Category: Syllabus

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M.I.T. Suggested Reading Syllabus

M.I.T. Monetary economics, reading lists. Ando and Modigliani, 1960-61

 

 

Franco Modigliani first came to M.I.T. as a visiting professor in 1960-61 from the Carnegie Institute of Technology before returning in 1962 after only one year at Northwestern. His former Carnegie Tech student Albert K. Ando was already on the M.I.T. faculty and the partial reading lists for their jointly taught courses can be found in Modigliani’s papers at Duke’s Economists’ Papers Archive. 

Readings and final exam from the monetary theory course taught by Modigliani at Northwestern in 1961 have been posted earlier.

Note: I have inserted part of the reading list on monetary policy from Modigliani’s course at Carnegie Tech in the term immediately preceding his visiting professorship at M.I.T. This insertion is motivated by last sentence in the course description in the M.I.T. catalogue that includes the topic “the role of money in policy”.

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Monetary Economics course enrollments
1960-61

Fall 1960.  14.461 Monetary Economics, A. K. Ando. 14 students.

Spring 1961.  14.192 Economics Seminar—Monetary Economics. Ando/Modigliani. 7 students.

Source: M.I.T. Archives. Department of Economics, Records. Box 3, Folder “Teaching Responsibility”.

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Course Announcement
Fall, 1960

14.461 Monetary Economics

Prereq.: 14.451 [Theory of Income and Employment]
Year: G(1)

Review of theory of income determination, with explicit attention to monetary parts of the model. Examination of sources and determinants of supply of money with attention to role of commercial banks, Federal Reserve System, and the Treasury. Exploration of both theory and fact about demand for money for transactions and for speculative purposes. Discussion of general equilibrium theory of money, interest, prices and output, and role of money in policy.

Ando, Modigliani

Source:   Massachusetts Institute of Technology Bulletin, 1960-61, p. 243.

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Modigliani
Ando
Fall, 1960

Monetary Economics
14.461

We assume that students are familiar with the elementary price theory and income theory, i.e., that they have taken 14.121, 14.122, 14.451, and 14.452. We also assume that students have some material ordinarily covered in the elementary course in Money and Banking. Those who feel that they need to refresh their memory of the latter may consult:

Steiner, Shapiro, Solomon, Money and Banking, Parts I, II, and III.

Day and Beza, Money and Income, Parts I and III.

Hart, Money, Debt, and Economic Activity, 2nd edition, Part I.

Chandler, The Economics of Money and Banking, 3rd edition.

  1. The nature of money and the position of money in the balance sheet for the United States: An Introduction

Tobin, J., Manuscript, Chs. 1 and 2.

Robertson, D. H., Money, Chs. 1 to 3.

Meade, J. E., “The Amount of Money and the Banking System,” Readings in Monetary Theory.

The Federal Reserve System—Purposes and Functions, Chs. I to VIII and XIII.

Modigliani, F., Lecture Notes No. 1-3.

Federal Reserve Bulletin, August, 1959, “A Quarterly Presentation of Flow of Funds, Saving, and Investment.”

Roosa, R. V. Federal Reserve Operations with Money and Government Securities Market.

  1. Demand for Money

This year, we shall postpone the discussion of the demand for money arising from various forms of uncertainty until later in the course, and confine ourselves in this section to dealing with the demand for money due to the existence of the cost of transaction.

    1. Why is demand for money different from demands for consumption goods?

Samuelson, P. A., Foundations, pp. 117-124

Marschak, J., “The Rationale of the Demand for Money and of ‘Money Illusion’,” Metroeconomica, August, 1950, Sections 1 and 2.

    1. Classical theory (Equation of Exchange and Cambridge Equation).

Fisher, I., The Purchasing Power of Money, Chs. 1 to 6 and 8.

Robertson, D. H., Money, Chs. 4 to 6.

Marshall, A., Official Papers, pp. 32-54.

Keynes, J. M., A Treatise on Money, Chs. 9-19.

Wicksell, K., Interest and Prices, Chs. 3 and 5 to 8.

Gregory, T. E., The Gold Standard and Its Future, Chs. 1 and 2.

Hicks, J. R., “A Suggestion for Simplifying the Theory of Money,” Readings in Monetary Theory.

Keynes, J. M., The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, Ch. 15.

Pigou, A. C., “The Value of Money,” AEA Readings in Monetary Theory, pp. 162-185.

Friedman, M., “The Restatement of the Quantity Theory of Money,” in Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money.

    1. More modern theory of transaction demand for money.

Tobin, J., Manuscript, Chapter 4, Sections 1 and 2, Appendix to Chapter 4.

Tobin, J., “The Interest Elasticity of Transaction Demand for Cash,” Review of Economics and Statistics, August, 1956, pp. 241-47.

Baumol, W. J., “The Transaction Demand for Cash,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, 1952.

Lecture notes, 3-6, 9 and 10.

    1. Some empirical evidence.

Bresciani-Turroni, The Economics of Inflation, Chs. 2, 4, and 5 (see also J. Robinson’s review in Economic Journal, September, 1938).

League of Nations, The Course and Control of Inflation, Part I.

Cagan, P., “The Monetary Dynamics of Hyper-Inflation,” in Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, (M. Friedman, ed.)

Kisselgoff, A., “Liquidity Preference of Large Manufacturing Corporations,” Econometrica, October, 1945.

Latane, H. A., “Cash Balances and the Interest Rate,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 1954, pp. 456-460.

Polak, J. and White, W. H., “The Effect of Income Expansion on the Quantity of Money,” in IMF Staff Papers, August, 1956.

Stedry, A.C., “A Note on Interest Rates and the Demand for Money,” RENS August, 1959.

Those who are not familiar with the elementary theory of inventory management should consult any one of the following:

Whitin, T., Theory of Inventory Management, Chapters 2 and 3.

Arrow, K. J., Karlin, and Scarf, Studies in the Mathematical Theory of Inventory and Production, Chapters 1 and 2.

Arrow, K. J., Harris, and Marschak, “Optimal Inventory Policy,” Econometrica, July 1951.

  1. Analysis of the place of money in the economy—general equilibrium theory of money, prices, and employment.
    1. Neo-classical theory: the case of flexible prices and perfect markets.

Marschak, J., “The Rationale of the Demand for Money and Money Illusion,” Metroeconomica, 1950, pp. 71-160.

Modigliani, F., Preliminary Notes on the Theory of Money and Interest, Part I, II, and III, Section A to D (2).

Patinkin, D., Money, Interest, and Prices, An Integration of Monetary and Value Theory.

Patinkin, D., “A Reconsideration of the General Equilibrium Theory of Money,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 18, 1950-51.

De Scitovsky, T., “Capital Accumulation, Employment, and Price Rigidity,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 8, pp. 69-88.

Pigou, A. C., “Economic Progress in a Stable Environment,” Readings in Monetary Theory.

Metzler, L., “Wealth, Saving, and the Rate of Interest,” JPE, April, 1951.

Archibald, G. C., and Lipsey, R.G., “Monetary and Value Theory: A Critique of Lange and Patinkin,” Review of Economic Studies, October, 1958.

    1. Keynesian theory: the effects of rigid prices.

Keynes, J. M., The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, Chs. 2, 6, 10, 11, 18, 19, 21 including appendix.

Hicks, J. R., “Mr. Keynes and the Classics,” Readings in the Theory of Income Distribution.

Modigliani, F., “Liquidity Preference and the Theory of Interest and Money,” Readings in Monetary Theory

Modigliani, Preliminary Notes, Part IV.

Pigou, A. C., Employment and Equilibrium.

Tobin, J., Manuscript, Chs. 5-6.

(To be continued)

Source: Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library. Economists’ Papers Archives. Franco Modigliani Papers. Box T6, Folder “Economic Fluctuation and Growth, 1961”.

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From: Course outline and major references, GI-583—Advance Economics III (Monetary Theory and Macro-Economic Analysis), Carnegie Institute of Technology, Spring Term 1960.

[Applications of the model to Economic Analysis and Policy]

  1. a) The causes of unemployment

(i) “Monetary” causes

(ii) Effective demand and the limits of monetary policy—Fiscal policy.

(iii) Real wage rigidity, market structures and the limits of monetary and fiscal policy

b) Creeping inflation and its causes—Cost push and demand pull

c) Implications for economic policy

Modigliani, Preliminary notes, Part IV section A.6 and C.6

Hart, A. G., Money, Debt and Economic Activity, Part V

Timlin, P., A MODEL OF THE CURRENT INFLATION—B.A. Thesis, Swarthmore College (Mimeographed) Ch. I

Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress—THE RELATIONSHIP OF PRICES TO ECONOMIC STABILITY AND GROWTH—COMPENDIUM March, 1958

(See especially: A. P. Lerner, “Inflationary Depression and the Regulation of Administered prices”) and G. Ackley, “A Third Approach to the Analysis and Control of Inflation”)

Selden, R., Cost Push versus Demand Pull, JPE Feb. 1959

WAGES, PRICES, PROFITS AND PRODUCTIVITY—The American Assembly, Columbia University

Schultze, C. THE RECENT INFLATION IN THE UNITED STATES. Joint Economic Committee, 1959

 

Source: Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library. Economists’ Papers Archives. Franco Modigliani Papers. Box T6, Folder “Economic Fluctuation and Growth, 1961”.

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List of Suggested Books
for Review in 14.461

Pigou, A. C., Employment and Equilibrium

Friedman, M., A Program for Monetary Stability

Hansen, B., Theory of Inflation

Hansen, B., Economic Theory of Fiscal Policy

Gurley, J. G., and Shaw, E., Money in a Theory of Finance

Faxen, K. O., Monetary and Fiscal Policy under Uncertainty

Botha, D. J., A Study in the Theory of Monetary Equilibrium

Hall, C. A., Fiscal Policy for Stable Growth

Buchanan, J. M., Public Principles of Public Debt

Musgrave, R. A., The Theory of Public Finance

Patinkin, D., Money, Interest, and Prices

Robinson, J., Accumulation of Capital

Sraffa, P., Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities

Source: Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library. Economists’ Papers Archives. Franco Modigliani Papers. Box T6, Folder “Economic Fluctuation and Growth, 1961”.

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Course Announcement

14.192 Economics Seminar

Prereq.: 14.121 [Economic Analysis (first term)]
Year: G(1)

Special social problems or economic problems of particular industries. (Open to graduate students only.)

Source: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Bulletin, 1960-61,  p. 242.

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Spring Term, 1961
Franco Modigliani
Albert Ando

14.192
Monetary Economics

  1. Preliminary Discussion of the Theory of Decision Making Under Uncertainty

Friedman, M., “Choice, Chance, and Personal Distribution of Income,” Journal of Political Economy, 1953, pp. 277-290.

Friedman, M., and Savage, L. J., “The Utility Analysis of Choices involving Risk,” JPE, 1948, pp. 279-304, reprinted in AEA Readings in Price Theory.

Dreze, J., and Modigliani, F., Consumer’s Behavior under Uncertaintydittoed notes.

Tobin, J., “Liquidity Preference as Behavior Toward Risk,” The Review of Economic Studies, February, 1958

Tobin, J., Manuscript, Ch. 3

Markowitz, H. M., Portfolio Selection

Hirschleifer—“Risk, the Discount Rate and Investment Decisions”—AER, Vol LI, No. 2 May 1961, pp. 112-120

Those who are not familiar with the standard theory of decision making under uncertainty should consult the following:

Luce, R. D., and Raiffa, H., Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey, Chs. 2, 13, and 14

Raiffa, H., and Schlaifer, R. O.,Applied Statistical Decision Theory, Preface and Introduction, Ch. 1.

 

Source: Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library. Economists’ Papers Archives. Franco Modigliani Papers. Box T6, Folder “Economic Fluctuation and Growth, 1961”.

Image Source: Albert K. Ando from the MIT Museum, People Records. Franco Modigliani from Gonçalo L. Fonseca’s History of Economic Thought website.

 

Categories
Exam Questions History of Economics M.I.T. Suggested Reading Syllabus

M.I.T. History of Economic Thought. Misc. Readings and exams. Samuelson, 1973-78

 

Scattered across several folders in the Paul Samuelson Papers at Duke are course materials from the graduate history of economic course regularly offered by Samuelson in the 1970s. Not included below are a few class lecture handouts and class lists also in the folders. Instead I have just transcribed the suggested reading lists or Dewey library course reserve lists and two final exams found in the folders. 

I did not take this course, once having sat in on a Marxian economics lecture that consisted of Paul Samuelson commenting on his textbook’s appendix “Rudiments of Marxian Economics”. Perhaps the arrogance of my youth got the better of me, but I thought there were other courses that were going to teach me something that I had not already learned so I am now condemned to trying to reconstruct his course content from such scraps as these we find in his archival record. Maybe a visitor to this page of Economics in the Rear-view Mirror has saved notes from the course?

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14.132 FALL 1973
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT
P. SAMUELSON

SUGGESTED READINGS

1. FOR BACKGROUND

T. Kuhn
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION

and parts or all of any sample of secondary sources, such as those by Roll, Gray, Gide-Rist, brief Schumpeter (1912), Heilbroner.

FOR BIOGRAPHY

Keynes
ESSAYS IN BIOGRAPHY

Schumpeter
TEN ECONOMISTS

H. Spiegel
GREAT ECONOMISTS ON GREAT ECONOMISTS

2. BASIC BACKGROUND REFERENCE

Perhaps the basic background reference is the posthumous, uneven classic:
J. S. Schumpeter
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

A valuable, MIT-graduate-school kind of reference is
Marc Blaug
ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT

3. ON RICARDO, you should at least sample

Sraffa edition
PRINCIPLES

Useful readings are:

Blaug

Baumol
ch 2 in ECONOMIC DYNAMICS

Stigler in
HISTORY OF ECONOMICS

Sraffa
his introduction to the PRINCIPLES

Kaldor
his brief section in 1954 RES “Alternative Theories of Distribution”

Models of Ricardo-like systems

Pasinetti
Samuelson
Edelberg

Source: Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library. Economists’ Papers Archive. Paul Samuelson Papers, Box 33, Folder “14.132 Fall 1973”.

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14.132 FALL 1974
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT
P. SAMUELSON E 52-394

SUGGESTED READINGS

1. FOR BACKGROUND

T. Kuhn
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION

and parts or all of any sample of secondary sources, such as those by Roll, Gray, Gide-Rist, brief Schumpeter (1912), Heilbroner, Cannan, Recktenwald’s POLITICAL ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

FOR BIOGRAPHY

Keynes
ESSAYS IN BIOGRAPHY

Schumpeter
TEN ECONOMISTS

H. Spiegel
GREAT ECONOMISTS ON GREAT ECONOMISTS

2. BASIC BACKGROUND REFERENCE

Perhaps the basic background reference is the posthumous, uneven classic:
J. S. Schumpeter
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

A valuable, MIT-graduate-school kind of reference is
Marc Blaug
ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT

3. First Topic of land and the interest rate: Turgot, Böhm-Bawerk and Keynes-Modigliani

Böhm-Bawerk, Vol I, Ch. 4
„Land and the Rate of Interest“: also Samuelson (1958, 1968, 1974)
Modigliani (1954, 1974)
Diamond (1965)

Source: Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library. Economists’ Papers Archive. Paul Samuelson Papers, Box 33, Folder “14.132 Fall 1973”.

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14.132 Fall 1975
STORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT
P. A. SAMUELSON E52-394
FRIDAY 1:30-3:30

SUGGESTED READINGS

1. FOR BACKGROUND

Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution
and parts or all of any sample of secondary sources, such as those by Roll, Gray, Gide-Rist, brief Schupeter (1912), Heilbroner, Cannan’s Review of Economic Theory, Recktenwald’s Political Economy: A Historical Perspective.

FOR BIOGRAPHY

Keynes, Essays in Biography

Schumpeter, Ten Economists

H. Spiegel, Great Economists on Great Economists [not in Dewey Library]

2. BASIC BACKGROUND REFERENCE

Perhaps the basic background reference is the posthumous, uneven classic:
J. A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis

A valuable, MIT-graduate-school kind of reference is
Mark Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect

For fruits of Marx’s hours in the British Museum, see
K. Marx, Theories of Surplus Value (many volumes, and sometimes called Vol. IV of Das Kapital)

Readable and scholarly essays are collected in
G. J. Stigler, Essays in the History of Economics

3. First topic of Quesnay’s Tableau Economique:

Any text like Gray, Peter Newman, Roll, Schumpeter;
Meek on Physiocracy, and edited volume;
A. Phillips, QJE, 1955;
S. Maital, QJE, 1972.

4. Topic of land and the interest rate: Turgot, Böhm-Bawerk and Keynes-Modigliani

Böhm-Bawerk, Vol I, Ch. 4, “Land and the Rate of Interest,” also,
Samuelson (1958, 1968, 1974)
Modigliani (1954, 1974)
Diamond (1965)

5. Modern model of Ricardo

6. Transformation problem of Marx

7. Smith, Adam

8. ….

Source: Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library. Economists’ Papers Archive. Paul Samuelson Papers, Box 33, Folder “14.132 Fall 1975”.

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Samuelson
To be placed on reserve for 14.132

Mass. Inst. Tech.
FEB 14 1977
DEWEY RESERVE

McLellan. Karl Marx: His Life and Thought

Luxemburg. Accumulation of Capital

Sweezy. Theory of Capitalist Development

Robinson. An Essay on Marxian Economics

Dobbs. History of Theories of Distribution [sic, Theories of Value and Distribution since Adam Smith: Ideology and Economic Theory]

Morishima. On Marxian Economics [sic, Marx’s Economics]

Schumpeter. History of Economic Analysis

Roll. History of Economic Thought 

Alexander Gray. The Development of Economic Doctrine

[Metzler Lloyd] Festschrift. (Trade, Stability and Macroeconomics) edited by G. Horowitz and P. Samuelson.

Reprints

Samuelson

Samuelson’s “Reply on Marxian Matters”

Insight and Detour in the Theory of Exploitation: A Reply to Baumol

Understanding the Marxian Notion of Exploitation: A Summary of the So-Called Transformation Problem Between Marxian Values and Competitive Prices

Marx as a Mathematical Economist

 

Journals

Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 2, 1934-35

American Economic Review, March 1938.

 

[Appendix: Rudiments of Marxian Economics (from Samuelson Economics, pp. 858-)]

Source: Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library. Economists’ Papers Archive. Paul Samuelson Papers, Box 33, Folder “14.132 Spring 1977”.

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14.132 Final Exam
History of Economic Thought
P. A. Samuelson
May 20, 1977

ANSWER (1) OR (2) QUESTIONS.

  1. Describe any aspects of the classical economists’ system that primarily interests you.
  2. Describe the doctrines of some one historical economist or school in which you have an interest.
  3. Analyze any aspects of Marxian economics that you think are of relevance to economic history and policy.

Source: Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library. Economists’ Papers Archive. Paul Samuelson Papers, Box 33, Folder “14.132 Spring 1977”.

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Reserve List, MIT Libraries
14.132 History of Economic Thought
Spring 1978

D. L. Thomson, Adam Smith’s Daughters, Exposition Press, 1973.

L. Robbins. An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science. Macmillan, 1935 and 1962.

M. Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect. Richard D. Irwin, 1962.

I. H. Rima. Development of Economic Analysis. Irwin, 1972.

H. W. Spiegel,The Growth of Economic Thought. Prentice-Hall, 1971.

Alexander Gray, Development of Economic Doctrines. Longman, Green and Co. 1934.

T. W. Hutchinson, A Review of Economic Doctrines, 1870-1929. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1953.

Thomas Sowell, Classical Economics Reconsidered, Princeton U. Press, 1974.

Eric Roll, A History of Economic Thought. Faber and Faber, 1973.

Eric Roll, The World After Keynes, Praeger, 1968.

J. A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis. Oxford U. Press, 1954.

G. L. S. Shackle. The Nature of Economic Thought. Cambridge U Press, 1966.

J. A. Schumpeter, Ten Great Economists. Oxford, 1965.

R. L. Meek. Precursors of Adam Smith. Dear (London), 1973.

Source: Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library. Economists’ Papers Archive. Paul Samuelson Papers, Box 33, Folder “14.132 Spring 1978”.

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14.132 Take-Home Exam
Spring 1978

Answer any one of these questions or any two or all three.

  1. Describe some topic covered in this course that you find to be of interest. Discuss its broad significance; or concentrate in depth on any aspect of the problem that you believe to be worth exploring. Do not hesitate to let your imagination soar.
  2. Describe some aspect or aspects of what we call neoclassical economics. If you wish, compare and contrast it with earlier classical economics; or with later Keynesian economics; or with the Marx-inspired economics that developed around the same time.
  3. Thomas Kuhn attempted to throw light on how the natural sciences tend to develop. If any part of his paradigms seems to you useful in any part of the history of economic thought, describe the use. If you have criticisms to make of the Kuhnian methodology, feel free to enlarge on them.

Source: Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library. Economists’ Papers Archive. Paul Samuelson Papers, Box 33, Folder “14.132 Spring 1977”.

Image Source:  Capture of the photos page from the Paul Samuelson memorial webpages at the MIT economics department (date of Wayback Machine capture May 22, 2011)

Categories
Economic History Economists Suggested Reading Syllabus Undergraduate Yale

Yale. Undergraduate European Economic History through the Industrial Revolution. Miskimin, 1971

 

Reflecting on my own academic upbringing, I am increasingly amazed at the sheer abundance of economic history courses still offered at Yale and MIT in the 1970s. My first taste of economic history came with Harry Miskimin’s course on the economic history of Europe up through the Industrial Revolution. I later took a graduate course he offered on French mercantilism. I remember well the sage advice he gave me to postpone work in economic history to first get trained in the analytic tools of economics, since he thought I apparently could handle the demands of economics graduate school. I believe he was the only professor I ever had who actually smoked (cigarettes) in class. 

From the Yale Daily News Archives I learned that Harry Miskimin later served as president of the Yale chapter of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). There is a low-resolution picture of Miskimin in his mature years in the article linked.

Below are the assigned readings for the European economic history course from the Fall Term, 1971-72.

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Harry Miskimin
100% Yalie

Harry Alvin Miskimin, Jr. was born September 8, 1932 in Orange, New Jersey. He died October 24, 1995.

B.A. Yale, 1954; M.A. Yale, 1958; Ph.D. Yale, 1960. From instructor to professor history Yale University, New Haven, since 1960, associate professor, 1964-1971, professor history, since 1971, chairman department history, 1986-1989, Charles Seymour Professor of History, since 1991.

_________________

Harry Miskimin
Obituary Note

Post by Wendy Plotkin
H-Urban Co-Editor
14 January 1996

1995 saw the death of Harry A. Miskimin, the Charles Seymour Professor of History at Yale University in October. According to a press release received from H-Net Central in December, Professor Miskimin was

“An authority on the economic history of medieval and early modern Europe” and “the author of five books, including The Economy of Early Renaissance Europe, 1300-1460and The Economy of Later Renaissance Europe, 1460-1600both of which were translated in Spanish and Portuguese; Money and Power in Fifteenth Century France, Money, Prices and Foreign Exchange in Fourteenth Century Franceand Cash, Credit and Crisis in Europe, 1300-1600.”

Professor Miskimin was general editor of four volumes of the Cambridge University Press series “The Economic Civilization of Europe.”

Of special interest to H-Urban subscribers, Miskimin co-edited THE MEDIEVAL CITY with A. Udovitch and D. Herlihy (Yale University Press, 1977). This collection included:

    1. The Italian City

Herlihy, “Family and property in Renaissance Florence”
Krekic, B., “Four Florentine commercial companies in Dubrovnik (Ragusa) in the first half of the fourteenth century”
Lane, F. C. “The First Infidelities of the Venetian Lire”
Cipolla, C. M. “A Plague Doctor”
Kedar, B.Z. “The Genoese Notaries of 1382”
Hughes, D. O. “Kinsmen and neighbors in Medieval Genoa”
Peters, E. Pars, parte: “Dante and an Urban Contribution to Political Thought”

    1. The Eastern City

Udovitch, A. L. “A Tale of Two Cities”
Goitein, S. D. “A Mansion in Fustat”
Prawer, J. “Crusader Cities”
Teall, J. “Byzantine Urbanism in the Military Handbooks”

    1. The Northern City:

Miskimin, H. A. “The Legacies of London”
Munro, J. “Industrial Protectionism in Medieval Flanders”
Strayer, J.R. “The Costs and Profits of War”
Hoffmann, R. C. “Wroclaw Citizens as Rural Landholders”
Cohen, S. “The Earliest Scandinavian Towns”

Professor Miskimin was noted for his work on the “beginning of the transition from medieval to modern economies.” I am interested in reflections on this and other work of Professor Miskimin.

After obtaining his undergraduate and graduate education at Yale, he spent the rest of his career teaching at Yale College, serving as director of graduate studies for the Economic History Program after 1967.

On leave from Yale, Miskimin was for a period director of studies at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes in Paris. Although his intellectual work was on the medieval period, he participated in present day activities in his community, serving as a zoning commissioner for the Town of Woodbridge 1976-85, a member of the Woodbridge Democratic Town Committee and a board member of the Woodbridge Town Library.

Professor Miskimin was born in 1932 in East Orange, New Jersey, graduated from Phillips Andover Academy in 1950, and was in the U.S. Army from 1955-57.

Source: Humanities and Social Sciences Net Online

_________________

Yale University
History 51 a – Economics 80a
Mr. Miskimin
Fall Term 1971-72

The readings from this course will be in diverse sources but the student may find it convenient to purchase the books of Herbert Heaton (Economic History of Europe rev. ed., Harper & Bros., New York, 1948) and Henri Pirenne (Economic and Social History of Mediaeval Europe, Harvest Books, Harcourt, Brace, New York.)

Sept. 17

 First Class

20

 Heaton, Chapters 4, 5

22

 Heaton, Chapters 6, 7

24

 Pirenne, pp. 38-86

27

 Pirenne, pp. 87-140

29

 Pirenne, pp. 141-188

Oct. 1

 Heaton, Chapter 8

4

 Heaton Chapters 9, 10

6

 Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. 2, pp. 433-441, 456-92

8

 Pirenne, pp. 188-end
(Rec. Miskimin, The Economy of Early Renaissance Europe.)

11

 Heaton, Chapters 11, 12

13

 Hamilton, E. J., American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1601-1650. Scan thoroughly

15

 Continue Hamilton

18

 Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. IV, pp. 1-95.

20

 Nef, J. U., Industry and Government in France and England, 1540-1640, Great Seal Books, Cornell University Ithaca, 1957. Also in Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society, vol. XV, 1940. First half.

22

 Finish Nef

25

 Green, R.W., ed., Protestantism and Capitalism—The Weber Thesis and its Critics, D.C. Heath & Co., Boston. First half.

27

 Finish Green

29

 Heaton, Chapters 13, 14

Nov. 1

 Heaton, Chapter 15

3

 Heaton, Chapter 16

5

 Viner, Jacob, Studies in the Theory of International Trade, Harper Brothers, New York. Chapter 1

8

 Viner, Chapter 2

10

 Cipolla, C. M., “The Decline of Italy,” Economic History Review, 1952, pp. 178-87. Hamilton, E. J., “The Decline of Spain,”Economic History Review, 1938, pp. 168-79

12

 Review Heaton, Chapters 13-16

15

 Hour Test (paper may be substituted)

17

 Wilson, C.H., “The Economic Decline of the Netherlands,” Economic History Review, 1939, pp. 111-127

19

 Heckscher, Eli, Mercantilism. Rev. ed., George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London, 1955, Vol. I, pp. 78-109

22

 Heckscher, Vol. I, pp. 137-78

24

 Heckscher, Vol. I, pp. 178-220

26

 Helleiner, K.F., ed., Readings in European Economic History, University of Toronto Press, 1946. Section by R. H. Tawney, pp. 143-82

29

 Helleiner, Section by Tawney, pp. 183-223

Dec. 1

 Bowden, Karpovitch, and Usher, An Economic History of Europe since 1750, pp. 45-66; Cambridge Economic History, IV, chapter V, pp. 276-308

3

 Bowden, Karpovitch, and Usher, pp. 146-96

6

 Ashton, T.S., The Industrial Revolution, 1760-1830. First third.

8

 Ashton, Second third

10

 Finish Ashton

13

 Taylor, Philip, ed., The Industrial Revolution—Triumph or Disaster? D.C. Heath & Company, Boston.

15

 Rostow, W.W., The Stages of Economic Growth, a Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge University Press, 1960, pp. 1-35

17

 Rostow, W.W., The Stages of Economic Growth, a Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge University Press, 1960, pp. 36-72

 

Source: Personal copy of Irwin Collier.

Image Source: Harry Miskimin’s 1954 Yale yearbook portrait.

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard Socialism Suggested Reading Syllabus

Harvard. Readings and Exams for Methods of Social Reform. Carver, 1902-03

Thomas Nixon Carver

 

“The trouble with radicals is that they only read radical literature, and the trouble with conservatives is that they don’t read anything.”

Thomas Nixon Carver quoted by John Kenneth Galbraith (A Life in Our Times)

This conservative Harvard economic theorist regularly taught the course on schemes of economic reform at Harvard early in the 20th century. He was certainly more forgiving than sympathetic to his radical subjects. 

Variations of this course syllabus have been transcribed earlier here at Economics in the Rear-view Mirror:

___________________

Course Description

[Economics] 14. Methods of Social Reform, including Socialism, Communism, the Single Tax, etc. Tu.,Th, at 1.30. Professor Carver.

The purpose of this course is to make a careful study of those plans of social amelioration which involves either a reorganization of society, or a considerable extension of the functions of the state. The course begins with an historical study of early communistic theories and experiments. This is followed by a critical examination of the series of the leading socialistic writers, with a view to getting a clear understanding of the reasoning which lies back of socialistic movements, and of the economic conditions which tend to make this reasoning acceptable. A similar study will be made of Anarchism and Nihilism, of the Single Tax Movement, of State Socialism and the public ownership of monopolistic enterprises, and of Christian Socialism, so called.

Morley’s Ideal Commonwealths, Ely’s French and German Socialism, Marx’s Capital, Marx and Engels’s The Communist Manifesto, and George’s Progress and Poverty will be read, besides other special references.

The course will be conducted by means of lectures, reports, and classroom discussions.

Source: Harvard University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Division of History and Political Science comprising the Departments of History and Government and Economics 1902-03. The University Publications, New Series, No. 55 (June 14, 1902), p. 42

___________________

Course Enrollment
(Harvard, 1902-03)

[Economics] 14. Professor Carver.— Methods of Reform. Socialism, Communism, the Single Tax, etc.

Total 15: 2 Graduates, 8 Seniors, 2 Juniors, 1 Sophomore, 2 Others.

Source: Harvard University. Report of the President of Harvard College, 1902-03, p. 67.

___________________

Course Enrollment (Radcliffe, 1902-03)

[Economics] 14. Professor Carver.— Methods of Social Reform.

Total 6: 4 Undergraduates, 2 Others.

Source: Radcliffe College. Report of the President of Radcliffe College, 1902-03, p. 43.

___________________

Economics 14
[handwritten note: 1902-03]

Topics and References
Starred references are prescribed

COMMUNISM

A
Utopias
1. Plato’s Republic
2. *Sir Thomas More.   Utopia.
3. *Francis Bacon.   New Atlantis.
4. *Tommaso Campanella.   The City of the Sun. (Numbers 2, 3, and 4 may be found in convenient form in Morley’s Ideal Commonwealths.)
5. Etienne Cabet.   Voyage en Icarie.
6. Wm. Morris.   News from Nowhere.
7. Edward Bellamy.   Looking Backward.

 

B
Communistic Experiments
1. *Charles Nordhoff.   The Communistic Societies of the United States.
2. Karl Kautsky.   Communism in Central Europe in the Time of the Reformation.
3. W. A. Hinds.   American Communities.
4. J.H. Noyes.   History of American Socialisms.
5. J. T. Codman.   Brook Farm Memoirs.
6. Albert Shaw.   Icaria.
7. G.B. Landis.   The Separatists of Zoar.
8. E.O. Randall.   History of the Zoar Society.

 

SOCIALISM

A
Historical
1. *R. T. Ely. French and German Socialism.
2. Bertrand Russell. German Social Democracy.
3. John Rae. Contemporary Socialism.
4. Thomas Kirkup. A History of Socialism.
5. W. D. P. Bliss. A Handbook of Socialism.
6. Wm. Graham. Socialism, New and Old.
7. [Jessica Blanche] Peixotto. The French Revolution and Modern French Socialism.

 

B
Expository and Critical
1. *Albert Schaeffle. The Quintessence of Socialism.
2. Albert Schaeffle. The Impossibility of Social Democracy.
3. *Karl Marx. Capital.
4. *Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels. The Manifesto of the Communist Party.
5. Frederick Engels. Socialism: Utopian and Scientific.
6. E. C. K. Gonner. The Socialist Philosophy of Rodbertus.
7. E. C. K. Gonner. The Socialist State.
8. Bernard Shaw and others. The Fabian Essays in Socialism.
9. The Fabian Tracts.
10. R. T. Ely. Socialism: An Examination of its Nature, Strength, and Weakness.
11. Edward Bernstein. Ferdinand Lassalle.
12. Henry M. Hyndman. The Economics of Socialism.
13. Sydney and Beatrice Webb. Problems of Modern Industry.
14. Gustave Simonson. A Plain Examination of Socialism.
15. Sombart. Socialism and the Social Movement in the Nineteenth Century.
16. Vandervelde. Collectivism [and Industrial Evolution].

 

ANARCHISM

1. *Leo Tolstoi. The Slavery of Our Times.
2. Wm. Godwin. Political Justice.
3. Kropotkin. The Scientific Basis of Anarchy. Nineteenth Century, 21: 238.
4. Kropotkin. The Coming Anarchy. Nineteenth Century, 22:149.
5. Elisée Reclus. Anarchy. Contemporary Review, 45: 627. [May 1884]

 

RELIGIOUS AND ALTRUISTIC SOCIALISM

1. Lamennais. Les Paroles d’un Croyant.
2. Charles Kingsley. Alton Locke.
3. *Kaufman. Lamennais and Kingsley. Contemporary Review, April, 1882.
4. Washington Gladden. Tools and the Man.
5. Josiah Strong. Our Country.
6. Josiah Strong. The New Era.
7. William Morris, Poet, Artist, Socialist. Edited by Francis Watts Lee. A collection of the socialistic writings of William Morris.
8. Ruskin. The Communism of John Ruskin. Edited by W. D. P. Bliss. Selected chapters from Unto this Last, The Crown of Wild Olive, and Fors Clavigera.
9. Carlyle. The Socialism and Unsocialism of Thomas Carlyle. Edited by W. D. P. Bliss. Selected chapters from Carlyle’s various works. [Volume 1; Volume 2]

 

AGRARIAN SOCIALISM

1. *Henry George. Progress and Poverty.
2. Henry George. Our Land and Land Policy.
3. Alfred Russell Wallace. Land Nationalization.

 

STATE SOCIALISM

An indefinite term, usually made to include all movements for the extension of government control and ownership, especially over means of communication and transportation, also street lighting, etc.

1. R. T. Ely. Problems of To-day. Chs. 17-23.
2. J. A. Hobson. The Social Problem.

 

WORKS DISCUSSING THE SPHERE OF THE STATE IN SOCIAL REFORM

1. Henry C. Adams. The Relation of the State to Industrial Action.
2. *D. G. Ritchie. Principles of State Interference.
3. D. G. Ritchie. Darwinism and Politics.
4. *Herbert Spencer. The Coming Slavery.
5. W. W. Willoughby. Social Justice.

Source:  Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in economics, 1895-2003. Box 1, Folder “Economics, 1902-1903”.

______________________

Economics 14
Mid-year Examination, 1902-03

  1. Give an account of More’s Utopia.
  2. Is there any ground for supposing that Utopian schemes have influenced social development? Give reasons.
  3. What were the periods of greatest activity in the founding of communistic settlements in America? What stimulated the activity in each period, and what were the general conditions favorable to such activity?
  4. Does the history of communistic experiments in America throw any light on the probable success or failure of socialism on a large scale? Give reasons.
  5. Give an account of the communistic plans and activities of Etienne Cabet.
  6. Describe the Communist Manifesto. What place does it hold in socialistic literature, and why?
  7. Compare the socialism of Rodbertus with that of Karl Marx.
  8. Outline Marx’ theory of surplus value.

Source: Harvard University Archives. Mid-year Examinations 1852-1943. Box 6. Papers (in the bound volume Examination Papers Mid-years 1902-1903).

______________________

Economics 14
Year-End Examination, 1902-03

  1. Give some account of Fourier and the Fourieristic experiments in the United States.
  2. Distinguish between Utopian and Scientific Socialism.
  3. What part has religion played in the history of Communistic Experiments?
  4. How does Karl Marx explain the existence of poverty?
  5. Trace briefly the history of the German Social Democratic Party.
  6. Distinguish between land and other forms of property.
  7. How do you account for the share of the capitalist in distribution?
  8. Is there any relation between the unequal distribution of workers among different occupations and the unequal distribution of wealth?
  9. What is meant by the term “Natural Monopolies.”
  10. Define “Christian Socialism” and explain how it differs from Marxian Socialism.

Source:  University Archives. Examination Papers 1873-1915. Box 6. Papers Set for Final Examinations in History, Government, Economics, History of Religions, Philosophy, Education, Fine Arts, Architecture, Landscape Architecture, Music in Harvard College, June 1903 (in the bound volume Examination Papers 1902-1903).

Image Source: Harvard Class Album, 1906.

Categories
Exam Questions M.I.T. Suggested Reading Syllabus

M.I.T. Core Economic Growth and Dynamics. Readings and Final Exam. Solow, 1968

 

The reading list and examination questions for the “Economic Growth and Short-run Fluctuations” course taught by Robert Solow in the core graduate macro sequence has been posted earlier for 1966. There were many changes in the readings chosen between 1966 and 1968.

Solow’s 1973 course material for a later revised version (Growth and Capital Theory), that was moved to be the final course in the core macro sequence has also been posted.

Here a glimpse at what students thought about this course (as well as the other courses and instructors in the core theory courses, both micro and macro).

________________________

R.M. Solow
Spring 1968

READING LIST
14.452

As a background text you should have a copy of R.G.D. Allen, Macro-Economic Theory (Macmillan, 1967). For review, read Chapters 1, 3, 7, 8.

ECONOMIC GROWTH

  1. Factual Basis

Kendrick & Sato, “Factor Prices, Productivity and Growth”, American Economic Review, December 1963.
Bureau of the Census, Long-Term Economic Growth, 1860-1965  (This is an excellent compendium of time series. You should spend a few hours with it, and might like to buy a copy from Supt. of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, $2.75)
Thurow & Taylor, “The Interaction between the Actual and Potential Rates of Growth,” Review of Economics and Statistics, November, 1966.

  1. One-Sector Real Theory

Allen, Chaps. 11, 14.
Hahn & Matthews, “The Theory of Economic Growth: A Survey”, Economic Journal, December 1964, Parts I, II except pp. 812-21.
Modigliani, “Comment” in Behavior of Income Shares (NBER), pp. 39-50.
(Optional: Johnson, “The Neo-Classical One-Sector Growth Model…,” Economica, August, 1966, pp. 265-79 only).

  1. Technical Progress

Allen, Chaps. 13, 15.
Solow et al., “Neoclassical Growth with Fixed Factor Proportions,” Review of Economic Studies, April 1966, pp. 27-89 only).

  1. One-Sector Monetary Theory

Tobin, “Money and Economic Growth”, Econometrica, October 1965.
Sidrauski, “Inflation and Economic Growth,” J.P.E., December, 1967.
Johnson, pp. 279-87 in article cited above.
See also Tobin-Johnson exchange in Economica, February, 1967.

  1. The Golden Rule and Optimal Growth

Marty, “The Neoclassical Theorem”, A.E.R., December 1964.
Diamond, “National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model”, A.E.R., December 1965, esp. pp. 1126-1135.
Koopmans, “Objectives, Constraints, and Outcomes in Optimal Growth Models,” Econometrica, January, 1967.

  1. Two (or more) Sector Real Theory

Hahn & Matthews, pp. 812-21.
Allen, Ch. 12.
(Optional: Shell & Stiglitz, “Allocation of Investment in a Dynamic Economy,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, 1967).

  1. Income Flows in Long-Run

Thurow, “A Policy Planning Model of the American Economy,” dittoed.

SHORT-RUN FLUCTUATIONS

  1. Cyclical Mechanisms

Samuelson, “Interaction between Multiplier Analysis and the Principle of Acceleration”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 1939, reprinted in A.E.A., Readings in Business Cycle Theory.
Metzler, “The Nature and Stability of Inventory Cycles”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 1941.
Kaldor, “A Model of the Trade Cycle”, Economic Journal, 1940, reprinted in Hansen and Clemence, Readings in Business Cycles and National Income and in Kaldor, Essays on Economic Stability and Growth.

  1. Income Analysis Models

Klein, “The Econometrics of the General Theroy,” Ch. IX in The Keynesian Revolution, SECOND edition.
Okun, “Measuring the Impact of the 1964 Tax Reduction,” xerox.
Surte, “Forecasting and Analysis with an Econometric Model,” A.E.R., March, 1962.
De Leeuw & Gramlich, “The Federal-Reserve-MIT Econometric Model,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, January, 1968.

  1. Inflation

Johnson, “A Survey of Theories of Inflation,” in Essays in Monetary Economics.
Solow, “Recent Controversies in the Theory of Inflation,” dittoed.
Solow & Stiglitz, “Output, Employment and Wages in the Short Run,” dittoed.

________________________

FINAL EXAMINATION
14.452
May 23, 1968

Please answer each question in a separate examination booklet. Indicate on the front page of each booklet whether you are seeking only a grade in 14.452 or a grade in the general examination in economic theory. Those who seek only a grade in 14.452 should answer two questions in Part I and two questions in Part II. Those who are taking the general examination and economic theory should answer two questions in Part II and two in Part III.

Part I

  1. Construct a difference-equation model embodying the following assumptions:
    1. Consumption is a linear function of disposable income lagged one time-unit;
    2. Tax revenue is proportional to national product;
    3. Investment is the sum of a component proportional to the current change in consumption and the component proportional to national product lagged one time-unit;
    4. Imports are proportional to national product lagged one time-unit; exports constant;
    5. Government purchases are constant.

Write down formally the conditions for and an oscillatory response of the model to disturbance. When are the oscillations damped? How do variations in the tax rate affect these conditions? Suppose part of government purchases were made negatively proportional to the last observed change in national product?

  1. Why is technical progress an important part of the usual model of economic growth? Could increasing returns to scale play the same role? What is the special role of purely labor-augmenting (i.e. Harrod-neutral) technical progress?
  2. Imagine a planned economy choosing among steady states in the one-sector model, without technical progress. The planner values both consumption per head and capital per head (as a measure of national strength, say) and his preferences can be expressed by a system of conventionally-shaped indifference curves in consumption per head and capital per head.

Use this indifference map and the requirements for a steady state to show how the optimal steady-state is chosen. Prove that the optimal capital per head will exceed the “Golden-Rule” (maximal consumption per head) level. Show what happens to the optimal position if the rate of population growth increases. Discuss briefly the case of a one-time upward shift in the production function.

 

Part II

  1. In the generalized multiplier-accelerator model, the equation \frac{dK}{dt}=I\left( Y,K \right) means that “investment decisions are always carried out”, so that when I\left( Y,K \right)\ne S\left( Y \right) “unintended consumption or saving” occurs. Replace the above equation with \frac{dK}{dt}=S\left( Y \right), and interpret and analyze the resulting model. Compare its behavior with this with the case analyzed in class.
  2. Suppose I =I(Y,K) and S= S(Y) are the schedules of desired investment and saving. In what sense is (I-S) a measure of excess demand in the aggregate commodity market?
    How is it that no specific supply variables (labor force, for example) appear in this measure? Under what circumstances is it natural to suppose that \frac{dY}{dt} responds to (I-S)? (Y = real output, P = commodity price level). Under what circumstances is it natural to suppose that \frac{dP}{dt} responds to (I-S)?
  3. Consider it a one-sector non-monetary model of growth under the following assumptions:
    1. The production function in intensive form is q= Akb;
    2. The wages equal to the marginal product of labor;
    3. Investment demand is such that the after-tax return on capital is always at a target level r*;
    4. There is a tax on profits at rate t in the government spends all its revenue on consumption;
    5. The savings rates from wages and after-tax profits are both equal to a constant s.

Find the tax rate that will permit a steady-state at full employment. When will it be between zero and one? How does it change if this changes? Interpret.

  1. Considered a one-sector growth model, with two factors of production (capital and labor), constant returns to scale, and no technical progress. Suppose that the propensity to save out of profits and capital gains is equal to one, and the propensity to save out of wages and transfer payments (taxes = negative transfers) is zero.

Money, which is non-interest-bearing government debt, is the only alternative asset to capital. The desired money-capital ratio is of the form \frac{m}{k}=L\left( {f}'\left( k \right)+{{\left( {{\dot{p}}}/{p}\; \right)}^{e}} \right) where m is the real per capita stock of money,k is the capital-labor ratio, and {{\left( {{\dot{p}}}/{p}\; \right)}^{e}} is the expected rate of inflation which is equal to the actual rate \left( {{\dot{p}}}/{p}\; \right) in the steady-state.

  1. Government purchases are zero and the budget deficit, which is equal to the excess of transfers over taxes, is financed by issuing money.
    1. Describe the steady-state characteristics of the model.
    2. Find the rate of inflation that maximizes steady-state consumption per head.
    3. Suppose that {{\left( {{\dot{p}}}/{p}\; \right)}_{0}} is the rate of inflation in (b) that maximizes steady state consumption per head. Would a higher rate of inflation lead to a higher or lower long-run capital-labor ratio?

 

Part III

  1. Write a comprehensive essay on the subject of “The Problem of Weights in National Income and Index-Number Construction”.
    Explain the criteria which are used, should be used (for what purpose?) and why.
  2. Discuss the economic effects of an increase in the stock of money. Include an evaluation of the positions of several (not less than two) prominent economists familiar to you. How would you test the correctness of their positions?
  3. Discuss the effects of inflation on the level of real investment.

 

Source: Duke University, David M. Rubenstein Library. Economists’ Papers Archives. Papers of Robert M. Solow, Box 67, Folder “Exams”.

Image Source:  Robert Solow (right) from MIT Museum website.

Categories
Harvard Suggested Reading Syllabus

Harvard. Location of Economic Activity. Readings. Usher, 1942

 

 

With this course taught by Abbott P. Usher we can see that the economics of transportation and location continued as standard fare in the economics curriculum at least up to the middle of the 20th century. The final exam for the course was transcribed and posted subsequent to this post.

___________________

Course Announcement

Economics 65a1hf. The Location of Economic Activity. General Principles and Current Problems

Half-course (first half-year). Tu., Th., and (at the pleasure of the instructor) Sat., at 9. Professor Usher.

Source: Final Announcement of the Courses of Instruction offered by the Faculty of Arts and Sciences during 1942-43. Official Register of Harvard University, Vol. 39, No. 53 (September 23, 1942), p. 54.

___________________

Course Enrollment

[Economics] 65a 1hf. Professor Usher. — The Location of Economic Activity. General Principles and Current Problems.

Total 15: 8 Seniors, 5 Juniors, 2 Sophomores.

Source: Harvard University. Report of the President of Harvard College, 1942-43, p. 47.

___________________

Course Description

Economics 65a 1hf. The Location of Economic Activity. General Principles and Current Problems.Half-course (first half-year). Tu., Th., and (at the pleasure of the instructor) Sat., at 9. Professor Usher.

Regional differentiation of resources and its significance. Topography and its influence upon patterns of urban settlement. Progressive revaluation of resources through technological change. Power resources of the modern world. Areas of primary industrialization, present and potential. Areas of secondary industrialization. Agricultural areas. The economic foundations of power politics, old and new.

Source: Division of History, Government, and Economics containing an Announcement for 1942-43.  Official Register of Harvard University, Vol. 39, No. 45 (June 30, 1942), p. 54.

___________________

1942-43
ECONOMICS 65a
Reading Assignments

  1. History of Population. (To Oct. 8)

Usher, A.P., History of Population and Settlement in Eurasia, Geographical Review, XX, pp. 110-132.

Willcox, W.F., Increase in the Population of the Earth, International Migrations, II, pp. 33-92.

  1. Resources as factors in the localization of economic activity. (To Oct. 31)

Dean, W.H., Jr., The Theory of the Geographic Location of Economic Activity, pp. 1-35.

Nef, J.U., The Rise of the British Coal Industry, I, pp. 109-261.

Zimmermann, Erich W., World Resources and Industries, pp. 178-399, 429-583.

  1. Topography as a locational factor. (To Nov. 21)

Dean, W.H., Jr., The Theory of the Geographic Location of Economic Activity, pp. 36-45.

Mackinder, H.J., Britain and the British Seas, pp. 231-259.

Weber, A.F., The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 1-19, 155-229.

Federal Housing Administration, The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhood in American Cities, 1939. pp. 15-25, 96-111.

Dagett, S., Principles of Inland Transportation, 3rd Edition. pp. 173-190, 301-427.

Vanderblus and Burgess, Railroads: Rates, Service, Management, (1924) pp. 139-156.

Daniels, W.M., The Price of Transportation Service, 1-86.

  1. Location of the heavy industries. (To Dec. 12)

Daugherty, De Chazeau, and Stratton,Economics of the Iron and Steel Industry in the United States, I, 9-111, 309-370.

Zimmermann, Erich W. World Resources and Industries, pp. 584-781.

  1. Markets and Market Structure. (To Dec. 22)

Hoover, E.M., Jr., Location Theory and the Shoe and Leather Industries, pp. 3-59.

Daugherty, De Chazeau, and Stratton, Economics of the Iron and Steel Industry in the United States, I, pp. 533-578.

___________________

Special Topics
Economics 65a

Students will select 200-250 pages of readings from one or two titles. This reading should be used as the basis for an essay of one hour written as part of the examination.

  1. Cities and City Planning.

Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities, 1938.

Regional Survey of New York and its Environs: esp. Vol. I, Major Economic Factors in Metropolitan Growth and Arrangement, 1927.
Vol. II, Population, Land Values and Government, 1929.

Regional Plan of New York, The Graphic Regional Plan, I, 1929.

Committee on the Regional Plan of New York, From Plan to Reality, 1933.

Great Britain, Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population, (1940) Cmd. 6153.

  1. Development of Power Systems.

Ernest R. Abrams, Power in Transition, 1940.

National Resources Committee, Energy Resources and National Policy, 1939.

  1. Studies of Special Industries and their Price Policies.

T.N.E.C. Monograph Number 42. The Basing Point System.

E.M. Hoover, Location Theory and the Shoe and Leather Industries.

Guthrie, John A. The Newsprint Paper Industry.

A.H. Cole and H.F. Williamson, The American Carpet Industry.

John M. Cassels, Study of Fluid Milk Prices.

  1. Railway Development.

I.L. Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission, vol. III, B, pp. 309-771.

R.D. Tiwari, Railway Rates in Relation to Trade and Industry in India. 1937.

N.B. Mehta, Indian Railways: Rates and Regulations, 1927.

A. Paillard, Les Tarifs de Chemin de Fer en Matière de Marchandises.

  1. Air and Motor Transport.

Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Public Aids to Transport.

O.J. Lissitzyn, International Air Transport and Public Policy

H.A. Smith, Airways: The History of Commercial Aviation in the United States, 1942.

S.B. Smith, Air Transportation in the Pacific Area, 1941.

  1. Water Transport and Canals.

Federal Coordinator of Transportation. Public Aids to Transport.

A. Siegfried, Suez and Panama.

N.J. Padelford, The Panama Canal in Peace and War.

Joseph G. Broodbank, The Port of London.

E.J. Clapp, The Port of Hamburg.

E.J. Clapp, The Port of Boston.

  1. VIII. Economic Geography.

Eugene Staley, World Economy in Transition.

Mikhailov, N. Soviet Geography: the new industrial and economic distributions of the U.S.S.R.

W. Rickmer Rickmers, The Duab of Turkestan.

Ellsworth Huntington, Civilization and Climate.

_______________ Palestine and its Transformation.

_______________ The Pulse of Asia.

Guy Le Strange, Lands of the Eastern Caliphate.

_______________ Baghdad under the Abbasid Caliphate.

 

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003. Box 3, Folder “Economics, 1942-1943 (2 of 2)”.

Image Source: Abbott P. Usher in Harvard Class Album 1947-48.

 

 

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard Syllabus

Harvard. Economics of Transportation and Public Utilities. Exams, Readings for Public Utilities. Crum, Cunningham, C.O. Ruggles, 1940-41

 

 

 

The following course on public utilities and transporation regulation was co-taught by William Leonard Crum, professor of statistics in the department of economics, William J. Cunningham, professor of railroad operations and transportation at the Graduate School of Business, and  Clyde Orval Ruggles, professor of public utility management at the Graduate School of Business.

Cunningham was a member of the original faculty of the Harvard Business School, having gone from working in railroad management and administration to teaching railroad operations. He had an honorary A.M. degree from Harvard in 1921 but apparently never possessed another formal academic credential (other than an honorary D.Sc. awarded him upon his 1946 retirement by the Clarkson College of Technology).

The only part of the course syllabus in the Harvard Archives’ course folder was for the portion taught by Professor Ruggles, transcribed below.

Looking for other biographical information about William J. Cunningham, I just discovered that there is a folder with course material at Harvard Business School’s Baker Library: Baker Library Special Collections, Harvard Business School, Harvard University William J. Cunningham papers Series II. Teaching Records, 1920-1941 Economics 163, 1940-1941.

_____________________________

Course Announcement

Economics 163. Economics of Public Utilities (including Transportation). Mon., Wed., at 4, and a third hour at the pleasure of the instructors. Professors Crum, Cunningham, and Ruggles.

This course deals with the economic problems of the Public Utility industries including railways. Attention is given to rates and rate structures, valuation, the issue and regulation of securities, utility managements, the relation of the commissions to the courts, and public ownership of utility enterprises.

Source: Division of History, Government, and Economics containing an Announcement for 1940-41. Official Register of Harvard University, Vol. XXXVII No. 51 (August 15, 1940), p. 62.

_____________________________

Course Enrollment

[Economics] 163. Professors Crum, Cunningham and Ruggles. — Economics of Public Utilities (including Transportation).

Total 18: 9 Graduates, 7 Seniors, 2 Radcliffe.

Source: Harvard University. Report of the President of Harvard College, 1940-41, p. 60.

 

_____________________________

READINGS FOR ECONOMICS 163

[Note: only for the Ruggles’ portion of the course]

Unless otherwise indicated, all references marked with the asterisk are required.

March 17

Legal and Economic Criteria Regarding the Public Utility Concept.

Read three of the following marked with the asterisk:

*Clay, C. M. Regulation of Public Utilities (1932). Part I, pp. 3-130.

*Jones & Bigham. Principles of Public Utilities (1931). Chapter II, “Characteristics of Public Utilities,” pp. 62-101.

*Wilson, Herring and Eutsler. Public Utility Industries. Chapter I, “The Characteristics of Public Utilities,” pp. 1-25.

Glaeser, Outlines of Public Utility Economics (1927).  Chapter I, “Nature and Scope of Public Utility Economics,” pp. 1-22.

*Thompson and Smith, Public Utility Economics (1941). Chapter IV, “What Is a Public Utility?” pp. 56-74;  Chapter V, “Economic Characteristics of Public Utilities,” pp. 75-98.

March 19

Competition, Load Factor, Output, and Economic Conditions as Affecting Rate Making.

*Behling, B.N. Competition and Monopoly in Public Utility Industries (University of Illinois Press, 1938). A Ph.D. thesis, p. 175.

*Bernstein, E.M. Public Utility Rate Making and the Price Level (1937). Chapter IX, “Rate Making in Prosperity and Depression,” pp. 105-119.

*Clark, J.M. Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs (1923). Chapter XVI, “Public Utilities,” pp. 318-334.

Eisenmenger, H.E. Central Station Rates in Theory and Practice (1921). Appendix II, Explanation of the Terms “Load Curve” and “Load Factor” (For the Non-technical Reader), pp. 260-266.

Hardy, C. O. Recent Growth of the Electric Light and Power Industry. The Brookings Institution, Pamphlet Series Vol. I, No. 1, April, 1929, p. 60.

March 24

Rate Structures; Reasonableness of Rates; Theory of Rate Making in the TVA Act.

*Nash, L.R. Rate Structures (1933). Chapter II, “Rate Classifications and Forms,” pp. 11-29; Chapter IX, “Promotional Rates,” pp. 152-197; and Chapter XIII, “Economic Factors in Rate Making,” pp. 296-330.

*Jones and Bigham. Op. Cit. Chapters VII and VIII, “Rate Structures,” pp. 288-386.

*Bauer. Effective Regulation of Public Utilities (1925). Chapter XI, “Rate Schedules,” pp. 275-301.

Barker, H. Public Utility Rates (1917). Chapter III, “Various Bases for Rates,” pp. 10-17.

Bryant and Hermann. Elements of Utility Rate Determination (1940).

Eisenmenger, H.E. Op. Cit. Section II, “The Price of Electric Service,“ pp. 62-102.

March 26

Discrimination in Rate Making; Service and Minimum Charges.

*Havilik, H.F. Service Charges in Gas and Electric Rates (1938). A Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, p. 234.

*Kennedy, W.F. The Objective Rate Plan (1937, Columbia University Press), p. 83.

Nichols, E. Public Utility Service and Discrimination (1928). Chapter XXVII, “Discrimination in Rates Generally,” pp. 856-901; Chapter XXVIII, “Rate Discrimination in Favor of Particular Classes,” pp. 902-934; Chapter XIX, “Rate Discrimination in Favor of Public Welfare, Educational, and Social Organizations,” pp. 935-949; Chapter XXX, “Rate Discrimination in Favor of Contract Holders of Equipment,” pp. 950-966; Chapter XXXI, “Rate Discrimination in Favor of Large Consumers and Industrial and Commercial Enterprises,” pp. 967-975.

Batson. The Price Policies of German Public Utility Undertakings (1933). Chapter IX, “Electricity-Supply Charges,” pp. 143-182; Chapter XII, “Conclusion,” pp. 213-216.

April 7

The Geographical Unit for Rate Making; Municipal, Statewide, and Regional Uniformity in Rates.

*Decision of Wisconsin Supreme Court in Eau Claire v. Railroad Commission. Public Utility Reports (P.U.R.) 1922 D666.

*Georgia and Alabama Commissions Install Uniform Electric Rates. Public Utility Fortnightly, Vol. IV, pp. 773-774 (1929).

*Decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Borough of Ambridge v. Pennsylvania Commission, 31 P.U.R. (N.S.) 50. (1939).

*Annual Report, Secretary of the Interior, 1938, p. 84 (Bonneville Rates).

*Commissioner Maltbie’s (New York) Criticism of Implications in Federal Power Commission’s Data on Public Utility Rates. Electrical World, January 14, 1939, p. 112.

*Statement of Chairman of Tennessee Rural Electrification Authority. Public Utility Fortnightly, Vol. XXV, p. 631 (May 9, 1940).

*Bonbright, J.C. Price Policy and Price Behavior. Papers and Proceedings of American Economic Association, Vol. XXX, No. 5, February, 1941, pp. 379-389.

April 9

The Rate Base; Theories in (a) Federal Water Power Act, 1920; (b) Transportation Act of 1920.

*Bonbright, J. C. Valuation of Property (1937). Vol. II, Chapter XXX, “Valuation for Rate Making Purposes: Economic Theory versus Legal Doctrine,” pp. 1078-1110; Chapter XXXI, “Valuation for Rate Making Purposes: Methods of Appraisal; Non-utility Price Fixing,” pp. 1111-1165.

*Bauer, John. Op. Cit. Chapter IV, “Valuation Primarily a Legislative Responsibility,” pp. 47-60; Chapter V, “Court Decisions on Valuation” pp. 61-103; Chapter IX, “Systematic Maintenance of the Rate Base,” pp. 228-252.

Hartman, H.H. Fair Value (1920). Chapter IV, “The Theory of Valuation,” pp. 77-93.

*Glaeser. Op. Cit. Chapter XIV, “The Movement for Physical Valuation,” pp. 311-338.

*Clark. Social Control of Business (2d ed., 1939). Chapter XX, “Fair Value and Fair Return — The Legal Doctrine,” pp. 303-319; Chapter XXI, “Fair Earnings and Fair Value from the Economic Standpoint — Two Phases of One Fact,” pp. 320-336.

Tendency of Supreme Court decisions to favor reproduction cost less depreciation. Indicated in Q.J.E. XVII (1912-1913), pp. 27 and 616.

Graham, W.J. Public Utility Valuation; Reproduction Cost as a Basis for Depreciation and Rate-Base Determination. Studies in Business Administration, University of Chicago (1934), Vol. IV, No. 3, p. 95.

Barnes, I.R. “Shall Going Value Be Included in the Rate Base?” Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics, November, 1940, pp. 430-437.

April 14

Rate of Return; Capital Structure; Control of Investment and Issue of Securities.

*Bernstein. Op. Cit. Chapter VIII, “The Fair Rate of Return,” pp. 91-104.

*Smith, N.L. The Fair Rate of Return in Public Utility Regulation (1932). Chapter I, “Regulation, Valuation and the Rate of Return,” pp. 1-48; Chapter II, “Elements of the Fair Return,” pp. 49-79.

*Thompson and Smith. Op. Cit. Chapter XVII, “Fair Rate of Return,” pp. 349-361.

*Waterman, M.H. Financial Policies of Public Utility Holding Companies, Michigan Business Studies, Vol. V (1932), Chapter 4, “Trading on the Equity,” pp. 78-99.

*Jones and Bigham. Op. Cit. Chapter XI, “Regulation of Securities,” pp. 495-547.

Report of the Public Utilities Division, Securities and Exchange Commission, on “The Problem of Maintaining Arm’s Length Bargaining and Competitive Conditions in the Sale and Distribution of Securities of Registered Public Utility Holding Companies and Their Subsidiaries” (December, 1940), p. 46. (Comprehensive Appendices A to F inclusive.)

April 16

Sliding Scale and other “Automatic” Devices for Controlling Rates and Rate of Return; Rate of Return and Efficiency in Management.

*Bussing, Irwin. Public Utility Regulation and the So-Called Sliding Scale. Columbia University Press, 1936, p. 174. (A Ph.D. thesis)

*Clark. Social Control of Business (2d ed., 1939). Chapter XXII, “Regulation, Service, and Efficiency,” pp. 337-349.

Morgan, C.S. Regulation and Management of Public Utilities (1923). Chapter V, “Methods at Present Used to Promote Efficiency in the Management of Public Utilities,” pp. 144-233.

April 21

The Holding Company; Corporate Simplification and Physical Integration under the Public Utility Holding Company Act.

*Bonbright and Means. The Holding Company (1932). Chapter V, “The Public Utility Holding Company — Organization of the Major Systems,” pp. 90-148; Supplement to Chapter VI, “Advantages and Disadvantages of Different Types of Utility Integration,” pp. 188-199.

*Lillienthal, D.E. “The Regulation of the Holding Company.” 29 Columbia Law Review 404-440 (April, 1929).

*Wright, Warren. “Tests of Reasonableness for Charges of Services from Holding Company to Subsidiary.” Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics, Vol. 6 (November 1930), pp. 417-423.

Waterman, M.H. Op. Cit. Chapter 3, “Parent Company versus Subsidiary Company Financing,” pp. 45-77.

National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners. Proceedings of Fortieth Annual Convention, 1928. “Report of the Committee on Capitalization and Intercorporate Relations,” pp. 504-511.

April 23

Regulatory Policies and Efficiency and Inefficiency in Management.

*Morgan, C.S. Op. Cit. Chapters I-III, pp. 1-117, and Chapter VII, pp. 307-346.

*Lyon, Abramson, and Associates. Government and Economic Life (1940). Chapter XXI, Sec. I, “The Rationale of Regulation,” pp. 618-625; Sec. II, “The Structure and Process of Regulation,” pp. 626-671; Sec. III, “The Substantive Problems of Regulation,” pp. 672-728.

Bauer, John. Op. Cit. Chapter XIII, “Effect upon Service and Efficiency of Operation,” pp. 328-349.

Fainsod, Merle. “Regulation and Efficiency in Management.” Yale Law Review, May, 1940, pp. 1190-1211.

April 28

National Power Policy; Public Ownership and the Government Corporation.

Voskuil, W.H. The Economics of Water Power Development (1928). Chapters I-III, pp. 1-43.

*Bird, F.L. The Management of Small Municipal Lighting Plants (1932). Chapters II-III, pp. 9-53, and Chapters VIII-IX, pp. 106-139.

Hodge, C.L. The Tennessee Valley Authority (1938). Chapter II, pp. 29-49; Chapter VIII, 201-248.

Mason, E.S. The Street Railway in Massachusetts (1932). Chapters 8 and 9, pp. 163-192.

Dimock, M.E. British Public Utilities and National Development (1933). Chapter I, “The Setting,” pp. 19-62; Chapter VI, “National Electricity Planning,” pp. 195-227; Chapter VII, “Electrical Progress and the National Economy,” pp. 228-262.

McDiarmid, John. Government Corporations and Federal Funds (1936). Chapters I and II, pp. 1-50; Chapter IX, “Conclusions,” pp. 209-232.

*Taussig. Principles of Economics. Vol. II, Chapter 66, pp. 472-489.

*Lyon, Abramson, and Associates. Op. Cit. Vol. II, Chapter XXI, Sec. IV, “Public Ownership and Operation,” pp. 369-377.

*Clark, J.M. Social Control of Business. Chapter XXIV, “Public Control versus Public Operation,” pp. 369-377.

Abrams, E.R. Power in Transition (1940). Chapter II, “National Power Policies and Activities,” pp. 20-41; Chapter IX, “Threats of Public Power Projects and National Power Policies,” pp. 297-306.

*Bonbright, J.C. Public Utilities and the National Power Policies. (Public lectures at Columbia University, 1940), p. 82.

April 30

Legislative, Judicial, and Administrative Regulation.

*Jones and Bigham. Op. Cit. Chapter III, pp. 102-156, and Chapter IV, pp. 157-190.

*Glaeser. Op. Cit. Chapter VII, “The Common Law Basis of Public Utility Regulation,” pp. 156-180; Chapter VII, “The Constitutional Basis of Public Utility Regulation,” pp. 181-194; and Chapter XXXIII, “General Summary and Forecast of the Development of Regulation,” pp. 733-754.

*Mosher and Crawford. Public Utility Regulation (1933). Chapter IV, “Judicial Review of Commission Determination,” pp. 41-53.

*Clay. Op. Cit. Part III, “Conclusion,” pp. 273-297.

*Fainsod, Merle. “Some Reflections on the Nature of the Regulatory Process.” Chapter X, pp. 297-323, in Public Policy, a Yearbook of the Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University (1940), edited by Friedrich, C.J. and Mason, E.S.

Landis, James M. “Crucial Issues in Administrative Law: The Walter-Logan Bill.” Harvard Law Review, May, 1940, pp. 1077-1103.

*National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners, Report of the Committee on Progress in Public Utility Regulation. Utility Regulation and National Defense, December, 1940. Section IV, “Critical Utility Regulatory Problems,” pp. 125-147.

Herring, E.P. Federal Commissioners, A Study of Their Careers and Qualifications. Harvard University Press, 1936, pp. 1-104.

Parsons, R.H. Early Days of the Power Industry (English), 1940. Chapter XI, “Legislation Affecting the Electrical Industry,” pp. 184-200.

Pegrum, D.F. “The Public Corporation as a Regulatory Device.” Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics, August, 1940, pp. 335-343.

Smith, N.L. “The Outlook in Regulation,” Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics, November, 1940, pp. 386-392, and February, 1941, pp. 48-53.

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003. Box 2, Folder “Economics, 1940-41”.

_____________________________

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
ECONOMICS 163
FINAL EXAMINATION
June 1941.

(Answer 6 questions, selecting 3 from Part 1 and 3 from Part 2. Use a separate blue book for each part.)

PART I—TRANSPORTATION

I

In his discussion of the cost of transportation Healy draws a distinction between “joint costs” and “common costs.” Give illustrations which for each of the two groups will make the distinction clear and discuss the bearing of such costs (whether designated as joint or common) on the determination of commodity rates.

II

The commodities clause of the Interstate Commerce Act has since 1908 prohibited a railroad from transporting commodities which it produced or in which it had any direct or indirect interest. That prohibition was continued in the 1940 revision of the Act but it has not been made applicable to common or contract carriers by highway, water or pipe line.

(a) What was the purpose of the prohibition when first applied to railroads in 1908?

(b) Does public interest now require the continuation of the prohibition?

(c) If continued for railroads should it be made applicable also to other carriers, especially common carrier pipe lines?

III

The Transportation Act of 1940 provides for the establishment of a transportation board which, among other things, would investigate and report on “the relative economy and fitness” of the several carriers for transportation service “or any particular classes or descriptions thereof.” Discuss this section of the Act from the following viewpoints:

(a) The need for the creation of such a board

(b) The criteria for the determination of relative fitness

(c) The problems of greatest difficulty in reaching conclusions as to how “there may be provided a national transportation system adequate to meet the needs of the commerce of the United States, of the postal service and of the national defense.”

IV

The present rule of rate making (Section 15a of the 1940 Transportation Act) applying to common carriers by rail, highway, water and pipe line is:

“In the exercise of its power to prescribe just and reasonable rates the Commission shall give due consideration, among other factors, to the effect of rates on the movement of traffic by the carrier or carriers for which the rates are prescribed;to the need, in the public interest, of adequate and efficient railway transportation service at the lowest cost consistent with the furnishing of such service; and to the need of revenues sufficient to enable the carriers, under honest, economical, and efficient management, to provide such service.”

(a) What was the main reason for departing from the principle of the 1920 Act requiring the Commission to set rates so as to yield, for the railroads collectively, a fair return on value?

(b) Why did the railroads object to the inclusion, in first place, of the factor of “effect of rates on the movement of traffic”?

(c) The present law differs from the 1933 law only by the addition of the words “by the carrier or carriers for which the rates are prescribed” (italicized above). What is the significance of the added words?

V

From the viewpoint of a sound financial structure of a railroad discuss the significance of:

(a) The ratio of funded debt to total capitalization

(b) Provision for sinking funds on mortgage bonds

(c) Provision for a stated sum annually, or a percentage of operating revenues, for routine capital improvements, such provision to take precedence in claim on net income over interest charges on income bonds and dividends on stock.

 

PART 2—PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS

VI

Explain the economic significance of a peak demand upon (a) an electric power utility, (b) a gas utility, (c) a local transit utility, and (d) a telephone utility.

VII

Explain the basis upon which utility service should or should not be extended that may not initially cover (a) the utility’s increment costs and (b) in addition to increment costs, some return upon an approved base.

VIII

Distinguish between (a) minimum and (b) service charges for public utility service and explain which type of rate you prefer.

IX

Discuss the economic significance of such modes of rate making as employ (a) such “escalator” devices as fuel clauses and (b) the so-called “sliding scale,” which relates rates to the utility’s rate of return.

X

What is the purpose of a depreciation charge? Of the following methods of determining annual depreciation, explain which you prefer and why: (a) a percentage of gross revenue, and (b) a percentage of depreciable property.

XI

Explain the difference in the theory of valuation of public utility property in (a) the Transportation Act of 1920 and (b) the Federal Water Power Act of 1920. Indicate which of the theories you approve and why.

 

Source: Harvard University Archives. Harvard University. Final examinations 1853-2001.Box 5. Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Papers Printed for Final Examinations—History, History of Religions,…, Government, Economics,…, Military Science, Naval Science. June 1941.

Image Sources:  Crum from the  Harvard Class Album 1941, Cunningham and Ruggles from the Harvard Business School Yearbook, 1946-47 and 1937-38, respectively.

 

Categories
Fields Harvard Suggested Reading Syllabus

Harvard. Consolidated undergraduate and graduate public finance syllabus. Butters and Soloway, 1954-55

 

Providing a ten page transcription of a course syllabus is a daunting task. It does have the useful side-effect of forcing me to read the syllabus closely and I still labor under the hope that something of potential future significance will lodge itself somewhere in my subconscious, ready to go if ever summoned. Of course having a digitized transcript allows us to easily search the growing sample of course syllabi already transcribed at Economics in the Rear-view Mirror. 

Harvard economics Ph.D.’s on the economics department faculty in the mid-1950’s, J. Keith Butters and Arnold M. Soloway, are listed on the public finance syllabus below that was distributed as a consolidated reading list for the undergraduate and graduate versions of the course taught in 1954-1955. I am not sure what to make of the fact that only Butters’ name appears in the enrollment report included with the annual report of the President of Harvard College.

P.S. The mid-year (January) and end-year (May) final exams have been transcribed and posted in a later post.

_______________________

Course Enrollments

[Economics] 151. Public Finance. Associate Professor Butters. Full course.

(W) Total 30: 15 Seniors, 9 Juniors, 1 Sophomore, 4 Other Graduates, 1 Other
(S) Total 27: 14 Seniors, 11 Juniors, 1 Sophomore, 1 Other Graduate

[Economics] 251 Public Finance. Associate Professor Butters. Full course.

(F) Total 19: 7 Graduates, 8 Other Graduates, 1 Radcliffe, 3 Special
(S) Total 16: 6 Graduates, 7 Other Graduates, 1 Radcliffe, 2 Special

Source: Harvard University. Report of the President of Harvard College 1954-1955, pp. 90, 93.

_______________________

Economics 151 and 251
PUBLIC FINANCE
Fall Term, 1954-1955

Professors Butters and Soloway

NOTE: Readings under the heading “Required” are required for Economics 151. Students in Economics 251 are required to read the asterisked assignments and to be generally familiar with the substance of the material covered in the other required assignments for Economics 151.

The following general studies and texts are suggested for reference throughout the course. Specific assignments on various topics are made from some of these sources.

General Texts and Treatises on Public Finance:

Blough, Roy, The Federal Taxing Process

Brownlee, O. H. and Allen, E. D., Economics of Public Finance, (Second Edition)

Due, John F., Government Finance

Groves, H. M., Financing Government (Third Edition) [Fifth edition]

Groves, H. M., Viewpoints on Public Finance

Hicks, U. K., Public Finance

Pigou, A. C., A Study in Public Finance

Poole, K. E., (Editor), Fiscal Policies and the American Economy

Schultz, W. J. and Harriss, C. L., American Public Finance [Third edition, before Harriss]

Somers, H. M., Public Finance and National Income

 

Serial Publications and Periodicals:

Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Treasury

Budget Messages of the President

Economic Reports of the President and Economic Reviews of the Council of Economic Advisers

Proceedings of the National Tax Association

National Tax Journal

Taxes, The Tax Magazine (Published by Commerce Clearing House, Inc.)

The loose-leaf tax services published by Commerce Clearing House, Inc. and Prentice-Hall, available in the Law Library

 

September 28: Nature and Scope of Government Finance

Required

*Brownlee and Allen, Economics of Public Finance, Second Edition, pp. 3-22

*Colm, Gerhard, “Why Public Finance,” National Tax Journal, Sept. 1948, pp. 193-206

*Due, Government Finance, Ch. 1, pp. 1-16

Suggested

*Hicks, Public Finance, Ch. 1, pp. 1-16

Groves, Financing Government, Ch. 1, pp. 1-8

 

September 30 – October 2: Concepts of Justice

Required

*Due, Government Finance, Ch. 7, pp. 114-133

*Simons, Henry, Personal Income Taxation, Ch. 1, pp. 1-40

*Blough, The Federal Taxing Process, Ch. 15, pp. 382-408

Suggested

Pigou, A. C., “Some Aspects of Welfare Economics,” American Economic Review, June 1951, pp. 287-302

*Pigou, A Study in Public Finance, Part II, Chs. 1-7, pp. 40-93

*Robbins, L., “Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility,” Economic Journal, December 1938, pp. 635-641

*Wright, D. Mc., “Income Redistribution Reconsidered,” Income, Employment and Public Policy, edited by Metzler, L. Pp. 159-176

Blum, W. J., and Kalven, Harry, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation

Shehab, F., Progressive Taxation: A Study in the Development of the Progressive Principal in the British Income Tax

 

October 5 – October 16: The Budget

Required

Groves, Financing Government (Third Edition), pp. 509-527

Schultz and Harriss, American Public Finance, pp. 131-151

*Smithies, Arthur, The Determination and Control of Federal Expenditures (mimeographed volume), Chs. I-VI (128 pages)

*Smith, Harold D., The Management of Your Government, Chs. 5-7, pp. 54-102

*March, Michael, “A Comment on Budgetary Improvement in the National Government,” National Tax Journal, June 1952, pp. 155-173. Also, “Reply to Mr. March” by Herman Loeffler, same issue, pp. 174-175

*The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1955, pp. M5-M104 and A3-A16. (This assignment can be scanned rather than studied carefully as to matters of detail.)

*National Income, 1951 (A Supplement to the Survey of Current Business) pp. 10-18, 21-34, 42-43, 46-49

*Tax and Expenditure Policy for 1950, Committee for Economic Development, pp. 35-41

Suggested

Hicks, J. R., The Problem of Budget Reform

Hansen, A. H., Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles, Ch. 10, pp. 186-222

Key, V. O., “The Lack of a Budgetary Theory,” American Political Science Review, Volume 34 (December 1940), pp. 1137-1144

U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Budget and Accounting, Parts I and II, pp. 7-31, 77-84

U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Task Force Report on Fiscal, Budgeting, and Accounting Activities (Appendix F), pp. 37-38

Loeffler, Herman C., “Alice in Budget-Land,” National Tax Journal, March 1951, pp. 54-64

Fieldler, Clinton, “Reform of the Legislative Budget,” National Tax Journal, March 1951, pp. 65-76

Burkhead, Jesse, “The Outlook for Federal Budget-Making,” National Tax Journal, December 1949, pp. 289-299

*Smithies, A., The Determination and Control of Expenditures, Chs. VII-XII and Ch. XVIII (Mimeographed)

Dirks, F. C., “Recent Progress in the Federal Budget,” National Tax Journal, June 1954, pp. 141-154

 

October 19 – November 6: Expenditures

Required

*Due, Government Finance, Chs. 2-6, pp. 17-113

*Musgrave, R. A. and Culbertson, J. M., “The Growth of Public Expenditures in the United States, 1890-1948,” National Tax Journal, June 1953, pp. 97-115

*”State and Local Government Receipt and Expenditure Programs,” Survey of Current Business, January 1953, pp. 11-16

*Douglas, P. H., Economy in the National Government, Chs. I-VIII, pp. 3-204

*Buchanan, J. S., “The Pricing of Highway Services,” National Tax Journal, June 1952, pp. 97-106

Studenski, “Federal Grants-in-Aid,” National Tax Journal, September 1949, pp. 193-214

*Newcomer, Mabel, “State and Local Financing in Relation to Economic Fluctuations,” National Tax Journal, June 1954, pp. 97-109

*Maxwell, J. A., “The Equalizing Effects of Federal Grants,” Journal of Finance, May 1954, pp. 209-215

*Stark, John R., “Equities in the Financing of Federal Old and Survivors Insurance,” National Tax Journal, September 1953, pp. 286-292

Suggested

*Maxwell, J. A., Federal Grants and the Business Cycle, Chs. I-IV, pp. 1-99

*Clark, C., “Public Finance and Changes in the Value of Money,” Economic Journal, December 1945, pp. 371-389

*Pechman, J. A., and Mayer, Thomas, “Mr. Colin Clark on the Limits of Taxation,” Review of Economics and Statistics, August 1952, pp. 232-242; and Smith, D. T., “Note on Inflationary Consequences of High Taxation,” Ibid., Pp. 243, 247

*Goode, Richard, “And Economic Limit on Taxes: Some Recent Discussions,” National Tax Journal, September 1952, pp. 227-233

*Pigou, A. C., A Study in Public Finance, Chs. I-V, pp. 1-34

Machlup, F., “The Division of Labor between Government and Private Enterprise,” American Economic Review, 1943 Supplement, pp. 87-104

Hansen, A. H., and Perloff, H. S., State and Local Finance in the National Economy, Chs. 2 and 8

Hicks, J. R. and Hart, A. G., The Social Framework of the American Economy, Ch. XIII, pp. 174-185

Bowen, H. R., Toward Social Economy, Ch. 18

Backman, Jules and Kurnov, Ernest, “Pricing of Government Services,” National Tax Journal, June 1954, pp. 121-140

 

November 9 – November 30: Fiscal Policy

Required

*Smithies, Arthur, “Federal Budgeting and Physical Policy,” in A Survey of Contemporary Economics (edited by Howard S. Ellis), Ch. 5, pp. 174-209

Hansen, A. H., Business Cycles and National Income, Ch. 12, pp. 195-207

(Note: Read one or two of the following four sources)

(1) Gordon, R. A., Business Fluctuations, Ch. 18, pp. 525-544

(2) Brownlee, O. H. and Allen, E. D., Economics of Public Finance, 2nd edition, Chs. VI-VIII, pp. 94-140

(3) Musgrave, R. A., “Fiscal Policy, Stability, and Full Employment,” Public Finance and Full Employment (Postwar Economic Studies No. 3, Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System), pp. 1-21

(4) Due, Government Finance, Chs. 25-26, and 28, pp. 470-505, and 524-550

*Hart, A. G., Money, Debt and Economic Activity, Second Edition, Chs. XXVII, XXVIII, and XXIX, pp. 448-495

*Hicks, U. K., Public Finance, Ch. XVII, pp. 316-336

*Committee for Economic Development, Taxes and the Budget: A Program For Prosperity in a Free Economy (November 1947), especially pp. 9-34

*Blough, Roy, “Political and Administrative Requisites for Achieving Economic Stability,” American Economic Review, May 1950, pp. 165-177

*Lerner, A. P., The Economics of Control, Ch. 24, pp. 302-322

*Pechman, Joseph A., “Yield of the Individual Income Tax During a Recession,” National Tax Journal, March 1954, pp. 1-16

Suggested

*Wallich, H. C., “Income Generating Effects of a Balanced Budget,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1944, pp. 78-91

*Musgrave, R. A., and Painter, M. S., “The Impact of Alternative Tax Structures on Personal Consumption and Saving,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1948, pp. 475-499

*Margolis, Julius, “Public Works and Economic Stability,” Journal of Political Economy, August 1949, pp. 277-292

Beveridge, W. H., Full Employment in a Free Society

Hansen, A. H., Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles

Terborgh, George, The Bogie of Economic Maturity

Hansen, A. H., “Some Notes on Terborgh’s ‘The Bogie of Economic Maturity,’” Review of Economics and Statistics, February 1946, and Terborgh’s reply R. E. S., August 1946

*”The Problem of Economic Instability,” A committee report, American Economic Review, September 1950, pp. 505-538 (sections pertaining to fiscal policy)

Bach, G. L., “Monetary-Fiscal Policy, Debt Policy, and the Price Level,” American Economic Review, May 1947, pp. 228-242

Bronfenbrenner, M., “Postwar Political Economy: The President’s Reports,” Journal of Political Economy, October 1948, pp. 373-391

*Clark, J. M., “An Appraisal of the Workability of Compensatory Devices,” American Economic Review, Proceedings, March 1939, reprinted in Readings in Business Cycle Theory, pp. 291-310

“Problems of Timing and Administering Fiscal Policy in Prosperity and Depression,” papers by E. E. Hagen and A. G. Hart; discussion by J. K. Galbraith, B. H. Higgins, W. S. Soytinski, and O. H. Brownlee, American Economic Review, May 1948, pp. 417-451

*Musgrave, R. A. and Miller, M. H., “Built-in Flexibility,” American Economic Review, March 1948, pp. 122-128

Musgrave, R. A., “Alternative Budget Policies for Pole Full Employment,” American Economic Review, June 1945, pp. 387-400

Clark, J. M., Economics of Planning Public Works

Lubell, “Efforts of Redistribution of Income on Consumers’ Expenditures,” American Economic Review, March 1947, pp. 157-170; Correction, December 1947, p. 930; Comment by J. M. Clark, p. 931

Burkhead, Jesse, “The Balanced Budget,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1954, Pp. 191-216

 

December 2 – December 18: Government Debt and Debt Management

Required

Due, Government Finance, Chs. 24 and 27, pp. 445-469 and 506-523

Schultz and Harriss, American Public Finance, Chs. XXV-XXVII, pp. 615-704

*Lerner, A. P., “The Burden of the National Debt” in Income, Employment and Public Policy (Metzler, L., et al.), Pp. 255-275

*”How to Manage the Debt,” Symposium in Review of Economics and Statistics, February 1949, pp. 15-32

*Murphy, H. C., The National Debt in War and Transition, Chs. 18-19, pp. 249-288

*Thomas, Woodlief, “Lessons of War Finance,” American Economic Review, September 1951, pp. 618-631

*Abbott, C. C., The Federal Debt (Twentieth Century Fund, 1952), Ch. 6, pp. 89-112

Suggested

Abbott, op. cit., pp. 1-196

*Roosa, R. V., “Interest Rates in the Central Bank,” in Money, Trade and Economic Growth (In Honor of John Henry Williams), pp. 270-295

*Simons, H. C., “On Debt Policy,” Journal of Political Economy, December 1944, pp. 356-361, and “Debt Policy and Banking Policy,” Review of Economics and Statistics, May 1946, pp. 85-89; both reprinted in Economic Policy for a Free Society, pp. 220-239

*Musgrave, R. A., “Credit Controls, Interest Rates and Management of Public Debt,” in Income, Employment and Public Policy (Metzler, L., At all.), Pp. 221-254

Harris, S. E., The National Debt and the New Economics

Committee on Debt Policy, Our National Debt

Seltzer, L. H., “Is a Rise in Interest Rates Desirable or Inevitable?” American Economic Review, December 1945, pp. 831-850

Roosa, R. V., “Integrating Debt Management and Open Market Operations,” American Economic Review, Supplement, May 1952, pp. 214-235

Wallich, H. C., “Debt Management as an Instrument of Economic Policy,” American Economic Review, June 1946, pp. 292-310

Bach, G. L., “Monetary-Fiscal Policy Reconsidered,” Journal of Political Economy, October 1949, pp. 383-394

Tobin, James, “Monetary Policy and the Management of the Public Debt: The Patman Inquiry,” Review of Economics and Statistics, May 1953, pp. 118-127

Burgess, W. Randolph, “Federal Reserve and Treasury Relations,” Journal of Finance, March 1954, pp. 1-11

 

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

Economics 151 and 251
PUBLIC FINANCE
Spring Term, 1954-1955

Professors Butters and Soloway

Note: Readings under the heading “Required” are required for Economics 151. Students in Economics 251 are required to read the asterisked assignments and to be generally familiar with the substance of the material covered in the other required assignments for Economics 151. References in Shultz and Harriss, American Public Finance, refer to the new 6thedition.

 

February 3-10: General Introduction to Taxation in the United States.

Required:

Shultz, W. J., and Harriss, C. L., American Public Finance, Chapters 7, 9, 10, 11.

Groves, Harold, Viewpoints on Public Finance, Chapter 1.

Lerner, A. P., Economics of Control, Chapter 24 (review).

Suggested:

*Bullock, C. J., Readings in Public Finance, Chapters VIII-IX.

Paul, Randolph E., Taxation in the United States (1954).

Ratner, Sydney, American Taxation, Its History as a Social Force in Democracy (1942).

Dewey, Davis R., Financial History of the United States.

 

February 10-17: Personal Income Taxation.

Required:

Shultz, W. J., and Harriss, C. L., American Public Finance, Chapters 12, 13.

*Simons, H. C., Personal Income Taxation, Chapter I (reread), Chapters II, III (passim), IV-VI, VIII, X.

Groves, H. M., Financing Government, 3rdedition, Chapter 9.

Your Federal Income Tax, Bureau of Internal Revenue.

Suggested:

*National Tax Journal, March 1955, articles by Professor Shoup, Brown, and Pechman.

*Vickrey, W. S., Agenda for Progressive Taxation, Chapters 1, 2, 4, 6 (passim), 12, 13, 14.

Fisher, I., and Fisher, H. W., Constructive Income Taxation, A Proposal for Reform, Chapters 1, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 21.

Holt, C. G., “Averaging of Income for Tax Purposes: Equity and Fiscal-Policy Considerations,” National Tax Journal, December 1949.

*Musgrave, R. A., and Tun, Thin, “Income Tax Progression, 1929-48”, Journal of Political Economy, December 1948, pp. 498-514.

Farioletti, Marius, “The 1948 Audit Control Program for Federal Income Tax Returns”, National Tax Journal, June 1949, pp. 142-150.

Farioletti, Marius, “Some Results from the First Year’s Audit Control Program of the Bureau of Internal Revenue”, National Tax Journal, March 1952, pp. 65-78.

Blakey, R. G., and Blakely, G. C., The Federal Income Tax.

Magill, Roswell, Taxable Income.

Prentice-Hall, Federal Tax Course – 1954, Chapters 1-3.

 

February 19-24: Capital Gains Taxation.

Required:

*Seltzer, L. H., The Nature and Tax Treatment of Capital Gains and Losses, Chapters 1, 2, 4, 9, 11.

Groves, H. M., Financing Government, 3rd edition, pp. 172-177.

*Simons, H. C., Personal Income Taxation, Chapter VII.

Suggested:

*Vickrey, W. S., Agenda for Progressive Taxation, Chapter 5.

Capital Gains Taxation (A Tax Institute Symposium) (passim).

Federal Income Tax Treatment of Capital Gains and Losses (A Treasury Tax Study), 1951.

Groves, H. M., Viewpoints on Public Finance, pp. 151-158.

Prentice-Hall, Federal Tax Course – 1954, Chapters 4-6.

 

February 26-March 5: Corporation Income Tax.

Required:

Shultz, W. J., and Harriss, C. L., American Public Finance, pp. 311-320.

*Goode, Richard, The Corporation Income Tax, Chapters 1-9, 11, 18.

*Thompson, L. E., and Butters, J. K., “Effects of Taxation on the Investment Policies and Capacities of Individuals”, Journal of Finance, May 1953, Pp. 137-151.

*Smith, D. T., “Taxation and Executives”, Proceedings of the National Tax Association, 1951, pp. 232-250.

*Brown, E. C., “Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives”, Income, Employment, and Public Policy (Essays in Honor of Alvin H. Hansen), pp. 300-316.

Butters, J. K., and Lintner, J., Effect of Federal Taxes on Growing Enterprises, Chapters I-VII, VII and IX passim.

Suggested:

Prentice-Hall, Federal Tax Course – 1954, Chapters 21-23.

Smith, D. T., and Butters, J. K., Taxable and Business Income, Forward, Introduction, and Chapter 1.

*Slitor, Richard E., “The Corporate Income Tax: A Re-evaluation”, National Tax Journal, December 1952, pp. 289-309.

*Domar, E. D., and Musgrave, R. A., “Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taking”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1944, pp. 388-422.

Butters, J. K., Effects of Taxation on Inventory Accounting and Policies, Chapters I, IV, V.

Butters, J. K., Thompson, L. E., and Bollinger, L. L., Effects of Taxation on Investments by Individuals, Chapters I-VI.

Smith, D. T., Effects of Taxation on Corporate Financial Policy, Chapters I, VI-IX.

*Smith, D. T., “Corporate Taxation and Common Stock Financing”, National Tax Journal, September 1953, pp. 209-225.

Brown, E. See., Effects of Taxation on Depreciation Adjustments for Price Changes, Chapters I-IV.

*Eldridge, D. H., “Tax Incentives for Mineral Enterprise”, Journal of Political Economy, June 1950, pp. 222-240.

Economic Effects of Section 102 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1951).

 

March 8-10: Integration of Personal and Corporate Income Taxation.

Required:

*Goode, Richard, The Corporation Income Tax, Chapter X.

*Simons, H. C., Personal Income Taxation, Chapter IX.

Suggested:

*The Postwar Corporation Tax Structure, U.S. Treasury Study.

How Should Corporations be Taxed?, A Tax Institute Symposium.

“Final Report of the Committee on the Federal Corporation Income Tax”, Proceedings of the National Tax Association, 1950, pp. 54-76.

Lent, G. E., The Impact of the Undistributed Profits Tax, 1936-1937.

 

March 12-15: Excess Profits Taxation.

Required:

*Hart, A. G., and Brown, E. C., Financing Defense, Chapter 7.

*Blough, Roy, “Measurement Problems of the Excess Profits Tax”, National Tax Journal, December 1948, pp. 353-365.

*”Symposium on the Excess Profits Tax”, National Tax Journal, September 1951, pp. 219-36.

Tax Institute, Excess Profits Tax, Parts 1 and 3, and pp. 119-141.

Suggested:

Oakes, E. E., “Excess Profits Tax Amendments”, National Tax Journal, March 1952, pp. 53-64.

Hicks, J. R., Hicks, U. K., and Rostas, L., The Taxation of War Wealth, Chapters 1, 4-7.

 

March 14-19: Estate and Gift Taxation.

Required:

Schultz, W. J., and Harriss, C. L., American Public Finance, Chapter 20.

*Groves, H. M., Viewpoints on Public Finance, Nos. 44, 46, 47, and 48 (all in Chapter 5).

*Butters, J. K., Lintner, J., and Cary, W. L., Effects of Taxation on Corporate Mergers, Chapters I-III and V.

Bloch, Henry S., “Economic Objectives of Gratuitous Transfer Taxation”, National Tax Journal, June 1951, pp. 139-147.

Suggested:

*Surrey, Stanley S., et al., “A Critique of Federal Estate and Gift Taxation”, California Law Review, March 1950. (Introduction by Stanley Surrey, Pp. 1-27, required for graduate students; remainder optional.)

*Federal Estate and Gift Taxes– A Proposal for Integration and for Correlation with the Income Tax. (A joint study by an advisory committee to the Treasury Department and the Office of the Tax Legislative Council, 1947) (Sections I and II and remainder, passim. Required for graduate students).

Keith, E. Gordon, “How Should Wealth Transfers Be Taxed?”, American Economic Review, May 1950, pp. 379-390.

Wedgewood, Josiah, The Economics of Inheritance, especially Chapters 9-11.

 

March 22-31: Taxes on Consumption.

Required:

Schultz, W. J., and Harriss, C. L., American Public Finance, Chapters 8, 16.

*Groves, H. M., Viewpoints on Public Finance, Nos. 58, 59, 60, 64.

Soloway, A. M., “The Purchase Tax and Fiscal Policy”, National Tax Journal, December 1951.

Suggested:

Due, John F., “American and Canadian Experience with the Sales Tax”, The Journal of Finance, September 1952.

*Due, John F., “Toward A General Theory of Sales Tax Incidents”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1953.

Pao Lun Cheng, “A Note on the Progressive Consumption Tax”, The Journal of Finance, September 1953.

Soloway, Arnold M., “Economic Aspects of the British Purchase Tax”, Journal of Finance, May 1954.

*Hicks, U. K., Public Finance, Chapters IX and X.

Hart and Brown, Financing Defense, Chapter 4.

 

April 12-23: Intergovernmental Tax Problems.

Required:

Shultz, W. J., and Harriss, C. L., American Public Finance, Chapters 23, 24, 18, 19.

*Groves, H. M., Postwar Taxation and Economic Progress, Chapter 12.

*State-Local Relations, The Council of State Governments, Report of the Committee on State-Local Relations, 1946, Parts 3 and 4; Parts 1, 2, 5, and 6 passim.

*Federal State Local Tax Correlation; Symposium of the Tax Institute, 1953. Chapters I, II, III, VII, VIII, XVIII.

Suggested:

Groves, H. M., Postwar Taxation and Economic Progress, Chapter 12.

Groves, H. M., Viewpoints on Public Finance, Chapter 2.

*George, Henry, Progress and Poverty.

Hansen and Perloff, State and Local Finance in the National Economy.

*National Tax Journal, December 1951, pp. 341-371.

 

April 26-May 5: Burden of Taxation.

Required:

*Musgrave, R. A., et al., “Distribution of Tax Payments by Income Groups”, National Tax Journal, March 1951, pp. 1-53.

*Tucker, Rufus S., “Distribution of Tax Burdens in 1948”, National Tax Journal, September 1951, pp. 269-283.

*Allen, E. D., and Brownlee, O. H., Economics of Public Finance, Chapter X.

*Tucker, R. S., “Distribution of Government Burdens and Benefits”, American Economic Review, May 1953, pp. 519-534.

Suggested:

*”Further Consideration of the Distribution of the Tax Burden”, National Tax Journal, March 1952, pp. 1-39.

Poole, K. E., Fiscal Policies and the American Economy (Chapter VIII, “The Fiscal System, The Distribution of Income, and Public Welfare” by John H. Adler), pp. 359-409.

 

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003. Box 6, Folder “Economics, 1954-1955”.

Image Source: J. Keith Butters from Webpage of the Harvard Business School Baker Library Historical Collection “Edwin H. Land & the Polaroid Corporation: The Formative Years”.

Categories
Berkeley Exam Questions Suggested Reading Syllabus

Berkeley. Syllabus and exams. Regulation and Antitrust. Woroch, 1996

 

Every so often I plunge into the Wayback Machine to search for “ancient” economics course materials from as far back as the 1990’s. Today I return with a syllabus, suggested readings for presentations and for paper topics, and some final examination questions for what has/had been the traditional second course in the field of industrial organization that covers regulation and competition policy. 

The course instructor at UC Berkeley was Glenn Woroch who had received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of California, Berkeley in 1983. According to his August 2013 homepage he taught that graduate course “Regulation and Antitrust” three times (Spring 1994, 1996, 1997).

__________________

Glenn Woroch: Short Bio

Dr. Glenn Woroch is Adjunct Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, and Executive Director of the Center for Research on Telecommunications Policy. Dr. Woroch is an internationally recognized expert in the economics of the telecommunications industry, and has served as a consultant to governments and the private sector on a wide range of telecommunications issues.
Dr. Woroch has published numerous articles on industrial organization, regulation, antitrust, corporate strategy and intellectual property. He served on the editorial boards of Information Economics & Policy, the Journal of Regulatory Economics, and Telecommunications Policy and was a founding member of the International Telecommunications Society.
Dr. Woroch is regularly retained as an economic expert witness on litigation matters involving monopolization claims, mergers, intellectual property infringement, and economic damages. Besides his expertise in telecommunications, Dr. Woroch has extensive experience in the broadcast and cable television, computer software, personal computer, computer networking, ecommerce, electric power and food and beverage industries. Dr. Woroch has been an economic advisor to government agencies including the U.S. Departments of Energy and Justice and the Office of Technology Assessment. In addition to his U.S. engagements, he has consulted to private and public sector clients in Latin America, the Pacific Rim and Western Europe.
Previously, Dr. Woroch taught economics at the University of Rochester and Stanford University, and was Senior Member of Technical Staff at GTE Laboratories. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics and M.A. in Statistics from Berkeley.

Source: Short bio of Glenn Woroch linked to his August 2013 webpage. Archived copy at the Wayback Machine internet archive.

__________________

Department of Economics
University of California
Economics 220B, Spring 1996
REGULATION & ANTITRUST
Glenn Woroch

Description. This is the second of two graduate courses in industrial organization. It will cover regulation and antitrust policy, concentrating on control of natural and artificial monopoly in theory
and in practice. Emphasis will be on theoretical developments although an occasional empirical study or case study will illustrate key points.

Instructor. Glenn Woroch, 669 Evans, 642-4308, glenn@econ.berkeley.edu.

Office hours: Wednesday, 2:30-4:00 PM.

Textbooks. No textbook is assigned for this course, but several books cover large portions of the material and have been put on reserve:

Sandy Berg and John Tschirhart, Natural Monopoly Regulation, Cambridge University Press.
Alfred Kahn, The Economics of Regulation, volumes I and II, (2nd edition) John Wiley, 199?.
Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, 1993.
William Sharkey, The Theory of Natural Monopoly, Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Daniel Spulber, Regulation and Markets, MIT Press, 1991.
Kenneth Train, Optimal Regulation, MIT Press, 1991.

Assignments. Students will select a paper, either one of the optional readings or a paper that we agree upon, and present it to the class. Each student will also write a paper of moderate length on a topic
related in some manner to the economics of regulation. I will distribute a list of suggested topics shortly. Lastly, there will be a final exam.

READING LIST

* – required, in reader. + – recommended for presentation.

I. NATURAL MONOPOLY AND ITS REGULATION

1. Natural Monopoly

* Panzar, J., “Technological determinants of firm and industry
structure,” Chapter 1 in Handbook of Industrial Organization, (Vol.
1) North-Holland, 1989.
* Faulhaber, G., “Cross-subsidization: pricing in public enterprises,”
American Economic Review, 1975.
Baumol, W., “On the proper cost tests for natural monopoly in a
multiproduct industry,” American Economic Review, December 1977.
Faulhaber, G., and S. Levinson, “Subsidy free prices and anonymous
equity,” American Economic Review, 1981.
+ Evans, D. and J. Heckman, “Multiproduct cost function estimates and
natural monopoly tests for the Bell System,” in Breaking Up Bell,
edited by David Evans, 1983.

2. Efficient Pricing

* Baumol, W. and D. Bradford (1970), “Optimal departures from marginal
cost pricing,” American Economic Review, June.
* Willig, R., “Pareto-superior nonlinear outlay schedules,” Bell
Journal of Economics, 1979.
Baumol, W., E. Bailey and R. Willig, “Weak invisible hand theorems on
the sustainability of prices in a multiproduct monopoly, American
Economic Review, 1977.
Braeutigam, R., “Optimal policies for natural monopoly,” in Handbook
of Industrial Organization, (Vol. 2) 1989.
+ Brock, W., and W.D. Dechert, “Dynamic Ramsey pricing,” William Brock
and W. D. Dechert, International Economic Review, October 1985.
+ Braeutigam, R., “Optimal pricing with intermodal competition,”
American Economic Review, 38-49, 1979.
+ Panzar, J., “The Pareto domination of usage-sensitive pricing,” in
Proceedings of the 6th Telecommunications Policy Research
Conference, H. Dordick (ed.) 1979.

3. Reality Check: Alternative Explanations of Regulatory Policy

* Stigler, G., “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” The Bell Journal of
Economics, 1971.
* Peltzman, S., “The economic theory of regulation after a decade of
deregulation,” Brookings Papers: Microeconomics, 1989.
* Joskow, P., “Pricing decision of regulated firms: a behavioral
approach, Bell Journal of Economics, 1973.
Peltzman, S., “Towards a more general theory of regulation,” Journal
of Law & Economics.
Noll, R., “Economic perspectives on the politics of regulation,” in
Handbook of Industrial Organization (Vol. 2) 1989.
Posner, R., “Taxation by regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics,
1971.
+ Winston, C., “Economic deregulation: days of reckoning for
microeconomists,” Journal of Economic Literature, September 1993.

II. REGULATION IN PRACTICE

1. Rate of Return Regulation

* Baumol, W. and A. Klevorick, “Input choices and rate of return
regulation: an over of the discussion,” Bell Journal of Economics,
1970.
* Averch, H. and L. Johnson, “Behavior of the firm under regulatory
constraint,” American Economic Review, December, 1962.
* Spence, A.M., “Monopoly, quality and regulation,” Bell Journal of
Economics, Autumn 1975.
+ Petersen, C., “An empirical test of regulatory effects,” Bell Journal
of Economics, Spring 1975.
+ Bailey, E., “Regulation and innovation,” Journal of Public Economics,
December 1974.

2. Contracting vs. Administration

* Demsetz, H., “Why regulate utilities?” Journal of Law & Economics,
1968
* Goldberg, V., “Regulation and administered contracts,” Bell Journal
of Economics, 1976.
* Williamson, O., “Franchise bidding for natural monopoly: in general
and with respect to CATV, Bell Journal of Economics, 1976.”
+ Zupan, M. “The efficacy of franchise bidding schemes in the case of
cable TV: Some systematic evidence,” Journal of Law and Economics,
October 1989.

3. Price Cap and Benchmark Regulation

* Brennan, T., “Regulation by capping prices,” Journal of Regulatory
Economics, 1989.
* Brauetigam, R., and J. Panzer, “Effects of the change from rate of
return to price cap regulation,” American Economic Review, 1993.
* Shleiffer, A. “A theory of yardstick competition,” Rand Journal of
Economics, 1985.
Vogelsang, I., “Price cap regulation of telecommunications services:
a long-run,” Rand Report, 1988.
+ Cabral, L. And M. Riordan, “Incentives for cost reduction under price
cap regulation,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1989.
+ Sappington, D., and D. Sibley, “Strategic nonlinear pricing under
price-cap regulation,” Rand Journal of Economics, Spring 1992.
+ Armstrong, M., S, Cowan and J. Vickers, “Nonlinear pricing and price
cap regulation,” Journal of Public Economics, September 1995.

III. DESIGN OF OPTIMAL REGULATORY MECHANISMS

1. Iterative and Dynamic Mechanisms

* Vogelsang, I. and J. Finsinger, “A regulatory adjustment process for
optimal pricing by multiproduct monopoly firms, Bell Journal of
Economics, 1979.
* Sappington, D., “Strategic firm behavior under a dynamic regulatory
adjustment process,” Bell Journal of Economics, Spring, 1980.
Salant, D., and G. Woroch, “Trigger price regulation,” Rand Journal
of Economics, Spring 1992.
+ Gilbert, R., and D. Newbery, “The dynamic efficiency of regulatory
constitutions,”Rand Journal of Economics, Winter 1994.
+ Blackmon, G., and R. Zeckhauser, “Fragile commitments and the
regulatory process,” Yale Journal on Regulation, 9:1, Winter, 1992.
+ Logan, J., R. Masson and R. Reynolds, “Efficient regulation with
little information: reality in the limit?” International Economic
Review, 30:4 November 1989.

2. Agency Approach

* Loeb, M., and W. Magat, “A decentralized method for utility
regulation,” Journal of Law & Economics, 1979.
* Baron, D., and R. Myerson, “Regulating a monopolist with unknown
costs,” Econometrica, July 1982.
* Laffont, J.-J., “The new economics of regulation ten years after,”
Econometrica, 1994.
Laffont, J.-J., and J. Tirole, “Using cost observation to regulate
firms,” Journal of Political Economy, 1986.
Baron, D., “Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions,” in
Handbook of Industrial Organization, (Vol. 2), 1989.
+ Lewis, T., and D. Sappington, “Regulating a monopolist with unknown
demand,” American Economic Review, December 1988.
+ Wolak, F., “An econometric analysis of the asymmetric information
regulator-utility interaction,” draft.

IV. DEREGULATION

1. Regulation with Horizontal Competition

+ Auriole, E., and J.-J. Laffont, “Regulation by duopoly,” Journal of
Economic Management and Strategy, 1993.
+ Riordan, M., “Regulation and preemptive technology adoption,” Rand
Journal, Autumn 1992.
Biglaiser, G., and A. Ma, “Regulating a dominant firm: unknown demand
and industry structure.” Rand Journal of Economics, Spring 1995.

2. Regulation with Vertical Competition

* Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole, “Optimal bypass and creamskimming,”
American Economic Review, 1990.
* Panzar, J., “Sustainability, efficiency and vertical integration,” in
Regulated Industries and Public Enterpirse, edited by Paul
Kelindorfer and Bridger Mitchell, 1979.
Vickers, J., “Competition and regulation in vertically-related
markets,” Review of Economic Studies, January 1995.
Baumol, W. “Some Subtle Pricing Issues in Railroad Regulation,”
International Journal of Transport Economics, August 1983.
+ Gilbert, R., and M. Riordan, “Regulating complementary products: a
problem of institutional choice,” Rand Journal of Economics, 1995.
+ Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole, “Access pricing and interconnection,”
European Economic Review, 1994.

VI. ANTITRUST POLICY

1. Predation

* McGee, John, (1958), “Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil
(N.J.) Case,” Journal of Law and Economics, pp. 137-169.
* Ordover, J., and G. Saloner, “Predation, monopolization and
antitrust,” chapter 9 in Handbook of Industrial Organization,
(Vol. 2) 1989.
Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts, “Limit pricing and entry under
incomplete inforamtion: an equilibrium analysis,” Econometrica,
1982.
Ordover, J., and R. Willig, “An economic definition of predation:
pricing and product innovation,” Yale Law Journal, 1981.

2. Merger to Monopoly

* Department of Justice, “The Merger Guidelines.”
* Farrell, J., and C. Shapiro, “Horizontal mergers,” American Economic
Review.
+ Baker, J., and T. Bresnahan, (1985), “The Gains from Merger or
Collusion in Product Differentiated Industries,” Journal of
Industrial Economics, 33:4, pp. 427.

3. Exclusion and Foreclosure

* Krattenmaker, T., and S. Salop, “Anticompetitive exclusion: raising
rivals’ costs to achieve power over price,” Yale Law Journal, 1986.
* Ordover, J., G. Saloner, and S. Salop, “Equilibrium Vertical
Foreclosure,” American Economic Review, 1990.
Ordover, J., A. O. Sykes and R. Willig, “Nonprice Anticompetitive
Behavior by Dominant Firms toward the Producers of Complementary
Products,” in Antitrust Regulation: Essays in Memory of John J.
McGowan, Franklin Fisher (ed.), 1985
Whinston, M., “Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion,” American Economic
Review, 1990.
+ Salinger, M., “Vertical mergers and market foreclosure,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 1988.
+ Economides, N., and G. Woroch, “Interconnection and foreclosure of
network competition,” draft, 1995.

 

Source: Spring Semester 1996 syllabus archived at the Wayback Machine.

________________________

Department of Economics
University of California
Economics 220B, Spring 1996
ADDITIONAL READINGS FOR PRESENTATIONS
Glenn Woroch

Lawrence Pulley and Yale Braunstein, “A Composite cost function for multiproduct firms with an application to economies of scope in banking,” Review of Economics & Statistics, 1992.

Besanko, David and Donnefeld, Shabtai, and Lawrence J. White, “The Multiproduct Firm, Quality Choice, and Regulation,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 1990, vol. 36, pp. 411-429.

Ma, Ching-to Albert and James Burgess, “Regulation, Quality Competition, and Price in the Hospital Industry,” mimeo, 1991.

Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole, “‘A Signal-Jamming’ Theory of Predation,” Bell Journal of Economics, 1986, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 366-376.

Ordover, Janusz and Robert Willig, “Antitrust for High Technology Industries: Assessing Research Joint Ventures and Mergers,” Journal of Law and Economics, 1985, vol. 28, pp. 311-333.

Guerin-Calvert, Margaret, “Vertical Integration as a Threat to Competition: Airline Computer Reservations Systems,” in L. White and J. Kwoka Jr. (eds.), The Antitrust Revolution, (pp. 338-370). 1989.

Sappington, David, and David Sibley, “Regulating without cost information: the incremental surplus subsidy scheme,” International Economic Review, 29:2, May 1988.

Frank Matthewson and Ralph Winter, “An economic theory of vertical restraints,” Rand Journal of Economics.

Ralph Bradburd, “Privatization of natural monopoly public enterprises: the regulation issue,” Review of Industrial Organization, 1995, 247-67.

Michael Whinston, “Tying foreclosure and exclusion,” American Economic Review, Sept 1990.

Paul Joskow and Richard Schmalensee, “Incentive regulation for electric utilities,” Yale Journal on Regulation, 4:1, Fall 1986.

Baron, David, “Price regulation, quality and asymmetric information,”American Economic Review, March 1981.

Harris, R., and E. Weins, “Government enterprise: an instrument for the internal regulation of industry,” Canadian Journal of Economics, February 1980.

 

Source: Additional Readings for Presentations from the Spring Semester 1996 archived at the Wayback Machine.

________________________

Department of Economics
University of California
Economics 220B, Spring 1996
SUGGESTIONS FOR TERM PAPER TOPICS
Glenn Woroch

The miscellaneous topics listed below are intended to get you thinking about a term paper. Most are applications to specific industries or specific regulatory policies. There are many more possibilities for research in theoretical aspects of regulation.

Problems of erecting incentives for efficient investment and operation of natural monopoly facilities placed under common ownership in a specific case such as an electric power grid or an internet backbone.

Efficient design of auctions to assign rights to common property resources such as radio spectrum or mineral/grazing rights.

Compare the trend toward re-emergence of end-to-end monopoly in telephone with the vertical divestiture in electric power in terms of the tradeoff between vertical economies and anticompetitive behavior.

Efficient design of duopoly policy in markets that are potentially natural monopoly (e.g., cellular telephone)

The increased concentration of hospitals and HMOs through mergers and joint ventures and the implications for the price and availability of health services.

Potential of labor and management sharing in the rents that accrue in trucking, railroad or other regulated industries.

Motivation and long-run sustainability of bypass in the natural gas distribution industry under different regulatory regimes.

Winners and losers from price ceilings, rationing and strategic reserves in the market for oil and gas.

Effectiveness of different ratemaking practices (e.g., ROR vs. price caps) to encourage adoption of new technologies in a specific industry (e.g., electric power, telephone, health care).

Apply principles of economic models of regulation to understand the passage of a particular piece of legislation that regulates, deregulates or re-regulates an industry (e.g., Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Cable Act of 1992, Telecom Act of 1996).

Cross country comparison (e.g., U.S. vs. Japan) of policy formation on a specific regulatory issue (e.g., regulation of nuclear power or deregulation of telephones), and the relation between the outcome and the possibilities for rent seeking under the different political systems.

Policy alternatives toward a dominant firm that achieves a de facto standard in an industry exhibiting strong complementaries among component products (e.g., Microsoft and Intel).

The use of structural separations or Chinese walls to guard against leveraging market power into complementary product markets.

Compare performance of public enterprises relative to regulated private firms within or across industries (e.g., water, electric power, cable TV, airlines) and relate to management incentives and/or regulatory policies.

Success of regulatory policy that uses a government-owned firm to compete against a dominant private firm.

The relative effectiveness of alternative regulatory mechanisms to elicit relevant information, e.g., yardstick vs. iterative mechanisms.

Success of privatization initiatives based on the nature of the post-privatization regulatory scheme especially with regards to rate regulation and the ease of competitive entry.

Creating efficient incentives for disposal of nuclear and other kinds of hazardous waste.

Tradeoff between efficiency and anti-competitiveness of mergers/alliances/joint ventures among local/long distance/cable/wireless companies aimed at exploiting multimedia opportunities.

Comparison of solutions to pricing interconnection sold to competitors across different industries (e.g., phone v. electric power) or for a single industry across different countries.

Source: Suggested Paper Topics from the Spring Semester 1996 archived at the Wayback Machine.

________________________

Department of Economics
University of California
Economics 220B
Glenn Woroch

TAKEHOME FINAL EXAM
Spring 1996

INSTRUCTIONS: Answer each of the first four questions and then choose just one of the last two questions In each case keep you answers concise. Due the end of business on Friday, May 17th.

  1. Suppose that all firms have available the technology characterized by the cost function:

C(y1, y2) = a y1 + b y2 + c max {y1, y2}

where y1 and y2 are quantities of the two goods, 1 and 2. Further suppose that the market demand for y1 exceeds that for y2 at all relevant output prices.

(a) For y1 > y2 > 0, determine whether this cost function exhibits economies of scope, economies of scale over the entire product set, economies of scale specific to good 1 or economies of scale specific to good 2.

(b) Find the first-best output price for the industry to charge for the two goods. Determine the configuration of firms in the industry that products the corresponding industry wide outputs at least cost for the industry.

(c) Prove that the industry configuration and prices given in you answer to part (b) satisfies the requirements of sustainability

(d) Describe in words what kinds of circumstances might lead to cost functions like this one.

  1. A regulated firm produces two products: A and B. The firm is required by regulators to earn no more than is necessary to cover its operating costs plus a competitive return on invested capital.
    Assume that product B exhibits constant marginal cost of production equal to cB.

(a) Describe the solution to the Ramsey pricing problem. In the process be certain to make explicit whatever demand and cost assumptions you need to support your answer.

(b) Now suppose that an unlimited number of unregulated firms can enter into the market for product B at a constant marginal cost of cE where cE > cB. How does this affect the regulated firm’s pricing, and what is the effect on consumer welfare?

(c) Now suppose that cE < cB. Demonstrate that the regulated firm might gain by selling product B at a price (slightly) below cE.

(d) Since, in general, the regulator does not know the relative sizes of cB and cE , what are the pros and cons of allowing the regulated firm to produce B?

  1. Many schemes for regulating natural monopolies have been tried, and many more have been proposed. Listed below are some the schemes studied in this class.

(i) Rate-of-return regulation
(ii) Vogelsang-Finsinger iterative mechanism
(iii) Yardstick regulation
(iv) Price cap regulation
(v) Demsetz-type franchise auction

Choose two off of this list, and compare their relative merits in terms of each of the following criteria:

(a) short-run allocative efficiency,
(b) speed and likelihood of achieving first/second best outcomes over the long run,
(c) cross subsidization across products
(d) the rents that accrue to producers,
(e) vulnerability to political influence by producers and/or consumers,
(f) incentives to invest in cost-reducing innovations,
(g) informational requirements for implementing the mechanism.

  1. [WARNING: THIS PROBLEM HAD SPECIAL CHARACTERS THAT DID NOT SURVIVE THE ASCII FORMAT SAVE. WHERE YOU SEE A “z”, I HAVE ONLY GUESSED.] Consider the application of the Baron-Myerson Bayesian incentive mechanism to the following special situation. Suppose that production requires an unknown constant marginal cost and a
    known fixed cost: C(y, z) = z y + F, where z is distributed uniformly over the unit interval [0,1]. Let demand for the single product be linear: D(p) = a – bp. Assume that a/b > 1. Finally, assume that the weight attached to consumer surplus, V(p(z),t(z)), is one and the weight attached to firm z’s profit is � where 0 < � < 1.

(a) Find the optimal two-part pricing rule: p(z), t(z). What values do they take on at the extreme of least cost z = 0 and at highest cost z = 1?

(b) At the optimal solution compute the consumer surplus and the firm’s profit as a function of . Again find the values they take on at the extreme of least cost = 0 and at highest cost = 1.

(c) Describe the unit price, fixed fee, consumer surplus and firm profit as z approaches 1.

(d) Compute the profit-maximizing uniform price p(z). Find values for z and for which this unregulated monopoly price is less than the regulated price.

  1. Choose one of the following industries and periods:

(i) Electric power generation and distribution in the 1960s
(ii) Long distance telephone service in the 1970s
(iii) Passenger air transportation in the 1980s
(iv) For-profit hospitals in the 1990s

In that case describe what economic research has to say about the presence of economies of scale and scope, vertical economies and the prevalence of transactions costs. Describer the predominant form of regulation in that industry during that period in the U.S. Evaluate the match between the cost conditions and the form of regulation based on efficiency criteria.

  1. Intense debate has broken out over the years over whether certain industry practices represent an efficient response to market conditions, or an expression of anti-competitive behavior. Identify one of the following practices:

(i) predatory pricing
(ii) exclusive dealing
(iii) product bundling or tying
(iv) resale price maintenance

For the practice that you chose, describe the current antitrust treatment based on court decisions and policies of antitrust authorities. (These may not be unambiguous.) Report the positions of the different sides of the debate, especially the arguments that view the practice as efficiency enhancing and as competitively harmful. Make a persuasive argument for one of these two positions, or for a third position.

Source:  Takehome Final Exam from the Spring Semester 1996 archived at the Wayback Machine.

________________________

Department of Economics
University of California
Economics 220B
Glenn Woroch

FINAL EXAM
Spring 1994

INSTRUCTIONS: The exam has FOUR parts. Please answer each one. To
guide your time allocation, a total of 100 points is distributed as
follows:

Part I: 24 points (= 6 x 4 points)
Part II: 30 points
Part III: 28 points
Part IV: 18 points

  1. Answer TRUE or FALSE and EXPLAIN with 2 or 3 sentences.
    1. If an industry configuration is sustainable, then
      production is cost efficient.
    2. A Ramsey price vector is necessarily subsidy free.
    3. In Peltzman’s private interest model applied to monopoly
      regulation, price obeys an inverse elasticity rule typical
      of efficiency but income distribution may be skewed.
    4. In Joskow’s behavioral model of rate-of-return regulation,
      rate reviews do not occur when unit costs are rising.
    5. Producer and consumer surplus increase with the HH Index in
      a Cournot oligopoly.
    6. The so-called “double markup” that results from monopoly
      power at both the manufacturing and the retail levels can
      be eliminated with a two-part tariff.
  1. Two schemes that are designed to regulate natural monopoly
    are:

(i) Rate-of-return regulation
(ii) Vogelsang-Finsinger iterative mechanism

Evaluate each of the schemes relative to the unregulated
outcome in terms of their effects on:

(a) short-run allocative efficiency,
(b) the rents that accrue to producers,
(c) the welfare of consumers.

  1. Auctioning off monopoly franchises has often been proposed
    as a way to inject some competition into natural monopoly
    markets.
    1. In terms of economic efficiency, compare the following two
      rules for awarding the franchise: give it to the bidder
      with the most attractive price-service-quality package, or
      give it to the bidder that offers the largest cash payment
      for the franchise.
    2. What are the informational requirements needed to implement
      the schemes proposed by Demsetz and by Loeb and Magat?
    3. What difficulties arise over the course of the franchise
      contract that hamper the performance of this scheme?
    4. Under what conditions will the outcome be improved as the
      length of the firm-regulator relationship becomes infinite?
  1. Consider the Baron-Myerson approach to regulating a firm
    with private cost information. For concreteness, let the
    cost function of the firm be C(y,b) which is increasing
    in output of the good y and a cost parameter b.

1. What is meant by an “information rent”? How is it paid to
the firm in the Baron-Myerson scheme?

2. In what sense does a cross subsidization occur across
different cost realizations?

3. What additional features do Laffont and Tirole build into
their model of regulation that generalizes Baron-Myerson?
How does their pricing optimum differ?

Source:  Wayback Machine Archived copy June 1, 2002.

Image Source:  Glenn A. Woroch’s Berkeley webpage (modified 13 Jan 1999). Archived copy at the Wayback Machine internet archive.

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard Suggested Reading Syllabus Undergraduate

Harvard. Reading list and final exam for course “Conflict, Coalition and Strategy”. Schelling, 1970

 

 

There are undergraduate courses, and then there are great undergraduate courses. Today we have the 49 item course bibliography for Thomas C. Schelling’s “Conflict, Coalition and Strategy” along with its ten-page final examination. This material comes to Economics in the Rear-view Mirror from one of the students who took that course, then Harvard undergraduate, Robert Dohner. I am  generally not jealous of Bob’s Harvard undergraduate education, but I’ll admit there are a good half-dozen economics and politics courses in my own Yale training that I would have gladly traded for that single Schelling semester in 1970. You can all thank Bob Dohner for sharing this memory!

The teaching assistant for the course, James T. Campen, was born 1943. He received an A.B. from Harvard in 1965, M.A. at St. John’s College, University of Cambridge in 1971 and Ph.D. from Harvard in 1976. Campen was active early on in the Union for Radical Political Economics and was on the faculty of the University of Massachusetts at Boston from 1977 where he worked up into his emeritus years.

_____________________

Economics 1030
“Conflict, Coalition and Strategy”
Prof. Thomas C. Schelling
Mr. James T. Campen
Fall 1970

(*Contained in Coop package)

Introduction (13 pages)

  1. *Schelling, T. C., “Strategic Analysis and Social Problems,” Social Problems, Vol. 12 (Spring 1965), pp. 367-379.

 

I. Personal Incentives and Social Organization (56 pages)

  1. Hardin, Garrett, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science, Vol. 162, No. 3859, pp. 1243-1248.
  2. Olson, Mancur, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 1-3,9-16, 53-57,86-87, 132-141.
  3. Luce, R. Duncan and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957), Chapter 5.4, “An Example: The Prisoner’s Dilemma,” and Chapter 5.5, “Temporal Repetition of the Prisoner’s Dilemma,” pp. 94-102.
  4. Demsetz, Harold, “Toward a Theory of Property Rights,” Papers and Proceedings of the American Economic Association, American Economic Review, Vol. 57 (May 1967), pp. 347-359.

 

II. Rules, Restraints, and Conventions (296 pages)

  1. Schelling, T. C., “Some Thoughts on the Relevance of Game Theory to the Analysis of Ethical Systems,” in Ira R. Buchler and Hugo G. Nutini (eds.), Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969), pp. 45-60.
  2. Lorenz, Konrad, On Aggression (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966), pp. 68-84, 109-138. NOTE: Different pages in Bantam paperback, pp. 64-80, 104-132.
  3. Piaget, Jean, The Moral Judgment of the Child (The Free Press, 1965, and Collier Books, 1962, same translator and identical pagination in both versions), pp. 65-76, 94-100, 139-174, 197-232. NOTE: Hardcover editions dated 1932 and 1948 have these pages instead: pp. 56-69, 89-95, 135-171, 195-231. To check: the first selection begins, “Consciousness of Rules: II Third Stage.”
  4. Jervis, Robert, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 18, 90-110, 147-152, 197-205, 216-223.
  5. Schelling, T. C., The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press, 1963), Chapter 3, pp. 53-80, and Chapter 4, pp. 89-108.
  6. Lewis, David K., Convention: A Philosophical Study (Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 5-8, 36-51, 83-107, 118-121.

 

III. Contests and Disputes (123 pages)

  1. Moore, Omar K. and Alan R. Anderson, “Puzzles, Games, and Social Interaction,” in David Braybooke, Philosophical Problems of the Social Sciences (The Macmillan Company, 1965), pp. 68-79.
  2. Langholm, Sivert, “Violent Conflict Resolution and the Loser’s Reaction,” Journal of Peace Research, 1965-4, pp. 324-347.
  3. Galtung, Johan, “Institutionalized Conflict Resolution,” Journal of Peace Research, 1965-4, pp. 348-383.
  4. Goffman, Erving, Interaction Ritual (Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 239-270, “Where the Action Is.”
  5. Skolnick, Jerome H., “Social Control in the Adversary System,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XI, No. 1 (March 1967), pp. 52-70.

 

IV. Formal Processes of Collective Decision (133 pages)

  1. *Steinhaus, Hugo, “The Problem of Fair Division,” Econometrica, Vol. 16 (January 1948), pp. 101-104.
  2. *Farquharson, Robin, “Sincerity and Strategy in Voting,” mimeograph, February 5, 1955, 7 pages.
  3. Schelling, T. C., “What Is Game Theory?” in James C. Charlesworth (ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis (The Free Press, 1967), pp. 212-238.
  4. Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tulloch, The Calculus of Consent (The University of Michigan Press, 1962), pp. 43-62, 131-145, 249-262.
  5. *Schelling, T. C., “Voting Schemes and Fair Division,” multilith, September 1970.
    [Handwritten note: 23 10th line 12th 1.27 s.b. 1.55. A gets 295 instead of 241. B gets 85]
  6. Leiserson, Michael, “Game Theory and the Study of Coalition Behavior,” in Sven Groennings, E. W. Kelley, and Michael Leiserson (eds.), The Study of Coalition Behavior (Holt, Reinhardt and Winston, 1970), pp. 255-272.
  7. Farquharson, Robin, Theory of Voting (Yale University Press, 1969), Appendix 3, pp. 77-80.

 

V. Individual and Collective Bargaining (266 pages)

  1. Schelling, T. C., The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press, 1963), Chapter 2, pp. 21-52, and Chapter 5, pp. 119-161.

[Handwritten note: Hour Exam]

  1. Fisher, Roger, International Conflict for Beginners (Harper & Rowe, 1969), Chapter 3, “Making Threats Is Not Enough,” pp. 27-59.
  2. Walton, R. E. and R. B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 4-6, 67-125, 310-340.
  3. Ross, H. Laurence, Settled Out of Court (Aldine, 1970), Chapter IV, “Negotiation.” NOTE: Pending appearance of book, mimeograph copy on reserve, entitled “Negotiation.”
  4. *Schelling, T. C., “Communication, Bargaining and Negotiation,” Arms Control and National Security, Vol. 1 (1969), pp. 69-71.
  5. *Rapoport, Anatol and Melvin Guyer, “Taxonomy of 2 x 2 Games,” Papers, Vol. 6, 1966, Peace Research Society (International), pp. 11-26.

 

VI. Violence and Nonviolence (191 pages)

  1. Sibley, Mulford Q., The Quiet Battle (Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 9-10, 55-66.
  2. Hubbard, Howard, “Five Long, Hot Summers and How They Grew,” The Public Interest, No. 12 (Summer 1968), pp. 3-24.
  3. Nieburg, H. L., “Violence, Law and the Informal Polity,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 1969), pp. 192-209.
  4. Schelling, T. C., Arms and Influence (Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 1-18, 92-105, 116-125.
  5. Roberts, Adam (Ed.), Civilian Resistance as a National Defense (Stackpole Books, 1968), or The Strategy of Civilian Defense (Faber & Faber Ltd., 1967) (the two versions are identical), pp. 9-13, 87-105, 205-211, 302-308.
  6. Walter, Charles W., “Interposition: The Strategy and Its Uses,” Naval War College Review, Vol. XXII, No. 10 (June 1970), pp. 72-84.
  7. Nozick, Robert, “Coercion,” in Sydney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes and Morton White (eds.), Philosophy, Science and Method (St. Martin’s Press, 1969), pp. 440-472.
  8. Shure, Gerald H., Robert J. Meeker and Earle A. Hansford, “The Effectiveness of Pacifist Strategies in Bargaining Games,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. IX, No. 1 (March 1965), pp. 106-117.

 

VII. Interactive Models: Large Groups (89 pages)

  1. Penrose, L S., On the Objective Study of Crowd Behavior (H. K. Lewis & Company, Ltd., 1952), Chapter 6, “Panic Reactions,” pp. 28-35.
  2. Boulding, Kenneth E., Conflict and Defense (Harper & Brothers, 1962), Chapter 6, “The Group as a Party to Conflict: The Ecological Model,” pp. 105-122.
  3. Schelling, T. C., “Neighborhood Tipping,” Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper No. 100, December 1969.
  4. *Schelling, T. C., “Models of Segregation,” The American Economic Review, Vol. LIX, No. 2 (May 1969), pp. 488-493.

 

VIII. Interactive Models: Two Parties (145 pages)

  1. Boulding, Kenneth E., Conflict and Defense (Harper & Brothers, 1962), Chapter 2, “The Dynamics of Conflict: Richardson Process Models,” pp. 19-40.
  2. Goffman, Erving, Interaction Ritual (Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 97-112, “Embarrassment and Social Organization.”
  3. *Valavanis, Stefan, “The Resolution of Conflict When Utilities Interact,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 2 (June 1958), pp. 156-169.
  4. Schelling, T. C., The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press, 1963), Chapter 9, pp. 207-229.
  5. Boulding, Kenneth E., Conflict and Defense (Harper & Brothers, 1962), Chapter 12, “International Conflict: The Basic Model,” and Chapter 13, “International Conflict: Modifications,” pp. 227-273.
  6. Schelling, T. C., “War Without Pain, and Other Models,” World Politics, Vol. 15, No. 3 (April 1963), pp. 465-487.

 

IX. Randomized Decision (55 pages)

  1. *Schelling, T. C., “Zero-Sum Games,” multilith, September 1970.
  2. Schelling, T. C., The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 175-190, 201-203.

 

Total pages: 1,367

Reading period: To be assigned later [see question 6 in final examination below]

 

Economics 1030
Final Exam
January 22, 1971

There are altogether six questions. The sixth contain several alternatives, according to your choice of reading-period assignment. You are not to answer any five questions out of the six. You may not choose more than one among the alternate forms of question six. Specifically, you may answer the first five questions; you may instead answer any four among the first five and one of the alternates in question 6.

The five questions you answer will be given equal weight and are intended to require about equal time.

  1. Each of the terms, concepts or principles listed on the next page is to be identified by reference to a matrix. Several matrices are provided and are adequate, but you may prefer to construct your own. (There may be more than one matrix shown that illustrates a particular concept; some of the matrices shown may illustrate several concepts. You need not make reference to more than one–your own, or one of those shown.)
    In some cases–marked by an asterisk–you need only identify an appropriate matrix; if, for example, one of the terms were “prisoners’ dilemma,” it would be sufficient to indicate Matrix #1. In other cases–where there is no asterisk–you will have to state clearly just what it is about the indicated matrix that exemplifies the concept; for example, if “promise” were one of the terms listed, you could state that in Matrix #1, if Column had first move, Row could promise first row on condition Column choose column 1, improving the expected outcome from payoffs of 1 apiece to 2 apiece in the upper left cell.

Here are the items to be identified:

    1. warning
    2. inducing move
    3. altruist’s dilemma*
    4. zero-difference game*
    5. Pareto equilibrium
    6. convention*
    7. randomized commitment
    8. dominated strategy
    9. threat-vulnerable equilibrium
    10. social contract*
    11. [a first] alternative concepts of “arms agreement”
    12. [a second] alternative concept of “arms agreement”
    13. Insurance as a bargaining advantage or disadvantage

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

  1. Explain the concept of interposition (Charles Walters, “Interposition: The Strategy and Its Uses”), and compare it with non-violent intervention (Gene Sharp, “The Technique of Non–Violent Action,” or Howard Hubbard, “Five Long Hot Summers and How They Grew”), then examine the strategic similarities and differences between (a) naval-force interposition and (b) tactics used to blockade, occupy or immobilize a campus building.

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

  1. John Stuart Mill argued that even

…if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character, even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were the sheer deduction from the benefit.

Assuming that the hypothesis which Mill discusses is true (that nobleness in itself detracts from individual happiness), under what conditions would you expect individuals to choose to develop noble characters? Discuss with reference to readings and lectures concerning interplay of individual incentives, social organization and moral codes.

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

  1. One of the questions on a makeup examination which you will take tomorrow will be based on either an article by Smith or an article by Jones. Your limited time in the library’s rules make it impossible for you to study both articles. If the exam question is based on the Smith article, you will have a 90 percent chance of answering it correctly if you read Smith, but will surely fail to answer correctly if you read Jones; if the exam question is based on Jones, you will have a 60 percent chance of getting it right if you study Jones, no chance otherwise. You will get the question either right or wrong; no partial credit will be given.
    You want to use your study time to maximize the probability of answering the question correctly. Your examiner will choose the exam question in such a way as to minimize the same probability. Both you and she know all of the information in this paragraph, and both of you are familiar with the basic theory of two-person zero-sum games.

A.

    1. Draw a payoff matrix to illustrate the situation, letting your payoffs be represented by the probability of getting the correct answer.
    2. What will be your strategy in this situation?
    3. What will be the teacher’s strategy be?
    4. If you use the strategy which you indicated in A2, what is the probability that you will get a correct answer?

B.

You suddenly recognize that the librarian whom you will be asking for one of the articles is also your teacher’s secretary, and knows which article the question will be based on.

    1. If you could get the secretary to tell you truthfully which article you should read, what would be your probability of getting the correct answer be? (That is, you are to estimate this probability before asking for the article, on the assumption that the librarian will know the answer and answer truthfully.)
    2. If you felt that the librarian/secretary would answer your question truthfully six chances out of 10 but there was a 40 percent chance the examiner would be told that you tried to cheat, resulting in your receiving an automatic zero on this question (but with no other negative consequences), would asking the library and increase your overall probability of getting credit for the question?

C.

If you knew (and the teacher knew that you knew) that the teacher believed that you would have .7 chance of answering either question, given that you studied the right article, but you alone knew that the chances were 90 percent and 60 percent for the two articles as mentioned above:

    1. What would your strategy be?
    2. What would be your probability of getting the question right?

D

Now consider the situation where you might be able to get the question correct even if you chose the wrong article. The chances of this are 1/5 if the question is based on Smith and 2/5 if the question is based on Jones. (Both you and the teacher correctly understand the situation.)

    1. What is your strategy in this case?
    2. What is the teacher’s strategy?
    3. What are your chances for getting the correct answer?

E.

Consider the same problem as in Part D with one change: you and the teacher both know that he wants you to do as well as possible on the exam.

    1. What is your strategy?
    2. What is the teacher’s strategy?
    3. What is your probability of getting the correct answer?

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

  1. You are one of two students in a small class who have arranged to write a paper in lieu of a final exam. You are certain that the grade your paper receives will depend not only on how much time you spend on it but also on how much time the other student spends on his. Even if the examiner tries to judge your paper on its merits alone he will be unconsciously influenced by how it compares with the other student’s paper.

You estimate…

    1. …that you will lose about 3 grade points on other exams for every 10 hours you spend on this paper;
    2. …that your grade on this paper will be:
      1. 5, 9, 12, 14 or 15 points according as you spend 10, 20, 30, 40 or 50 hours on it,
      2. plus 3, 5 or 6 points if you spend 10, 20 or 30 hours more than your rival, and minus 3, 5 or 6 points if you spend 10, 20 or 30 hours less than your rival.

When you plot a smooth graph of your overall grade, taking all three factors into account–quality of your paper, quality of the competing paper, time taken away from your other courses–you get the following “contours” of your overall net score as a function of the time you both devote to your papers.

The graph is interpreted this way. If you work 30 hours and he does nothing, you get a net score of 9 (i.e., a gross score of 12 for your paper on its merits, plus 6 for superiority, less 9 for the 30 hours taken from other courses). If you both work 30 hours you get 3 (the same 12 on your own paper, less 9 on other courses, and did nothing for superiority). If you work 20 hours and he works 10, you get 6. Every point on the graph denotes a combination of your work time and his; every point has an associated net score for you; points of equal score can be connected by “contour lines” is in the graph. (The dotted lines at 45 degrees represents equal time for the two of you.)

You are quite sure that your rival, whoever he is, has a nearly identical graph when he considers his own grade in relation to the time you both spend on your papers.

  1. Draw your “reaction curve” (otherwise called in Boulding, “partial-equilibrium curve” or “reaction function”), and explain what it means.
  2. Drawing on your knowledge that your rival reaches identical estimates with respect to his own grades, draw his reaction curve.
  3. Locate and characterize any equilibria that occur.
  4. Discuss the likely amounts of work the two of you will do on each of the following alternative assumptions:
    1. Each of you can see the other work–in the library, for example–and can keep count of each other’s time, but you are unacquainted and not permitted to consult each other.
    2. You have no idea who the other student is and no way to monitor the amount of work he does, nor does he know who you are.
    3. You do not know who he is, but are sure that he can recognize you and watches you work in the library, keeping track of how much work you do.
    4. You are well enough acquainted to get together and talk the situation over, reaching an understanding about how much work you intend to do, perhaps reaching a bargain on restraining your competition; but you are not close enough friends to be unselfish toward each other and furthermore you do not know how badly each other may need grade points.

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  1. This question is based on the reading period assignment. If you chose one of the following four books answer Part A:

Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society
J. H. Dales, Pollution, Property and Prices
H. L. Nieburg, Political Violence: The Behavioral Process
Carl M. Stevens, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiation

If you chose James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, answer Part B.

If you chose Erving Goffman, Interaction Ritual, answer Part C.

If you chose Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations, answer Part D.

If you chose Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action, answer Part E.

  1. Identify one or more major themes or propositions in the book which you chose is the reading period assignment. Discuss what you consider to be the most more interesting and/or important ways that these themes illuminate the body of Economics 1030 and are in turn illuminated by it. Be specific.
  2. Buchanan and Tullock
    1. Using their concept of “cost,” explain the roles ascribed by the authors to unanimity rule, majority rule, and any other competing alternatives rules.
    2. On what conditions, if any, or with what reservations, would you accept their point of view?
  3. Goffman

Goffman’s book contains the word, “ritual,” in its title, and every chapter involves some analysis of ritual in phase-to-face behavior even though the chapters were originally independent essays. Explain what “ritual” means in this context and identify its role in the following topics of Economics 1030:

      1. Personal incentives and social organization
      2. Rules, restraints and conventions
      3. Contests and disputes
      4. Formal processes of collective decision
      5. Individual and collective bargaining
  1. Jervis
    Define signals and indices, then illustrate the manipulation of indices, and the veracity and ambiguity of signals, by reference to any one of the following sources of signals and indices, which you should examine in some detail:

    1. An advertising campaign
    2. A student’s essay on a final examination
    3. The public relations involved in the year-long process of selecting a Harvard president
  2. Olson
    Most of Olson’s book is devoted to an analysis of the behavior of large groups. How important is group size? In what ways does the behavior of small groups differ systematically from that of larger ones? What are the most important reasons for this?
    With reference to college courses, speculate briefly on the location and significance of the boundary between “small” and “large.”

Source: Personal copy of course syllabus and final examination shared for transcription at Economics in the Rear-View Mirror by Robert Dohner (Harvard, 1974; M.I.T., 1980).

Image Source: From Schelling testifying before a Senate subcommittee on national security in 1966. New York Times, Dec. 13, 2016.