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Cowles Commission. Arrow declines offer for joint appointment of research director and professor of economics. 1953

 

Tjallings Koopmans declared his intention to resign his research directorship of the Cowles Commission for Economic Research at the University of Chicago effective June 30, 1954, having served in that position for six years. This necessitated a search for an economist who could satisfy the needs of both the Cowles Commission and the Chicago Department of Economics. Kenneth Arrow, a Cowles alumnus so-to-speak, was the first target of the search. In this post you will find transcriptions of some of the relevant correspondence in the matter. Arrow was offered a salary of $12,000 (approximately $140,000 at today’s prices) which was equal to that of Koopmans and $1000 less than that of the more senior Jacob Marschak.

For a history of the Cowles Commission and Foundation for Research in Economics, see Robert W. Dimand’s Cowles Working Paper (November 2019).

Plot-spoiler: Arrow declined the offer, “The activity of administration represents for me, I feel, a violation of the principle of comparative advantage, especially if one takes account of my strong subjective preferences,” to which Economics in the Rear-view Mirror can only add, “Good Choice!”

Postscript: Economics in the Rear-view Mirror has appended the September 30 announcement of Arrow’s being appointed executive head of the Stanford economics department. OK, so the comparative advantage argument could have played a role in his Chicago decision, assuming he believed a move would have increased the productivity of both the Stanford and Chicago faculties! Now I’ll  bet that having experienced winters in Chicago and Stanford, the family simply decided to stay in California.

Posted earlier: a mini c.v. for Arrow as of 1951.

________________________

COWLES COMMISSION
FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
CHICAGO 37, ILLINOIS

July 21, 1953

Professor T. W. Schultz
c/o Hotel Maury
Casilla Correo 1385
Lima, Peru

Dear Mr. Schultz:

                  The Central Administration and the Board of Trustees have now approved our recommendation with respect to Arrow. Please find enclosed a copy of my letter to Arrow. I presume that Dean Tyler will send you a copy of his letter. May I ask you, if you can find time, to write to Arrow to support this offer, and to indicate the participation the Economics Department? In case you have secretarial assistance, may we have a carbon of your letter?

                  It may be winter in South America just now, but here it is mid-summer, with all that that means. Hoping that you find your trip interesting and profitable,

Sincerely yours,
[signed]
Tjalling C. Koopmans

TCK:lb

Enclosure

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

[COPY]

July 21, 1953

Professor Kenneth J. Arrow
c/o The RAND Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, California

Dear Ken:

                  In this letter, which will reach you simultaneously with a letter from Dean Tyler, I am writing to express the gratification of the Cowles Commission research staff in general, and of myself in particular, at the action of the University and of the Executive Committee of the Commission, in extending to you an invitation to join our staff as Director of Research. The Executive Committee has acted on the unanimous recommendation of our faculty, which reflects our great confidence in you as an intellectual leader. We believe that, above all others in the field, you are the person capable of giving the Commission the research leadership it needs during the years just ahead. Needless to say, we hope that you will decide to accept.

                  I well remember your statement this April that you wished not to be considered for a position which like this one has administrative aspects. As illustration you mentioned that you did not wish to become chairman of your department at Stanford either.  The fact that you are now taking another view of the latter task gives us the courage to ask you to reconsider your attitude toward the former. The administrative aspects of this position are adjustable in terms of your own preferences. I think you will find Ross Cardwell capable of discharging those administrative functions which you may wish to avoid. He brings to this a real understanding and sympathy for the objectives of the group.

                  Mr. Schultz will write to you concerning the participation of the Economics Department in this offer. Since he is currently in South America, some time will go by before his letter can reach you. Let me say only that the Department is likewise unanimous in its support for a joint offer, and hopes that you will regard participation in its teaching and other activities an compatible with your primary responsibility with regard to the Commission. A tentative ratio, two-thirds Commission, one-third Department, is proposed for your consideration.

                  I am writing to Jascha [Jacob Marschak], who is currently at the Institute for Numerical Analysis, to inform him that this offer has now been approved. Please feel free to discuss the matter with him and to regard him as an additional source of information. We also hope that you will find it possible to visit Chicago some time in September so that you may inform yourself fully with regard to the opportunities and challenge of this position. The best timing of this visit depends somewhat on Mr. Schultz’ plans, on which I am not fully informed.

                  In conclusion, I want you to know that I look forward with great anticipation to the prospect of a reintensified contact with you, both in research and in a personal way. We all hope that our proposal is challenging enough to you to earn your serious consideration and, ultimately, your acceptance.

                  Please give our best regards to Selma. We hope that she will look with sympathy on our trying to get you both back to Chicago.

Cordially yours,

Tjalling C. Koopmans

cc: Executive Committee (A. Cowles, R. L Cardwell, T. W. Schultz, R. W. Tyler)
J. Marschak

________________________

COPY

The University of Chicago
Chicago 37, Illinois
The Division of the Social Sciences

Office of the Dean

July 21, 1953

Professor Kenneth J. Arrow co The RAND Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, California

Dear Mr. Arrow:

                  I take great pleasure in inviting you to become Professor of Economics of the University of Chicago and Director of Research in the Cowles Commission. This is a regular tenure position as a full professor at a salary of $12,000 per year effective for 1954-55, on a 4-E contract. As you may have heard, the provisions of the 4-E contract have recently been liberalized so that the faculty member retains his earnings from royalties, from occasional lectures, and other occasional short-term assignments.

                  The interest in your appointment is indicated by the fact that you were the unanimous selection of the Executive Committee of the Cowles Commission, as well as the research staff of the Commission and the faculty of the department of economics. We are all anxious to have you join us and feel sure that we can provide you with excellent conditions for making an important intellectual contribution. We hope that you will come to Chicago at our expense sometime in September to look into the situation as fully as you wish and to work out conditions that are satisfactory, including the time when you would be able to join our staff.

Sincerely yours,
[unsigned copy]
R. W. Tyler
Dean

RWT:rk

________________________

[COPY]

August 24, 1953

Professor Kenneth J. Arrow
c/o The RAND Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, California

Dear Mr. Arrow:

                  I have returned from my field work in Peru and Mexico and learned with great pleasure from Dean Tyler and Professor Koopmans that the Chancellor has approved our recommendation to invite you to come to the University of Chicago as Professor of Economics and Director of Research in the Cowles Commission. Dean Tyler has already formally extended to you this invitation and Professor Koopmans has written to you at some length. May I convey to you the fact that this invitation is rare in that it is the unanimous view and wish of the members of the Department of Economics. This expresses in the strongest possible terms our own very high regard for your professional achievements as an economist and our firm wish to have you become one of us.

Sincerely yours,
[unsigned copy]
Theodore W. Schultz

TWS:jw

________________________

[COPY]

September 11, 1953

Professor Kenneth J. Arrow
c/o The RAND Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica California

Dear Ken:

                  This is further to my handwritten letter of about a month ago, in which I indicated that I would write again upon returning to Chicago. Let me again express the hope that you may be able to visit us at a time convenient to you. I continue to believe that this is the most effective procedure for you to obtain clarification on points such as those ou have raised in conversation with Jascha. However, in case you should prefer to seek clarification by correspondence, may I suggest that you write to Dean Tyler if you have questions relating to the Cowles Commission (with a carbon copy to me) and to Mr. Schultz for questions relating to the Department.

                  We had an interesting and fruitful meeting at Kingston, in which high temperature and a light program contributed to a relaxed atmosphere.

                  Looking forward to hearing from you.

Cordially,
[unsigned copy]
Tjalling C. Koopmans

TOK:lb

Cc: J. Marschak, T.W. Schultz, R.W. Tyler

________________________

The RAND Corporation
1700 Main St. • Santa Monica • California

15 September 1953

Professor Theodore W. Schultz
Department of Economics
The University of Chicago
Chicago 37, Illinois

Dear Professor Schultz:

Thank you very much for your letter of August 24. I am indeed thrilled by the evidence of approbation by my former colleagues at the University of Chicago.

However, for reasons set forth in the enclosed letter to Dean Tyler, I feel that I should not accept the offer. The activity of administration represents for me, I feel, a violation of the principle of comparative advantage, especially if one takes account of my strong subjective preferences.

Best regards to all members of the Department.

Sincerely yours,
[signed]
Kenneth J. Arrow

KJA: ge
encl.

________________________

[COPY]

15 September 1953

Dean R. W. Tyler
The Division of the Social Sciences
The University of Chicago
Chicago 37, Illinois

Dear Dean Tyler:

I have thought over very seriously the kind and flattering offer to serve as Research Director of the Cowles Comission. It is with a great deal of regret that I feel that I must decline.

The stimulating and vital intellectual atmosphere at the University of Chicago and the high salary offered were very strong inducements, but I feel that I am not temperamentally qualified to assume the administrative responsibilities called for. I would feel strongly the conflict between pursuing my individual research and the responsibilities of leadership, and I do not feel that I would make a satisfactory resolution. I wish to thank you again, not least, for your willingness to wait this long for me to come to a decision.

Sincerely yours,
[unsigned copy]
Kenneth J. Arrow

KJA:ge
cc: Prof. T. C. Koopmans, Prof. T. W. Schultz [checkmark]

________________________

[COPY]

The University of Chicago
The Division of the Social Sciences

Office of the Dean

September 21, 1953

Mr. Kenneth J. Arrow
The RAND Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, California

Dear Mr. Arrow:

                  We are greatly disappointed that you feel it unwise to accept our invitation to become Director of Research for the Cowles Commission. We think you have an important contribution to make to our University. Hence, I hope we can work out some other position here that would appeal to you.

Sincerely yours,
R. W. Tyler
Dean

RWT:rk

cc:  Mr. T. W. Schultz  [checkmark], Mr. T. C. Koopmans

Source: University of Chicago Archives. Department of Economics, Records. Box 42, Folder 4.

________________________

Postscript

New Economics Executive Named

Kenneth J. Arrow, professor of economics and statistics at Stanford, has been appointed executive head of the University’s Department of Economics, President Wallace Sterling announced yesterday.

Nationally known for his work in the analysis of criteria for economic decisions, Dr. Arrow has been on the Stanford faculty since 1949. As department head he replaces Professor Edward S. Shaw, who has resigned to devote full time to teaching and research.

Dr. Arrow heads a project at Stanford supported by the Office of Naval Research to study the efficiency of economic decision-making.

As a post-doctoral fellow of the Social Science Research Council, Dr. Arrow traveled extensively in Western Europe for nine months of 1952, studying statistical problems of national economic planning.

He lectured at Oxford University and the Institute of Applied Economics in Paris and was one of a small group of distinguished American economists invited to participate in a colloquium on the theory of risk. The colloquium was conducted in Paris by the National Center of Scientific Research of the French Ministry of Eduaction.

Professor Arrow was graduated by the College of the City of New York in 1940 with Phi Beta Kappa honors and as winner of the Pell medal for highest scholastic proficiency.
He served as assistant professor at the University of Chicago in 1948-49. Appointed acting assistant professor at Stanford in 1949, he became associate professor in 1950 and this year was promoted to full professor.

[Note: the promotion was announced April 28, effective September 1, 1953.]

Source: The Stanford Daily, 1 October 1953.

Image Source:  Kenneth J. Arrow as Guggenheim Fellow (1972)  John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation.

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Stanford. Kenneth Arrow’s mini-cv at age thirty. 1951

This post repackages the information contained in the mini-c.v. for the Social Science Research Council fellow of 1951-52, Kenneth Arrow, then a thirty year old freshly minted Columbia economics Ph.D. and associate professor of economics at Stanford. Fellows were asked to limit their cited publications to ten. It is interesting to note that Arrow could have easily added three other items but didn’t. It is also interesting to see that he gave a citation to the French translation of a chapter he published in English. Does any one have a clue to why Arrow might have made that choice? 

The data below come from the publication Fellows of the Social Science Research Council, 1925-1951  that is simply chock-full of mid-career biographical information for other economists as well

______________________

ARROW, KENNETH (JOSEPH)
Research Training Fellow 1951-52

[Personal:]

b. New York, N. Y. August 23, 1921.
m. Selma Schweitzer 1947.

[Education:]

B.S. 1940, City College, New York;
M.A. in mathematics 1941, Ph.D. 1951, Columbia, economics.

[Employment:]

Actuarial clerk 1941, Guardian Life Insurance Company;

USAAF 1942-46, captain;

Instructor in economics, summer 1946, City College, New York;

Research associate 1947-49, Cowles Commission for Research in Economics;

Assistant professor of economics 1948-49, University of Chicago;

Acting assistant professor 1949, associate professor of economics and statistics 1950—, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.

Home: 4 Aliso Way, Menlo Park, Calif.

Consultant:  Bureau of the Budget 1948;
Rand Corporation 1948-51.

Publications:

On the Use of Winds in Flight Planning,” J. Meteorology 1949; in Econometrica: (with D. Blackwell and M. A. Girshick) “Bayes and Minimax Solutions of Sequential Decision Problems” 1949; “Homogeneous Functions in Mathematical Economics: Comment” 1950. “A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare,” J. Polit. Econ. 1950; “L’Utilisation des Modèles Mathématiques dans les Sciences Sociales” in Les “Sciences Politiques” aux États-Unis (ed. D. Lerner and H. A. Lasswell) 1951 [Original english version (?) as Chapter 8 in “Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences” in Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell (eds.), The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method (Stanford University Press, 1951)]; “Alternative Proof of the Substitution Theorem for the Leontief Model in the General Case” in Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation (ed. T. C. Koopmans) 1951; Social Choice and Individual Values 1951.

Fellowship program: study in Western Europe of statistical problems arising in economic planning.

Current research: welfare economics; foundation of statistical inference; index number theory; statistical problems in “model building”; theory of economic behavior under conditions of uncertainty.

Source: Fellows of the Social Science Research Council, 1925-1951. pp. 11-12.

Image Source: From the book ad placed by the bookstore La Memoire du Droit (Paris) at the AbeBooks website. As of this posting it is available for US$ 50.30 + shipping cost. Economics in the Rear-view Mirror is here solely for educational and research purposes and provides such information solely to satisfy the pecuniary curiosity of its visitors.

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Harvard Suggested Reading Syllabus

Harvard. Reading Lists for Second Semester Graduate Economic Theory. Arrow, Bewley, Oniki, 1972

It’s been a while since Economics in the Rear-View Mirror has posted “new stuff”, e.g. the following half-century old reading list for the second half of the Harvard graduate sequence in economic theory taught in the spring term of 1972 by (not-quite-yet Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences Laureate) Kenneth Arrow, Truman Bewley, and Hajime Oniki.

The six reading lists for the course were transcribed from the copies in Zvi Griliches’ papers at the Harvard Archives. 

______________________

About the course instructors

Even youngster economists should need no introduction to Kenneth Arrow, but here is a memoir by K. Vela Velupillai in the Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society just in case.

Truman Bewley, University of California (Berkeley) Ph.D. in 1970. Assistant professor, Harvard (1972-1978). Professor, Northwestern (1978-83). Professor through emeritus professor at Yale (1983-)

Hajime Oniki received his Ph.D. from Stanford in 1968, was assistant professor of economics at Harvard from 1969 to 1972, assistant/associate professor at Queen’s University, Canada (1972-1979), returning to Japan as Professor at Osaka University in 1979.

______________________

Course Announcement for Advanced Economic Theory Sequence, 1971-1972

Economics 2010a. Advanced Economic Theory
Professor Dale W. Jorgenson, Assistant Professors Melvyn Fuss and ____ (fall term); Professor Assistant Professor Michael Rothschild (spring term)

Production theory, consumption theory, and the theories of firms and markets.
Prerequisite: Economics 1050 (formerly Economics 199) or equivalent.
Half course (fall term; repeated spring term). Fall: Tu., Th., (S.), at 12. Spring: Tu., Th., 10-12.

Economics 2010b. Advanced Economic Theory
Professor Stephen A. Marglin and Assistant Professor Masahio Aoki (fall term); Professor Kenneth J. Arrow and Assistant Professors Hajime Oniki and Truman F. Bewley (spring term)

General equilibrium, welfare economics, income distribution, captial and growth.
Prerequisite: Economics 2010a.
Half course (fall term; repeated spring term). Tu., Th., (S.), at 12-1:30.

Source: Harvard University, Official Register. Courses of Instruction for Harvard & Radcliffe, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, 1971-71,  p. 155.

______________________

Spring 1972
Professors Arrow, Bewley,
and Oniki

ECONOMICS 2010b
Reading List #1

Last term, you studied the behavior of the individual economic units which make up the economy. With that as background, we will put all of the pieces together and study properties of the economic system as a whole. We will be concerned primarily with allocations through the price system, first under conditions of perfect competition and later under less restrictive conditions. We will discuss the following kinds of questions: Do “equilibrium” allocations exist? Is it stable? Unique? Of course, in answering these questions we will have to define rigorously such concepts as “equilibrium,” “efficiency,” and “stability.” This will constitute the first heading of the course:

  1. General Competitive Equilibrium, for which the reading list follows.
    For orientation we state the intended subsequent headings of the course.
  2. Welfare Economics
  3. Additional Aspects of General Equilibrium Analysis
  4. Departures from Perfect Competition
  5. Dynamics I: Theories of Interest and Investment
  6. Dynamics II: Theories of Accumulation and Growth
  7. General Equilibrium with Uncertainty and Money; Keynesian Equilibrium
  8. Theories of Income Distribution

In the following reading list, the dates in parentheses are those of the corresponding lecture. It is important that the relevant readings be done before the lecture.

  1. GENERAL COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM (8 February)
    1. The Concepts and Assumptions
      1.  J. R. Hicks, Value and Capital, Oxford, 1939; chapters 4,8.
      2. K. J. Arrow, “Economic Equilibrium,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 4, pp. 376-386.
      3. R. Dorfman, The Price System, Prentice-Hall, 1964, ch. 5.
      4. T. C. Koopmans, Three Essays on the State of Economic Science, McGraw-Hill, 1957, pp. 1-40, 55-64.
      5. J. Quirk and R. Saposnik, Introduction to General Equilibrium Theory and Welfare Economics, McGraw-Hill, 1968, chapters 1, 2, and 3, sections 1, 2.
    2. Existence of Competitive Equilibrium (10 February)
      1. W. J. Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations Analysis, Prentice-Hall, 1961, chapter 16, sections 1, 2.
      2. Quirk and Saposnik, chapter 3, sections 3-8.
      3. H. Scarf, “An Example of an Algorithm for Calculating General Equilibrium Prices,” American Economic Review 59 (1969) : 669-677.
    3. Uniqueness and Stability of Equilibrium (15 February)
      1. Baumol, chapter 16, section 3.
      2. Quirk and Saposnik, chapter 5, sections 1-3.
      3. P. Newman, The Theory of Exchange, Prentice-Hall, 1965, chapter 4.
    4. Nonconvexity and the Existence of Equilibrium (15 February)
      1.  J. Rothenberg, “Nonconvexity, aggregation, and Pareto optimality,Journal of Political Economy 68 (1960): 435-468.
      2. H. Houthakker, “Economics and biology: specialization and speciation,” Kyklos 9: 181-187.

______________________

Spring, 1972
Professors Arrow, Bewley
and Oniki

ECONOMICS 2010b
Reading List #2

  1. WELFARE ECONOMICS
    1. Pareto Efficiency (February 22)
      1. Quirk and Saposnik, chapter 4, sections 1-4.
      2. Samuelson, P. A., Foundations of Economic Analysis Atheneum, 1965, chapter 8, pp. 203-228.
    2. Social Choice and Just Distributions (February 22-24)
      1. Arrow, K. J., “Values and collective decision-making,” in P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman (eds.), Philosophy, Politics, and Society, Third Series, Basil Blackwell, 1965, chapter 10.
      2. Edgeworth, F. Y., Mathematical Psychics, C. Kegan and Paul, 1881, pp. 56-82.
      3. Edgeworth, F. Y. “Pure theory of taxation,” in Papers Relating to Political Economy, Macmillan, 1925, Vol. II, Pp. 100-122.
      4. Vickrey, W. S., “Utility, strategy, and social decision rules,” in K. J. Arrow and T. Scitovsky (eds.), Readings in Welfare Economics, Irwin, 1969, pp. 459-461.
      5. Rawls, J., “Distributive justice,” in Laslett and Runciman, op. cit., chapter 3.
      6. de Jourvenel, B., The Ethics of Redistribution, Cambridge University Press, pp. 53-56, 62-65.
    3. Competitive Equilibrium and Pareto Efficiency (February 24-29)
      1. Scitovsky, op. cit., chapters 4 and 8 (and note to chapter 8).
      2. Bator, F. M., “The simple analytics of welfare maximization, ” American Economic Review, Vol. 47, 1957, pp. 22-59.
      3. Koopmans, op. cit., pp. 41-65.
      4. Quirk and Saposnik, op. cit. chapter 4, section 5.
    4. Market Failure (February 29, March 2)
      1. Bator, F. M. “Anatomy of market failure,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 72, 1958, pp. 351-379.
      2. Coase, R. H., “The problem of social cost,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 3, 1960, pp. 1-44.
      3. Scitovsky, op. cit., chapter 20.
      4. Scitovsky, T. “Two concepts of external economies,” in Arrow and Scitovsky, op. cit., pp. 242-252.
      5. Arrow, K. J., “Political and economic evaluation of social effects and externalities,” in J. Margolis (ed.), The Analysis of Public Output, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1970, pp. 1-23; see also the following comment by S. Alexander, pp. 24-30.
    5. Problems of Redistribution (March 2)
      1. Meade, J. E., Efficiency, Equality, and the Ownership of Property. George Allen & Unwin, 1964, pp. 35-77.
      2. Diamond, P., “Negative taxes and the poverty problem — a review article,” National Tax Journal, Vol. 21, 1968, pp. 288-303.

______________________

Spring, 1972
Professors Arrow,
Bewley, and Oniki

ECONOMICS 2010b
Reading List #3

  1. ADDITIONAL ASPECTS OF GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
    1. The Core of a Market Economy (March 7)
      1. Debreu, G. and H. Scarf, “A Limit theorem on the core of an economy,” International Economic Review 4 (1963): 235-246.
      2. Newman,  op. cit., chapter 5.
    2. Input-Output Analysis (March 7)
      1. Leontief, W. W., The Structure of the American Economy, 1919-1939, Second Edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 1951, pp. 139-163, 188-207.
      2. Baumol, op. cit. (first edition), chapter 15.
      3. Dorfman, R., P. Samuelson and R. Solow, Linear Programming and Economic Analysis, McGraw-Hill, 1958, chapter 9 except section 5.
    3. Activity Analysis in General Equilibrium (March 9)
      1. Dorfman, Samuelson and Solow, chapter section 5; chapter 13.
      2. Koopmans, op. cit., pp. 66-104.
    4. Pricing of Goods in General Equilibrium (March 9)
      1. Samuelson, P. A., “Pricing of goods and factors in general equilibrium,” Review of Economic Studies, 21 (1953-4): 1-20; reprinted in Collected Scientific Papers, vol. 2, MIT Press, 1960, chapter 70.
      2. Robinson, J., “Rising supply price,’ ” AEA Readings in Price Theory, pp. 233-241.
      3. Robinson, J. “The basic theory of normal prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 76 (1962): 1-19.
      4. Friedman, M., Price Theory: A Provisional Text, Chicago: Aldine, 1962, pp. 74-93.
      5. Morishima, M., “On the three Hicksian laws of comparative statics, Review of Economic Studies 27 (1960): 195-201.
  2. DEPARTURES FROM PERFECT COMPETITION
    1. Measurement of Welfare Loss (March 14)
      1. Dupuit, J., “On the measurement of the utility of public works,” International Economic Papers, Vol. 2 (1952), pp. 93-110; reprinted in AEA Readings in Welfare Economics (Arrow and Scitovsky, eds.), pp. 255-283.
      2. Hotelling, H., “The general welfare in relation to problems of taxation and of railway and utility rates, Econometrica 6 (1938): 242-249; reprinted in Arrow and Scitovsky, op. cit., pp. 284-308 (read pp. 294-308).
      3. Oort, C., Decreasing Costs as a Problem in Welfare Economics, chapter 2.
      4. Harberger, A. C., “Three basic postulates for applied welfare economics: an interpretive essay,” Journal of Economic Literature 9 (1971): 785-797.
    2. Theory of Second Best (March 16)
      1. Little, I.M.D., “Direct versus indirect taxes,” Economic Journal 61 (1951): 577-584; reprinted in Arrow and Scitovsky, op. cit., pp. 608-615.
      2. Mohring, H., “The peak-load problem with increasing returns and pricing constraints,” American Economic Review 60 (1970): 693-705.
      3. Meade, J. E., Trade and Welfare, Oxford, 1955, chapter 1, pp. 3-9, chapter 7, pp. 102-118.
      4. Lipsey, R. and K. Lancaster, “The general theory of second best, ” Review of Economic Studies 24 (1958-9): 11-32.
    3. Imperfect Competition
      1. Kaldor, N., “Market imperfections and excess capacity,” Economica, 1935, pp. 33-50; reprinted in AEA Readings in Price Theory, pp. 384-403.
      2. Marris, R., The Economic Theory of “Managerial” Capitalism, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964 chapters 1, 3, 5, 6.
      3. Shubik, M., Strategy and Market Structure, New York: Wiley, chapters 1, 3-6.
      4. Harsanyi, J., “Approaches to the bargaining problem before and after the theory of games: a critical discussion of Zeuthen’s, Hicks’, and Nash’s theories, Econometrica 24 (1956): 144-157.
      5. Modigliani. F., “New developments on the oligopoly front. Journal of Political Economy 66 (1958): 215-232.

______________________

Spring, 1972
Professors Arrow,
Bewley, and Oniki

ECONOMICS 2010b
Reading List #4

  1. DYNAMICS I: THEORIES OF INTEREST AND INVESTMENT
    1. Dynamics vs. Statics
      1. Hicks, J. R., Capital and Growth. Chapters 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8.
      2. Samuelson, P. A., Foundations of Economic Analysis, Chapter 11.
    2. Productivity of Capital and the Rate of Return
      1. Haavelmo, T., A Study in the Theory of Investment, Chapters 7, 17, 25, 28-31.
      2. Solow, R., Capital Theory and the Rate of Return, Chapter 1.
      3. Harcourt, G. C., “Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital,” Journal of Economic Literature, 7 (1969): 365-386.
      4. Hirshleifer, J., Investment, Interest, and Capital, Chapter 6.
    3. Equilibrium and Optimal Capital Accumulation
      1. Hirshleifer, op. cit., Chapters 4, 7.
      2. Dorfman, Samuelson, and Solow, op. cit., pp. 265-281.
      3. Ramsey, F. P., “A mathematical theory of saving,” Economic Journal 38 (1928); reprinted in Arrow and Scitovsky (op. cit.), pp. 619-624, 630-633.
      4. Arrow, K. J. and M. Kurz, Public Investment, the Rate of Return and Optimal Fiscal Policy, Chapter 3, section 1.
    4. Technological Change
      1. Solow, R., op. cit., Chapters 2, 3.
      2. Solow, R., “Technical change and the aggregate production function,” Review of Economic Statistics, August 1957.
      3. Arrow, K. J., “The economic implications of learning by doing,” Review of Economic Studies, June 1962, pp. 155-173; reprinted in P. Newman, Readings in Mathematical Economics, Volume II, pp. 200-220.
      4. Becker, G., Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, Columbia University Press, 1964, Chapters 2, 3.

______________________

Spring, 1972
Professors Arrow,
Bewley, and Oniki

ECONOMICS 2010b
Reading List #5

  1. DYNAMICS II. THEORIES OF ACCUMULATION AND GROWTH
    1. One-Sector Models
      1. Solow, R. M., Growth Theory: An Exposition. Oxford, 1970. Chapters 1, 2.
    2. Maximal Growth: The von Neumann Model
      1. Koopmans, T. C., “Economic growth at a maximal rate, Quarterly Journal of Economics 82 (1968): 335-345. Reprinted in P. Newman, Readings in Mathematical Economics, Johns Hopkins, 1968, Vol. II, pp. 239-278.
      2. Hicks, J. R., Capital and Growth, Chapters 17-19.
      3. von Neumann, J. “A model of general economic equilibrium, Review of Economic Studies, August 1945, pp. 1-9. Reprinted Newman, op. cit., pp. 221-229.
    3. Intertemporal Efficiency
      1. Koopmans, T. C., Three Essays on the State of Economic Science, pp. 105-126.
      2. Phelps, E. S., Golden Rules of Economic Growth, North-Holland, 1967, pp. 3-20.
      3. Dorfman, R., P. A. Samuelson, and R. M. Solow, Linear Programming and Economic Analysis. McGraw-Hill, 1958, Chapter 12.
      4. Samuelson, P. A., “An exact consumption loan model of interest with or without the social contrivance of money,” Journal of Political Economy 18 (1958): 467-482.
      5. Starrett, D. A., “On golden rules, the ‘biological theory of interest,’ and competitive inefficiency,” H.I.E.R. Discussion Paper. June 1970.

______________________

Spring, 1972
Professors Arrow,
Bewley, and Oniki

ECONOMICS 2010b
Reading List #6

  1. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM: UNCERTAINTY AND EMPLOYMENT (25,27 April, 2 May)
    1. Uncertainty in General Equilibrium
      1. Hirshleifer, J., Investment, Interest, and Capital. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970, Chapter 9.
      2. Diamond, P. A., “The role of a stock market in a general equilibrium model under technological uncertainty,” American Economic Review 57 (1967): 758-776.
    2. Underemployment Equilibrium
      1. Leijonhufvud, A., On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of Keynes. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, chapter II.
      2. Arrow, K. J. and F. Hahn, General Competitive Analysis. San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1971, Chapter 14.
    3. Growth and Distribution Without Full Employment
      1. Robinson, J., Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth. London: Macmillan, 1964, pp. 1-87.
      2. Sraffa, P., Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities, pp. 12-95.

Source: Harvard University Archives. Papers of Zvi Griliches. Box 123, Folder “Advanced Economic Theory, 1971-1975”.

Image Source: Photo of Kenneth Arrow by Irwin Collier, August 22, 2011.

Categories
Economics Programs Fields Harvard

Harvard. Report of Economics Department Visiting Committee. Brimmer, 1974

 

The first African American to have served as a governor of the Federal Reserve System  (1966-1974) was the Harvard economics Ph.D. (1957), Andrew F. Brimmer (1926-2012). Brimmer was a loyal alumnus who served his doctoral alma mater on the Harvard Board of  Overseers and as a member/chair of the visiting committee for the economics department

This post provides the 37 page text of the 1974 Visiting Committee Report on conditions in the Harvard economics department. The topics of radical economics, hiring, tenure and promotion, and the deep dissatisfaction of about half of the economics graduate students with Harvard’s Ph.D. curriculum are all covered in this fairly remarkable document.

_________________________

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO VISIT THE
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

[Andrew F. Brimmer, Chairman (April 15, 1974)]

I. Introduction

General Impression: The Committee found the Department of Economics under a great deal of stress, and it left with considerable concern for its future effectiveness. The Committee observed some disagreements within the senior faculty, but the major division appears to be between the latter as a group and perhaps half the graduate students. The factors giving rise to this division are numerous and complex, but one element stands out above all others: a substantial proportion of the graduate students are convinced that the senior faculty has little interest in teaching them and is not concerned with their welfare. A strong sense of alienation pervades the Department, and the frustration is evident on the part of a significant number of nontenured faculty members as well as among graduate students. On the other hand, the undergraduate concentrators seem to be much more contented than they were a few years ago.

The Committee was deeply troubled about this state of affairs—because on previous visits it had found a far different situation. For example, in its Report for the academic years 1969-71, it concluded:

“…The Department of Economics is in excellent condition. In addition to first-class leadership and fine internal condition, it enjoys the best of reputations. Its graduate school received the top rating in the recent canvas made by the American Council on Education. As we were able to see for ourselves during the visitations, the standard of teaching is very high and the work produced impressive….” 1/

1/ “Report of the Committee to Visit the Department of Economics for the Academic Years, 1969-71,” November 22, 1971, Number Two, p. 7

Against that background, the condition of the Department at the time of the last visit was particularly disturbing. A significant proportion of the members had served on the Committee during previous visits, and they were able to compare the present atmosphere to that which prevailed on previous occasions. For them, the sharpness of the deterioration in attitudes and relationships within the Department was particularly distressing.

Having reported these pessimistic impressions at the very outset, it must also be stressed that the Department of Economics at Harvard remains at the very forefront of the economics profession, For instance, at the time of the Committee’s visit, a senior member of the faculty [Wassily Leontief] was absent—because he was in Europe to accept the 1973 Nobel Prize in Economics, thus joining two other colleagues in the Department [Simon Kuznets (1971), Kenneth Arrow (1972)] who have received this signal honor. In a number of fields (especially in Economic Theory and Econometrics), the Department is at or close to the apex of the profession. Its members are also conducting first-class work in most of the applied fields. Moreover, as discussed more fully below, the Department has appointed a number of committees to re-examine its program. The expected recommendations—if adopted—will undoubtedly correct some of the deficiencies noted in this report. Thus, while economics at Harvard is going through a number of strains, it is by no means on the edge of dissolution.

The Visitation: The Committee met in Cambridge on the evening of December 10 and all day December 11, 1973. Fifteen of the 20 members of the Committee were present for all or a substantial part of the visit. An agenda identifying the main topics to be covered—along with supporting material—had been distributed in advance.

The issue of “Radical Economics” at Harvard was a matter of considerable interest to a number of Committee members, and several had requested that it be given a high priority on the agenda. Reflecting this interest, a number of contemporary items of information were circulated. In addition, an excerpt, “Much Ado About Economics,” from James B. Conant’s My Several Lives, was sent to Committee members. In this chapter, Dr. Conant discussed the controversy evoked by the report of the Committee which visited the Department of Economics in 1950. In its public report, the Committee (through its chairman) criticized the Department for a lack of “balance with respect to the viewpoints of its members.” In essence, The Committee at that time found that the Department had a number of “Socialists,” “Keynesians,” and “advocates of Government control of the economy”; but it found no one on the faculty with opposing views. It concluded that the situation should be corrected. The criticism against the Department which attracted the present Committee’s interest was the charge that political bias on the part of senior members of the faculty influenced the decision not to give tenure to one or more younger members identified as “radical economists.” So, while the specific facts were different, the basic issues were quite similar.

Several other specific issues had been identified in advance, and one or more members of the Visiting Committee had been asked to take responsibility to see that they were not overlooked. Among these were: (1) the quality of undergraduate teaching; (2) the quality of instruction in the first-year graduate courses, and (3) the Department’s affirmative action program.

During its visit, the Committee met separately with representatives of the tenured and non-tenured-faculty. It also met separately with undergraduates. The Committee was invited to a specially-called meeting of the Graduate Economics Club, and a number of faculty members also attended. Several of the Committee members also attended some of the classes which were then in session. On the basis of these contacts, the Committee formed a number of impressions and reached a number of conclusions. These are discussed in the following sections. The Committee also made several suggestions to the Department, and some of these are indicated in the text. Finally, the Committee weighed several recommendations, but agreement could not be reached on some of them. The outcome of that discussion is reported in the final section of this report. At the Chairman’s request, several of the Committee members prepared written accounts of their impressions, and others communicated orally with him following the visit. The Chairman drew extensively on these accounts — as well as on notes taken during the visit — in the preparation of this report.

 

II. Structure of the Department

The Department of Economics at Harvard is a fairly large organization. As shown in Table 1, there were 132 persons holding appointments in the Department during the 1973-74 academic year. Fifty-two of these had primary appointments in the Department, and seven held joint appointments with other units of the University. Three were visitors from other institutions. There were also 70 teaching fellows all of whom were graduate students. There were also 11 persons from other faculties offering instruction in the Department. Four of these had their primary appointments in the Kennedy School and two in the Business School.

Table 1. Faculty of the Department of Economics
Academic Year, 1973-74
Economics Faculty Other Faculty Offering Instruction
Professional Chairs 10 Kennedy School
Professors 10 Professors 2
Associate Professors 6 Associate Professors 1
Assistant Professors 14 Lecturer 1
Lecturers 12 Sub-Total 4
Sub-Total 52
Joint Faculty Business School
Professors 5 Professor 1
Assistant Professors 2 Assistant Professor 1
Sub-Total 7 Sub-Total 2
Visiting Faculty Other Schools
Professor 2 Professors 3
Lecturers 1 Associate Professors 2
Sub-Total 3 Sub-Total 5
Total 62 Total 11
Teaching Fellows 70
Grand Total 132

The size of the Department has been fairly stable in recent years — following a noticeable expansion during the first half of the 1960’s. For example, in the Fall of 1959-60, there were 55 members; by the Fall of 1966-67, there were 118. So the 132 in the Department during 1973-74 represented a gain of 12 per cent over the last seven years. It should be noted, however, that all of the members reported do not devote full time to the Department. The average teaching fellow spends about one-third of this time in the classroom while the remainder is devoted to research (primarily in the preparation of dissertations). Most of the Assistant Professors teach roughly half time and are involved in some variety of research for the remainder. Those members holding joint appointments are also engaged in on-going research for a significant part of their work load. Finally, during any given period, a number of the members will be on leave to pursue independent projects. For the 1973-74 academic year, eight faculty members were scheduled to be on leave for the full year. Three others were to be absent in the Fall term and four others during the Spring. A number of faculty members also had reduced teaching loads because they had bought off a fraction of their time via research grants. The figures in Table 2 show the number of faculty members on a full-time equivalent basis for each rank.

As indicated in Table 3, roughly half of the Economics Department’s faculty (excluding teaching fellows) have tenure. However, quite contrary to the impression frequently gotten by casual observers—the tenured members of the Department carry a sizable share of the teaching load at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. Moreover, as shown in Table 4, the proportion of undergraduate courses taught by the tenured faculty has risen significantly over the last ten years. In contrast, the proportion of graduate courses taught by the senior members has declined somewhat. During the 1972-73 academic year (not shown in Table 4), tenured faculty taught 20 of the 36 undergraduate courses offered. There were 18 tenured members in residence during the year, and 16 of them taught at least a one-semester course offered primarily for undergraduates. Moreover, all of them were available to advise on theses and to supervise independent work. Nevertheless, teaching fellows still carry a significant share of the total teaching load in the Department.

Table 2. Number of Economics Faculty Members on a Full-Time Equivalent Basis,
By Rank
Academic
Year
Full
Professors
Assoc. & Ass’t. Professors Lecturers Teaching
Fellows
1973-74 15.75 11.05 4.25 2.6
Est. for 1974-75 14.25 12.00 2.00 19.1

 

Table 3. Tenure Status of the Economics Faculty
Academic Years 1970-71 and 1971-72
Academic
Year
Total
Faculty
Tenured Professors Non-Tenured Professors
Number Per Cent Number Per Cent
1970-71 71 29 41 42 59
1971-72 53 25 47 28 53

 

Table 4. Number of Economics Courses Taught, By Status of Faculty,
Selected Academic Years
Term and Status
of Faculty
Number of Undergraduate Courses
(Exc. Junior & Senior Tutorials)
Number of Graduate
Courses
1953-54 1962-63 1971-72 1953-54 1962-63 1971-72
Fall Term
Tenured 6 8 14 23 25 25
Non-Tenured 8 6 11 5 5 12
Total 14 14 25 28 30 37
Tenured as per cent of total 43 57 56 82 83 68
Spring Term
Tenured 7 6 15 24 29 27
Non-Tenured 10 11 11 5 5 11
Total 17 17 26 29 34 38
Tenured as per cent of total 41 35 58 83 85 71

 

III. Trends in Enrollment

Undergraduates: The Department has continued to attract a substantial proportion of all undergraduates to its courses. For example, it is estimated that nearly half of all undergraduates were attracted at least to Economics 10—the introduction to economics. Fall term enrollment in this course in recent years is shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Fall Term Enrollment in Economics 10
Year Number Year Number
1965 774 1970 553
1966 828 1971 570
1967 734 1972 706
1968 732 1973 987
1969 535

These figures indicate that enrollment in the introductory course has surpassed the previous peak set in the Fall of 1966. In fact, while enrollment declined by over one-third between 1966 and 1969, the recovery in enrollment since the low point was reached amounted to more than four-fifths through the Fall of 1973.

The Department continues to attract about 7 per cent of all undergraduates as concentrators. Trends over recent years are shown in Table 6.

Table 6. Undergraduate Enrollment
Academic
Year
Number of Economics Concentrators
(3 years)
Per Cent of All Concentrators Harvard/
Radcliffe
Ratio
Course Enroll. Below 300 Level
(Student Sem.)
Economics as Per Cent of Arts & Sciences
1968-69 346 7.4 4.4 3,510 6.4
1969-70 292 6.4 5.5 3,437 6.4
1970-71 288 6.2 4.2 3,588 6.8
1971-72 301 6.4 4.5 3,542 7.0
1972-73 315 6.7 3.8 N.A. N.A.

These results have been achieved in the face of expanding competition from new concentration options offered elsewhere in Harvard and Radcliffe Colleges. The Department’s share of concentrators has been rising somewhat in recent years. However, it still remains well below what it was in the past-for example, 9.8 per cent in 1953 and 8.6 per cent in 1966. Moreover, economics continues to appeal substantially less to Radcliffe students than it does to those in Harvard College. Thus, the figures reported above suggest that men are about four times as likely to concentrate in economics as are women. This situation has existed for many years, and the presence of several women on the economics faculty seems not to have enhanced the Department’s appeal to women undergraduates. In the years ahead, the Department plans to place special emphasis on broadening enrollment of Harvard and Radcliffe undergraduates.

The figures presented above also show that the Department’s courses above the introductory (but below the graduate) level have been competing reasonably well in comparison with other undergraduate offerings.

Graduate Students: The figures in Table 7 show trends in graduate student enrollment and doctorates granted in recent years.

Table 7. Graduate Enrollment and Doctorates Awarded
Academic Year Graduate Students Doctorates Awarded
1968-69 159 28
1969-70 183 28
1970-71 171 33
1971-72 151 37
1972-73 161 28
1973-74 158

These data suggest that roughly one-sixth to one-fifth of the graduate students enrolled complete the requirements and receive the doctorate each year. As a rule, the typical Ph.D. candidate spends about two years taking courses and in other ways preparing for the generals examinations—normally taken toward the end of the second year. The next phase of the work involves the preparation of a dissertation and a special examination. The median time covered by this phase was in the neighborhood of 32 months for the group completing the Ph.D. degree in 1964-65, compared with 57 months for those doing so in 1954-55. Since the mid-1960’s, the median time probably has been shorted further.

As shown in Table 8, the range of specialization of those completing the Ph.D. in economics at Harvard continues to be quite wide. Among the various fields, however, Economic Development continues to be the most popular field. It accounted for about one-fifth of degrees granted during the four years shown. Money and Banking and Econometrics (the next most popular fields) each accounted for about one-tenth of the degrees awarded. Several of the traditional fields (such as Economic Theory, International Trade, Labor Economics, and Public Finance) each accounted for about 5 per cent of the total number of degrees. The emergence of several newer fields of interest—such as Urban Economics, Environmental Economics, and Socio-Economic Structure—should also be noted.

Table 8. Fields of Specialization of Ph.D. Recipients, Selected Years
Special Field 1965-66 1967-68 1971-72 1972-73
TOTAL 29 35 37 28
1. Agriculture 1 1
2. Chinese Studies 1 1
3. Comparative Economic Systems 1
4 Economic Development 4 12 6 6
5. Economic Growth 2
6. Economic History 1 2 3 1
7. Economic Theory 2 1 2 3
8. Econometrics 4 5 3
9. Environmental Economics 1
10. Health Economics 1 1
11. Industrial Organization 1 1 3
12. Input-Output Economics 2
13. International Trade 3 2 2 1
14. Labor Economics 2 2 3
15. Managerial Economics 1
16. Mathematical Economics 2 1
17. Money and Banking 1 3 4 4
18. Public Finance 2 2 2 1
19. Public Utilities 1
20. Regional Economics 1 2
21. Socio-Economic Structure 1
22. Soviet Economics 1 1
23. Statistics 1
24. Transportation 2 1 1
25. Urban Economics 4 2
26. Water Resources 1

 

IV. Departmental Atmosphere

As I have indicated above, the Committee encountered a greatly disturbed environment. One member of the Committee, who had participated in several previous visits, took special note of the strengths as well as the weaknesses within the Department:

“…As for the divisions in the department, the major one by far is between the senior faculty and about 50% of the graduate students. This is the problem that particularly distressed me, and the one which really threatens the future effectiveness of the department. There are, to be sure, disagreements within the senior faculty on issues dramatized by the decision (not to grant tenure to Professor Samuel Bowles). But I do not believe that — absent the unrest of the graduate students — they are beyond normal academic expectations or outside the capacity of the department for accommodation and compromise. Within the senior faculty there is still the civility and mutual respect needed for a functioning, self-governing department. I say this partly because I have recently visited another economics department where this condition does not obtain.

“The undergraduates seemed reasonably content with the program. …A minority of them are concerned about the loss of radical economists, but there was not as strong an undergraduate voice on this issue as might have been expected. As elsewhere, undergraduate radicalism is much weaker than it was five years ago.

“The complaints of junior faculty seemed to me much the same in kind and intensity as on previous visits. They have to do with the impersonality of the place, the lack of community, the inaccessibility of senior faculty, the division of the department into research empires which communicate very little with each other. In addition, junior faculty often express sympathy with the complaints of graduate students about the curriculum and the quality of instruction. At the same time, junior faculty do recognize the very great advantages of the Harvard environment for their own research and intellectual development. And they also participate with devotion and enthusiasm in the teaching programs of the department, and in the work of the various committees for curricular reform.

“The critical problem is the alienation of the graduate students. The most distressing thing is not that there are radicals among them, but that the general shortcomings of graduate instruction have alienated so many students of all persuasions. The radicals have evidently been able to capitalize on this discontent to make recruits among successive waves of students. Otherwise it is hard to understand how a movement which has waned rapidly in economics on other campuses and in other departments at Harvard continues to be so strong. It may also be true that some of the appeal of Bowles et. al. was that they cultivated a solicitude for students in contrast to the indifference perceived in “straight” faculty.

“In my own department radical dissent regarding the methodology of economics, the organization of our program, and the substance of economics has been expressed with emphasis but almost never with hostility and distrust toward the faculty as individuals or as an institution. So I found the tone of hostility and distrust at the Harvard (Graduate Economic Club) meeting very distressing. And of course I was quite impressed that about half of the graduate students were there, and that among them only one person said he was having a really good educational experience. I realize that the 50% present were not representative, but that’s a lot of students in itself and evidently the satisfied students didn’t have strong enough feelings to show up.

“The criticisms of first year courses are not new. We heard a couple of years ago that the theory course was a heavy dose of technical mathematics with no attempt at elucidation of basic economic content. Since then the course has shifted teachers again (frequent shifting is one of its problems), but remains a problem. It is much too large (maybe 80) for effective teaching. For the richest university, that is disgraceful.

“The general reputation of the senior faculty is that they are inaccessible, unapproachable, that they know and see only the few students who have gained access to their empires. No one serves for graduate students the functions performed by junior faculty for undergraduates, as teachers, advisers, tutors, friends. This really must be changed, even at some expense in research output and in outside activities of faculty. As things stand, I would not advise a bright … senior to go to the Harvard department unless he was of such a specialized interest and talent that he clearly could become a student protégé of one of the giants of the Harvard department.

“Perhaps the reduction in size of the graduate student body and the appointment of more non-tenure associate professors who will be active in graduate instruction will improve the situation. But that will not be enough. The senior faculty seems to me overly complacent about the situation, perhaps because they have been so close to it so long that they have forgotten what a decent and civilized community of faculty and graduate students is like.

“Unfortunately it will take time to recreate one at Harvard even if the faculty tries to do so. I don’t think it takes a drastic reformation of the curriculum so much as greater dedication to teaching, the use of smaller classes, assistants in first year courses, etc.”

Still another member of the Visiting Committee addressed himself to the atmosphere in the Department:

“…At the very outset, I think (one must not get) the impression of a deeper split within the senior faculty than actually exists. The division of opinion over Bowles involved only a small minority (not-by the way—a bloc that would hold together on many issues) and represented the sort of difference of opinion that any large faculty must expect to have. Had it not been for the size and intensity of the reaction from graduate students, nothing much would have followed from the Bowles decision. The real split in the department is between most of the senior faculty and a substantial fraction of the graduate student body. That, in turn, is a compound of radical dissidence and much broader student discontent with the teaching and conduct of the graduate program. The most striking aspect of the situation, in some ways, is how little the senior faculty seems to care. To give a clear picture of the department, I think (one must note) the contrast between the turbulence down below and the disaffection of some assistant professors on the one hand, and the fact that at the top things are really quite serene, large amounts of excellent research are getting done, and the faculty is justifiably pleased with its place and performance in the profession. That dichotomy is very important. The Overseers should realize that actions taken to fix some of the bad things may have unexpected effects on the good things…”

In a letter written following the visit, another member of the Committee also captured the essence of the prevailing conditions:

“… The distressing morale situation in the Economics Department shook me profoundly. I know enough to recognize the normal level of gripes in the special pleadings to which one is always open in such a situation, but the reactions of the various academic people on the Committee and that Law School professor at the (Graduate Economics Club) meeting confirm to me that things are really bad.

“…The argument about the radical professors probably pinpoints the entire problem, which is one of alienation between the tenured faculty (most of them, anyway) and all the rest of the department – faculty and students. There is a feeling that nobody cares…. Add to that the clear and unhappy failure to cope with the challenges it must meet (and perhaps was itself the cause of these problems), and the impatience and frustration of the younger people with the conventional … ‘received doctrine’ is only natural.

“…I have never heard the word ‘disappointment’ used so often. One shocking comment at the lunch with the non-tenured faculty was that, ‘It’s almost impossible to get a senior faculty person to read our research papers, but that’s easy in comparison with getting them to look at a reading list of a course we are preparing.’ The conscious and persistent rejection of discussion or Socratic teaching techniques in the classroom is hardly the proper way to help students to master a complex and essentially analytical rather than descriptive subject.

“The contrast with my days as an undergraduate is striking. We knew, took classes with, and spent time with all the great stars of our time—Hansen, Williams, Schumpeter, Mason, Leontief, Chamberlin, Haberler, Machlup, etc. All but the largest classes were full of active discussion and argument. The younger faculty was in ferment about Keynesianism and was just jamming it down the throats of the older faculty—who listened, argued, and clarified. I have never stopped going back to my class notes or the annotations in our books. The whole thing has never lost its relevance, fascination, or utility over the … years. This is what Harvard should do and must do to justify its reputation and importance, but that is precisely what it is not doing now.”

One member (who has visited the Department on several other occasions) focused on another impression shared by a number of others on the Committee. Following the visit, he wrote:

“…For the first time (in several years of) visitations (they were annual prior to the recent innovation)…I feel that the department is in great need of leadership. This conclusion is the result of a number of factors. Among them:

“1. While the department is unquestionably the finest in the country, the aura of leadership stems primarily from research activities. Teaching is another and a considerably spottier story. While the samples we observed were highly selective, they were not good.

“2. The furor over the radical economists does not seems to me to be related nearly as much to the facts as to the way in which the situation has been handled. That Harvard is alone among all universities in being in this position would tend to support this conclusion.

“3. The Harvard Economic Research Institute was a device for channeling research funds to the department. It has been allowed to run down completely. As much as faculty members may like the idea of additional funds being available, there seems no plan for replacing this source. Without such a plan and organized approach, it seems unlikely to me they will be replaced.

“4. I gather Ed Mason’s international activity is about to go out of business. I do not know the full story.

“5. The feeling persists among students (and this is not new) that the Economics Department lacks a ‘personality’ and interest in the student as an individual. As a result, they feel ‘at sea’.

“6. The impression I had from the students, at least, is that the number of socially relevant policy courses is limited (probably wrong) and that it is only the radical economists who are interested in teaching them (probably also wrong) and that these are the kinds of subjects on which students want to spend their time (with which I completely sympathize). If the students are right, this is a bad state of affairs. The fact that this is their perception of reality also seems to me a poor state of affairs.

“I am sure that each of these has its rationale and history. Yet, however much each requires the kind of careful handling one normally associates with management of professional staffs, none of these situations is necessary. Taken together, they worry me. My impression is that if we had time to study the issues truly important to the department’s future, we might well find they lacked the kind of forceful handling they should have….”

The assessment of the Department by a new member of the Committee was as follows:

“…My impression of the concern expressed by both the undergraduate and graduate students was threefold: (1) radical economics; (2) ‘relevant’ courses; and (3) a demonstrated concern for and interest in teaching and students. It seemed that the ‘radical’ economists were lecturing on topics of great interest to the students and were good, concerned teachers. Thus, I would like to emphasize that the Department not only broaden its course offerings but make evident, in a visible, systematic and continuing fashion that a priority function is teaching undergraduates and graduates…”

Again, it must be emphasized that the Committee’s exposure was necessarily short, and it may not have gotten a fully rounded picture of the prevailing situation. On the other hand, the fact that Committee members who have seen the Department over several years got the same impression must be given a great deal of weight.

 

V. Undergraduate Instruction Program

The Committee encountered few criticisms with respect to the undergraduate program offered by the Department of Economics. This was in noticeable contrast to the situation just a few years ago. At that time, students complained about the quality of tutorial programs and the lack of an opportunity to pursue joint majors with other substantive fields. During the 1972-73 academic year, the Department greatly expanded the amount of instruction provided on an individual or small group basis. As part of the initial effort, 20 sophomores received individual tutoring with highly favorable results. As a consequence, individual tutorial will become a permanent option — while group instruction will also be available for those students who prefer it. All concentrators have the option to participate in junior tutorial, and the option is being elected by an increasing number of such students. A senior thesis workshop has been in operation for more than a year. This program (led by a senior faculty member) provides an opportunity for seniors pursuing honors to explain and defend their research proposals well in advance of the March date on which the theses are due.

For the last few years, the Undergraduate Instruction Committee (UIC) has circulated questionnaires in all undergraduate courses in Economics to permit students to evaluate each course. The questions have focused on matters such as (1) the lecturer’s ability to hold interest; (2) overall evaluation of lectures; (3) overall evaluation of reading material; (4) helpfulness of sections; (5) preparation of section leaders; (6) fairness in grading; (7) attainment of initial expectations, and (8) overall impression of course. Each of these elements is rated on a scale of 9 for excellent, 7 for good, 5 for average, etc. The mean evaluation of undergraduate courses (weighted by enrollment) taught in the Fall term of 1971-72 was 6.65. (The standard deviation was 1.63) The highest score was achieved by junior tutorial groups, and several intermediate lecture courses followed fairly closely behind. A rough summary of the students’ evaluation of courses taught in the academic year 1972-73 (unweighted by enrollment) suggests that the overall assessment was about the same as in the previous year.

During the Committee’s visit, however, representatives of the Undergraduate Instruction Committee made two recommendations affecting the undergraduate program. The first related to the procedures of the Faculty Subcommittee on the Undergraduate Curriculum. The UIC expressed apprehension over the possibility that the Faculty Subcommittee might recommend major changes in the objectives and curriculum of the Economics Department without providing an ample opportunity for economics concentrators to discuss the proposals. The UIC strongly urged against such a course. After meeting with UIC, members of the Visiting Committee reported this concern to the chairman of the Faculty Subcommittee and were assured that no definitive action would be taken without proper consultation with undergraduate concentrators.

The second recommendation concerned the place of “radical” economics at Harvard. The UIC stated that:

“…it is clear to the committee that the Department of Economics should provide opportunities for undergraduate study in all major areas of economic theory. ‘Radical’ (Marxist) economic theory, as taught by Professors Bowles, Gintis, MacEwan, and Marglin, is a major alternative to neoclassical economic theory. The possibility exists that none of these faculty members will be teaching at Harvard during the academic year 1974-75. In light of this fact, this committee urges that the Department of Economics make certain that “radical” professors of economics be present on the Harvard Department of Economics faculty for 1974-75.”

In assessing the status of the undergraduate program, a member of the Committee observed:

“…The undergraduate program seems to be in better shape, perhaps because some of the assistant professors and teaching fellows are, against all odds, devoted to teaching. It seems to me that there is a genuine issue to be faced in the (recommendation)…. I have only little sympathy for the notion that “radical” or Marxian economic theory deserves a major place in the curriculum. But I do think that a department that goes in one or two years from a complement of four actively teaching radicals to none is in grave danger of violating a legitimate expectation of continuity held by students. If any number of undergraduates were attracted into the field by the hope of doing some specifically “radical” courses and research, then it is perhaps unfair to them to withdraw that opportunity so suddenly. If that is the content of the UIC recommendation, I think there is merit in it. There may be a similar point to be made on behalf of graduate students.

The Visiting Committee assured the representatives of UIC that their recommendations would be included in its report.

 

VI. Graduate Instruction Program

The Visiting Committee heard the most vocal expressions of discontent from graduate students. The strident tone of these comments was new—even to persons who had been on the Committee for several years. In explaining the apparent sharpness of the changed environment, one must give weight to the observations made by the chairman of the Department of Economics: since the Committee did not meet during the 1972-73 academic year, it perhaps had not kept abreast of emerging graduate student attitudes. Moreover, when the Committee visited the Department during the last few years, the “radical” students had boycotted the Committee’s meeting with graduate students. This time they chose to participate in the discussion through the Graduate Economic Club (G.E.C.).

In fact, the special meeting called by that organization (and to which the Committee and faculty members were invited) was the best session of the entire visit—at least in the opinion of several members of the Committee. The co-chairman of the G.E.C. had obviously worked hard to organize the meeting, and a substantial proportion of the graduate students enrolled participated. Three key issues were listed on the agenda: (1) the first-year program (including the Economic History requirement, theory courses, mathematics instruction, class size, and teaching quality); (2) curriculum content and the “firing” of radical professors, and (3) the structure and control of the Department. The presentations were crisp, and the discussion — while full — was highly focused.

The meeting took place against the background of considerable student unhappiness over the graduate program. One expression of that attitude is embodied in a long letter prepared by the Graduate Economics Club and addressed to entering graduate students. The opening section of that letter sets the general tone:

“The Graduate Economics Club is an organization open to all economics graduate students, whose purpose is to represent, and provide a forum for, the views of students in the department. We are writing to welcome you to the Economics Department. We only wish we could report that it was a more pleasant experience. In general, most of us have found that the first year at Harvard was the worst year of our lives. The teaching is often terrible, the professors distant and uninterested in new students. Many of us found that we were forced to work extremely hard at courses that were poor by any standard. The department makes little attempt to ease new students’ adjustment to Cambridge, so many entering graduates find the initial months are alienating and lonely. Student-faculty relations are often poor, in part as a result of academic and political disputes which have riven the department in the last three or four years.

“Harvard can be a very exciting place to work. Cambridge is a lively, stimulating city: the intellectual and cultural resources available here are extremely broad ranging. Once they come to know the department and the city, most students find Harvard an enjoyable place to study. It is largely the first few terms here that prove so difficult. In an effort to make the first year somewhat better for you than it was for us, a fair number of students have discussed how we might have treated our first year here differently. This letter is an attempt to condense what we now that might help you. Not all of us agree with all of what is included, but most of us agree with most of it….”

The letter then took up three main subjects: (1) the formal academic requirements and the older students’ collective judgment as to the best way to handle them; (2) housing and living arrangements, and (3) an account of the “political” conflicts evident in the Department of Economics in the last few years. The first and third of these subjects were also dominant themes of the G.E.C.’s meeting in which the Visiting Committee participated.

The formal requirements for the Ph.D. established by the Department of Economics specify that candidates must pass examinations in five fields: Economic Theory, Economic History; Quantitative Methods, and two “special” fields chosen by the student. By long-standing practice, many students “write-off” the Economic History and Quantitative Methods requirements by taking specified courses. An additional requirement is enrollment in one working seminar in which a paper must be prepared.

These requirements—and the way in which they have been administered—have engendered numerous complaints by graduate students. In response, the Graduate Instruction Committee was instructed by the faculty of the Department of Economics to review a number of aspects of the doctoral program and to recommend improvements. Six curriculum review committees (which included student members as well as both tenured and non-tenured faculty) were established for this purpose. These were: (1) Committee on the Structure of the Doctoral Program and Examinations; (2) Committee on the First-year Program; (3) Committee on Economic Theory and its History; (4) Committee on Economic History; (5) Committee on Special Fields, and (6) Committee on the Relations Between the Economy and Society. The Graduate Instruction Committee prepared several memoranda to give guidance to the various review committees and to identify the main issues and questions on which it was hoped the latter would focus. At the same time, however, it was made clear that the review committees should not feel constrained by such memoranda but should feel free to define the scope of their own deliberations and recommendations. The key issues on which the committees were urged to focus are summarized in Appendix I to this report.

It was thought unnecessary and unduly complicated to require formal coordination of the work of the various review committees. However, consultation among them was encouraged. This was especially true of the committees dealing with the structure of the doctoral program and relations between economics and society. Most of the committees were asked to report during the Fall term. The tasks were well underway at the time the Visiting Committee was at Harvard, and the Department expects to consider the various recommendations before the end of the 1973-74 academic year. It was generally expected that significant changes will be recommended in several of the areas under review.

 

VII. Controversy over Radical Economics

As indicated above, the debate over Harvard’s receptivity to the presence of “radical” professors on the faculty and the inclusion of “radical economics” in the curriculum held a great deal of interest for members of the Visiting Committee. Background material on the subject had been shared with committee members in advance, and a considerable amount of time during the visit was spent on the issues involved.

To put the matter in perspective, it might be well to summarize the emergence of the debate in the Economics Department in recent years. Apparently in the mid-1960’s, a number of younger faculty members and graduate students concluded that conventional training in economics (in which Harvard was in the forefront) did not address most of the social problems of the day which they thought important. Acting on this conviction, they began to work within the Department for a reform of the curriculum. Some of the senior faculty members were sympathetic with these goals. Partly as a result of these efforts, students were added to the Graduate Instruction Committee (G.I.C.)—first two students and then three on a committee of 13 members. Evidently these changes did little to resolve the student’s discontent. It is reported that recommendations by the G.I.C. favorable to students were not endorsed by the faculty as a whole.

In the generally unsettled atmosphere at Harvard during 1969-70, graduate student protest over the economics curriculum also rose considerably. To meet the criticism, the form of the general examination requirements was relaxed somewhat. Yet, many students still found the content of the curriculum unsatisfactory. Again, it seems that some faculty members (not all of them without tenure) shared this feeling. By the Spring of 1971, this continuing disappointment led to the Graduate Economics Club (GEC) to pass “…a resolution calling for full democratization of the economics department. As the first steps towards implementation the GEC demanded equal representation on the Graduate Instruction Committee and the non-tenured faculty committee….” The faculty (after what was apparently a vigorous debate) turned down these propositions in late March, 1971.

In the wake of this outcome, discussions were held among small groups of students and faculty which focused on the general examination requirements and on the graduate program generally. One of the committees formed at that time addressed itself to the role of “socio-economic structure” and Marxist theory in the curriculum. These two subjects were later approved by the faculty (in the Spring of 1971) as special fields in the Ph.D. program. However, no major changes were made in the content of the generals examinations, and no commitment was made to invite any Marxist economists to join the permanent faculty. Also in the Spring of 1971, the student representatives left the Graduate Instruction Committee—protesting what they considered token representation and lack of influence. Finally, in the Fall of 1971, the Graduate Economics Club adopted a resolution specifying that “… a Marxist theorist shall be hired to teach a curriculum in Marxist theory, to begin no later than the Fall of 1972….”

The faculty made no immediate response to this resolution. However, the issue came into sharp focus during the early months of 1972. At that time, a debate got underway over the question of the tenure of Associate Professor Samuel Bowles—a question which the Department had to answer by the end of the calendar year. The term appointment of Assistant Professor Arthur MacEwan was also moving to the stage at which a decision with respect to his future status would have to be made by the same deadline. These two men were viewed by the students as “…the last two remaining non-tenured radical faculty members….” A campaign to win tenure for them was launched by both undergraduate and graduate students. As part of this effort, a petition urging that they be retained and that more radical economists be brought to Harvard was circulated in the Spring of 1972. More than 700 persons signed the petition. In the Fall of that year, a substantial proportion of Professor Bowles former students (reportedly 75 per cent of them—virtually all of those who could be reached) orally or in writing supported the effort to obtain tenure for him. But, after a long (and apparently sometimes divisive) debate, the majority of the Department voted against a tenure appointment for Professor Bowles. A few weeks later, Professor MacEwan’s term appointment was not renewed, and he was not promoted to Associate Professor. Previously two other “radial” economists (Herbert Gintis and Thomas Weisskopf) had failed to receive promotions.

Immediately, these decisions were attacked as “politically” motivated by many of the students and some of the faculty. These charges of bias were denied vigorously by members of the senior faculty. However, the reverberations of those actions reached well beyond the boundaries of Harvard University. For example, at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association (AEA) in Toronto in late December, 1972, a resolution was proposed condemning the action of the Harvard economics faculty. The chairman and other representatives of Harvard spoke against the resolution which was not adopted. However, a modified version was approved. It held that:

  1. The American Economic Association urges that hiring decisions in economics departments be free of political bias. The Association strongly condemns political discrimination in hiring decisions against radical economists or any others.
  2. The American Economic Association urges all departments to set up university procedures whereby allegations of discrimination on the basis of political differences can be systematically investigated.
  3. The American Economic Association strongly opposes discrimination in government grant allocation on the basis of political views.

As indicated above, strong voices were heard on both sides of the debate over the Bowles appointment. The formal view of the faculty majority was given by Professor James Duesenberry, Department Chairman, in his report covering the 1972-73 academic year:

“…Our pleasure…was marred by criticism, from students and others, of the department’s failure to recommend Associate Professor Samuel Bowles for a tenure appointment. The non-tenure associate professorship is a new rank at Harvard and Professor Bowles was the first person appointed to it and therefore the first to reach the time at which a decision as to a tenure recommendation had to be made. There was perhaps some misapprehension as to the likelihood of tenure appointments for associate professors. There are at present six associate professors and it is a source of regret that only a fraction of this extraordinarily able group of economists can be offered tenure appointments. In Professor Bowles’ case it was alleged that the Executive Committee’s decision was biased because of Professor Bowles’ ‘radical’ views. Since bias like beauty is in the eye of the beholder, that is a difficult charge to answer. I can only say that in my twenty years on the Executive Committee the primary consideration has always been the search for persons who could be expected to maintain and enhance the outstanding professional position of the department. Failure to recommend a particular associate professor for a tenure appointment is not an indication of bias unless it can be alleged that the person in question has scholarly abilities and accomplishments which are obviously superior to those of any other persons—at Harvard or elsewhere—who might be appointed.

“Alternatively it might be argued that ‘radical economics’ should receive more attention. The department already has one ‘radical’ full professor (appointed before his conversion to be sure, but here none the less). The amount of weight to be given to any subfield or approach in our discipline is always a matter of opinion and dispute, but it does not seem obvious that the accomplishments of the relatively new radical approach are so overwhelming as to outweigh the many other claims on our limited number of appointments….”

Several other senior faculty members who thought Bowles should have been given tenure—although their reasons differed—have also spoken on the issue. Professor Stephen A. Marglin (a member who was voted tenure before he began to identify with the “radical” economists) urged his colleagues to give Bowles a tenure appointment—and also to bring more radicals to Harvard. By so doing, he though radical economics would have a chance to develop. Professors Kenneth J. Arrow, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Wassily Leontief were also willing to give radical economics an opening: and they, too supported tenure for Bowles. Professor Arrow has been quoted as saying that Bowles’ appointment would broaden the Department, and he felt that his work was “good enough” judged by standard that “hardly had anything to do with radicalism.”

Partly as a response to this debate, Herbert Gintis (who was lecturing in the School of Education after he failed to win reappointment three years earlier) was invited back to the Department of Economics as an Assistant Professor, with the understanding that he would be recommended for promotion effective with the 1974-75 academic year. Beginning in September, 1974, Gintis and Bowles (along with two other “radical” economists — Stephen A. Resnick and Richard Wolff) will go as a team to the Economics Department of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.1/With their departure, Stephen Marglin will be the only “radical” economist with tenure — in a Harvard community numbering more than 60 economists. Moreover, he is scheduled to be on leave for the 1974-75 academic year.

1/ Subsequent to the Committee’s visit, it was learned that Gintis may remain at Harvard. As this report was being written, the matter was still uncertain.

 

VIII. Continuing Controversy Over the Scope of Economics at Harvard

Aside from the debate over the role of radical economists at Harvard, a number of faculty members (both tenured and non-tenured) are concerned about the scope and content of the curriculum—and think it should be broadened considerably. The curriculum review committees discussed above were appointed for this purpose. Several tenure appointments will become available to the Department in the next few years, but opinions differ as to how they should be filled. The Department chairman, in his report covering the 1972-73 academic year, identified the fields of labor, industrial organization, economic development, and economic history as ones in which additional strength is needed.

More fundamentally, however, at least a few senior faculty members apparently believe that the differences in view with respect to the content of the economics program are so wide that a basic reorganization of the Department may be in order. So far, Professor Galbraith is the only one to express his views in writing. However, Professors Arrow, Albert Hirschman, Leontief, and Marglin are reported to have thought — during the Spring of 1973 — that the possibility of forming a new department or a separate track within the existing Department was worth exploration2/By late fall, Professor Galbraith (who chairs the Committee on the First-Year Graduate Program) had in circulation a proposal to establish an Experimental Program and Committee within the existing Department of Economics. If adopted, this program would provide students an alternative path to the Ph.D. paralleling the more traditional route. Under the umbrella of the new faculty Committee which would oversee the alternative route, appointments would be made and associated research would be conducted. Subject matter of interest to faculty and students working in the Committee’s area might include problems of the arts, discrimination, income maintenance, and poverty. Perhaps one-quarter of the graduate students might elect to pursue this new track. The proposal also visualizes that the committee would have the right to recommend appointments — tenure and non-tenure — about in proportion to its share of the teaching load (both undergraduate and graduate). While the Executive Committee of the Department would vote on such recommendations, there would be a broad presumption that the Committee’s recommendations would be accepted.

2/ A member of the Visiting Committee thought the report should note that this group of senior faculty “…is the group that supported Bowles, and that it is in fact a group that has very little else in common. Galbraith’s and Hirschman’s view of economics has very little overlap with Arrow’s and Leontief’s, and Marglin is his own kind of (man). This appears to more an alliance based on political attitude and temporary happenstance than a genuine current of thought.”

At the time the Visiting Committee was in Cambridge, this proposal had generated considerable reaction. It had apparently won strong support among some of the senior faculty as well as among the non-tenured group and graduate students. But it apparently had also encountered strong opposition — especially on the part of some of the tenured members. Since a version of the proposal will probably be submitted to the Graduate Instruction Committee this spring, the Department may have to vote on it before the end of the 1973-74 academic year.

 

IX. Affirmative Action Program

The Visiting Committee made a special effort to appraise the effort being made by the Department of Economics (in keeping with University policy) to recruit women and members of minority groups. The subject was discussed primarily with the Department Chairman, but other senior members of the faculty also contributed. The non-tenure recruitment procedures used during 1972-73 were described by the Department Chairman as follows:

“The Department of Economics normally plans to hire 4 or 5 assistant professors each year. In the 1972/73 recruiting season, the non-tenure appointment committee obtained names and short vitas of prospective new Ph.D.’s from over twenty leading departments of economics. Additional names were supplied to us on an informal basis by a number of smaller graduate departments. Members of the committees and other members of the department then contacted department chairmen, placement officers, and others to develop a shorter list of the outstanding prospects from this year’s Ph.D. crop. In making these inquiries chairmen and placement officers were pressed as to the availability of women and minority candidates. At the time of the 1972 Christmas meetings of the American Economics Association the “short list” included 40 names of which 6 were women. There were no minority candidates who seemed suitable for our department. At the AEA meetings members of our department interviewed all candidates on the short list who could be contacted, as well as others who requested interviews.

“On the basis of interviews and further correspondence with other universities, a number of candidates were included in these invitations. In the end five offers of assistant professorships were made and accepted through these procedures, of whom one was a woman. It may be worth noting that it was necessary for us to make a considerable effort to find a post for her husband at another university in the city in order to obtain the services of the one woman we have recommended for an assistant professor appointment.

“In addition to the appointments made through these procedures, we have recommended that two persons now holding lectureships in the university be appointed assistant professors. One of these is our head tutor who had been teaching in Social Studies but will now undertake an important teaching assignment in our department. In his case we feel that he should assume professorial status. Because of the importance of continuity in his post as head tutor, we have not considered any other candidates.

“A second appointment has been recommended for a lecturer in the School of Education who has previously taught in our department but who will now switch the bulk of his teaching from the School of Education to the Department of Economics.

“We have also recommended two associate professor appointments. One of these is to be promoted from assistant professor upon completion of his term. We had no women assistant professors reaching the review point this year. The other recommendation is for an appointment to associate professor in the field of labor economics as a stop-gap replacement for Professor Dunlop. An extensive search by a special committee did not reveal any women or minority candidates who could be seriously considered for this position.”

On balance, several members of the Visiting Committee thought that the Department’s procedures (while clearly aimed in the right direction) did not show the kind of vigorous effort required to achieve the Harvard goal. At least one academic member of the Committee thought that the Department’s efforts fell appreciably short of those made by several other institutions — which had also been much more successful in competing for an admittedly scarce supply of women and minority group economists.

Another member of the Committee, who had been asked to give special attention to the matter, observed as follows:

“…The first evening… we discussed … Affirmative Action Plan. But I had a strong feeling that it was a farce. The message seemed to be: Look how hard we’ve tried. We’ve done everything we could, but there simply aren’t any qualified women or blacks. As (another member) said to me informally, they really seem to believe women are inferior. This member of the Visiting Committee would urge a much stronger effort to recruit women at the assistant professor level so as to increase the number in the pipeline for higher level positions later….”

 

X. Concluding Observations

At the conclusion of its visit and after considerable discussion — the Visiting Committee decided not to draw up a list of specific recommendations. Instead, it chose to describe as fully as possible the situation it encountered in the Economics Department. It was assumed that the Harvard faculty itself is best suited to cope with its own problems.

On the other hand, several general observations should be made. In the first place, it was obvious to virtually every member of the Committee that the curriculum being offered by the Department of Economics is greatly in need of reformation.3/ The subject matter ought to be broadened to provide greater scope for students and faculty to work on problems — and search for solutions to them — that are not easily encompassed within the corpus of traditional economics as taught at Harvard. It was realized, of course, that the Department of Economics at Harvard is far less narrow than almost any other department in the forefront of the profession. Yet, a number of the men who have provided this broad thrust over the years have recently retired and others are scheduled to do so in the near future. Consequently, the Visiting Committee thinks it is vital that the upcoming opportunities to make tenure appointments be used to assure that Harvard’s historic concern for economic welfare (broadly defined) be kept alive in the years ahead.

3/ A member of the Committee noted that “…the Harvard curriculum is not atypical for university departments aspiring to high status in the profession’s pecking order. So it is a problem of the criteria by which the profession judges, not specifically of the Harvard Department. Nevertheless, there may be good reason for Harvard to assume some leadership in searching for a broader curriculum. Of course, there may be no good answer….”

The Visiting Committee refrained from expressing a judgment on the appropriateness of the decision not to give tenure appointments to specific members of the faculty identified as radical economists. The reason was simple: in the final analysis, the faculty itself has to decide who will be given status and the right to enjoy its privileges and carry on its responsibilities. On the other hand, the Committee feels strongly that “political” bias or other forms of discrimination should have no weight in judging candidates for tenure. Again, however, these judgments have to be made by the faculty.

But one member of the Visiting Committee also felt strongly that some kind of machinery should be created that would enable some outside body (perhaps even outside the University) to review faculty decisions in which those affected adversely feel they are the victims of discrimination — “political” or otherwise. Two or three other members of the Committee expressed some sympathy with this general view — although not necessarily with the specific elements outlined. On balance, however, the Committee decided not to endorse the proposition or transmit it as a recommendation. 4/ Nevertheless, everyone was sensitive to the difficult issues involved. Several members thought that the general position on political bias embodied in the resolution adopted by the American Economic Association (reported above) is one the Harvard Economics Department might well adopt as its own.

4/ The tone of the opposition to the proposal was captured by one member: “…I have my doubts about any proposal for outside review….Appointments may in fact sometimes be made on a discriminatory basis, and I would be interested in suggestions for protective machinery. I fear, however, that the solution mentioned here may be so open to abuse as to be worse than the problem. I wish I had a better alternative to suggest….”

The Committee was deeply impressed with the criticism of the graduate curriculum which it heard. For that reason, it was pleased to note the work now underway in the various review committees to reassess the program. It appears that a number of important recommendations will be made to the faculty — which if adopted could significantly enhance the appeal and usefulness of the program to graduate students. At the same time, it is also obvious that the senior faculty members in the Department must devote far more time directly to the education of the students who look to them for inspiration and guidance.

Finally, the Committee is convinced that a much greater — and far more systematic — effort should be made to seek out promising women and members of minority groups as potential faculty members. The Committee is under no illusions that this is an easy task. But, unless the Department’s procedures are revamped and more resources devoted to the assignment—it appears doubtful that the Department of Economics will make a significant contribution toward helping Harvard University achieve the goals established in its affirmative action program.

Andrew F. Brimmer
Chairman

April 15, 1974

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

APPENDIX I
SUMMARY OF ASSIGNMENTS OF CURRICULUM REVIEW COMMITTEES

[Incomplete]

As indicated above, the Department of Economics has established six curriculum review committees to work on the improvement of a number of aspects of the doctoral program. The principal guidance given to these task forces by the Graduate Instruction Committee is summarized below.

Committee on Structure of the Doctoral Program and Examinations: This committee “will be responsible for reconsidering the procedure whereby a candidate becomes a doctor of philosophy and is expected to contemplate if not to recommend very fundamental changes in the organization of the program.” Its mandate includes:

  1. Reconsideration of the length and chronology of the doctoral program.
    1. Currently the Economic Department expects candidates to take general examinations at the end of their second year and special examinations one and a half to two years later. What is the actual chronology in recent years? Is this norm sound, or should the Department develop a program of different length and segments?
    2. Should candidates be involved in teaching and research sooner than at present, say during the second year, although this may require some extension of the time devoted to preparing for the general orals?
  2. Consideration of possible course requirements. At present there are none (formally), but it may be advisable to require candidates to take a specified minimum number of courses for letter grades.
  3. Reconsideration of the offering of advanced courses and seminars. There are now a large number of advanced courses and seminars, many with small enrollments. Who takes these courses: second-year students, post-generals students, students from outside the Department? Would it suit the needs of the faculty and students better if some or all of them were replaced by less formal and more flexible tutorials, group or individual?
  4. Is the Department meeting the needs of post-generals students with respect to advanced instruction, stimulation, and guidance? How should that phase of the program be strengthened?
  5. Reconsideration of the role and concept of the thesis. Current legislation is intended to encourage theses that are more like a long paper or short monograph than like a comprehensive treatise, but this seems to be largely a dead letter. Which concept is sound, and how can it be implemented?
  6. Reconsideration of the final examination. For the last few years, the grading and conduct of the special examination have been separated from the acceptance and grading of the thesis. Has this change made the special examination a more useful educational experience than previously? Would other changes improve it further?
  7. Finally, is the graduate program properly attuned to the job market or the requirements for a career in economics? What kinds of jobs do Harvard graduates find, and have they been equipped properly for such jobs? Are any procedures needed for adjusting the program to meet the changing demands on economists?

This list of topics, though long and demanding, was not meant to be exhaustive. The committee was encouraged to feel free to raise questions of its own and to make recommendations about any aspects of the program.

 

Committee on the First-Year Program: Some matters and questions that this committee was asked to consider are:

  1. The efficacy and adequacy of the current procedures for advising first-year students.
  2. Whether the courses and programs now available to entering students provide enough flexibility in view of their widely varying levels of preparation and fields of interest. Is the first year concentrated excessively on the three required fields?

 

  1. [sic, “3.” apparently skipped over or omitted] Whether there is need for more information about the level and contents of graduate courses than is provided by the catalog listing and, if so, how to provide it. Are the current pamphlets about the general nature of the program and the degree requirements adequate? Indeed, should the organization and contents of the catalog listing being revised substantially?
  2. Is there need for additional physical facilities, in particular, for a common room?

 

Committee on Economic Theory and Its History: Some of the issues called to the committee’s attention are:

  1. Level of the requirement. At present the instructors and examiners in economic theory and its history do not have any guidance except vague traditions for determining the level of attainment to expect. It is somewhere between the acquaintance with fundamental concepts expounded in the intermediate undergraduate economic theory course and the highly technical proficiency (also vaguely conceived) expected of a candidate who offers advanced economic theory as a special field.
    A clear, and if possible, operational definition would be highly desirable. This task consists, really, of two parts: first, a policy decision on the appropriate level of advancement, and second, the discovery of a way to express that decision in clear and operational terms, perhaps a syllabus.
  2. The scope of the field. Just what topics are to be included in the field of economic theory and its history is nowhere laid down. It is not at all clear how much acquaintance the faculty expects candidates to have with the present of economic doctrine, either first-hand or second-hand. There is considerable disagreement about how much [… end of copy]

 

NOTE:  PAGES STARTING WITH A-5 ARE MISSING.

Missing are “(4) Committee on Economic History; (5) Committee on Special Fields, and (6) Committee on the Relations Between the Economy and Society.”

Source: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. John Kenneth Galbraith Papers. Series 5. Harvard University File, 1949-1990. Box 527. Folder “Harvard Department of Economics Report of the Visiting Committee, 1975”.

Categories
Chicago Economics Programs Economist Market

Chicago. Draft memo of a program to rebuild the department of economics by T.W. Schultz, 1956

 

The following draft memo by T. W. Schultz outlines the serious faculty replacement needs of the University of Chicago department of economics in the mid-1950s. Particularly noteworthy, aside from the impressive list of lost faculty, is the appended table listing the sponsored research/3rd party funders of the economics department at that time. One also sees that the department had been authorized to make offers to Kenneth Arrow, Robert Solow and Arthur F. Burns. So much for the best-laid plans of mice and men. A better historian of economics than I might spin a counterfactual tale of a post-Cowles Chicago with Arrow and Solow on the faculty.

Regarding the ICA Chile Enterprise: Economic Research Center, Schultz wrote “The Chilean enterprise will give us a fine ‘laboratory’ in which to test ourselves in the area of economic development– a major new field in economics.” This reminds me of the old Cold-War Eastern European joke about whether Marx and Engels were scientists (“No, real scientists would have tried their experiments on rats first”). What a “fine ‘laboratory'” for testing oneself!

_________________________

A Program of Rebuilding the Department of Economics
(first draft, private and confidential – T. W. Schultz, May 22, 1956)

Your Department of Economics has been passing through a crisis. Whether it would survive as a first rate department has been seriously in doubt, with one adversity following another as was the case up until last year. It is now clear, however, that we have achieved a turning point in that we can rebuild and attain the objective which is worth striving for – an outstanding faculty in economics.

The crisis came upon us as a consequence of a combination of things: (1) the department, along with others in the University, had been denied access to undergraduate students of the University who might want to become economists; (2) Viner left for Princeton, Lange for Poland, Yntema for Ford and Douglas for the Senate; (3) the Industrial Relations Center drained off some of our talent and when it jammed, Harbison left for Princeton; (4) Mr. Cowles’ arbitrary decision to shift “his” Commission to Yale was a major blow; (5) Nef been transferring his talents to the Committee on Social Thought, and (6) add to all these the retirement of Knight.

Meanwhile, there were several external developments which did not reduce our difficulties: (1) a number of strong (new) economic centers were being established – at Stanford, Johns Hopkins, Yale, Vanderbilt, M.I.T. and with public funds at Michigan and Minnesota; (2) our salaries were falling behind seriously relative to some of the other places, and (3) recruiting of established, highly competent economists became all but impossible given the crisis that was upon us and the (then) low repute of the University neighborhood.

The ever present danger of the past few years has been that we would be in the judgment of competent colleagues elsewhere, in the beliefs of oncoming graduate students and in the eyes of the major foundations – not recover our high standing but instead sing to a second or even a third-rate department and in the process lose the (internal) capacity to recruit and rebuild.

We now have achieved a turning point distinctly in our favor.

The major efforts which have contributed most have been as follows:

  1. We have taken full advantage of our unique organization in combining real research with graduate instruction. Our research and instruction workshops are the result. The Rockefeller Foundation gave us three grants along the way – agricultural economics, money and public finance – to test this approach and advanced graduate work. The Ford Foundation has now financed our workshops with $200,000 (eight 5-year grant) (our proposal of January 1956 to The Ford Foundation states the theory and argues the case for this approach on the basis of the experiences we have already accumulated).
  2. We set out aggressively to recruit outstanding younger economists. The workshops were a big aid to us in doing this; so was the financial support of the University. We had the ability to “spot them”. We now have the best group of talented young economists, age 30 and less, to be found anywhere. This achievement is rapidly becoming known to others in keen “competition” is already upon us as a consequence.
  3. We need urgently to run up a lightning rod, a (rotating) professorship with a salary second to none, to attract talent and make it clear we were in business and would pay for the best. The Ford Foundation took favorably to the idea. (Thought so well of it that they will do the same for 3 other privately supported Universities – Columbia, Harvard and Yale!)
    The $500,000 endowment grant from them for a rotating research professorship is our reward.
  4. The foundations have given us a strong vote of confidence: grants and funds received by the Department of Economics during 1955-56 now total $1,220,000. (A statement listing these is attached).
  5. The marked turn for the better in the number and the quality of students applying for scholarships and fellowships is, also, an affirmative indication.
  6. The Economics Research Center is filling a large gap in providing computing, publishing and related research facilities which was formally a function of the Cowles Commission.
  7. The Chilean enterprise will give us a fine “laboratory” in which to test ourselves in the area of economic development – a major new field in economics.

There remains, however, much to be done. We must, above all, not lose the upward momentum which is now working in our favor.

Faculty and University Financial Support

To have and to hold a first rate faculty in economics now requires between $225,000 and $250,000 of University funds a year.

To have a major faculty means offering instruction and doing research in 8 to 10 fields. Up until two years ago we came close to satisfying the standard in our graduate instruction. We then had 11 (and just prior to that, 12) professors on indefinite tenure.

Then, Koopmans and Marschak were off to Yale, Harbison to Princeton and Knight did reach 70. And, then there were 7. On top of these “woes” came the serious illness of Metzler which greatly curtailed his role; and, Nef having virtually left economics. Thus, only 5 were really active in economics with Wallis carrying many other professional burdens. Meanwhile we added only one – Harberger was given tenured this year.

Accordingly at the indefinite tenure level we are down to about one-half of what is required to have a major faculty. Fortunately, several younger men have entered and have been doing work of very high quality.

It should be said that the Deans and the Chancellor have stood by, prepared to help us rebuild.

Major appointments were authorized – Arrow, Stigler, Solow and others. We still are hoping that Arthur F. Burns will come.

The resignations and the retirement, however, did necessarily reduce sharply the amount of financial support from the University.

In rebuilding, at least five additional tenure positions will be required:

  1. Labor economics (from within)
  2. Trade cycle (we hope it will be Arthur F. Burns, already authorized).
  3. Money
  4. Econometrics and mathematical economics.
  5. Business organization
  6. Consumption economics (when Miss Reid retires; next 3 years we shall have the extra strength of Dr. D. Brady with finances from The Rockefeller Foundation)
  7. International trade (pending Metzler’s recovery)
  8. Economic development.

The faculty and the University financial support recommended is as follows:

Tenured positions (for individuals fully committed to economics).

    1. Now in the harness

6: Friedman, Johnson, Harberger, Hamilton (Metzler), Wallis (Nef), Schultz

    1. To be added

5: Burns pending, (labor), (money), and two other fields, most likely econometrics and business organization

 

Budget:

11 [tenured positions]

 

$165,000

Metzler and Nef $15,000
$180,000
III. Supplementary non-tenure faculty $45,000
Altogether $225,000

 

Outside Financial Support for the Department of Economics

Grants

Amount of grant Available 1956-57

A. Received during 1955-56.

1.     Sears Roebuck Fellowships

$4,000

$4,000

2.     National Science Foundation (2 years)

$13,000

$6,500

3.     Conservation Foundation (2 years)

$33,000

$16,500

4.     Rockefeller Foundation: consumption economics (3 years)

$45,000

$15,000

5.     American Enterprise (2 years)

$17,250

$8,625

6.     Ford Foundation: research and instructional workshops (5 years)

$200,000

$30,000

7.     Earhart Fellowships.

$6,000

$6,000

8.     S.S.R.C. Student Grants

$5,000

$5,000

9.     Ford Foundation: 3 pre-doctoral grants

$10,200

$10,200

10.  Ford Foundation: faculty research grant (Hamilton)

$12,500

$8,000

11.  ICA Chile Enterprise: Economic Research Center Fellowships, research support (3 yrs)

$375,000

$125,000

12.  Ford Foundation: endowment for rotating research professor

$500,000

$25,000

13.  Rockefeller Foundation: Latin America (Ballesteros)

$5,000

$5,000

Sub-totals

$1,225,950

$264,825

B. Received prior to 1955-56 where funds are available for 1956-57.

1.     Rockefeller Foundation: workshop in money (3 years with one year to go)

$50,000

$20,000

2.     Rockefeller Foundation: workshop in public finance (3 years with one year to go)

$50,000

$20,000

3.     Resources for the Future (3 years with one year to go)

$67,000

$27,000

4.     Russian Agriculture (2 years with one to go)

$47,000

$22,000

B sub-totals

$214,000 $89,000

A and B totals

$1,439,950

$353,825

 

Source:  University of Chicago Archives. Department of Economics Records. Box 42, Folder 8.

Image Source: 1944 photo of T.W. Schultz from University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf1-07479, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library. Cf. Wikimedia Commons, same portrait (dated 1944) from Library of Congress.

Categories
Columbia

Columbia. Alvin S. Johnson recounts exams with Franklin Giddings, 1951

 

Perhaps I lived a blessed student life. I never felt that I had been particularly ill-treated in an examination, though I should add that I have fortunately been spared the trauma of an oral examination, except for matters involving my dental health. I once spoke with Kenneth Arrow, on the day before his 90th birthday, and was surprised to hear just how salient a memory was of an injustice that had been inflicted upon him by John Maurice Clark in an oral examination some seven decades earlier. Apparently Alvin Johnson nursed an analogous decades-long grudge as a result of his oral exam at the hands of the sociologist Franklin Giddings. In his letter to Joseph Dorfman transcribed in this post, we see that he was later able to leverage a poor exam performance of a Giddings’ student into a sweet payback of sorts. 

____________________

Letter from Alvin Johnson to Joseph Dorfman

THE NEW SCHOOL
66 West 12th St. New York 11
[Tel.] Oregon 5-2700

August 21, 1951

Dear Joe:

You haven’t answered my query as to whether it wouldn’t suit your purpose better to substitute for the piece I sent you on the School of Political Science my experience of the economics department proper.

I think my second minor was in Constitutional History under Burgess. At my doctor’s exam Burgess asked me three questions, but to be fair he elaborated them so much that he answered them himself, and I had only to nod assent.

Not so with Giddings. He was having a feud with Seligman and set about taking it out of my hide. I had attended a course with him on the English Poor Laws, a course that bored Giddings stiff. He came to my exam with a sheet of details he couldn’t have remembered himself.

“What was the Statute of Laborers? What year of what reign?
“What law was enacted in the third year of Edward VI?
“What was the ‘Speenhamland Act?’ What year of what reign?”

            About forty such questions. After I had retired for the Faculty to vote[,] Giddings, who after all was my friend, came out first, slapped me on the back and said:

“Well you passed. But by God, I made you sweat.”
“I’d have made you sweat yourself if I had had the written sheet and you hadn’t loaded up for me.”
“You bet.”

            I had my revenge a few months later, when one of Giddings’ protégés came up with a thesis on Puerto Rico. He was a theologue [sic], savagely Protestant, who ascribed all the woes of Puerto Rico to the Catholic Church. His book was full of fishy figures, the worst on the food situation. The Puerto Ricans were starved; they produced practically no food but lived on imported rice, the figures for which the thesis gave. I used my arithmetic and found that the figures gave fifty pounds of rice daily per capita.

“And you say they are underfed,” I added, not very humanely.

            When the candidate had retired Goodnow moved, first that the candidate be flunked; second that Giddings be censured for bringing such a fool before the Faculty; third that I be censured for making a Faculty member laugh right out in meeting. All three votes carried.

Sincerely,
[signed]
Alvin Johnson

Dr. Joseph Dorfman
Columbia University
Faculty of Political Science
New York 27, N.Y.

aj:ar

 

Source:  Columbia University Libraries, Manuscript Collections. Joseph Dorfman Collection, Box 13, Folder “C.U. Dept.al history”.

Image Source: From the cover of Alvin S. Johnson’s 1952 autobiography.

Categories
Chicago Economists

Chicago. Economics Department on Possible Candidate for Permanent Employment, 1950

 

How big was the split within the department of economics in 1950 at the University of Chicago? Judging from the decision by chairman T. W. Schultz to essentially table the matter of approaching the central university administration with a candidate for a permanent position, there was a departmental deadlock.

The half-dozen economists discussed were: George Stigler, Abba Lerner, Kenneth Boulding, Leonid Hurwicz, Kenneth Arrow, and Lawrence Klein. Contemplate those names for a moment and then read aloud the following two sentences:

Several members of the Department stated that none of these men had all of the qualities sought: a good mind reaching out fruitfully in new directions in economics. It was agreed, however, that there were no likely candidates possessing these qualities in a high degree.   

We can only speculate which alpha economists happened to lock horns in those three meetings.

_________________________

From the MINUTES, Meeting of the Department,
May 24, 1950.

Present: T. W. Schultz, T. Koopmans, A. Rees, H. G. Lewis, D. G. Johnson, E. J. Hamilton, R. Burns, J. Marschak, F. H. Harbinson, F. H. Knight, M. Friedman, B. Hoselitz, L. Metzler

[…]

II. Appointments

Schultz informed the Department that Hildreth’s position has been renegotiated for a term of three years. The Department approved a motion authorizing for Hildreth the courtesy rank of Associate Professor for a three year term.

The Department then considered the appointment problem raised by the leaving of Blough (probably initially on a one year leave of absence) and Brownlee. Schultz suggested that the Department had two alternatives open to it: a temporary replacement (construed broadly) and a permanent appointment of a top ranking person.

The Department considered first possible candidates for permanent appointment. Attention centered on George Stigler, Abba Lerner, Kenneth Boulding, Leonid Hurwicz, Kenneth Arrow, and Lawrence Klein. For a temporary appointment Schultz suggested Gunnar Myrdal.

[Meeting began at 3:30 pm and ended 5:45 p.m.]

_________________________

From the MINUTES, Meeting of the Department,
May 30, 1950.

Present: T. W. Schultz, R. Burns, D. G. Johnson, E. J. Hamilton, F. H. Knight, L. Metzler, R. Blough, F. H. Harbinson, A. Rees, H. G. Lewis, T. Koopmans, J. Marschak, M. Friedman.

Appointments

The discussion of appointments continued from the previous meeting. Schultz expressed the conviction that the time was propitious for a new permanent appointment. On Metzler’s suggestion, the Department returned to discussion of the following candidates for a permanent appointment: Stigler, Hurwicz, Boulding, Klein, Lerner, Arrow.

Several members of the Department stated that none of these men had all of the qualities sought: a good mind reaching out fruitfully in new directions in economics. It was agreed, however, that there were no likely candidates possessing these qualities in a high degree.

The chairman then polled those present with respect to their first choice (or ties for first) for a permanent appointment. As a result of the poll the list of candidates was narrowed to Hurwicz, Stigler, and Lerner. The chairman then polled those present on their position toward permanent appointment of each of these men.

The poll showed that of those present

4 would favor and 5 oppose the permanent appointment of Hurwicz
4 would favor and 5 oppose the permanent appointment of Lerner
6 would favor and 6 oppose the permanent appointment of Stigler

A motion was passed instructing the chairman to poll the absent members of the Department in the same way on the appointment of Hurwicz, Lerner, and Stigler and to report back to the Department for further discussion.

[Meeting began at 3:30 pm and ended 6:15 p.m.]

_________________________

From the MINUTES, Meeting of the Department,
June 8, 1950.

Present: T. W. Schultz, H. G. Lewis, D. G. Johnson, J. Marschak, H. Kyrk, P. Thomson, M. Friedman, T. Koopmans, A. Rees, E. J. Hamilton, F. H. Knight, R. Blough.

Appointments

Schultz reported that he had polled Kyrk, Thomson, Mints, and Nef (but had not heard from Goode) on the matter of a permanent appointment for Stigler or Hurwicz or Lerner. The upshot of the poll was that the Department, the Chairman not voting, was evidently divided in its rating of Stigler for a permanent appointment; both permanent members and temporary members of the faculty showed an even division. The Chairman explained that he would abstain from voting on the belief that the Department was not now prepared to advance, with a strong meeting of minds, a strong case to the Central Administration for a permanent appointment. Schultz proposed that we investigate a slate of names for a one-year appointment.

A motion was passed authorizing the Chairman to put Gunnar Myrdal in the first position on the slate for a one-year appointment.

Successive motions passed by the Department added the following names to the slate:

Nicholas Kaldor   Simon Kuznets
Arthur F. Burns
H. M. Henderson
W. Vickrey
A. Hart
H. Stein

The Department then, following the system of ranking used in fellowship appointments, ranked these seven persons. The rank order follows:

1. Kaldor
2. Burns
3. Henderson
4. Kuznets
5½. Vickrey
5½. Hart
7. Stein

[Meeting began at 3:30 pm and ended 6:00 p.m.]

Source: University of Chicago Archives, Department of Economics Records, Box 41, Folder 12.

Image Source: Social Science Research Building.  University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf2-07466, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.

 

Categories
Harvard Suggested Reading Syllabus

Harvard. Undergraduate microeconomics reading list. Marglin, 1969-70

 

 

In the year after being granted tenure at Harvard, Stephen A. Marglin taught an undergraduate microeconomics course to which he invited Professors Galbraith, Arrow, Gintis and Dorfman for a discussion with his students. He included a copy of his reading list in his invitation to Galbraith which are both transcribed below. 

Marglin’s biography was featured in a few Harvard Crimson articles over the years (the common theme to these articles is “What’s a nice radical economist like you doing in a place like this?”): May 12, 1975; March 12, 1980 ; May 21, 1982 ; June 1, 2009.

 

____________________________________

Invitation from Marglin to Galbraith to participate in a discussion with his microeconomics students in January 1970

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Stephen A. Marglin
Professor of Economics

1737 Cambridge Street, Room 410
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
(617) 868-7600 Ext. 3759

December 19, 1969

Professor J. Kenneth Galbraith
Littauer Center 207
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

Dear Ken:

The “confrontation” you kindly agreed to participate in for the benefit of Ec 20 and Ec 21 students has been fixed for Friday January 9, 1970 2-4 PM, in Emerson 105. In addition to yourself Ken Arrow and Herb Gintis have agreed to participate. Bob Dorfman, who teaches Ec 21, has agreed to help guide the discussion.

The meeting will rely heavily on students’ questions, but not completely. To get the ball rolling, I am working with my section-men to prepare questions that they will ask in the beginning. These will hopefully elicit from each of your short statements on the issues we believe to be most important. I expect these questions and your answers will occupy the first 45 minutes or so of the meeting, with the rest of the time for the students.

I am enclosing a copy of the reading list to give you an idea of the scope and depth of the course. I appreciate very much your willingness to participate in this meeting. I expect it will be extremely worthwhile for my students, the teaching fellows, and for me personally.

Yours sincerely,
[Signed: “Steve”]
Stephen A. Marglin

cc: Robert Dorfman
SM:lw
(enclosure)

____________________________________

Harvard University
Economics 20a
Microeconomic Theory

Fall 1969-70
Professor Marglin

Reading List I

  1. Consumption
    1. Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition, pp. 29-50
    2. Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations Analysis, (2nd edition), pp. 169-202
  2. Production
    1. Dorfman, The Price System, pp. 14-42
    2. Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition, pp. 109-147
    3. Dorfman, “Mathematical or ‘Linear’ Programing: A Nonmathematical Exposition,” reprinted in Kamerschen, Readings in Microeconomics, (abbreviated DRK henceforth), pp. 547-576
    4. Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” reprinted in Boulding and Spivey, AEA Readings in Price Theory, (henceforth abbreviated AEA), pp. 331-351
  3. Competitive Markets
    1. Dorfman, The Price System, pp. 76-88
    2. Viner, “Cost Curves and Supply Curves,” reprinted in DRK, pp. 197-228, and in AEA, pp. 198-232
  4. Restricted Competition
    1. Sraffa, “The Laws of Returns Under Competitive Conditions,” reprinted in AEA, pp. 180-197
    2. Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition, pp. 319-337, 373-396
    3. Dorfman, The Price System, pp. 89-104
    4. Modigliani, “New Developments on the Oligopoly Front,” DRK, pp. 355-378
  5. Capital and Interest
    1. Fisher, The Theory of Interest, pp. 61-287
    2. Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition, pp. 189-216
    3. Duesenberry, Business Cycles and Economic Growth, pp. 49-133
  6. General Equilibrium
    1. Dorfman, The Price System, pp. 105-125
    2. Lange and Taylor, On the Economic Theory of Socialism, pp. 59-129
  7. Welfare
    1. Dorfman, The Price System, pp. 126-146
    2. Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition, pp. 338-370
    3. Bator, “The Simple Analytics of Welfare Economics,” reprinted in DRK, pp. 503-544
  8. Income Distribution
    1. Budd (editor), Inequality and Poverty, Introduction
    2. Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ch. 5 (“Of Property”)
    3. Clark, J.B., The Distribution of Wealth, ch. 1
    4. Budd (editor), Inequality and Poverty, Part 1, pp. 1-49
  9. Criticisms of Conventional Theory
    1. Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, ch. 2, 4, and 5
    2. Galbraith, The Affluent Society, ch. 10 and 11.
    3. Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Skim Book 1; read Book IV more carefully.
    4. Nordquist, “The Break up of the Maximization Principle,” reprinted in DRK pp. 278-295
    5. Veblen, “The Limitations of Marginal Utility,” reprinted in Mitchell (editor), What Veblen Taught, pp. 151-175
    6. Cohen and Cyert, Theory of the Firm, pp. 329-351
    7. Simon,” A Behavioral Model of Economic Choice,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1955 (omit appendix). Reprinted in Simon, Models of Man, pp. 241-256
    8. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, pp. 1-36, 108-160
    9. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Part II, pp. 61-163
    10. Galbraith, The New Industrial State
    11. Baran and Sweezy, Monopoly Capital
    12. Rawls, “Distributive Justice”, pp. 58-72, 79-82

 

Source: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. John Kenneth Galbraith Personal Papers. Series 5. Harvard University File, 1949-1990. Box 526, Folder “Harvard University Department of Economics: General Correspondence, 1967-1974 (2 of 3)”.

Image Source: Stephen A. Marglin from Harvard Crimson June 1, 2009.

Categories
Columbia Economists

Columbia. Arrow on the Subordination of Price Theory, 1940-42

 

Reading this account by Kenneth Arrow, I wondered why the lecturer in his history of economic thought course was not identified by name and who the lecturer was. In the Arrow papers at Duke’s Economists’ Papers Archive one finds his notes to John Maurice Clark’s course “On Current Types of Economic Theory” so for now I’ll presume that the son of the great John Bates Clark was the unknown lecturer of Arrow’s anecdote. 

_________________________

Kenneth Arrow Recalls the Subordination of Price Theory at Columbia

The intellectual environment at Columbia University when I was a graduate student in 1940-1942 was far different from that in which the modern graduate student in economics finds himself. Neoclassical price theory now holds pride of place, as all students will acknowledge, some joyfully, some ruefully. But at Columbia at that period there was no required course in price theory. Indeed there was no course at all offered which gave a systematic exposition of microeconomics, except for Harold Hotelling’s one term offering of mathematical economics, the content of which would today be more or less standard for a general course but which was then regarded as highly esoteric indeed. The one required course which was most nearly equivalent to price theory was a course on the history of economic thought, where the lecturer gave potted summaries of everyone from the mercantilists on. Walras was barely mentioned and certainly was much less prominent than H. J. Davenport. Keynes was not mentioned (for that matter the General Theory was not mentioned even in the course on business cycles, though there were some glancing references to the Treatise on Money).

But the work of Thorstein Veblen was indeed prominently displayed in the course on economic thought, and it was no accident. The corrosive skepticism of Veblen towards “received” theory had, belatedly and even posthumously, under mined the never-very-secure hold of neoclassical thought on teaching of American economics. Of course he was not alone in effecting the change; the more benign, but equally negative, judgments of John R. Commons, in whose name we are gathered, shaped a generation of economists trained under him at the University of Wisconsin. At Columbia, the channel of influence was Wesley C. Mitchell, creator of the National Bureau of Economic Research. His version of the attack upon neoclassical economics was an insistence on the large-scale accumulation of data. It was in large part his direct influence plus the general background created by Veblen and Commons that led to the subordination of price theory at Columbia.

Source: From Kenneth J. Arrow, “John R. Commons Award Paper: Thorstein Veblen as an Economic Theorist.” The American Economist 19, no. 1 (1975): 5-9.

Image Source:  Kenneth J. Arrow as Guggenheim Fellow (1972)  John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation.

Categories
Chicago Economists

Cowles Commission. Evsey Domar’s Four Salient Episodes, 1947-48

 

When asked by Clifford Hildreth who was working on his project, The Cowles Commission in Chicago, 1939-1955, for suggestions and/or observations from economists who had worked at Cowles during that period, Evsey Domar had few vivid recollections to offer of his year there some thirty five years earlier. Two items were associated with Jacob Marschak, one with Lawrence Klein, and one with Kenneth Arrow.

Having written the last Ph.D. dissertation supervised by Evsey Domar, I feel it my obligation to include such nuggets of Domaresque delight as his characterization of the difference between the economist (Kenneth Arrow) and the political scientist (David Easton) whom Domar had introduced to each other: “the political scientist assumed all except what he had explicitly rejected; the economist assumed only what he had explicitly stated.” 

___________________

Carbon copy of Domar letter to Hildreth

November 26, 1982

Professor Clifford Hildreth
Department of Economics
University of Minnesota
1035 Business Administration
271 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, NM 55455

Dear Cliff:

This is in reply to your letter of October 27th regarding my impressions of the Cowles Commission.

I really have very little to say, because my connection with the Commission was short (about a year) around 1947-48, and also because I was only nominally a member of the group. I remember four episodes:

  1. Jacob Marschak asking for another dozen years or so to make economics truly scientific.
  2. Same, discussing the economics of free (atomic) energy.
  3. Larry Klein predicting such a low GNP for (I believe) 1947, that after some six months hardly anything was left for the remainder of the year.
  4. I introduced Ken Arrow and David Easton (the political scientist) to each other. it took them some time to find a mutual language. Reason: the political scientist assumed all except what he had explicitly rejected; the economist assumed only what he had explicitly stated. Perhaps this episode was the most educational of all.

Sorry I cannot help you more.

Cordially,

Evsey D. Domar

/gjk

Source: Economists’ Papers Archive, David M. Rubenstein Library, Duke University. Evsey Domar Papers, Box 4, Folder “Correspondence Hf-Hz”.

___________________

Arrow on David Easton

The exposition of the book [Social Choice and Individual Values] was developed in the next year back in Chicago. I presented the material over a number of seminars. I was grateful to these people [Tjalling Koopmans, Herbert Simon, Franco Modigliani, T.W. Anderson, and Milton Friedman] because they thought it was a good idea, encouraged me and asked good questions; parts of the book are making clear points they found obscure.

Easton was a little different. He was the first political scientist I talked to about this. He gave me the references to the idealist position which was sort of the opposite idea. In a way the idealist position was the only coherent defense that I could see in political philosophy. It wasn’t a very acceptable position, but it was the only one that had at least a coherent view of why there ought to be a social ordering.

Source:  J. S. Kelly and Kenneth J. Arrow, An Interview with Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1987), pp. 55-56.

Image Source: Economists’ Papers Archive, David M. Rubenstein Library, Duke University. Evsey Domar Papers, Box 18, Folder “Photographs (Domar)”.