. I was an apprentice turned journeyman sorcerer, a fledgling member of a clan of economists associated with the Yale-MIT axis. Had you asked me at the time what it meant, I would have answered it was really no more than a pedigree, if anything, a signal as to the quality of the people who taught me. Gradually, I learned as I interacted in a professional context with people trained at other places and in other traditions, this Yale-MIT axis signaled belonging to a well-defined clan. Think of West Side Story, the gangs of Sharks and Jets, just without the dancing.

The first inkling I had about the influence of where you learned your economics was as an undergraduate during my Council of Economic Advisers time when a fellow intern, a graduate student from UCLA, derisively commented on the fact that I had waited hours to watch the Watergate Hearing for Nixon’s chief-of-staff H.R. Haldeman, “queues are inefficient”. Subtext: a market should have been created to let a price mechanism allocate the scarce space to the highest bidders.  Since he was my first observation, I thought it was the individual effect talking, i.e., he was just a jerk. But then later another UCLA man, a senior professor at the University of Houston when I was an assistant professor there, nonchalantly dismissed a vast swath of applied economic analysis as we interviewed young people at the annual job market, “Nobody believes welfare economics…”  I recall my first serious encounter with German ordo-liberalism at the University of Siegen. Hearing so much praise for Walter Eucken and his Freiburg school that inspired the policy architects who brought us the German social-market economy led me to read some of his work.  I felt like I was listening to folks speaking German in some remote alpine valley.

The point of these examples is that it was beginning to look to me that how and where you were trained had a major impact on the sorts of questions you asked and the style of argument and the forms of evidence you accepted. Thinking back I expected the sorts of political differences and research strategies would be more-or-less randomly distributed across departments. People, and I stress economists are people, are a heterogeneous bunch, simply put, “a mixed bag”. But even allowing for concentration of the one or other paradigm for research, couldn’t we expect serious scholars to outgrow their apprentice years as they would become exposed to inter-university variation? In a statistical sense I interpreted what I observed, namely, knowing where someone had been trained had “too much” explanatory power for what a mature university research economist would think about economics. You could see a definite family resemblance across the clan. What I still don’t really understand was why academic disputes between clans have almost invariably escalated to the intensity of a shooting feud between the Hatfields and McCoys. But then again, I’m the sort of guy who is still shocked that people are so rude to each other on twitter. The working hypothesis perhaps is best expressed in the adage, “Academic politics are so vicious because the stakes are so low.”

Time for another short historical break before reflecting on networks or clubs that academics have established.

Economics became an easily identifiable collective pursuit of truth for the first time in the middle of the 18th century at the court of Louis XV at Versailles where the French Physiocrats coalesced into a self-conscious school for the purpose of enlightened economic policy. They actually called themselves les économistes and they even had their own journal. Their time on the world stage was brief, the French Revolution scattered the school to the winds, and one member, DuPont de Nemours settled in the United States where his son founded the gunpowder business that ultimately became the DuPont corporation. Incidentally Thomas Jefferson’s idealization of the yeoman farmer and contempt for the mercantile classes was a reflection of his reading Physiocratic texts. In England in the nineteenth century political economy was passionately debated among gentlemen in clubs. Members would read their Hume, Smith, Ricardo and Malthus to join the chatter and contribute to the literary magazines of the time debating economic policy.  From about 1935 through 1950 the gradual expansion of mathematical and statistical tools had become such a critical part of the kit of the professional economist that political economy or economics was no longer “clubbable” in the literal sense.

But even before the shift to mathematical and statistical methods had become complete, substitutes for the club were found in the extra-university learned societies, professional associations, and regularly recurring conference groups. All of these networks had established admission procedures to establish whether a potential peer brought the right stuff to the table.

Just as the modern research seminar goes back to the university seminaries of Germany, the Verein für Socialpolitik was officially founded at its conference in Eisenach in October 1873 a year after an initial conference a year earlier also in Eisenach on the “soziale Frage” (social question). This association brought economists, lawyers and government statisticians together. Now some twenty-three standing field committees span the scope of economic research in the German language area. Thanks to a retired colleague, Wolfram Fischer, I received an invitation to become a member of the standing committee for the history of economics. For these standing committees one is invited to present a paper and is voted membership.  The Verein itself used to be the sort of association that members had to propose candidates whose approval then was voted upon.

The very same American students who studied in the German seminaries of economics during the last third of the 19th century, returned to become founding members of the American Economic Society, that unlike the Verein für Socialpolitik, which was long to have a sharp anti-Manchester capitalism profile, reached out to their classic liberal colleagues who initially resisted joining forces. From its early years the American Economic Association was a bigger tent than the Verein für Socialpolitik.

Two other societies worth mention are the international Econometric Society that was dedicated to the use of mathematical and formal statistical modeling in economics. It was first organized in December 1930 in Cleveland, Ohio with Joseph Schumpeter chairing a meeting of sixteen people who elected Irving Fisher of Yale as its president. The Econometric Society then met officially for the first time the following September in Lausanne. Not quite four decades later dissatisfaction with the scope of mainstream economics that focused excessively on “plenty” and with too little attention to its distribution and almost none to issues of power and politics, the Union of Radical Political Economy was founded in 1968 (This year celebrating its fiftieth anniversary at the University of Massachusetts in Amherst).

In the course of the Allied Social Sciences Meeting every year, field associations organize their panels where the networks of colleagues meet.  Of course no list of clubs would be complete without mentioning the Mt. Pelerin Society founded by economists along with historians and philosophers at the invitation of Friedrich Hayek in 1947 and which formed a bedrock of neoliberalism, long before it was fashionable.

As we say, birds of a feather, flock together and the communication among researchers working on similar topics, using similar methods, interested in the same kinds of evidence is necessary for the success of the cooperative endeavor. These networks allow sub-fields to achieve scales impossible to expect in all but the largest and richest university settings. Indeed stepping back and regarding the research output of these professional clubs whose membership spans university, disciplinary, territorial bounds, few of us would want to go back to the high days of the London Political Economy Club or even the early days of the relatively exclusive professional societies requiring formal nomination for membership.

At this point I need to insert a big fat German “Aber…” (But…). The clans and clubs of economics (and economics is hardly unique here) have a diversity problem with respect to, I’ll limit myself to the United States here, race, ethnicity, and gender. In the course of my INET funded research, I have examined archived economics departmental records of M.I.T. from the 1970s dealing with the recruitment and subsequent performance of students from traditional black colleges and of women admitted to the program. Something that struck me was the sheer experimental willingness of this overwhelmingly white, male and politically liberal department to expand the numbers of blacks and women in the economics Ph.D. program. Of course M.I.T., sitting at the apex of the economics graduate programs at that time, was able to recruit easily. But after several years, the realization set in that to avoid the creation of a Zwei-Klassensystem (twin tracks) the recruiting pools needed to be equalized and this would require a strategic switch to recruiting aggressively and exclusively from elite undergraduate programs. Having been an observer-participant from a time that I can now witness again in an archival light, I appreciate the dilemma felt by the M.I.T. economics department then between increasing the inclusivity of the clan but only at the cost of an increased risk of failure for precisely those new groups who had been previously overlooked.

Let us shift focus now from entry to the clan to the issue of gender diversity in the clubs or professional networks.  [Due to unexpected turbulence, the captain has turned on the fasten seat belt sign.] Last year a dynamite paper originally submitted as a Berkeley senior thesis was published by Alice H. Wu “Gender Stereotyping in Academia: Evidence From Economics Job Market Rumors Forum”. Ms. Wu processed more than a million posts from the anonymous online message board econjobrumors.com.  It is as close to systematic eavesdropping around a water cooler that can be done legally. It turns out that the ordered list of the thirty words most uniquely associated with women were (warning: NSFW): [read list very quickly] “hotter, lesbian, bb (internet speak for “baby”), sexism, tits, anal, marrying, feminazi, slut, hot, vagina, boobs, pregnant, pregnancy, cute, marry, levy, gorgeous, horny, crush, beautiful, secretary, dump, shopping, date, nonprofit [?!], intentions, sexy, dated and prostitute”. The analogous men-words included: [read slower] “juicy, keys, adviser, bully, prepare, fought, wharton, austrian, checkers, homo [!], genes, mathematician, advisor, burning, pricing, philly, band, nobel, amusing, greatest, textbook, goals, irate”–with the singular exception of a homophobic slur, not nearly so much to be ashamed of in guy gossip…about guys. But even before the publication of Wu’s paper, the active standing Committee on the Status of Women in the Economics Profession of the American Economic Association was addressing issues of sexual harassment and drafting of codes of conduct. Manels (i.e., panels consisting of only men) still occur quite regularly at professional meetings but the outcry cannot be overheard. Let us just say, the situation regarding the issue of gender falls seriously short of the Platonic community of scholars, but it is not hopeless. I say this as a member of Yale’s first four-year coeducational class — looking back a half-century the differences for the better are truly striking.

I see the shortfall in meeting the criterion of inclusivity less to be found either on the race or gender fronts where important corners have been turned. The greater problem seems to me to be one of a relentless trend in which we observe the homogenization of particular methods and approaches to the exclusion of others. For a five-year old with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

Today’s heterodoxy can improve the quality of the flow in the mainstream as well as vice-versa. Loyalty to the clan is only a virtue to the extent that your clan is up to good. Besides the obligation to expose one’s future students to a wide-range of views, as good as we feel and as justly we might think that we can adequately summarize “the other side”, we Hatfields are probably a poor substitute for the real McCoy.

Calls for broadening the curriculum clash with the budgetary realities forcing faculties to choose a balance between breadth and depth in the coverage of fields and methods. But my decades in this business have led me to conclude that we have less to fear from the tragic constellation of beer budgets and champagne tastes than we have to fear from the narcissistic gene of scholars, present company excluded of course (I want to be able to eat lunch in Dahlem in the future!). That narcissistic gene leads even top scholars to attempt to clone themselves into entire faculties. My hope is that a pragmatic tolerance and taste for diversity in paradigms can trickle down from senior to junior and through all levels of instruction.

In their modern clubs scholars find kindred spirits, it is there scholars can find honest peer review.  So what could possibly go wrong?  Well here is where we need a second, a vertical dimension to understand what is happening. In a race for status, gatekeepers and judges play an important role. The old question necessarily arises, who will guard the guards? Can we be confident that the norms of the Platonic community of scholars will be able to weather the winds of rivalry for the zero-sum game of status or of self-interested competition for scarce resources?

One expects economists to talk about money. So let’s talk about it in this context. My father once wisely told me when he thought that I was getting too academically big for my real-world britches: brains don’t hire money, money hires brains.   Expressed in terms a Marxist might appreciate:  my father apparently believed that the reproduction cycle goes Money—Brains—Money rather than Brains—Money—Brains. Besides putting the horse (money) before the cart (brains), I can only mention en passant that large private concentrations of wealth can and have been used to support research programs of a particular political stripe just as an unequal distribution in wealth can and has been used for disproportionate political influence (i.e. violating the essential democratic symmetry of one citizen, one vote / one voice). I’ll just mention the documented ability of the Koch brothers to have funneled enormous funds into George Mason University that had strings attached with respect to faculty hires that no self-respecting faculty member could possibly support.

Before I start foaming at the mouth, I pause to bid my colleagues here this afternoon to reflect on the distance they perceive between the Platonic ideal of an academic community and their personal experience.

A lecture title that signals “reflections” is an open confession that no attempt has been made for rigorous argument. My somewhat random walk defies summary. Still I have been raised to think that it is prudent to leave one’s audience with a nugget to share when they leave, in the event that someone should ask what I, the speaker, had to say.

For me (and I am sure for many in this room) the happiest and most productive times were in those moments when I felt firmly embedded within an environment approaching a community of scholars. Academic life has taught me that such communities are mostly figments of some philosopher’s imagination. The work of a scholar, when not the fruit of a monastic life-style, is conducted within clans and clubs. My experiences from a career in university life and listening to the experiences of others have led me to the conclusion that “academic community” is analogous to genius, and when or if ever it really exists, it is extremely rare and probably the result of rather random dependent paths of history rather than the result of conscious human intention. My plea, especially to the undergraduate and graduate students in the room, is not to sink into cynicism once you discover for yourselves that your professors and their professors, that researchers in private or government laboratories, that senior researchers in think-tanks happen to display the shortcomings I have identified in clubs (especially, exclusivity regarding who gets admitted) and clans (especially, an allegiance where blood is thicker than water). Clubs can open themselves and clans can indeed coexist peacefully and even intermarry. Rival research programs need not have to end in blood feuds like the Hatfields and McCoys. While my pursuit of happiness is found in the pursuit of truth, due diligence demands that all of us sharing that pursuit keep a watchful eye on those serving as the gate-keepers of our clubs.

So much for my reflections. Allow me a few personal words in closing.

*  * *  *

One enters and remains in our imperfect community of scholars, in part on one’s own merits but more importantly due to those who trusted that ex post merit would justify ex ante support. These scholars, near colleagues, friends and family members are too numerous to mention outside of an extended written memoir. But without them the arc of my academic life would have ended far short of Freie Universität Berlin. Fostering the development of latent or raw talent made the difference for me and my hope is that I have played a similar role in the academic lives of others.

I have had the pleasure of working with both colleagues and staffs of the Faculties of Business and Economics and the John-F.-Kennedy Institute. Secretaries like our own Kerstin Brunke have provided that first line of defense known as the front office and they deserve medals for valor. Good cheer and a quite competency have served as a wonderful complement to my management-challenged ways of dealing with the world outside.  From the offices of administration in the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences to the bowels of the libraries, I have had a reasonably blessed time. Perhaps we only survive in a Burgfrieden, a truce in times of trouble, but I cannot say that I have suffered either severely or disproportionately. At this point of my professional life I am so happy for the continued emotional and intellectual support provided by my wife, the psychiatrist Prof. Isabella Heuser-Collier, whose own Abschiedsvorlesung at Berlin’s Charité I eagerly await some two years from now.

General Douglas MacArthur immortalized the refrain from an old barracks song in his farewell address to the U.S. Congress in April 19, 1951: “Old soldiers never die, they just fade away.” In that spirit, beginning this September at Bard College Berlin I shall fade to teaching half-time with an increased emphasis on the history of economics. This will give me significantly more time for transcribing and curating archival artifacts for my blog Economics in the Rear-view Mirror (www.irwincollier.com). I don’t really believe in the prospects of a happy hunting ground in the sky, but as a member of the greater academic community going forward, I find the prospect of my work surviving in a happy virtual cloud in the sky a spur for me to continue my work. I once toyed with the idea of slipping a $100 bill into the library copy of my M.I.T. Ph.D. dissertation to reward an anonymous anybody who has decided to fish the dissertation from the safe obscurity of the Dewey library stacks. Now the thought occurs to me that perhaps leaving a bitcoin in the cloud somewhere buried in my blog would be a legacy worthy of a scholar of the early 21st century.

I thank you for your attention this afternoon but especially for being with me now at this cusp of my academic life-cycle.

 

Categories
Columbia Cornell Economists M.I.T.

Columbia. Economics Ph.D. Alumnus, David Durand. Obituary, 1996

 

David Durand’s Columbia University Ph.D. dissertation (degree awarded in 1941) was published as Risk Elements in Consumer Instalment Financing. National Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Program, Studies in Consumer Instalment Financing, no. 8. New York: NBER, 1941. He is perhaps best known among economists, as Paul Samuelson notes, for his pioneering empirical work on the yield curve.

David Durand. Basic Yields of Corporate Bonds, 1900-1942. NBER, June 1942.

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Prof. David Durand of MIT Dies at 83
February 28, 1996

CAMBRIDGE, Mass.–Dr. David Durand, a professor emeritus of management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who was an early adherent of applying statistical methods–especially sampling–to problems in corporate finance and other fields, died Monday, Feb. 26, at the MIT Infirmary. Dr. Durand, who lived in Lexington, Mass., was 83.

His family said the cause of death was aplastic anemia.

Raised in Ithaca, N.Y., Dr. Durand received a bachelor of arts degree from Cornell University in 1934, and both a master’s degree (1938) and PhD (1941) from Columbia University. He was a lieutenant in the US Naval Reserve during World War II, serving in the Hawaiian Islands and on Guam.

Before coming to MIT in 1953, he was associated with the National Bureau of Economic Research, then in Riverdale, N.Y., and the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University. He also did consulting work for the Twentieth Century Fund and taught part-time at Columbia.

It was at the National Bureau of Economic Research, said MIT economist Dr. Paul A. Samuelson, an Institute professor and Nobel laureate, that Dr. Durand “pioneered the empirical study of how long-term bonds usually require a higher yield than short. Everyone understands that today, but he was the first to document it.”

Dr. Durand’s first appointment at MIT was as a research associate at the Sloan School of Management. He became an associate professor in 1955 and professor in 1958. He retired in 1973.

In addition to the application of statistical methods to financial problems, his fields of specialization included term structure of interest rates and statistics.

His research in finance included a sampling analysis of default experience for consumer installment loans, farm mortgage lending experience and factors affecting bank stock prices.

His work with statistical methodology and techniques involved the early use of punched card equipment for general statistical tabulation as well as for mathematical computation.

He was the author of a textbook, Stable Chaos, as well as numerous articles for professional journals. He was an associate editor of Financial Management for a number of years.

Some of Dr. Durand’s strongly-held views stirred lively debate with other members of the management faculty.

One of his former doctoral students, Don Lewin of Lewin Associates of York, Pa., a consulting firm, said that Dr. Durand “used his keen intellect and statistical knowledge and skills to develop many ideas” and to question whether statistical models matched reality. “Frequently, this did not endear him to those enamored of a model. Indeed, his doubting approach caused him to be often in the center of a controversy.”

In one such case involving the cost of capital, Dr. Durand wrote that two Sloan colleagues who disagreed with him “have cut out for themselves the extremely difficult, if not impossible, task of being pure and practical at the same time. Starting with a perfect market in a perfect world, they have taken a few steps in the direction of realism; but they have not made significant progress…”

Dr. Durand insisted, too, Dr. Lewin said, that the model builder rely heavily on his or her own judgment. In Stable Chaos, Dr. Durand wrote, “Systematic procedures and objective tests serve to strengthen the analyst’s judgment, not to replace it; they enable him to learn more quickly and more effectively from his own experience, and to sharpen his critical faculties.”

Dr. Durand also championed good writing and enlivened some of his own journal articles with intriguing figures of speech. In one, he wrote: “To suppose that any imaginative analyst or responsible financial manager, interested in a comprehensive view, would be content to base an important appraisal and the subsequent investment decision on just one of the many useful numbers available is on a par with supposing that a hungry gourmet at a smorgasbord would be content to make a whole meal of pickled herring…”

Another former student, Dr. Paul D. Berger, professor and department chair in Quantitative Methods & Marketing at the Boston University School of Management, recalls Dr. Durand as “a special teacher and mentor to many students. He had a ‘jolly’ manner about himself that set students at ease and allowed them to enjoy the material he imparted to them. He cared about people and was dedicated to academic integrity and excellence.”

Dr. Durand was a member of the American Economic Association, the Finance Association, the American Society for Quality Control, the American Statistical Association, the Econometric Society, the Biometric Society, the Institute of Mathematical Statistics and the International Association for Statistics in Physical Science.

He leaves his wife, Edith (Elbogen) Durand of Lexington, and a daughter, Marie Durand of Princeton, N.J.

There was no funeral service.

A memorial service will be held in the MIT Chapel on April 13 at 1 PM.

Contributions may be made to Deep Springs College in Dyer, Nev. 89010.

Source:  MIT News. Obituary for Prof. David Durand, February 28, 1996.

Image Source:David Durand portrait at the MIT Museum Website  .

Categories
Exam Questions M.I.T.

M.I.T. Core Micro Theory. Exam Questions for Resource Allocation/Price System. Weitzman, 1973

 

In earlier posts I provided transcriptions of the course outline and readings and the final examination questions for Martin Weitzman’s 1974 course on resource allocation and the price system that was the second of four half-term courses that made up the required core graduate microeconomic theory sequence at M.I.T. back then. In the approximately one hundred page typescript that he distributed for his course Weitzman also included three earlier exams from his course. These exams are transcribed below. The September exam was offered for people to place out of taking the course, the November exam would have been the actual course final examination, and I presume the following February exam was offered as a make-up examination.

An expression that Martin Weitzman was fond of saying to get us to think about the economic intuition behind some result or to motivate an argument was for us to first consider “a quick-and-dirty banker’s calculation”. The diagram above was just borrowed from a random blog post because of its “quick-and-dirty” theme and was never used by Weitzman.

_________________

Typically three questions are answered in an hour and a half.

Exam
(September, 1973)

  1. There are “investment opportunities” indexed by = 1,2,…, n. Up to cdollars can be invested in the ith investment opportunity, and each dollar so invested yields apresent value dollars back (a> 1). There is a budget constraint limiting investment spending to dollars.
    1. Specify the programming problem of picking investments to maximize returns subject to a budget constraint.
    2. Describe precisely the solution to the problem.
    3. What is the shadow price of an extra dollar of budget?
    4. If a new project is discovered which pays an+1 per dollar invested, should it be undertaken? Show how the shadow price of an extra dollar of budget can be used to easily give an answer. (Hint: if you are having trouble, try a numerical example.)
  2. There are n ways of combining capital with labor to produce output. The ith technique (= 1,…,n) has coefficients afor labor per unit of output and bfor capital per unit of output. If units of capital and units of labor are available, we can define a production function F(K,L) as follows:

\begin{array}{c}F\left( K,L \right)=\max \sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}{{{y}_{i}}}\\\text{subject to}\\\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}{{{a}_{i}}{{y}_{i}}}\le L\\\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}{{{b}_{i}}{{y}_{i}}}\le K\\{{y}_{i}}\ge 0.\end{array}

a. Prove that F(K,L) is concave and homogeneous of degree one in and L.
b. Interpret the shadow prices associated with the inequalities in labor and capital, for a given and L.

  1. State clearly…
    1. …the conditions under which it is possible to decentralize allocation decisions and yet achieve efficiency in a production system by using prices.
    2. Prove the theorem you have just stated, or at least sketch an outline of it.
    3. Comment on the importance of the convexity assumption. Will and non-convexity spoil the situation irreparably? What about externalities?
  2. A village owns given amounts of grade land, and grade B. The total labor supply of \overline{L}=5 is used solely for growing corn. The production function for grade land is {{Y}_{A}}=12{{L}_{A}}-2L_{A}^{2} and for grade land is {{Y}_{B}}=7{{L}_{B}}-\left( 1/2 \right)L_{B}^{2}. Naturally {{L}_{A}}+{{L}_{B}}=\overline{L}.
    1. The village uses the land as communal property to give each man an equal income, i.e., everyone gets an amount of land or an amount of land which yields each one the same output when he works it. Spell out in detail what this solution implies. Is this an efficient social production scheme? Why or why not?
    2. Suppose the village chief hires a consultant from 14.122. His problem is to maximize total output (YA+ YB) subject to production constraints. Then returns are equally distributed. What is the solution? What is the marginal product of labor?
    3. Let the marginal product of labor from (b) be w. Now show that if plots and are run as profit-maximizing firms with w being the wage rate (maximize separately {{Y}_{A}}-w{{L}_{A}} and {{Y}_{B}}-w{{L}_{B}}), that society ends up with the same solution as in (b). What does this mean? What is the difference between (b) and (c) especially as regards workers’ welfare? Are the workers better off under (a) or (c)? Would your answer have to be the same if the production functions changed? Explain.
  3. The following table specifies four processes for the production of steel. Assume
    1. factors of production are perfectly divisible and transferable among processes,
    2. all processes exhibit constant returns to scale,
    3. the wage rate is $10 per man/day,
    4. production is always efficient.
Factor requirements/ton of steel/day
Process No. Man-days Machine days
1 2 5
2 4 3
3 2 2
4 6 1

(i) Initially only processes 1 and 2 are known and both are in use. Draw one diagram showing the unit isoquant for steel production and another showing the long-run average total cost curve for steel production. Indicate the magnitude of long-run average total cost per ton of steel on your cost diagram.
(ii) Show on the relevant diagrams the unit isoquant and long-run average total cost curve which prevail after the discovery of processes 3 and 4.
(iii) Suppose that prior to the change in technology some firm was producing 10 tons of steel per day by operating each process at a level of 5. On your cost curve diagram show this firm’s short-run average total cost curve before and after the change in technology. Indicate the magnitude of any shifts in the cost curve on your diagram. (Note: in the short-run labor can be hired in any desired amount but the total amount of machinery a firm possesses is fixed.).

 

Exam
(November, 1973)

  1. There are types of machine, indexed by i= 1,2,…, The ith type of machine is designed to work with {{\alpha }_{i}} workers, in which case it produces {{\beta }_{i}} units of output. There are {{\gamma }_{i}} machines of type available.
    1. Formulate the problem of finding the minimum amount of labor to produce a given amount of output, say .
    2. Describe precisely the solution to the problem for arbitrary .
    3. What is the shadow cost of an extra unit of output and why?
    4. What is the shadow rental on a machine of type iand why?
    5. If a new machine is discovered of type n+1 with specification {{\alpha }_{n+1}}{{\beta }_{n+1}}{{\gamma }_{n+1}}, should it be used? Show how the shadow cost of an extra unit of output can be used to easily give an answer.
  2. There are plots of land. Land of type (i= 1,…,n) can be used to grow either abushels of wheat or bbushels of rye (or the appropriate combination).
    1. Characterize efficient specialization patterns for these plots of land. Which land should grow which crop and why?
    2. Suppose (as in a competitive market economy) a price of wheat is announced and also a price of rye. Then every plot grows the profit maximizing crop. Is this efficient? Why or why not? (show directly).
    3. Show how a supply of wheat curve would be derived in a market economy. Is it upward sloping? Why or why not?
  3. A firm consists of two plants. For each of statements (a) and (b), either prove the statement or give a counterexample. Be precise.
    1. The firm’s overall production plan will be efficient whenever each plant is producing efficiently.
    2. If both plants are maximizing profits at the same prices, the resulting overall plan will be efficient for the firm.
  4. There are two products in an economy (guns and cars) and two basic factors of production (and B). There are techniques for producing guns: the ith technique uses aunits of and bunits of per gun. Similarly there are techniques for producing cars: the ith technique uses up aunits of and bunits of B per automobile. The economy has a total availability of units of and units of B.
    1. Define carefully the production possibilities set for this economy. Sketch roughly what it looks like in the space of cars and guns.
    2. Prove that it must be convex (what does this mean geometrically?).
    3. State carefully why (b) is important for the possibility of effective indirect or decentralized control (using prices) of the way guns and cars will be produced.
  5. We derived the result that a free market competitive allocation of resources is efficient. Does this mean that a market system is the best way to organize an economy in the sense that it gives the greatest benefits? Why or why not? What are the major real world situations which would cause an exception to the above cited “result” in a real life market economy? Try to be as specific as possible in showing why and where the efficiency result breaks down for each cited example.
  6. Suppose a firm or economy consists of a number of divisions or subsectors, each of which is characterized by a convex technology. Then any efficient plan will have associated with it a set of prices (one for each good, the same prices for each subsector) such that the efficient plan is sustained by having each subsector maximize its own profits. Outline a detailed sketch of how the proof of such an assertion goes. Why is this sometimes called a “decentralization theorem”. What does it suggest as a way of efficiently organizing production?
  7. An organization has 2 inputs and 2 outputs, and a production set consisting of the following 7 activities, all scalar multiples of activities in the set, and all sums of activities in the set.
Activity a b c d e f g
Good 1 2 1 2 1 1 3 1
Good 2 0 2 1 1 1 1 3
Good 3 -2 -4 -3 -1 -3 -5 -6
Good 4 -2 -3 -4 -3 -1 -5 -4

a. Consider a plan to run activities (a, d,e) at a positive level. If this were an efficient plan, what shadow prices would be associated with it?
b. Is this plan efficient, in fact? Prove your answer by appealing to particular theorems or results.
c. Consider a plan to run activities (a, b,d) at a positive level. Is this an efficient? Why, or why not?

 

Exam
(February, 1974)

  1. A firm consists of two plants. There are no externalities. For each of statements (a) and (b), either prove the statement or give a counterexample. Be precise.
    1. The firm’s overall production plan will be efficient whenever each plant is producing efficiently.
    2. If both plants are maximizing profits at the same positive prices, the resulting overall plan will be efficient for the firm.
        An organization has a production set consisting of the following 7 activities, all scalar multiples of activities in the set, and all sums of activities in the set.
  2. An organization has a production set consisting of the following 7 activities, all scalar multiples of activities in the set, and all sums of activities in the set.
Activity a b c d e f g
Good 1 2 1 2 4 0 3 0
Good 2 2 5 1 0 -1 1 2
Good 3 -1 -3 -1 -1 1 -2 0
Good 4 -2 -3 -4 -4 -3 -3 -1

a. Consider a plan to run activities (a,d,e) at a positive level. If this were an efficient plan, what shadow prices would be associated with it?
b. Is this plan efficient, in fact? Prove your answer by using the prices from (a) and appealing to particular theorems or results.
c. Consider a plan to run activities (a,d,g) at a positive level. Is this an efficient plan? Why, or why not?

  1. State…
    1. …clearly the conditions under which it is possible to decentralize allocation decisions and yet achieve efficiency in a production system by using prices.
    2. Prove the theorem you have just stated, or at least sketch an outline of it.
    3. Comment on the importance of the convexity assumption. Will any non-convexity spoil the situation irreparably? What about externalities?
  2. The following table specifies four processes for the production of steel. Assume
    1. factors of production are perfectly divisible and transferable among processes,
    2. all processes exhibit constant returns to scale,
    3. the wage rate is $10 per man/day,
    4. production is always efficient.
Factor requirements/ton of steel/day
Process No. Man-days Machine days
1 1 2.5
2 2 1.5
3 1 1
4 3 .5

(i) Initially only processes 1 and 2 are known and both are in use. Draw one diagram showing the unit isoquant for steel production and another showing the long-run average total cost curve for steel production. Indicate the magnitude of long-run average total cost per ton of steel on your cost diagram.
(ii) Show on the relevant diagrams the unit isoquant and long-run average total cost curve which prevail after the discovery of processes 3 and 4.
(iii) Suppose that prior to the change in technology some firm was producing 10 tons of steel per day by operating each process at a level of 5. On your cost curve diagram show this firm’s short-run average total cost curve before and after the change in technology. Indicate the magnitude of any shifts in the cost curve on your diagram. (Note: in the short-run labor can be hired in any desired amount but the total amount of machinery a firm possesses is fixed.)

  1. Consider the following production function:Y={{T}^{\alpha }}{{L}^{1-\alpha }}
    where is output, and are inputs and 0 < {{\alpha }} < 1.

a. Prove that this production function has constant returns to scale.
b. Describe the production set that corresponds to this production function. Which points are efficient?
c. Given an arbitrary efficient point (Y*, T*, L*), find the shadow or efficiency prices associated with that point.
d. Prove that the production set is convex.

  1. Let be an index of land plots running from 1 to 10. The higher the index, the more moisture in the soil. Either rye or wheat can be grown. Land of type i (i=1,…,10) can costlessly produce either 5 units of rye or units of wheat (or an appropriate combination).
    1. If a total of 30 units of rye is to be grown, what is the most wheat that can also be obtained?
    2. For the same situation as in (a), what are the shadow prices of wheat and rye? Explain fully what these shadow prices mean. What is the shadow rent on land of various types?
    3. Describe in general the efficient patterns of specialization. Which land should grow which crop and why?
    4. Derive the supply of wheat curve and show what it looks like.
    5. Verify that any profit maximizing output combination is efficient.

Source:  Martin Weitzman’s Notes to 14.122, personal copy of Irwin Collier, pp. 88-97.

Image Source: Blogpost: “The truth about quick and dirty” POSTED BY NIK ⋅ 10 JULY 2007 at niksilver.com

Categories
M.I.T. Suggested Reading Syllabus

M.I.T. Core Micro Theory. Resource Allocation/Price System. Weitzman, 1974

 

For the second half of the first term of 1974-75, Martin Weitzman distributed a 100 page typescript for his lectures in the four half-course sequence of core microeconomic theory. The typescript consisted of 87 pages of lecture notes, 10 pages of final exam questions from previous years and three pages of course outline and select references. The order of Robert Bishop’s and Weitzman’s courses were reversed starting with the 1974-75 academic year so that the numbering for Weitzman’s course was changed from 14.121 to 14.122. 

Weitzman’s course outline and reading list have been transcribed below.

The final exam questions for this Fall, Term 1974 course have been posted earlier. Note: the old course numbering was used (14.121) on the exam. In a coming post I’ll provide the final exam questions from earlier years.

_____________________

Course Description corresponding to 14.122

14.121 Microeconomic Theory I
Prereq.: 14.04
Year: G(1)
2-0-4

[Instructors: D. K. Foley (1972/73); Martin Weitzman (1973/74)]

Introduction to the theory of resource allocation and the price system. Decentralization of economic decisions. Competitive equilibrium Pareto optimality. Productive efficiency.

Source:
M.I.T. Annual Catalogue, 1972/73, p. 95D.
M.I.T. Annual Catalogue, 1973/74, p. 268.

_____________________

 

Outline and Selected References

Topics

Activity Analysis Model of Production

Activity Vectors
Production Sets
Production Functions

Prices and Efficiency

Price Systems
Profit Maximization
Efficiency

Duality Theory

Convexity
Separating Hyperplanes
Shadow Prices
Cost Functions and Factor Demand

Comparative Systems and Other Applications

Efficiency Prices and Decentralized Decision Making
Externalities and Non-Convexities
Efficiency and Distribution
Foundations of Cost Benefit Analysis

 

Background References

(if time permits, it might be useful to read these before taking 14.122)

T.C. Koopmans, Essay I in Three Essays on the State of Economic Science.
W.J. Baumol, Operations Research and Economic Theory, chs. 1-8, 12, 21.

 

Reading List(14.122)

Readings should be considered as background material for the lectures. At certain times they can be of help in clarifying a topic which has been only briefly treated in class. The reading material listed here is redundant to some extent and the degree to which you will wish to consult outside reading sources should depend among other things on your preparation for the course and the extent to which you feel you understand the subject matter.

The reading list is arranged by topics.

  1. The Activity Analysis Model

A.S. Manne, Economic Analysis for Business Decisions, chs. 1, 2.
E. Malinvaud, Lectures on Microeconomic Theory, ch. 3, sects. 1-3.
Dorfman, Samuelson, and Solow, Linear Programming and Economic Analysis, ch. 6.
T.C. Koopmans, ch. 1, ch. 3, sects. 3.1-3.7, of “Allocation of Resources and the Price System”, essay 1 of Three Essays on the State of Economic Science.
W.J. Baumol, Operations Research and Economic Theory, ch. 12.
G.W. Dantzig, Linear Programming and Extensions, chs. 1-3.
D. Gale, The Theory of Linear Economic Models, ch. 1, sect. 1

  1. Prices and Efficiency

L.V. Kantorovich, The Best Use of Economic Resources, intro. and ch. 1.
Koopmans, ch. 3, sects. 3.8-3.14.
Malinvaud, ch. 3, sects. 4-8.

  1. Duality Theory

D. McFadden, An Econometric Approach to Production Theory.
Gale, ch. 1, sects. 2-4.
Dantzig, ch. 12.
Dorfman, Samuelson, and Solow, chs. 7,8.

  1. Applications and Extensions

T.C. Koopmans, “Efficient Allocation of Resources” and “Uses of Prices”, pp. 211-221 and 243-257 in Scientific Papers of Tjalling C. Koopmans.
Baumol, ch. 8, sects. 1-3, ch. 16.
W. Nicholson, Microeconomic Theory, pp. 451-456, ch. 25.
M.L. Weitzman, “Free Access vs. Private Ownership as Alternative Systems for Managing Common Property”, paper on reserve.
T. Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition, chs. 12-14.

 

Source: Personal copy of Irwin Collier.

Image Source: Detail from 1976 MIT economics department group picture.

 

 

 

 

Categories
Berkeley Carnegie Institute of Technology Chicago Columbia Cornell Duke Economist Market Harvard Illinois Indiana Iowa Johns Hopkins M.I.T. Michigan Minnesota Northwestern Princeton Salaries Stanford UCLA Virginia Wisconsin Yale

Economics Faculty Salaries for 15 U.S. universities. Hart Memo, April 1961

 

Here we have a memo written by member of the Columbia University economics department executive committee, Albert G. Hart, that presents the results of what appears to be his informal polling of the chairpersons of 21 departments. Fifteen of the departments provided the salary ranges at four different ranks. No further details are provided, this one page memo was simply filed away in a folder marked “memoranda”. Maybe there is more to be found in Hart’s papers at Columbia University. Up to now I have only sampled Hart’s papers for teaching materials and perhaps next time, I’ll need to look into his papers dealing with departmental administrative affairs.

For a glance at salaries about a half-century earlier:  Professors and instructors’ salaries ca. 1907

________________

AGH [Albert Gailord Hart] 4/21/61

CONFIDENTIAL information on economic salaries, 1960-61, from chairmen of departments

Institution

Professors Associate professors Assistant professors

Instructors

Harvard

$12,000-22,000

$9,000-12,000 $7,500-8,700

$6,500

Princeton

$12,000-…?…

$9,000-11,500 $7,000-8,750

$6,000-6,750

California

$11,700-21,000

$8,940-10,344 $7,008-8,112

$5,916-6,360

MIT

$11,000-20,000

$8,000-11,000 $6,500-9,000

$5,500-5,750

Minnesota

$11,000-18,000

$8,500-11,000 $6,800-8,400

?

COLUMBIA

$11,000-20,000

$8,500-10,000 $6,500-7,500

$5,500-5,750

Northwestern

$11,000-…?…

$8,000-11,000 $6,800-7,500

?

Duke

$11,400-16,000

$8,200-10,000 $7,200-8,200

$5,800-6,500

Illinois

$11,000-15,000

$7,500-10,000 $6,900-8,600

$6,500-7,100

Cornell

$10,000-15,000

$8,000-10,000 $6,500-7,500

$5,500-6,500

Indiana

$10,000-14,800

$8,300-10,000 $6,500-7,500

?

Michigan

$10,000-…?…

$8,700-..9,500 $6,600-8,000

$5,000

Virginia

$..9,800-15,000

$7,800-..9,800 $6,600-7,800

?

Wisconsin

$..9,240-16,150

$8,000-..9,000 $6,550-8,460

$5,250-5,450

Iowa State (Ames)

$..8,500-13,000

$7,500-..8,500 $6,700-8,000

$4,700-6,600

[…]

Note: The following institutions for which data were not included in the source materials are believed to pay their economists at scales at or above the Columbia level:

Carnegie Tech
Chicago
Johns Hopkins
Stanford
Yale
UCLA

[…]

 

Source:  Columbia University Archives. Columbia University, Department of Economics Collection. Carl Shoup Materials: Box 11, Folder: “Economics—Memoranda”.