Categories
Economists Harvard War and Defense Economics

Harvard. Account of his government service during WWI. Gay, 1920

Edwin F. Gay was an 1890 alumnus of the University of Michigan (A.B.) whom the Harvard Class of 1890 elected to honorary class membership its 25th anniversary. Five years later we find in the 30th anniversary report of the class a short note paying tribute to Gay’s war service. That note is posted below. Rather than overthink what might be new information worth putting into the digital record here, Economics in the Rear-view Mirror simply decided to transcribe the entire artifact. 

The previous post highlights the role Edwin F. Gay and Wesley Clair Mitchell played at the creation of the “Survey of Current Business” of the Department of Commerce, an important legacy of then Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover.

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In-depth look at the life and career of Edwin Francis Gay

Herbert Heaton. A Scholar in Action, Edwin F. Gay. Harvard University Press, 1952.

Contents

Introduction—The man and his work

    1. A Scholar in the Making, 1867-1902
    2. Harvard, 1902-1917
    3. Wartime in Washington, 1917-1919
    4. The New York “Evening Post,” 1919-1923
    5. Harvard and the Squirrel Cage, 1924-1936
    6. In and Out of the Ivory Tower, 1936-1946

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From the 1920 Report
of the Harvard Class of 1890

EDWIN FRANCIS GAY

DEGREES: (Harvard) LL.D. (Hon.); (Berlin) Ph.D.; (University of Michigan) A.B. 1890.

OCCUPATION: Publisher New York Evening Post.

Offices held in Harvard: instructor in Economics, 1902-03; assistant professor of Economics, 1903-1906; professor of Economics, 1906-1919; dean of Graduate School of Business Administration, 1908-1919. Graduated from the University of Michigan in the class of 1890 and came to Harvard as the dean of the School of Business Administration. He was elected an honorary member of our class at the time of our twenty-fifth anniversary. During the war he went to Washington where he was in charge of the allocation of shipping and at the close of the war he came to New York as the editor of the New York Evening Post where he now is.

Gay really did a wonderful work in Washington in bringing his statistical data to practical results. He started in on the Shipping Board and conceived the idea of restricting imports that were not particularly needed for war work and thus gaining space in ships for carrying munitions, food and men for our Army and those of our Allies from this country abroad. He established a splendid number of expert statisticians, each one of whom made a certain commodity a specialty. These were mostly college deans and professors who quickly acquired a book knowledge of needs and supplies of these various commodities.

For instance, a man would be devoted to the study of rubber. He would know the whole subject and have at his fingers’ ends the amount of rubber imported into this country during the last ten years; the growth of the use of rubber, and what percentage of this total could properly be called essential – to which amount importations might be safely limited without in any way injuring our war preparations. Another man would have similar knowledge of wool; another of minerals; fruits; peanuts; rabbit skins for hats; rattans and reeds for furniture; tobacco, etc., down the list of hundreds of raw materials. In this way over seven hundred and fifty thousand tons of shipping were found for the necessities of the war.

So successful was Gay in quickly starting this bureau that he was made a member of the War Trade Board, and afterwards the War Industries Board, and was the strongest man on both. He was a tremendous worker himself, and had the magnetism to inspire enthusiasm in others. It was generally conceded that he was one of the few strong men in Washington who made it possible for men and supplies to get across the water; a man of great knowledge, but no bigotry. His department was as full of Socialism as were all others in Washington. These college professors were so enthusiastic in keeping out unnecessary commodities that they laughed with glee when an unfortunate business man faced ruin as a result; but the main business was to win the war and it was confidently planned that if the armistice had not come on November 11th, on the following July the United States would have had four million men in Europe and the necessary munitions and supplies.

Source: Harvard College, Class of 1890.Thirtieth Anniversary, 1920, Secretary’s Report, No. 7, pp. 76-77.

Image Source: Portrait of professor Edwin Francis Gay (colorized by Economics in the Rear-view Mirror) from the Harvard Class Album 1914.

Categories
Economists Michigan War and Defense Economics

Michigan. Account of lecture on economic and sociological theory. Boulding, 1961

 

My first presentation at an ASSA annual meeting took place in an 8-10 a.m. session  on Sunday, December 30, 1979 in Atlanta, Georgia. At “my” session were three paper authors together with the chair. Across from the four economists sitting at the panelists’ table was a public of three. Sitting in the first row of chairs was the thesis advisor of my fellow panelist Robert Scott Gassler, Professor Kenneth Boulding. So considering the product of quality and quantity of attendees, I was pretty fortunate with that early Sunday morning public. Most of the economists following Economics in the Rear-view Mirror have their own stories of brushes with legendary economists and that was mine with Kenneth Boulding. But let’s get to the Boulding content of today’s post.

Kenneth Boulding has always been a favorite of economists with interdisciplinary leanings. Fewer probably remember him as the John Bates Clark medalist (1949) who followed Samuelson and preceded Friedman, Tobin, Arrow, Klein, and Solow. He was one of a dying breed of economists having a range and depth of interests that spanned the social sciences. He has no single method or empirical finding that has survived in the textbooks that I am familiar with. However, in most every random foray into his writings I have usually found some nugget of insight or wisdom to keep. 

This post began as an exploration of the University of Michigan student newspaper archives. I stumbled upon an account of a 1961 lecture given by Kenneth Boulding. The newspaper story included a photo of him that I had not ever seen. Most images one finds are typically of the later, American bald eagle look that was iconic Boulding and how he is etched on my memory. The image from the newspaper article is presumably from 1960 or 1961 and worth including among the economist mugshots shared by Economics in the Rear-view Mirror.

Prefacing the transcribed newspaper report of Kenneth Boulding’s 1961 lecture “Economic Theory and Sociological Theory” are (i) an interdisciplinary verse composed by Boulding (included in his contribution to the 1963 AEA Papers and Proceedings); (ii) the University of Michigan’s tribute to him on the occasion of the award of an honorary doctor of laws degree (1978); (iii) a brief biographical sketch from the finding aid to Boulding’s papers at the University of Michigan.

Links to four published works from 1962 have been appended to the post to provide some meat to the skeleton of a lecture reported in the University of Michigan newspaper account.

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A Boulding Verse

Four things that give mankind a shove
Are threats, exchange, persuasion, love;
But taken in the wrong proportions
These give us cultural abortions.
For threats bring manifold abuses
In games where everybody loses;
Exchange enriches every nation
But leads to dangerous alienation;
Persuaders organize their brothers
But fool themselves as well as others;
And love, with longer pull than hate,
Is slow indeed to propagate.

Source: Boulding, Kenneth E. “Towards a Pure Theory of Threat Systems.” The American Economic Review 53, no. 2 (1963): 424–34. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1823883.

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Honorary Degree
University of Michigan
(December 17, 1978)

Since Kenneth Boulding, of the University of Colorado at Boulder, was Professor of Economics at The University of Michigan for twenty years, we may claim him as our own. Here, stimulated by our Institute for Social Research, he was able to go “beyond economics” into the philosophical and psychological problems, ranging from consumer-behavior to war-and-peace, of conflict resolution.

Honors soon followed: the John B. Clark medal for Economics, the American Council of Learned Societies’ prize in the Humanities, the Presidency of the American Association, memberships in the National Academy of Science and the American Philosophical Society. He has been visiting Professor at the University College of Kingston, Jamaica; the University of Natal; the University of Edinburgh; and the International Christian University in Tokyo. He is at home in the world as well as the universe.

A member of the Society of Friends, Professor Boulding has carried his religious commitment into the practice of love to achieve through his more than thirty challenging books goals heretofore deemed unattainable. Early he discovered that the actual writing of poetry is a whetstone with which to sharpen one’s English prose. Out of his discipline, his humanity, and his
faith, Kenneth Boulding, to quote one of his own “eiconic” phrases from The Image, has built a true “Temple of the Mind.”

With admiration and love, therefore, The University of Michigan bestows upon him the degree Doctor of Laws.

Source: University of Michigan. Faculty History Project.

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Biographical Note from the Boulding papers at Michigan

Kenneth Ewart Boulding, professor of economics and pacifist, was born in Liverpool, England, January 18, 1910. He was educated at New College, Oxford, England (1928-1932) and the University of Chicago (1932-1934). Boulding taught economics at Colgate (1937-1941), Fisk (1942-1943), Iowa State (1943-1946), and McGill University (1946-1947) before joining the University of Michigan as a professor of economics, 1949-1967. Since 1968, Boulding has been associated with the University of Colorado at Boulder as a professor of economics and director for the Program on General Social and Economic Dynamics and the Institute of Behavioral Science.

Some of his related activities and honors included receiving the John Bates Clark Medal for Economics for 1949; a fellowship at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, 1954-1955; visiting professorships in Jamaica (1959-1960) and Japan (1963-1964); and directing the University of Michigan Center for Research in Conflict Resolution (1964-1966). Boulding also wrote numerous books, articles, and book reviews. Boulding was active in several peace, anti-nuclear, and disarmament groups, notably the Society of Friends and the National Council of Churches Department of the Church and Economic Life, and UNESCO. His wife, Elise (Biorn-Hansen) Boulding, was a sociologist and also very active in the international peace movement, women’s issues, and Quaker activities.

Kenneth Boulding viewed economics as a creative and philosophical integration of various disciplines–political science, sociology and anthropology. He coined the word “eiconics” to describe the weaving together and restructuring of interdisciplinary knowledge.

Source:  Finding aid for the Kenneth Ewart Boulding Papers, 1880-1968, University of Michigan Library.

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Boulding Cites Passage To ‘Post Civilization Era’

By PHILIP SUTIN
The Michigan Daily (March 2, 1961)

“The world is passing from the civilization era to a post civilization era,” Prof. Kenneth Boulding of the economics department said yesterday in, his lecture on “Economic Theory and Sociological Theory.”

He noted that many of the characteristics of civilization are disintegrating. Cities, national defense, poverty, and exploitation which distinguishes this order are now changing.

National Defense

As an example he cited national defense. “National defense as a social system ended in 1945,” he said.

He explained his hypothesis by the theory of oligopoly. In a bipolar situation, for example, each nation has a certain basic home strength and declining foreign power as the distance from that nation increases. A boundary of equal strength exists between the two which shifts with variations in power until one is no longer viable.

However, today nations are at a point where they are no longer unconditionally viable due to their lack of desire or inability to reduce the power of the opposition, he said.

“Oligopoly can be demonstrated by two firms, A and B, which produce identical commodities. The total costs of transportation increase with increasing distance from the firm.

“A boundary of indifference exists between them where the consumer goes equally to both.

Push Boundary

“If A should cut his price, the boundary will be pushed toward B. This price cutting and shifting of boundaries will continue until one cannot cut his price. He can then no longer be viable,” Boulding explained.

“This is analogous to the arms race,” he said.

In discussing social theory, Boulding noted that all social sciences are essentially one. Each discipline takes pieces of the social system, often in incompatible ways.

In their studies social scientists take different levels of abstraction and parcel out the various institutions. The first action, he said, is laudable while the second is deplorable.

However, social scientists cannot study people, as they are much too complicated. So they try to develop a series of abstractions which are relevant to reality.

Meet Difficulties

They run into difficulties, however, in trying to find the level of abstraction. Society encompasses the entire social systems which is fundamentally symbolic, he explained.

“Social scientists have never succeeded in developing a level of abstraction to deal with symbolic systems. They do not know what to abstract out of them or what gives these symbolic systems power,” Boulding said.

Sociology can learn a great deal from economics as many social phenomena have exchange relationships like those that occur in economics.

The basic unit of economics, he noted is the commodity. This world of commodity is seen in terms of price. “It is only accidental to the economist that people move commodities,” Boulding noted,

Generalize Exchange

However, exchange can be generalized, missing important factors in social relationships. As an example, Boulding cited labor relations. “The economist pulls out the commodity from labor, but leaves a great residue. Group relations and alternative uses of time are important factors. A great cloud of reality overshadows- the economic framework of labor relations,” Boulding said.

He noted other comparisons between economics and sociology. The economist, he said, looks at behavior as fundamentally a problem of choice.

The individual looks over the field of alternatives, puts an evaluation in terms of ordinal numbers on each possibility, and chooses number one.

However, “rational behavior may not be sensible behavior” as rationality is merely ordering the field.

The economists view people in terms of this field theory, Boulding explained. Behavorial action tends toward the point of highest utility.

Source: The Michigan Daily, vol. 71, issue 105 (March 2, 1961), p. 5.

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Sample of Boulding’s Writings
(1962)

  • Boulding, Kenneth E. Conflict and Defense. New York: Harper & Bros., 1962.
  • Boulding, Kenneth E. “Where Are We Going If Anywhere? A Look at Post-Civilization.” Human Organization 21, no. 2 (1962): 162–67. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44127756 .
  • Boulding, Kenneth E. “The Death of the City: A Frightened Look at Post-Civilization.” Ekistics 13, no. 75 (1962): 19–22. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43617612 .
  • Davis, James A., and Kenneth E. Boulding. Review of Two Critiques of Homans’ Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms, by George Caspar Homans. American Journal of Sociology 67, no. 4 (1962): 454–61. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2775146.

Image Source:  The Michigan Daily, vol. 71, issue 105 (March 2, 1961), p. 5.

Categories
Chicago Economics Programs Economists Harvard UCLA War and Defense Economics

Harvard. Economics Ph.D. alumnus, Jack Hirshleifer, 1950

 

This UCLA economics department obituary of Jack Hirshleifer is so good that Economics in the Rear-view Mirror keeps a copy for its “Meet an economics Ph.D. alumnus/a” series. Hirschleifer was Brooklyn born and Harvard bred, but his scientific fruit definitely ripened in the California sun.

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Harvard Ph.D. 1950

Jack Hirshleifer, S.B. [Harvard] 1946 (1945), A.M. [Harvard] 1948.

Subject, Economics. Special Field, Labor Problems. Thesis, “Price Flexibility and General Interdependence.”

Source: Harvard University. Report of the President of Harvard College 1949-50, p. 197.

__________________________

UCLA
Department of Economics

Obituary of Jack Hirshleifer

Education:

Ph.D. Harvard University

Research Areas:

Economic analysis of conflict; bioeconomics with particular reference to sources of cooperative behavior and the nature of evolutionary equilibrium; voluntary provision of public goods.

Biography:

Jack Hirshleifer, professor emeritus of economics, died July 26, 2005, bringing to a close a career marked by wide- ranging interests and brilliant contributions to the subfields of information economics, investment and capital theory, bioeconomics, and the economic theory of conflict.

After active duty in the U.S. Naval Reserve during World War II, Hirshleifer completed his A.B. degree at Harvard, magna cum laude. Five years later he had earned his doctorate in economics, also at Harvard. From 1949 to 1955 he worked as an economist at the Rand Corporation. Before coming to UCLA in 1958, he took a postdoctoral fellowship in statistics and economics at the University of Chicago where he also taught for five years.

His extensive publications included seven books and close to a 100 scholarly articles. From his first study, Water Supply: Economics, Technology, and Policy [Chicago, 1960] to The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory [Cambridge, 2001], Professor Hirshleifer in his scholarship has demonstrated a clarity of analysis and probing for fundamental assumptions which set him apart as one of the most distinguished economists of his generation.

Elected a fellow of both the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Econometric Society, Professor Hirshleifer also served on the editorial boards of the American Economic Review, the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, and the Journal for Bioeconomics. In 2000 he was elected a Distinguished Fellow of the American Economic Association. He also served as president of the Western Economic Association and as vice- president of the American Economic Association.

Professor Hirshleifer was deeply respected by all his fellow faculty members during his 33 years as a member of the UCLA economics department. His door was always open for any colleague, graduate student or undergraduate who might feel like “popping- in.” While a giant among researchers, Professor Hirshleifer was also deeply committed to the teaching of economics. As a teacher he always strove to give his students a sense of his own deep fascination with the role of competitive markets. This led him to write a revolutionary and best- selling textbook in intermediate microeconomics, Price Theory and Applications. While prior books focused on modeling and theory, the new text added dozens of intriguing real world illustrations of economics forces at work. Through his own text- book and through the many texts that have copied his approach, Professor Hirshleifer continues to influence tens of thousands of undergraduates each year.

Tribute by David Levine

Jack Hirshleifer was an economic theorist with broad-ranging interests. Two areas in economics have especially felt the impact of his work. Early in his career, he was instrumental in the information economics revolution; late in his career, he expanded the domain of economic discourse with his work on evolutionary economics and conflict resolution.

Hirshleifer spanned a broad range of issues in his early work as one of the founding fathers of information economics. He made the abstract ideas of contingent claims concrete through his examples and applications. In the process, he helped develop fundamental tools, such as the covariance of risks, the analysis of gambling and insurance, the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, and the analysis of public investment. He also expanded the range of information economics with two fundamental contributions. His work on the private and social value of information clearly shows that competitive markets need not reflect the social value of information. His example of an inventor who can invest based on the knowledge of the impact of his invention shows that there can be an oversupply of inventive activity. This “race to be first” has its reflection in the current literature on patent races, and represents a fundamental problem in intellectual property law that the profession is only now coming to grips with. His second fundamental contribution showed that differences in taste are not enough to explain speculation. He was the first to analyze speculation in a full general-equilibrium model, with different structures of market completeness carefully considered. Although not generally recognized as such, this is also the first paper to point out the indeterminacy of equilibrium when markets are incomplete.

In addition to his founding contributions in information economics, Hirshleifer had a lifelong interest in conflict, beginning with his earliest work on war damages. Late in his career this area became the focus of his contributions, and he was a leader in extending economic methods to problems more traditionally studied in political science. He wrote broadly on expanding the domain of economic discourse to include the “rational” evolutionary analysis of altruism and spite. His work on conflict showed how “Peace is more likely to the extent that the decisiveness of conflict is low, or … if the stakes are small or the technology favors the defense. More surprisingly, perhaps, increased productive complementarity between the parties does not systematically favor peace…the poorer side is generally motivated to invest more heavily in fighting effort. So conflict can become an income-equalizing process.” Finally, his weakest link/best shot experiment (with Glenn Harrison) demonstrates that economic incentives play a key role in determining how much people will contribute to a public good.

Tribute by Roger Farmer

I was approached last month by Junyao Ying, a UCLA alum who is now working in China. Junyao and his wife Weiyi Qiu have recently translated Jack’s book, Investment Interest and Capital into Chinese. Junyao asked me to write a few words about Jack for the translation. This is what I wrote.

The economics department at UCLA was a very exciting place in the 1980s, not least because of Jack Hirshleifer.  Many of us ate lunch every day in the Faculty Center, and being in Southern California, most days we ate outdoors in the sunshine.  Jack would arrive at 12.00 sharp with an economic question for the day that he would pose to the table. Jack’s questions would be from the news of the day and the analysis he expected would be in the UCLA style.

The department had a unique approach to economics and Jack, along with Harold Demsetz, Armen Alchian, Ben Klein and later, Al Harberger, were a huge part of that. Their economics was intuitive, often verbal, but always incisive.  One story, relayed to me by another UCLA  giant of the era, Axel Leijonhufvud, expresses well the Socratic teaching style that permeated the UCLA curriculum. As Axel relays it, he was sitting in on Armen’s first graduate micro class when the master appeared, paced back and forth for a few minutes, and then boomed loudly: “So why don’t we sell babies anyway?”

Jack had the same approach. Many of our discussions would end up around one of his favorite topics: the economics of disasters. Earthquakes were never far from our minds and Jack was an expert on what today we might call black swan events. LA earthquakes are relatively frequent but they typically register less than 5.0 on the Richter Scale, enough to shake the floor, but usually not to do much damage. Sometimes we see larger quakes and every century or so, an 8.0 magnitude quake brings significant loss of life. Jack pointed out that, if you go far enough back in the fossil record, there have been earthquakes large enough to cause a slippage in the earth’s crust large enough to move two points that were previously next to each other five miles apart!

Jack was an economic imperialist. He believed passionately that the economic method can and should be applied to all of the social sciences. While we may not all share that opinion, in this time of crisis, we can nevertheless benefit from Jack’s insights. He may not be here in person to opine on how to deal with black swan events,  but we can still learn from Jack by reading his written words.

Publications

“War Damage Insurance,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 35, No. 2. (May 1953), pp. 144-153. Argues that vulnerability rated war damage insurance would create private incentives to make property less vulnerable to enemy bombing, and that this would be superior to administrative fiat.

“On the Theory of Optimal Investment Decision,” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 66, No. 4. (Aug 1958), pp. 329-352. Examines different internal rate of return and present value rules when there is a divergence between borrowing and lending rates, and shows that while the problem can be solved by careful consideration of the budget constraint,  neither of these rules gives the correct answer all the time.

“Risk, The Discount Rate, and Investment Decisions,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 51, No. 2(May 1961), pp. 112-120. Discusses how covariance of new risks with the existing portfolio makes it desirable to diversify by adding new risks.

“Investment Decision Under Uncertainty: Choice-Theoretic Approaches,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 79, No. 4. (Nov 1965), pp. 509-536; and “Investment Decision under Uncertainty: Applications of the State-Preference Approach,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 80, No. 2. (May 1966), pp. 252-277. These two paper develop the time-state-preference approach (what we now call the state-contingent model) applied to traditional problems in economics: gambling and insurance; Modigliani-Miller Theorem and evaluation of public projects.

“Urban Water Supply: A Second Look,” (with  J. W. Milliman) The American Economic Review, Vol. 57, No. 2 (May 1967), pp. 169-178. In a famous earlier work with J.C. DeHaven Water Supply: Economics, Technology and Policy(University of Chicago Press, 1960) alternative methods of supplying water to Southern California were subject to cost-benefit analysis. This paper review what actually happened: policy makers ignored the advice, and chose what both prospectively and retrospectively was the worst economic choice. They conclude: “It appears that the agenda for economists, at this point, should place lower priority upon the further refinement of advice for those efficient and selfless administrators who may exist in never-never land. Rather, it should focus on devising institutions whereby fallible and imperfect administrators may be forced to learn from error.”

“The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 61, No. 4. (Sep 1971), pp. 561-574.   Makes the simple yet crucial point that the benefit of receiving information first bears no necessary relationship to the social value of the information. For example, inventive activity may be oversupplied because the inventor can make investments based upon knowledge of the invention. This paper also makes careful use of an infinitesimal deviant individual in a representative individual world.

“Speculation and Equilibrium: Information, Risk, and Markets,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 89, No. 4. (Nov 1975), pp. 519-542. This paper shows that differences in taste are not enough to explain speculation – differences in beliefs are required. Unlike earlier work on speculation that ignores the endogeneity of prices, the setup here is a full general equilibrium model, with different structures of market completeness carefully considered. In particular, market incompleteness alone cannot explain speculation.  Although not generally recognized as such, this is the first paper to point out the indeterminacy of equilibrium in an incomplete market setting.

“Competition, Cooperation, and Conflict in Economics and Biology,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 68, No. 2 (May 1978), pp. 238-243. This paper draws connections between the economics and sociobiology literature, and marks the beginning of Hirshleifer’s interest in sociobiology and conflict.

“The Expanding Domain of Economics,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 75, No. 6. (Dec 1985), pp. 53-68. This paper is a broad overview of the application of economic logic to a variety of “non-economic” problems. Hirshleifer begins by examining endogeneity of preferences. He identifies the different between altruistic preferences, and what would now be called the “warm-glow” effect of participation. He reviews Becker’s “rotten kid” theorem, which says that an altruistic parent can actually gain from altruism. As an alternative theory of preferences, models of status, such as the rat-race are examined. The underlying point of view is that of “as-if” rationality – altruism must provide some benefit to the altruist. From this perspective, Hirshleifer examines models such as the psychological model of “anger, gratitude, response” and argues that seemingly irrational behavior does indeed benefit the individual. The final topic is once again that of conflict. A narrow range of possible settlements it is argued increases the potential for conflict. Increasing returns followed by diminishing returns explains the monopoly on military force within the state, while also explaining the multiplicity of states.

“An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods,” (with Glenn W. Harrison) The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97, No. 1. (Feb 1989), pp. 201-225. This experimental contribution to the public goods literature explores how the increasing incentives to free ride lead to greater free riding. This paper also introduces the “best-shot” game, a public goods contribution game in which only the largest contribution to the public good matters. In this type of game it is socially and individually optimal for only one player to contribute, and unlike many other types of public goods games, this theoretical prediction is exactly what happens in the laboratory.

“The Technology of Conflict as an Economic Activity,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 2  (May 1991), pp. 130-134. “Peace is more likely to the extent that the decisiveness of conflict is low, or … if the stakes are small or the technology favors the defense. More surprisingly, perhaps, increased productive complementarity between the parties does not systematically favor peace…the poorer side is generally motivated to invest more heavily in fighting effort. So conflict can become an income-equalizing process.”

Source: Jack Hirshleifer UCLA page archived by the Wayback Machine.

Image Source: The 1946 Harvard Class Album, p. 153.

Categories
Economists Harvard War and Defense Economics

Harvard. Reactions to Galbraith’s call for students to boycott professors doing classified government research, 1967

 

Looking through my files of material from the Gottfried Haberler papers at the Hoover Institution Archives, I came across an unpublished, heavily sarcastic “letter to the editor” of the Harvard Crimson by the economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron in reaction to John Kenneth Galbraith’s statement at an anti-war event at Radcliffe in which he suggested that students could reasonably consider boycotting the classes of professors engaged in classified research to protest that war. One of Galbraith’s targets was clearly his colleague Arthur Smithies. (“I assume that Professor Smithies would suppress all protest. Many will doubt the wisdom of this course as also, I trust, the wickedness of the secret work on which he is engaged.”) While the rules of English grammar are such that Galbraith did explicitly state “many will doubt…the wickedness of [Smithies’] secret work…”, it is a pretty cheeky way to simultaneously mention that there are indeed some who will see Smithies’ secret work in a wicked light.

The post ends with a later Harvard Crimson article that reports on Smithies’ career, with considerable emphasis on his work for the U.S. government (including the C.I.A.) on South Vietnam’s economy. We also see below that Thomas Schelling was so little amused by Galbraith’s boycott proposal as to have written a letter for actual publication in the Harvard Crimson.

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“Galbraith Asks Campus Blacklist of Recruiters”

The Boston Globe. 14 November 1967 pp. 1,9.

            Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith urged Monday that college students oppose the Vietnam War by publicly blacklisting war-linked campus recruiting agencies and by boycotting professors engaged in classified government research.

Speaking at Radcliffe College, Galbraith explained his blacklist as a “proclamation” on which signatories would state their intention to refuse to work for agencies, such as Dow Chemical Co. or the C.I.A.

A boycott of professors engaged in classified research, he said, would be a “particularly effective way of expressing your opposition.”

The former U.S. ambassador to India, publicly backed “moderate” student demonstrations before a packed Harvard Radcliffe group in Hilles Library.

He cautioned the students against protests that are “violent or in egregiously bad taste.”

These, he said, would “provide a welcomed handle for the opposition.”

Galbraith said he had discussed his blacklist and boycott proposals with colleagues and many found them favorable. He called both courses “legitimate means of dissent within the university framework of conduct rules.”

He originated the black-list concept at talks with business and government leaders who indicated that recruiters are “greatly concerned with campus recruiting demonstrations,” Galbraith said.

Turing to anti-war referenda, Galbraith advised they would have more chances of success if they were worded “for political reality rather [than] for candor.”

The San Francisco anti-war referenda would have had a good chance for approval had it been stated in “milder” terms, he said. (This referendum, which asked: ‘should the U.S. immediately withdraw from Vietnam?’ drew a 38 percent affirmative response.)

“It would be an enormous mistake to assume your protest efforts have been futile,” he told students. Only three years ago, he said the State and Defense Departments” would have assumed wide spread acceptance of escalation.

“But now, in the wake of widespread university opposition to the war, there has been a snowballing effect of mounting opposition.”

His talk was sponsored by the Committee for Effective Action, a student group “opposed to the war but frustrated by the means of opposing it,” explained its spokesman. This was the first of an expected four or five meetings with the faculty.

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Letter from John Kenneth Galbraith

The Harvard Crimson, November 16, 1967

To the Editors of the CRIMSON:

My distinguished colleague may be out of touch with recent discussion, but the issue is probably worth explaining. Students here and elsewhere have been told how they may not react to university involvement in military activities of which they disapprove. With other Faculty members I assume that this carries an obligation to say how they may react. I suggested (initially in Michigan and later here) that they organize to avoid employment in corporations of whose products they disapprove and classes of professors whose secret contracts they deplore. (I also suggested that this last was inapplicable under Harvard policy and that there be combined effort to find other forms of legitimate and effective protest.) I assume that Professor Smithies would suppress all protest. Many will doubt the wisdom of this course as also, I trust, the wickedness of the secret work on which he is engaged.

John Kenneth Galbraith
Paul M. Warburg Professor of Economics

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Unsent, but circulated, reaction to Galbraith’s proposal
by Alexander Gerschenkron

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

M-7 Littauer Center
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Alexander Gerschenkron
Walter S. Barker Professor of Economics

November 16, 1967

The Editor
The Crimson
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Sir,

It is with greatest possible interest that I have read of Professor Galbraith’s suggestion that students should boycott lectures of those members of the Faculty who are known to engage in classified research. This is a most original and stimulating idea, which is not surprising as nothing less novel and exciting could be expected from Professor Galbraith’s fertile mind.

The only thing that disturbs me are problems of implementation. Professor Galbraith abstained from discussing them, probably feeling that what mattered was to cast abroad a fine idea, while the rest could be safely left to more pedestrian minds. May I try to fill out the gap? Obviously, the first thing that is needed is to provide some machinery in order to discover just who is engaged in classified research. I suggest therefore, that the Student-Faculty Committee should immediately establish a special Sub-Committee charged with carrying out the requisite investigations. It should be called “Student-Faculty Sub-Committee on Un-Left Activities.” This Sub-Committee should interrogate members of the faculty. A difficulty to be faced will no doubt stem from the lack of subpoena powers on the part of the Sub-Committee. But the problem should not be insoluble. The Administration should be put under pressure to agree that those members of the Faculty who 1) refuse to appear before the Un-Left Sub-Committee or, 2) if appearing, refuse to name those colleagues whose connection with classified research is known to them, or 3) refuse to answer questions concerning their own classified research, should be informed by the Administration that such refusals constitute contempt of the Un-Left Sub-Committee, and, by the same token, must be regarded as acts of gross misconduct. In all fairness, the offenders should be given a fortnight to reconsider, but should they stubbornly persist in their hostile attitude, their connection with the University should be severed without further delay.

On the other hand, should the Administration hesitate to accede to the Sub-Committee’s fair and reasonable demands, which as Professor Galbraith likes to say are surely justified by the extraordinary situation in which the country finds itself, occupation of University Hall by the students should be the first natural step, if necessary, to be followed by other more stringent measures.

Thus Professor Galbraith’s idea appears to be altogether practicable. In conclusion, I cannot help praising his wise restraint. He could have suggested, for instance, that also lectures of those Faculty members who either themselves express Un-Left opinions or associate with colleagues who have expressed Un-Left opinions should be boycotted by the students. That he failed to make such suggestions agrees well with the sapient counsels of moderation which informed his speech.

Very truly yours,
[signed]
Alexander Gerschenkron

AG:dod

Note: For reasons well within this writer’s control, the foregoing epistle has failed to reach the editorial office of The Crimson.

Source: The Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Gottfried Haberler, Box 12, Folder “GH—Alexander Gerschenkron”.

_________________________

Letter from John Kenneth Galbraith

The Harvard Crimson, November 16, 1967

To the Editors of The CRIMSON:

I am persuaded that at some risk of repetition I should be sure that there is no misunderstanding of my recent remarks on legitimate and non-violent forms of student protest as these concern University involvements with military activities. Two or three weeks ago in Detroit I was asked to comment on prospective efforts to obstruct physically the Willow Run laboratories operated on contract by the University of Michigan and engaged, I am told, on development of highly secret materiel for use in Vietnam. I urged not alone the futility but the adverse public effects of such action; I said that a better remedy lay against the Faculty members who ran this enterprise. Students might organize to avoid their classes, i.e., peacefully to boycott them. Last Monday evening at the meeting in the Hilles Library arranged by [Radcliffe] President Bunting to discuss legitimate forms of protest I repeated (along with others) this suggestion and added that this particular one would not be without effect on those who sponsored such work in a university but that it did not have application at Harvard where, wisely, the Administration frowned on secret contracts. I confess that I did not think of the possible application of my suggestion to confidential or secret consulting work or research by individual Harvard professors. A member of the Faculty has since invited the attention of those who are, with sufficient reason, sensitive to the association between the University Community and this war. Additionally, my reference to boycott, which of course means peaceful abstention, was evidently taken to mean some kind of physical action.

I would like to urge in the most earnest possible fashion that there be no effort by anyone, students in particular, to identify and oppose in any manner the individual participation by Faculty members in confidential or secret tasks of the government. There is a radical difference between this varied and individual work and the classified contracts for weapons development which I had in mind. This individual work covers a wide range of matters and much, or most, has no bearing on military activity. Most of it is the work of those Faculty members with the strongest instinct for public service. An effort to discriminate between approved and disapproved work would import into the academic community an improper concern for the extra-curricular pacifists who are so engaged as to those who are otherwise disposed. It could also be a most disagreeable source of tension and suspicion.

As members of the Harvard community will be aware, I am not indifferent to the Vietnam war. I regard it as an appalling tragedy; to no other matter of my adult life have I devoted more effort than to opposing the war. But I would be profoundly and also greatly embarrassed were anyone to take my remarks at Radcliffe as an invitation to any form of opposition to the participants of individual Faculty members, on a public or confidential basis, in government activities. Needless to say, none of this impairs in any way my promise at the Radcliffe meeting to work with concerned Faculty members and students to devise other effective, legitimate and non-violent forms of protest.

John Kenneth Galbraith
Paul M. Warburg Professor of Economics

_________________________

Letter from Thomas Schelling in response to Galbraith’s boycott proposal

The Harvard Crimson, December 5, 1967

To the Editors of the CRIMSON:

While I’ve seen no indication that Professor Galbraith’s proposed boycott of professors who do classified research for the government is going to stimulate a new movement, it does raise important questions about the personal activities of faculty members and the ways they may be involved with the government, and about the appropriate selection of target for protest. May I explain why I think his proposal is probably not workable and, if not workable, objectionable?

Let me first point out that Professor Galbraith did not propose that students boycott those professors whose research is objectionable, nor did he clarify what research would be objectionable. His reference was merely to “classified” research. I’m sure that by almost anyone’s standards of wickedness (Galbraith’s term) some classified research would be found unobjectionable. People concerned about the dissemination of nuclear technology, about the limitation of weapons, even about ways of ending the war in Vietnam, often require classified information to do their work or, at least, have to be exposed to classified information in doing their work and cannot do it unless they are willing to safeguard what the government calls “security.” Even if the character of everybody’s classified research could be ascertained, drawing the line between the objectionable and the unobjectionable, or between what any reasonable man would consider objectionable and what some reasonable men might consider to be in the public interest, would require subjective judgments. (Most classified research, incidentally, is probably unrelated to Vietnam.)

Second, much of the unclassified research that goes on would be objectionable to people who oppose any kind of war-related research; and to exclude such unclassified research would be arbitrary discrimination.

Third, “research” itself is difficult to define. Many faculty members are occasionally consultants or members of advisory boards in various agencies, or participants in government-sponsored conferences, sometimes classified, sometimes unclassified. Whether their influence is benign or malignant would be hard to judge; so would the degree of support or implied approval in attendance at a meeting at which one criticizes a government program or decision.

And if unclassified contributions had to pass the same strict test as classified work, to qualify for boycott or immunity from it, one would have to ask whether an activity like the Peace Corps is to be treated as a propaganda arm of the Johnson administration or as a benign and constructive activity. Again a judgment depends on a complex evaluation of the different purposes that a government program may serve.

Finally, are Faculty members who are unaffiliated with the government in any fashion, classified or unclassified, but who openly support the administration’s policy toward Vietnam, to qualify for boycott? It seems strange to exclude them; but again the line would be hard to draw for those who neither wholly support the conduct or the war nor are wholly committed to one drastic alternative. (It is unclear to me on which side of the line Professor Galbraith would be placed.)

I could go on multiplying the difficulties of finding a reasonable line to draw between the non-university-administered activities of professors that are objectionable and those that are not, whatever one’s standards of wickedness; and, further, I doubt whether there is enough consensus on standards to make it possible to draw an agreed line, even if some people think they know where to draw it. If I’m right about this, any line has to be arbitrary, as Professor Galbraith’s line was arbitrary. (If Professor Galbraith interprets his original proposal as applying only to university-administered research, the line is clearer but only because more arbitrary.)

If, though, the line is arbitrary–if its purpose just to mark out an identifiable target without regard to the nature of the research itself or of the non-research activity–then, aside from the likelihood that an embarrassingly large number of angels will be caught in the netful of devils, there is the question of what is being objected to and what the purpose of the boycott is. The purpose can no longer be described as bringing pressure to bear to get objectionable activities terminated. Rather, it would look–to me, at any rate–as though a boycott were being used to induce a particular group of professors to join a boycott against the government, or to embarrass them for declining to join a boycott.

Whatever my feelings about Professor Galbraith’s protest movement, I resent his proposal that students organize to coerce me into joining it. And I hope nobody stays away from Professor Galbraith’s classes in a vain organized attempt to embarrass him into changing his politics.

T.C. Schelling
Professor of Economics

_________________________

An Academic [Arthur Smithies] in the War
By Seth M. Kupferberg

The Harvard Crimson, May 23, 1975

Edward F. Chamberlin, superintendent of Kirkland House, tells a story about a Kirkland celebration that took place some years back, when Arthur Smithies was House master. Smithies was pouring drinks for the members of the victorious House crew team, starting with the bow man and working towards the stern of the shell, and as he reached the stroke, someone brought word that he had just become a grandfather.

“He kept right on—he just said, ‘Coxswain!'” Chamberlin recalls, chuckling. ‘”Coxswain, take your wine…’ We almost died.”

Smithies–Ropes Professor of Political Economy and a long-time adviser in the Saigon bureau of the Agency for International Development—gave up his mastership—”certainly Harvard’s best job,” he says—last spring. (“You can stay on past 66 as a professor but you have to retire as a master,” he grouses. “It should be the other way around—the brain deteriorates before the body does.”) But the story of the Agassiz Cup celebration still seems characteristic of him—both in content and in style, for a certain kind of sharp, logical humor as well as, perhaps, a certain cheerful indifference to happenings that would excite or upset or change the attitudes of many people. It’s a style, arguably, that found expression in Smithies’s work in Vietnam as well as his praise of the Agassiz Cup winners—and there, it was likely to have larger effects and meanings, since it served a side in an internecine war instead of an intramural regatta.

At the simplest, most straightforward level, the Agassiz Cup story is characteristic because it’s about crew—the sport that in 1929 helped bring Smithies, a 22-year-old Australian law student, the great-grandson of the first Methodist minister in western Tasmania, a Rhodes Scholarship. Finding England “too structured for my taste,” Smithies went on to discover “the fleshpots of the United States” with a Commonwealth Fellowship and a Model A Ford, earn a quick Harvard doctorate in economics, return to Australia briefly to work in its treasury department, then settle in the United States for good.

Smithies accepted tenure at Harvard in 1949—partly “so I could take up rowing again”—and continued to work at budgetary and fiscal economics. He also demonstrated an idiosyncratic kind of firmness—”I’m a believer in strict academic requirements, but for something important, like seat-races, I would make an exception,” he once told a Kirkland House oarsman. In its more political manifestations, many students came to find Smithies’s firmness objectionable. “People used to go around screaming ‘CIA Agent!’ and things at me,” he recalls. For when anti-ROTC students occupied University Hall in April 1969 and opened the files of then dean of the Faculty Franklin L. Ford, one of the letters they released to The Old Mole, the underground Cambridge newspaper that folded in 1970, was from Smithies. Dated December 7, 1967, it read: “The Central Intelligence Agency has instructed its consultants to inform their official superiors of this connection with the Agency. I hereby inform you of my connection of ten years duration. I wish I could, add that there is something subtly interesting or sinister about it.”

The tinge of self-mockery—the impatience of a person who takes certain things for granted, maybe—was typical: the same slight aloofness you sense when Smithies says he spends his free time “rowing boats and toiling in my garden,” as though the joys of domesticity in Belmont, like England, are a little too structured for his taste. But that didn’t stop the CIA letter from kicking up a minor storm.

“The CIA is divided sharply into two parts—covert and overt,” Smithies—who says he was most recently consulted by the agency, regarding a report on the future of the Vietnamese economy, last year—explains now. “For about ten years I’d go down there and review their papers on national economic matters: I’ve never been the cloak-and-dagger type. But naturally they made a big fuss about it,” he concludes, with something close to approval. “That’s good tactics.”

It was partly an exclusive attention to improving tactics—rather than more fundamental questions about the Vietnam war—that the University Hall occupiers and other Harvard radicals objected to in Smithies, even before they discovered his CIA letter, Smithies traces his service as an Agency for International Development consultant, advising the Republic of Vietnam on its fiscal policy and rates of international exchange, to previous foreign-affairs interests that included involvement in administering the Marshall Plan. He says he was regarded as a liberal both as a young teacher at the University of Michigan, where he defended the Michigan Daily‘s right to take leftist editorial stands, and in his early years in the Harvard Economics Department, where Keynesians like him were still an embattled minority.

And he still offers qualified praise for radical economists like Stephen A. Marglin ’59 or other members of the Union of Radical Political Economists—for aiming at a historical perspective on economic systems. “I think if they’d let me I’d be more of an ally than I am,” he says. “I don’t like a narrow concentration on Marx—I think it should also include Weber and people like that. I also and not a socialist, and URPE people generally are socialists—I firmly believe in the mixed economy.” For his part, Marglin says he agrees with Smithies’s stress on “the historical nature of economic theory and the fact that neo-classical theory is not the pinnacle of economic thought.” But he claims that Smithies shares orthodox economists’ bias toward marginal improvements that don’t call basic assumptions into question—”that perspective divides him pretty fundamentally from most URPE people,” he says.

Even setting aside Smithies’s belief in a mixed economy, Marglin’s criticism isn’t too surprising—budgetary economics by definition focuses on evaluating means, not ends, which it takes more or less for granted. Smithies’s book, The Budgetary Process in the United States, begins by calling a description of the ways the government sets its priorities “quite enough for one volume and one author,” and it offers only one assumption about how the budgetary process should end up—that “government decision-making can be improved by the clear formulation of alternatives.” Like his work on the budget, Smithies’s work on Vietnamese fiscal policy took its basic political framework more or less for granted.

And like the Agassiz Cup celebration, it was carried on with a certain quiet bravado, even in defiance of what many people might think of as reflex reactions to human events. Apart from his consulting work for AID—which kept him in.

During the height of campus anti-war activity, Smithies recalls, “People used to go around screaming ‘CIA Agent!’ and things at me.” Saigon most summers—Smithies wrote several reports, comparable to other American economists’ and political scientists’ attempts to improve the Saigon government’s chances and provide scientific descriptions of its progress.

Like these other writers, Smithies’s descriptions often reflected Saigon’s assumptions and interests, and so worked to limit debate in the United States and thus to keep the Saigon government strong. Not all American analysts acknowledged this political effect of their writing, but to many of their critics. It was its most important aspect. For the politics underlying questions of Vietnamese economic development included more even than questions about who should manage development and profit from it. The human, political context AID economists could all but ignore also included the struggle over these questions that was killing people and making them homeless, the struggle in which the government AID belonged to was playing an increasingly dominant part.

In a 1971 report commissioned by the Institute for Defense Analyses, called “Economic Development in Vietnam: The Need for External Resources,” and based on a “planning assumption” of “military stalemate and withering away of the war, a process that can last for a decade or more.” Smithies called for $500 million a year in American aid to the Saigon government “during the next decade,” and $700 million more in financing, preferably from an international consortium of countries, “for the indefinite future.” And while noting some of the bad effects of the war on South Vietnam’s economy—such as an unfavorable balance of trade, governmental corruption, the destruction of bridges and the defoliation of forests—Smithies also took note of countervailing factors, such as “the increase in the expectations of the Vietnamese people,” which he suggested would remain after “the horrors of war” had faded.

“The war has provided Vietnam with paved highways from end to end, with more airfields than it can possibly use, with spectacular harbors, with an elaborate communications system, with power plants, and with potable water in Saigon,” Smithies wrote.” …While it is impossible to make an accurate inventory of the changes in the infrastructure during the war, the impression is inescapable that the plusses greatly outweigh the minuses.” It was the kind of report that led Frances Fitzgerald ’62 to call AID economics “perhaps the ultimate expression of American hubris.”

Today, Smithies—who says he grew to like Saigon very much, despite a “very rarefied atmosphere” that necessitated weekly trips to the provinces for a reminder that there was a war going on—is naturally less sanguine. “Whatever the merits of the cause. I’m deeply disturbed to see the U.S. forced into a position of unconditional surrender under any circumstances,” he says. “And it’s not clear to me that there is still a clear direction to foreign policy.”

“I wouldn’t have gone there unless I thought the objective of a free and independent South Vietnam was a worthwhile one,” he continues, “and it’s fairly obvious that we didn’t pursue that role at all effectively.” Nevertheless, Smithies stresses American advisers’ accomplishments in such areas as improving rice strains—”whatever side you’re on politically, this was a useful thing,” he says—and the importance of combating “the impression that everyone connected with Vietnam was a scoundrel.”

“I think the economic staff there was really doing a good job,” he says. “In the economic and financial areas there were some very good Vietnamese and some very devoted and sincere Vietnamese—extremely able and also extremely patriotic. I can’t say the same for some of the corps commanders—but in the welter of recriminations there’s a tendency to forget what was good.”

* * *

It took just a few days after the Provisional Revolutionary Government’s victory last month for Smithies’s acquaintances to stop asking him, as at least one had the first day, about “the end of those summers in Saigon.” In the burgeoning New England spring, Saigon seemed very far away. It seemed more appropriate to remember smaller-scale settings for imperturbability in the face of exciting or famous or upsetting people or events—the Agassiz Cup celebration, say, or the Kirkland House dinner two years ago at which Smithies gave President Bok a long, pointed introduction, replete with references to “the days when the University was interested in education—before the present administration took office.” (“These occasions can get very stolid if you don’t liven ’em up a bit,” Smithies explains now. “I think one ought to be mildly provocative—what do you think?”)

At most, it seemed in keeping with the intoxicating spring weather to remember Smithies’s 1969 visit to occupied University Hall—the only one by a master, possibly helping to inspire his belief that by playing a “civilizing role,” “the House system vindicated itself in 1969 as I haven’t seen it do before or since.” Smithies says the visit was mostly a matter of bravado, “rather foolish. I suppose,” but he still seems proud of it—he’s supposed to have informed an occupier who called him an administration spy that he had “rather more right to be here than you do.” The occupiers voted to expel Smithies, but they allowed him to speak first. “It was rather reassuring, in a way,” he said, but the occupiers evidently weren’t sympathetic—”all I remember just what he said, but the occupiers evidently weren’t sympathetic—”all I remember is that it was philosophically weird,” one of them said recently.

Meanwhile, Smithies continued to teach macroeconomic theory, scull on the Charles, lunch in the Kirkland dining hall, even be mildly provocative, if only because senior English majors in the House were taking general exams, on such moderately unlikely subjects as the poetry of T.S. Eliot ’10. “My wife and I used to be very fond of Eliot—I think we still are,” Smithies explained later, but at lunch, he didn’t seem so sure.

“But is it poetry–the broad-backed hippopotamus?” he asked his companions, a little quizzically. Then he proceeded to rattle off three or four stanzas: The broad-backed hippopotamus Rests on his belly in the mud; Although he seems so firm to us He is merely flesh and blood…

“Is that poetry–or is it just a jingle?” he asked again. No one offered an immediate answer: things were back to normal.

Steven B. Geovanis

Image Sources:  Left to right. Smithies and Galbraith from Harvard Class Album 1958; Gerschenkron from Harvard Class Album 1957.

Categories
Duke Harvard M.I.T. Nebraska Virginia War and Defense Economics

United States. College and University Courses on War Economics, 1942

 

This post is limited to the economics courses reported in a survey conducted in the days and months after the attack on Pearl Harbor that provides an extensive list of “War Courses” offered at U.S. colleges and universities at the time. The post begins with a short description of the survey itself. Next, two tables provide the names of institutions, courses (with descriptions), and instructors together with enrollment statistics. The post ends with a short bibliography of books listed for some of the courses on war economics.

Most of the courses in the survey (and not included here) concern administrative matters such as the procedures governing military procurement. There is at least one course on the economics of war that had been organized at Harvard by Seymour Harris not included in this survey (68 schools did not respond).

_________________________

Not included in the survey

Harvard University. Economic Aspects of War, organized by Seymour Harris, 1940

Final Exam for Economic Aspects of War, 1940

_________________________

How the Study was was Made
[pp. 11-13]

In April, 1942, a study was issued entitled A Report on War Courses offered by Collegiate Schools of Business and Departments of Economics. In this study were presented the combined information sent in by 58 schools and departments listing 196 separate courses. The Department of Commerce in cooperation with the National Conference of State University Schools of Business had distributed these questionnaires to approximately 175 schools on December 11, 1941. The questionnaires called for information on war courses offered after September, 1939.

In May another questionnaire was sent out to approximately the same number of schools of business administration and departments of economics. This questionnaire asked the school to list those war courses which were not reported for inclusion in the April report. Replies were received from 120 schools, 89 of which reported that they were offering war courses not previously reported, and 31 of which reported that they were offering no war courses. Sixty-eight schools did not reply.

Since the questionnaire asked the schools to “include established courses such as Business Policy and Cost Accounting provided they have been reoriented to meet war needs”, the element of judgment enters in to qualify the results. Some schools reported that they had organized no new courses but had reorganized old ones to meet war needs. They felt, however, that the alteration was not great enough to warrant reporting them as war courses. Other schools reported courses which contained in their description very little of a war nature. Courses which it was felt were not primarily war courses were not included in the report. In addition, courses were excluded which it was felt did not fall clearly into the field of business administration and economics.

Any further information which is desired on any of the courses reported here can be secured by writing to the instructor of the particular course. His name appears along with the description of the course.

_________________________

War Courses Offered in Collegiate Schools of Business and Departments of Economics

Economics of War

SCHOOL

COURSE TITLE WEEKS
OF COURSE
HOURS
PER
WEEK
CREDIT
HOURS
ON
CAMPUS
SEC-TIONS STU-
DENTS

PREREQ-UISITES*

U. of Akron, Akron, Ohio.

Economics of War

16

2 2 No 1 15

2C

Albright Col., Reading, Pa. Economic Problems

16

3 3 Yes 1 18

2C

U. of Ariz., School of Bus. & Pub. Admin. Tucson, Ariz.

Economics of War 18 3 3 Yes 1 17 2C
U. of Ariz., School of Bus. & Pub. Admin. Tucson, Ariz. Geography of War Areas 18 3 3 Yes

Babson Inst., School of Bus. Admin., Wellesley, Mass.

War Economics 12 3 0 Yes 2 40 C
Brooklyn Col., Brooklyn, N.Y. Econ. of Defense & War 16 3 3 Yes 2 34

2C

Brown U., Dept. of Econ., Providence, R.I.

Economics of War 30 3 6 Yes 1 45 2C
Bucknell U., Dept. of Commerce & Finance, Lewisburg, Pa. Econ. of Modern War 6 6 ½ 3 Yes 1 20

2C

Carleton Col., Dept. of Econ., Northfield, Minn.

Economics of War 18 3 3 Yes 1 2C
City College of N.Y., Commerce Center, New York, N.Y. Price Control Reguls. 6 6 3 Yes 1 39

U. of Cincinnati, Col. of Engin. & Commerce, Cincinnati, Ohio.

Economics of War 14 3 3 Yes 2 60
U. of Cincinnati, Col. of Engin. & Commerce, Cincinnati, Ohio. Probs. of War and Reconstruction 14 3 3 Yes 2 60

Claremont Col., Claremont, Cal.

America at War: Econ. Org. 6 10 5 Yes 4
Claremont Col., Claremont, Cal. War and Economics 15 3 5 Yes

4

Clark U., Worcester, Mass.

Economics of War 6 5 2 Yes 1 2C
Clemson Col., Clemson, S.C. Economics of War 16 3 3 Yes 1 32

2C

Dartmouth Col., Tech. School of Bus. Admin. Hanover, N.H.

Econ. Prob. of War 13 3 3 Yes 3 100 3C
U. of Detroit, Col. Of Commerce & Fin., Detroit, Mich. Economics of War 17 3 3 Yes 1 49

2

U. of Detroit, Col. Of Commerce & Fin., Detroit, Mich.

War Finance 6 7 3 Yes 1 2
Duke U., Durham, N.C. Economics of War 18 3 3 Yes 2 55

3

Fenn Col., School of Bus. Admin., Cleveland, Ohio.

Economics of Price Control 10 2 2 Yes 1 2C
U. of Fla., Col. of Bus. Admin. Gainesville, Fla. Economics of Total War 3 3 3

Franklin & Marshall Col., Lancaster, Pa.

Econ. History of U.S. 15 3 3 Yes 5 125
Franklin & Marshall Col., Lancaster, Pa. War Economics 15 3 3 Yes 4 110

C

U. of Ga., Athens, Ga.

Advanced Econ. Theory 8 5 5 Yes 1 8 3C
U. of Ga., Athens, Ga. Economics of War 8 5 5 Yes 2 66

2C

U. of Ga., Col. of Bus. Admin., Athens, Ga.

Econ. of Consumption 12 5 5 Yes 2 40 3C
Hamline U., St. Paul, Minn. Prins. of Economics 8 3 3 Yes 2 62

1

Harvard Grad. School of Bus. Admin., Boston, Mass.

Banking Probs. and Federal Fin. 16 3 3 Yes C
James Millikin U., Decatur, Ill. Econ. of War and Reconstruction 16 3 3 No 1 24

2C

Loyola U., Dept. of Econ., New Orleans, La.

Economics of War 16 3 3 Yes 1 25 2
Macalester Col., St. Paul, Minn. Econ Probs. of a War Economy 18 3 3 Yes

2C

U. of Md., Col. of Commerce, College Park, Md.

Econ. Institutions & War 16 3 3 Yes 2
Mass. Inst. of Technology, Dept. of Econ. & Soc. Sci., Cambridge, Mass. Economics of War 15 2 6 Yes 1 35

Mass. Inst. of Technology, Dept. of Econ. & Soc. Sci., Cambridge, Mass.

Postwar Econ. Probs. 15 2 6 Yes
Mass. Inst. of Technology, Dept. of Econ. & Soc. Sci., Cambridge, Mass. Postwar Problems 15 3 9 Yes

3C

U. of Minn., School of Bus. Admin., Minneapolis, Minn.

Finance 11 3 3 Yes 1 11 3C
U. of Minn., School of Bus. Admin., Minneapolis, Minn. Our Economic Life 11 3 3 Yes 1 125

U. of Minn., School of Bus. Admin., Minneapolis, Minn.

Public Finance 22 3 6 Yes 1 15 4C
Mont. State U., School of Bus. Admin., Missoula, Mont. War Economics 10 4 4 Yes 1

2C

N. Dak. Agri. Col., Dept. of Econ., Fargo, N.D.

War Economics 16 3 3 Yes 1 25 2C
U. of N. Dak., School of Com., Grand Forks, N.D. Economics of War 8 5 3 Yes 1 21

2C

Okla, A&M, Col., School of Com., Stillwater, Okla.

War and Post-War Econ. Problems 18 3 3 Yes 3C
U. of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa. War Economics 18 2 2 Yes 2 65

2C

Pomona Col., Claremont, Cal.

Econ. of War & Defense 6 5 3 Yes 1 19 2C
St. John’s U., Collegeville, Minn. Economics of War 18 3 3 Yes 1 20

2C

U. of S. Dak., School of Bus. Admin., Vermillion, S.D.

Economics of War 18 3 3 Yes 1 25 2C
U. of S. Dak., School of Bus. Admin., Vermillion, S.D. Money & Banking & War Finance 18 3 3 Yes

2C

Stanford U., Dept. of Econ., Stanford U., Cal.

American Economy in Wartime 10 5 5 Yes 2 89 2C
Stanford U., Dept. of Econ., Stanford U., Cal. War Effort 10 4 3 Yes

Stout Inst., Menomonie, Wisc.

War Economics 6 5 5 Yes 1 2C
Susquehanna U., Selinsgrove, Pa. Amer. Probs. in World Relationships 32 2 2 Yes 1 27

1

Temple U., Philadelphia, Pa.

Economic Planning 15 3 3 Yes 1 25 2C
Temple U., Philadelphia, Pa. Internat. Trade & Commerce 15 3 3 Yes 1 30

2

Transylvania Col., Econ. & Sociology Dept., Lexington, Ky.

Economics of War 18 3 3 Yes 1 18 3C
Villanova Col., Villanova, Pa. Probs. of Peace After the War 6 5 2 Yes

U. of Va., Charlottesville, Va.

Economics of War 36 3 6 Yes 1 2C
U. of Va., Charlottesville, Va. Prins. of Economics 12 3 2 Yes 2 180

1

State Col. of Wash., School of Bus. Admin., Pullman, Wash.

Econ. & Bus. Tendencies 18 3 3 Yes 1 3C
U. of Wash., Col. of Econ. & Bus., Seattle, Wash. Econ. of Natl. Defense 12 5 5 Yes 1 94

2

U. of Wash., Col. of Econ. & Bus., Seattle, Wash.

World at War 12 5 5 Yes 1
Western Reserve Univ., Cleveland, Ohio. Econ. of Natl. Defense 16 4 3 Yes 1

2C

Western Reserve Univ., Cleveland, Ohio.

Econ. of War and Reconstruction 15 1 ¾ 2 Yes 1 27

2 or E

*Prerequisites:

Numerals—years of college which must have been completed
C—certain courses in the same or allied subjects
E—experience in the field

_________________________

Instructors and course descriptions

SCHOOL COURSE TITLE INSTRUCTOR AND COURSE DESCRIPTION
U. of Akron, Akron, Ohio. Economics of War Jay L. O’Hara. Economic causes of war; transition from peace to war economy, fiscal and monetary problems of war economy; price control, rationing and priorities.
Albright Col., Reading, Pa. Economic Problems John C. Evans. Text supplemented by lectures, readings in economic theory for purposes of orienting the student, and current reading in the better newspapers and periodicals for correlation of current opinions.
U. of Ariz., School of Bus. & Pub. Admin. Tucson, Ariz. Economics of War E. G. Wood. An analysis of those economic factors which determine modern war; man power and materials, methods for their mobilization.
U. of Ariz., School of Bus. & Pub. Admin. Tucson, Ariz. Geography of War Areas G. Herrech. A course dealing with climatic, topographical and economic factors in war areas. Population characteristics and pertinent matters of history and government will be included, as well as a discussion of the military characteristics of the geographic background. Text material will be newspapers and magazines, and reference work in the library.
Babson Inst., School of Bus. Admin., Wellesley, Mass. War Economics James M. Matthews. Introductory analysis of economic causes of war, the economics of the war process, the post-war economic adjustment, war production, labor, wages, finance, prices, consumer control, railroads, electric power, housing, agriculture.
Brooklyn Col., Brooklyn, N.Y. Econ. of Defense & War Curwen Stoddart – The economic problems of defense in modern times; the expenditures by countries for armament and defense purposes since 1914 and the economic policies pursued in financing these expenditures. The functioning of the economy under war time controls, including the regulation of prices, production, consumption and finance, the repercussions of war upon neutral countries and the consequences of peace; with special attention to the immediate problems resulting from demobilization of war-time resources.
Brown U., Dept. of Econ., Providence, R.I. Economics of War Antonin Basch. Economic mobilization for war. Government controls over production, consumption, foreign trade, prices and wages through monetary policy, fiscal policy, price control, priorities, rationing and foreign exchange control. Economic warfare. Lessons of the first World War. Problems of post-war reconstruction.
Bucknell U., Dept. of Commerce & Finance, Lewisburg, Pa. Econ. of Modern War Rudolph Peterson. Problems created by the war in the field of production, distribution, finance, and prices and methods of meeting them.
Carleton Col., Dept. of Econ., Northfield, Minn. Economics of War D.A Brown [no course description]
U. of Cincinnati, Col. of Engin. & Commerce, Cincinnati, Ohio. Economics of War H.B. Whaling. Inflation and price controls. Fiscal and tax problems, function of the banking system in the war economy, rationing, devices for saving, conversion of peacetime to wartime economy, impact of war economic policies on post war economy.
U. of Cincinnati, Col. of Engin. & Commerce, Cincinnati, Ohio. Probs. of War and Reconstruction R.R. McGrane. How the war came to Europe. Problems of financing the war, mobilization of industrial resources, mobilization of public opinion. Problems of peace; what kind of peace does the U.S. want, what will be the position of the U.S. in the new world order?
City Col. of N.Y., Commerce Center, New York, N.Y. Price Control Regulations Henry Bund, Joseph Friedlander, Percy J. Greenberg. This laboratory and clinic course to be given by prominent authorities will provide up-to-the minute information and analysis of rulings and interpretations of orders of the Office of Price Administration. The lecturers will concern themselves with the purpose and provisions of the various regulations; individual groups of manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers will receive instruction in the computation of price ceilings for various commodities and how to obtain relief from present regulations which are oppressive; a series of laboratory exercises will be required.
Claremont Col., Claremont, Cal. America at War: Econ. Org. Arthur G. Coons [no course description]
Claremont Col., Claremont, Cal. War and Economics Walter E. Sulzbach. Emphasis on international aspects of war and economic organization.
Clark U., Worcester, Mass. Economics of War S. J. Brandenburg. A descriptive study of public economic policy in relation to war: what economic mobilization for modern war means in terms of labor, resources, civilian and military economic preparation, finance, and private and government enterprise. A study of economic problems to be faced in post war reconstruction will form a final unit of the course.
Clemson Col., Clemson, S.C. Economics of War James E. Ward. We deal with the problems of financing a war, production problems, maladjustments caused by war, post-war aspects, etc.
Dartmouth Col., Tuck School of Bus. Admin. Hanover, N.H. Econ. Prob. of War George Walter Woodworth. The chief aim of this course is to develop an understanding of how the economic resources of a nation can be most effectively marshalled for total war. First requirements are seen, then the problems of mobilization and conversion of resources. Final section is devoted to post-war problems.
U. of Detroit, Col. Of Commerce & Fin., Detroit, Mich. Economics of War Bernard F. Landuyt. An analytical survey of the economic aspects of the preparation for and conduct of war, with particular reference to the participation of the United States in World War II. Attention given to both the armed conflict and the civilian scene.
U. of Detroit, Col. Of Commerce & Fin., Detroit, Mich. War Finance Bernard F. Landuyt. A survey of the major aspects of the problem of war finance, with especial reference to the current American problem. Emphasis will be placed on the nature and significance of the problem, the principles basic to its solution, and the effectuation of these principles.
Duke U., Durham, N.C. Economics of War Earl J. Hamilton and H. E. von Beckerath [no course description]
Fenn Col., School of Bus. Admin., Cleveland, Ohio. Economics of Price Control A. O. Berger. A study of price control in normal times by (a) competition and (b) regulation under monopoly conditions, such as utilities. Price control under conditions of war: the reasons for it, the determination of ceilings, the economic implications.
U. of Fla., Col. of Bus. Admin. Gainesville, Fla. Economics of Total War Walter J. Matherly [no course description]
Franklin & Marshall Col., Lancaster, Pa. Econ. History of U.S. Harold Fischer and Noel P. Laird. A study of the factors in the economic development of the United States, with special attention to these factors as they influenced America’s rise to the rank of a world power. A history of the evolution of the economic life of the American people. Emphasis on problems involved in our adjustments to a war economy.
Franklin & Marshall Col., Lancaster, Pa. War Economics Noel P. Laird. A careful analysis of such economic problems as agriculture, consumers’ needs, price, banking, public finance, labor, transportation, and unemployment. Special attention will be given to war economy with emphasis on priorities, rationing, and government control over production, distribution, consumption, finance and other economic activities. A survey of the economic problems created by the war.
U. of Ga., Athens, Ga. Advanced Econ. Theory E. C. Griffith. The course deals with monopolistic competition and the problems of government regulation of prices; special emphasis is given to specific industries such as the iron and steel industry. Special attention will be given in 1942 to government control of inflation, rationing, and antitrust policy in a period of war.
U. of Ga., Athens, Ga. Economics of War Robert T. Segrest. Economic problems and policies of nations in wartime. Post-war problems with special emphasis on the United States.
U. of Ga., Col. of Bus. Admin., Athens, Ga. Econ. of Consumption John W. Jenkins. National economy from the interests of the consumer, before the war, now and in the post-war world.
Hamline U., St. Paul, Minn. Prins. of Economics C. B. Kuhlmann. War economics is given as the last 8 weeks of the course in principles of economics.
Harvard Grad. School of Bus. Admin., Boston, Mass. Banking Problems and Federal Finance Ebersole and D.T. Smith. Financing of the Federal Treasury during the present war is the over-shadowing concern of business, finance, and banking. Current activities of the Treasury are studied in relation to fiscal policy, and bank operations. Indispensable background is covered in two parts: bank portfolios and bank relations, with emphasis upon government relations arising out of government lending corporations, financing Federal deficits by bond issues sold to banks or to the public, and central bank and money management policies of the Treasury and Federal Reserve system.
James Millikin U., Decatur, Ill. Econ. of War and Reconstruction M. E. Robinson. An analysis of the fundamental framework of the war economy. Problems of finance, population, prices, civilian production, and procurement as affected by war. Study of our efforts to convert and produce for war in contrast to those of other nations. Brief study of the economic structure and problems of a post-war economy. Much of the course will be devoted to a study of sources, propaganda, and war annals.
Loyola U., Dept. of Econ., New Orleans, La. Economics of War John Connor. Economic factors in war: strategic materials; man power; production and consumption controls; price regulations; financing; post-war problems, etc.
Macalester Col., St. Paul, Minn. Econ Probs. of a War Economy Forrest A. Young. Modern warfare and the economic system; economic warfare; critical and strategic raw materials; maximizing production; foreign trade and shipping; labor and wage policies; housing difficulties; priorities, allocations, rationing and demand controls; direct and indirect price control and bases of price fixing; fiscal policy and war financing; problems of postwar readjustment.
U. of Md., Col. of Commerce, College Park, Md. Econ. Institutions & War G. A. Costanzo. An analysis of the Economic causes and problems of war. Industrial mobilization; theory and techniques of price control; banking and credit control; war finance; international trade and foreign exchange controls; economic sanctions and autarchy; and the problems of readjustment in a post-war economy.
Mass. Inst. of Technology, Dept. of Econ. & Soc. Sci., Cambridge, Mass. Economics of War Ralph E. Freeman. A study of the economic changes resulting from the adjustment of industry to the demands of War, and the impact of these changes on business stability, standards of living and methods of social control.
Mass. Inst. of Technology, Dept. of Econ. & Soc. Sci., Cambridge, Mass. Postwar Econ. Probs. Richard M. Bissell. A study of the economic difficulties that are likely to arise after the war, and of policies that may be adopted to cope with them.
Mass. Inst. of Technology, Dept. of Econ. & Soc. Sci., Cambridge, Mass. Postwar Problems Richard M. Bissell. A study of the economic problems involved in maintaining national income and employment under the conditions that are likely to prevail after the war.
U. of Minn., School of Bus. Admin., Minneapolis, Minn. Finance J. Warren Stehman. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Commodity Credit Corporation, Federal Housing Administration Title VI, governmental financial policies to control prices, war finance and its effects upon business policy and upon investments. Probably fifty percent of the course dealt with financial material related directly to the war effort and fifty percent not so related.
U. of Minn., School of Bus. Admin., Minneapolis, Minn. Our Economic Life Helen G. Canoyer. Although the title of the course was not changed, due to an action of the advisory committee of General College, the committee did agree to a change in the emphasis of the course to war economics.
U. of Minn., School of Bus. Admin., Minneapolis, Minn. Public Finance Roy G. Blakey.  Each meeting was a discussion led by one of the members of the seminar. All were assigned certain basic readings and each was required to write a term paper or thesis on a phase of the subject selected by him in consultation with the instructor.
Mont. State U., School of Bus. Admin., Missoula, Mont. War Economics Roy J. W. Ely. The course is a study of the various factors that appear to lead to war; pre-war preparations; an analysis of war economy; and post-war adjustments.
N. Dak. Agri. Col., Dept. of Econ., Fargo, N.D. War Economics Paul E. Zerby.  Causes of war; economic means of warfare; economic problems and adjustments of post-war period; money and banking, public finance, labor, international economic policies, government and business.
U. of N. Dak., School of Com., Grand Forks, N.D. Economics of War S. Hagen. The course covers the steps by which a peace economy is transferred into a war economy. The controls instituted by the government to direct economic activity during the war period are studied and compared with peace time controls. Special attention is given to such topics as priorities, price-ceilings, war finance, labor management, lend-lease, and post-war problems.
Okla, A&M, Col., School of Com., Stillwater, Okla. War and Post-War Econ. Problems R. H. Baugh. An analysis of the impact of war on economic arrangements and processes; deals with such problems as the conversion of industry to war production, war-time labor issues, inflation, financing the war, rationing, conversion of war production to peace-time production, post-war employment, and international trade from the war.
U. of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa. War Economics M. K. McKay. Emphasis is given to the problems emerging in the transition from peace to war. Special consideration is directed to war production, the role of the consumer and the various regulatory measures introduced by the government. Finally, post-war problems were viewed.
Pomona Col., Claremont, Cal. Econ. of War & Defense Kenneth Duncan. The economic problems and policies of a nation at war. Attention, is given to the economic forces contributing to war and to the strategy of international markets, materials, and shipping. The shift to a war economy and the war-time control over production, labor, prices, and consumer demand. War finance and inflation. Problems of demobilization and post-war economic planning.
St. John’s U., Collegeville, Minn. Economics of War Linus Schieffer. This course is designed to examine the repercussions upon the economy of the nation of a total war effort such as modern war entails. It investigates the problem of conversion of plant and resources, the dangers of inflation, the influence of strategic materials. It likewise spends some time discussing the postwar consequences of such a wholesale conversion of the national economy.
U. of S. Dak., School of Bus. Admin., Vermillion, S.D. Economics of War Claude J. Whitlow. Economic causes of war; nature of total war; man-power regulation and total war; war effort in real terms; price system under impact of war; labor problems in war time; war-time control of production and consumption; public finance and war; international relations during and after a period of war; post-war economic problems.
U. of S. Dak., School of Bus. Admin., Vermillion, S.D. Money & Banking & War Finance E. S. Sparks [no course description]
Stanford U., Dept. of Econ., Stanford U., Cal. American Economy in Wartime B. F. Haley, K. Brandt, W. S. Hopkins. War economics of raw materials, labor resources and policy in the war economy; transportation in World Wars I and II; business organization and policy; controls in the war economy, international aspects of the war effort; consumption and living standards in the war economy.
Stanford U., Dept. of Econ., Stanford U., Cal War Effort Staff. Lectures in all phases of the national war effort.
Stout Inst., Menomonie, Wisc. War Economics A. Stephen Stephan. The change from peace-time to war-time economy and the problems involved. The war and its effect on industry and consumers. Problems of war production, financing the war, price control, economic regulations and civilian morale.
Susquehanna U., Selinsgrove, Pa. Amer. Probs. in World Relationships W. A. Russ, H. A. Heath. A survey of the problems confronting the United States in her present day relationships with Europe, the Far East, and Latin America. These problems will be discussed, from the standpoint of relationships in economics, science, history and government. The second semester surveyed the economic relationships of war.
Temple U., Philadelphia, Pa. Economic Planning Russell H. Mack. Examination of the chief problems of production, pricing, and distribution arising under capitalism and planned economy. Special emphasis on the problems and techniques of war-time price control and rationing.
Temple U., Philadelphia, Pa. Internat. Trade & Commerce Grover A. J. Noetzel. The fundamental principles of international commerce. Special emphasis throughout upon the disorganizing effects of the present war upon world commerce. Proposed plans of reconstruction of post-war trade.
Transylvania Col., Econ. & Sociology Dept., Lexington, Ky. Economics of War W. Scott Hall. Background of nature and causes of war, economic factors in the causation, preparation for, and waging of war, economic effects of war. Emphasis on term paper.
Villanova Col., Villanova, Pa. Probs. of Peace After the War Edward J. McCarthy. An historical survey of the various efforts to organize states for economic and political purposes. Religious, social, economic and political problems facing nations at war are considered together with the several plans for post-war organization now being offered.
U. of Va., Charlottesville, Va. Economics of War David McC. Wright. Production for war, labor supply, price control, war finance, changes in the structure of the economy, post-war reconstruction, etc.
U. of Va., Charlottesville, Va. Prins. of Economics Tipton R. Snavely, D. Clark Hyde [no course description]
State Col. of Wash., School of Bus. Admin., Pullman, Wash. Econ. & Bus. Tendencies [No instructor named] Basic tendencies, in economic and business ideas and institutions. The effect of the war on economic change and the environment of business enterprise. The objectives and policies of government. Problems of post-war institutional adjustments.
U. of Wash., Col. of Econ. & Bus., Seattle, Wash. Econ. of Natl. Defense Harold G. Moulton and Howard H. Preston. Analysis of the problems arising from our national defense program, including organization of production, procurement of materials, financing industrial expansion, monetary issues, price control methods, labor relations, international exchange, fiscal policy of the government.
U. of Wash., Col. of Econ. & Bus., Seattle, Wash. World at War Staff. Factual information on the background of the present war, the ideological conflict; the fundamentals of military and naval strategy, economics and war, and the essentials of planning for peace.
Western Reserve Univ., Cleveland, Ohio. Econ. of Natl. Defense Russell Weisman. The problems of industrial mobilization. Priorities, allocations, and price control. Methods of financing – taxation, public borrowing, fiat money and credit. Economic policies of the leading nations in World War I and II.
Western Reserve Univ., Cleveland, Ohio. Econ. of War and Reconstruction Warren A. Roberts. An analysis of the steps involved in the conversion to war effort, and the effects upon business. An examination of the economic program of Germany and England and a comparison of policies of labor representation, of personnel conversion from normal occupations, of stages of development of war finance, and of uses of compulsory loans. A brief consideration of post-war problems.

 

_________________________

Bibliography
Texts used in War Courses Offered by Collegiate Schools of Business and Departments of Economics

ECONOMICS OF WAR

Atkins, W. E. (Editor). Economic Behavior. Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1931, 1079 p., $8.50.

Backman, Jules. Wartime Price Control and the Retail Trade. National Retail Dry Goods Association, New York, 1910, 48 p., $.10.

Baruch, Bernard M. American Industry in the War. Prentice-Hall, Inc. New York, 1941498 p., $3.75.

Boulding, Kenneth Ewart. Economic Analysis. Harper and Bros., New York, 1941, 809 p., $4.25.

Brown University Economists, A. C. Neal (Editor). Introduction to War Economics. Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Chicago, 1942, $1.25.

Burnham, James. Managerial Revolution. John Day Company, Inc., New York, 1941, 285 p., $2.50.

Chamberlin, Edward. Theory of Monopolistic Competition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1938, 241 p., $2.50.

Condliffe, John Bell. The Reconstruction of World Trade; A Survey of Industrial Economic Relations. W. W. Norton, Inc., New York, 1940, 427 p., $3.75.

Fairchild, F. R.; Furniss, E. S. and Buck, N. S. Economics. Macmillan Co., New York, 1940, 828 p., $3.00.

Faulkner, Harold Underwood. Economic History of the United States. Macmillan Co., New York, 1937, 319 p., $.80.

Fraser, Cecil E. and Teele, Stanley F. Industry Goes to War; Readings on American Industrial Rearmament. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1941, 123 p., $1.50.

Hardy, C. O. Wartime Control of Prices. Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1940, 216 p., $1.00.

Harris, Seymour E. Economics of American Defense. W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York, 1941, 350 p., $3.50.

Lorwin, Louis L. Economic Consequences of Second World War. Random House, New York, 1941, 510 p., $3.00.

Meade, J. E.; and Hitch, C. J. Introduction to Economic Analysis and Policy. Oxford University Press, New York, 1938, 428 p., $2.50. Mendershausen, Horst. Economics of War. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1940, 314 p., $2.75.

Nelson, Saul and Keim, Walter G. Price Behavior and Business Policy (T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 1) U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1940, 419 p., $.45.

Pigou, A. C. The Political Economy of War. MacMillan and Company, London, 1921, 251 p., $3.25.

Robbins, Lionel Charles. Economic Causes of War. Macmillan Co., New York, 1939, 124 p., $1.35.

Robinson, Joan. The Economics of Imperfect Competition. Macmillan and Co., London, 1934, 352 p., $4.50.

Spiegel, Henry William. Economics of Total War. D. Appleton-Century Co., New York, 1942, 410 p., $3.00.

Stein, Emanuel and Backman, Jules. War Economics. Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., New York, 1942, 501 p., $3.00.

Steiner, George A. and Associates. Economic Problems of War. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, 1942, 676 p., $3.50.

Steiner, W. H. Economics of War. Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., New York, 1942, 250 p., $3.00.

Vaile, Roland Snow; and Canoyer, Helen G. Income and Consumption. H. Holt and Co., New York, 1938, 394 p., $2.25.

Waller, Willard Walter (Editor). War in the Twentieth Century. Random House, Inc., New York, 1940, 572 p., $3.00.

Zimmermann, Erich W. World Resources and Industries; A Functional Appraisal of the Availability of Agricultural and Industrial Resources. Harper and Bros., New York, 1934, 842 p., $4.00.

 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. Supplementary Report on War Courses offered by Collegiate Schools of Business and Departments of Economics. Washington, D.C.: August 1942. Pages 11-13, 20-25, 45-89, 94-96.

Image Source: U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Buy War Bonds” (Uncle Sam). Wikimedia.