Tag: FetterFW

Today’s post is a jewel of fiscal policy thought in a memorandum from the University of Chicago written in 1932 at the trough of the Great Depression in the United States. Looking at the signers of the memorandum that argues for aggressive fiscal stimulus (economists covering the ideological spectrum from Aaron Director through Paul Douglas), one is reminded of Ben Bernanke’s bon mot from the last big financial crisis: “There are no atheists in foxholes or ideologues in a financial crisis”.

Note: Bernanke’s crack appears to be a minor variation on Jeffrey Frankel’s twist.

Backstory

After WWI, veterans lobbied for “adjusted compensation” to partially make up the difference between their combat pay and the significantly higher wages that had been paid to workers at home during the War. Veterans preferred the term “adjusted compensation” to the term “bonus” (the latter term being construed as implying something that goes beyond full and fair compensation). In 1924 veterans were finally granted “adjusted universal compensation” in the form of certificates that credited $1.25 for each day served abroad plus $1.00 for those days served in the U.S. These certificates were essentially 20-year insurance policies equal to 125% of the service credit to be redeemed in full on the veteran’s birthday in 1945. (Exceptions for immediate cash payments were granted for amounts less than $50 and in order to settle estates of deceased veterans for payments of less than $500). More details can be found at this link. 

In 1932 the question arose whether an early payout of these certificates would be a prudent and effective fiscal stimulus and Congressman Samuel Barrett Pettengill (Democrat) of Indiana sent the questionnaire that follows to academic economists across the country to solicit their advice in the matter.

A month later protesting “Bonus Marchers” (ca 20,000 veterans) set up camps in Washington, D.C. that they were evicted from by regular troops of the U.S. Army let by General Douglas MacArthur. It wasn’t until 1936 that the WWI veterans were paid their adjusted compensation.

Responses to Congressman Pettengill’s inquiry were published in the Hearings of the House Committee on Ways and Means for:

Edwin Walter Kemmerer,  Princeton University
Frank Whitson Fetter, Assistant Professor of Economics, Princeton University
Thomas Nixon Carver, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
S. J. Coon, Dean of the College of Business Administration, University of Washington
Harry E. Miller, Professor of Economics, Brown University
C. W. Hasek, Head of the Department of Economics and Sociology, Pennsylvania State College
Walter W. McLaren, Department of Economics, Williams College
Harry L. Severson, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics and Sociology, Indiana University
Hiram L. Jome, Professor of Economics, DePauw University
Warren B. Catlin, Department of Economics and Sociology, Boudoin College
E. E. Agger, Professor of Economics and head of the Department of Economics, Rutgers University
Edwin R. A. Seligman, Columbia University
H. A. Millis et al., Department of Political Economy, University of Chicago
Jacob H. Hollander, Johns Hopkins University
William C. Schleter, University of Pennsylvania
Albert Bushnell Hart, Harvard University (historian)

 Today’s post begins with the cover statement of the memorandum found with the copy in the Papers of the President of the University of Chicago, Robert Maynard Hutchins, Box 72.  It is followed by Congressman Pettengill’s list of questions, as well as the Chicago memorandum submitted by H. A. Millis and eleven of his University of Chicago colleagues.

A cursory sweep of the web discovered that this Chicago memorandum has been reprinted as Appendix B in J. Ronnie Davis’s 1967 Virginia Ph.D. dissertation, “Pre-Keynesian economic policy proposals in the United States during the Great Depression.” A scanned version of the Congressional Hearings in which the Chicago memorandum was published can be found at Hathitrust.org. I have compared the published version from the House Ways and Means Committee Hearings with the typed copy filed with the papers of President Hutchins at the University of Chicago Archives. Other than minor differences in spelling (e.g. the capitalized form “Federal” is used in the published version), the memorandum was published by the House Ways and Means Committee exactly as received.

__________________________________

A MEMORANDUM PRESENTED TO A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS, APRIL 26, 1932.

Two members of the staff of the Department of economics, at the University of Chicago, received letters from a member of the House Committee on Military Affairs, requesting answers to certain questions. Inasmuch as the views of a large number of economists were desired, the letter was circulated among and read by twelve men of the Chicago faculty; and steps were taken to prepare a memorandum covering the points raised….The memorandum, with the names of the twelve professors participating in its formulation, is reproduced in its entirety. Because of the character of the issues raised, it seemed better to prepare the memorandum in the form it has taken than to answer the specific questions, the one after the other.

Source: University of Chicago Archives. Hutchins Box 72. Folder 6 “Economics Department, 1932-1933”.

__________________________________

STATEMENT OF HON. SAMUEL B. PETTENGILL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

Mr. Pettengill. Mr. Chairman, I am not on the calendar this morning and therefore in justice to those who are here I have asked for only one minute.

Some time ago, before I knew when the Ways and Means Committee was to have hearings on this matter, on my own initiative I sent a questionnaire to 50 of the leading economists of the country on the Patman and the Thomas bills; also with reference to the benefit of “reflation” and the danger of inflation.

I have a very interesting file here, including letters from Mr. Kemmerer and Mr. King who have appeared before the committee.

In order to shorten the record as much as possible, I have briefed the replies somewhat. The entire letters, of course, are available.

[…]

Mr. Pettengill. Mr. Chairman, as I have stated, I endeavored to get the benefit of the best and most disinterested economic thought of the country with reference to the advisability of either borrowing money or printing money with which to liquidate the adjusted service certificates. In the main, I sent my letters to the economics department of our leading colleges and universities. In order to make their replies more intelligible to you, as many of them answered numbered questions in my letter, I attach, first, my original letter.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

Dear Sir: I am writing you and other leading economists in the country with reference to the problem confronting Congress with regard to the proposed payment of the soldiers’ bonus. I trust that I will be able to secure a symposium of opinion by authorities such as yourself which will be of real value to Congress.

As you know, at the end of this fiscal year we will have an accumulated deficit of some $3,000,000,000. It is, I think, the largest peace-time deficit of any country in the world. It is rapidly getting larger. We are going into the red now $7,000,000 a day. United States obligations have recently sold below 85.

On the other hand, commodity, wage, land, and security prices are slowly drifting to levels so disastrous that they threaten the most widespread repudiation of debts and tax defaults, which may wipe out, along with the debtors, classes holding the obligations of individuals, corporations, States, and municipalities now totaling some one hundred fifty to two hundred billion dollars, which is about one-half the Nation’s wealth. For example, the conservative Washington Post, April 11, said:

“The dollar increases in value every day … unless this vicious movement is checked it will result in panic. The extension of credit will not be sufficient. Heroic emergency measures that will arrest the fall of prices seem to be in order. … This economic malady has reached a point where it can not be expected to cure itself without leaving horrible scars. … Some powerful agency must be thrown into the breach to restore the value of goods and services against this exaggerated value of money. … Emergencies of this kind call for drastic action. … It is time for the leaders in Government and financial circles to focus their minds upon realignment of values. The people would not countenance the manufacture of fiat money to make prices rise, But some method of currency expansion on a sound gold basis may be necessary.”

            The question is the advisability of paying the so-called soldiers’ bonus as an antideflationary, inflationary, “reflationary” or stabilizing measure. The name, of course, is not important.

A number of different bills have been proposed. H. R. 1, introduced by Mr. Patman, of Texas, calls for borrowing the $2,400,000,000 necessary to make payment.

1. Do you think we can, or should, borrow this?

Sentiment here, however, is crystallizing around (for or against) Mr. Patman’s substitute, H. R. 7726; I inclose copy.
This bill simply proposes to print money to pay the debt. Is this sound, advisable, or defensible, in view of the existing emergency? And in the light of present gold reserves?

 It has been suggested that it could be strengthened as follows:
Call in the outstanding adjusted-service certificates now redeemable in 1945. Collateralize them together with 40 per cent gold which is said to be now available over and above the amount necessary for circulation now outstanding. Issue currency against this hypothecation and pay the veterans off. Then set up a sinking fund to retire the currency (together with the certificates) in whole or in part in 1945, or gradually before that time.

With reference to “excess reserves” see Federal Reserve Bulletin, March, 1932, page 143: “On the basis of these excess reserves, the Federal reserve banks could issue $3,500,000,000 of credit if the demand were for currency and $4,000,000,000 if it were for deposits at the reserve banks.”

2. What credit do you give this statement as a basis for the proposed bonus payment?

There are, of course, all sorts of social and political features around this problem, but I direct your attention to its economic and fiscal aspects. It is a problem of the most tremendous consequences and Members here who are patriotically trying to do their best to cut the present vicious circle for the good of the entire country (not the veterans alone) need, and will appreciate, the advice of men like yourself, whose life study makes your judgment so valuable.

3. Is the suggested alternative sound?

4. Does it in reality add any element of safety to H. R. 7726, the outright issue of nonretirable currency?

5. Can it be improved? If so, how?

6. It is said the Europe holds $2,000,000,000 of deposits in this country. With their experience with “printing-press” money, would they become frightened for the solvency of the dollar, and cause disastrous liquidation and withdrawals here in America? Could such liquidation of foreign-held obligations be stopped unless we “went off gold,” or had available the precautionary device of authorizing the Treasury to change the amount of gold in our dollar along the lines advocated by Irving Fisher? If foreign exchange began to go against us, would it help Europe pay us her public and private debts, as an offset against our investment and deposit obligations held by Europeans?

7. Would the introduction of $2,400,000,000 new currency into the pockets of the people necessarily result in the rise of commodity and other levels thus causing merchants to place orders for the products of farm and factory, thus starting production and accelerating employment?

8. The Glass-Steagall bill, as you know, for the period of one year, authorized placing 60 per cent Government bonds plus 40 per cent gold behind Federal reserve money. This, of course, as I understand it, is 60 per cent “greenbackism,” placing one promise to pay (Government bond) behind another promise to pay (currency) to the extent of 60 per cent. Assuming that the adjusted-service certificates are also promises to pay, can the Glass-Steagall bill and the suggested method of handling the payment of the bonus be distinguished, from the standpoint of soundness?

The Glass-Steagall bill, as it appears to me, does not seem to have stopped the deflationary trend, for the reason that its potential currency expansion is based upon borrowing, and banks and individuals are not borrowing (or lending).
Recently I have heard Willford I. King, professor of economics, New York University, testify before the House Banking and Currency Committee. Although not directing his particular attention to the “bonus” he was quite clear that the currency must be expanded at the present time in order to start commodity prices upward and permit debts and taxes to be paid, as well as to start buying, and employment. However, he was equally clear that for such currency something of equal value should be taken in by the Government, e. g., Government bonds, thus temporarily substituting noncirculating certificates of indebtedness (bonds) for circulating certificates (currency). Then, he said, when commodity prices reach the desired level, e. g., 1926 commodity index, the process would be reversed, the bonds resold, and the currency retired. It was his opinion that such a device is necessary in order to stop the elevator at the right floor—i. e., prevent inflation beyond a certain point.
Neither the Patman nor the suggested alternative plan seems to me to contain this safeguard. That is, the adjusted-compensation certificates when once taken in would not be available for reissue.

            I need not state that every member here is anxious to solve the problem, not from the standpoint of helping the needy veteran and his family at the expense of the rest of the community, but only from the standpoint of benefiting the entire Nation, on the theory that a distribution to the veteran would, of course, be passed on at once in the payment of taxes, interest, land contracts, doctors’ and merchants’ bills, etc., and with the expectation that this would stop and reverse the trend of values. If the plan or any other conceivable plan at this time would bring only disaster to the Nation and thus to the veteran and his family we have no alternative except to wait until the present economic storm blows over.

Your thoughtful consideration of this matter is most earnestly requested. Your prompt reply will be a distinct public service.

I desire, of course, to use the substance of your reply, but will not quote you, by name, without your permission. Please let me know if you do give this permission.

Sincerely yours,

Samuel B. Pettengill, Member of Congress.

Source:  U. S. Congress (Seventy-Second Congress, First Session). Payment of Adjusted-Compensation Certificates in Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives (April 11 to 29, and May 2 and 3, 1932),pp. 508, 511-513

______________________________

The University of Chicago,
Department of Economics,
April 26, 1932.

Hon. Samuel. B. Pettengill,
            House Office Building, Washington, D. C.

My Dear Mr. Pettengill: The inclosed memorandum has been prepared in an attempt to answer the questions put in your letter of April 13. It has been developed in a committee of two, in conference, and in round table. It is approved by all of the University of Chicago economists who participated in the discussion and formulation; their names appear at the end of the memorandum.

It has seemed better to answer your questions in a memorandum divided into five sections rather than to answer them specifically, the one after the other. I think all of your questions, save that relating to Professor King’s testimony, are answered. No direct reference is made to King’s position because it has seemed better to take a positive stand rather than to criticize.

You ask permission to use the replies to your questions. This is, of course, granted, but our preference would be to have the whole rather than a part of the memorandum given publicity.

Trusting that the memorandum will be of some assistance to you, I am

Very truly yours,

H. A. Millis.

(The memorandum referred to follows:)

I.

Severe depression and deflation can be checked, and recovery initiated, either by virtue of automatic adjustments, or by deliberate governmental action. The automatic process involves tremendous losses, in wastage of productive capacity, and in acute suffering. It requires drastic reduction of wage rates, rents, and other “sticky” prices, notably those in industries where readjustments are impeded by monopoly and exceeding politeness of competition. It must also involve widespread insolvency and financial reorganization, with consequent reduction of fixed charges, in order that firms may be placed in position to obtain necessary working capital when and where expansion of output becomes profitable. Given drastic deflation of costs and elimination of fixed charges, business will discover opportunities for profitably increasing employment, firms will become anxious to borrow, and banks will be more willing to lend.

As long as wage cutting is evaded by reducing employment, and as long as monopolies, including public utilities, resist pressure for lower prices, deflation may continue indefinitely. The more intractable the “sticky” prices, the further credit contraction will go, and the more drastic must be the ultimate readjustment. We have developed an economy in which the volume and velocity of credit is exceedingly flexible and sensitive, while wages and pegged prices are highly resistant to downward pressure. This is at once the explanation of our plight and the ground on which governmental action may be justified. Recovery can be brought about, either by reduction of costs to a level consistent with existing commodity prices, or by injecting enough new purchasing power so that much larger production will be profitable at existing costs. The first method is conveniently automatic but dreadfully slow; and it admits hardly at all of being facilitated by political measures. The second method, while readily amenable to abuse, only requires a courageous fiscal policy on the part of the central government.

(We agree entirely with your remarks as to the inadequacy of the Glass-Steagall bill and similar expedients. Little is to be gained merely by easing the circumstances of banks, in a situation where, by virtue of cost-price relations, everyone, including the banks, is anxious to get out of debt. Such measures may retard deflation and prepare the way for recovery; but they cannot much mitigate the fundamental maladjustments between prices and costs.)

II.

If action is needed to raise prices (and we believe it is), it should take the form of generous Federal expenditures, financed without resort to taxes on commodities or transactions. For the effect on prices, the direction of expenditure is not crucially important. Heavy Federal contribution toward relief of distress is the most urgent and, for reflation, perhaps the most effective measure. Large appropriations for public and semipublic improvements are also an attractive expedient, provided projects are chosen which can be started quickly and opportunely stopped. Generous bonus legislation would be the most objectionable of all available devices for releasing purchasing power. Purchase of the certificates at their present value, instead of at maturity value, is perhaps relatively unobjectionable.

Bonus legislation invites comparison with a program of Federal subsidy to agencies engaged in administering emergency relief. Both measures involve a sort of outright gift, the provision of funds to individuals or for their support. One involves allocation according to need, when need is dreadfully acute; the other ignores this criterion completely. Furthermore, funds spent for relief would certainly be spent for commodities, and very promptly, while less needy veterans might only use additional cash further to increase hoarded savings. Of the possible consequences of bonus concessions for the future of pension legislation, mere reminder should suffice. Congress has already capitulated to the veterans and their votes on the grounds that the Treasury was full, and the community prosperous. It is now on the verge of capitulating again, on the grounds that the Treasury is empty, and the community impoverished.

III.

It is impossible to estimate in advance how much Federal expenditure might be required to bring genuine revival of business. We are persuaded, however, that the automatic adjustments have already proceeded to a stage where the necessary inflationary expenditures would be handsomely rewarded, in greater production, larger employment, and higher tax revenues.

One should recognize at the outset a danger that any measures of fiscal inflation may be too meager and too short lived. Inadequate, temporary stimulation might well leave conditions worse than it found them. We might experience temporary revival and then serious relapse, followed by more drastic deflation than would otherwise have been necessary. If we indorse inflation, we should be prepared to administer heavy doses of stimulant if necessary, to continue them until recovery is firmly established, and to discontinue them when the emergency is ended. It is obvious that the bonus measures fail utterly to provide this necessary flexibility.

IV.

The question of how emergency expenditures, for whatever purposes, should be financed, is difficult and highly controversial. The wisest policy for the present, however, would seem to be one guided largely by psychological considerations. It is likely that adequate stimulus could be imparted, and recovery assured, without creating an excessive drain upon our gold reserves. Inflationary measures, in whatever form, will probably accelerate for a time the export of gold; but this strain we may well be able to endure until revival of business is assured. Domestic hoarding of gold, on the other hand, might force us to suspension of our currency laws; and this possibility dictates caution as to the technique of inflation. The problem is simply that of selecting the procedure which will be least alarming.

On other grounds, the issue of greenbacks seems most expedient; but this method must be ruled out unless one is ready to abandon gold immediately, for it would create the greatest danger of domestic drain. Large sales of Federal bonds in the open market would be much less alarming; but the probable effect upon the prices of such bonds must give us pause, especially since a marked decline might jeopardize the position of many banks. It would certainly be better for the Government to sell new issues directly to the reserve banks or, in effect, to exchange bonds for bank deposits and Federal Reserve notes. Much may be said, indeed, for issuing the bonds with the circulation privilege, thus permitting the Reserve Banks to issue Federal Reserve Bank notes in exchange; for this procedure does not much invite suspicion, has supporting precedent, and would greatly reduce the legal requirements with respect to gold.

It is well to face the possibility, though it seems remote, that adequate fiscal inflation might force us to abandon gold for a time. We must be prepared to see a sort of race between depletion of the gold holdings of the reserve banks and improvement of business. If definite business revival is attained before the gold position becomes acute, the hoarders will have missed some great investment bargains; if inflation must be carried beyond the limits tolerated by gold, the hoarders will reap a profit. Moreover, if other gold-standard countries follow our example, as is quite probable, the threat to our adherence to the gold standard will prove negligible.

But we would insist again that, once deliberate reflation is undertaken, it must be carried through, whatever that policy may mean for gold. To withdraw artificial support before genuine recovery is achieved, might create a situation worse than that which would have obtained in the absence of remedial efforts. If the time comes, as it probably will not, when we must choose between recovery and convertibility, we must then abandon gold, pending the not distant time when world recovery will permit our returning to the old standard on the old terms. The remote possibility of our being forced to this step, however, should not influence our decision now. The supposedly awful consequences of departure from gold are, as England has shown us so clearly, nothing but fantastic illusions.

V.

It is easy to be too greatly alarmed about the possibility of extreme and uncontrolled inflation. With improvement of business, Federal revenues will automatically increase. Expenditures may then be financed to a lesser extent by borrowing, and thus with less inflationary influence. Indeed, one might maintain that temporary inflation is the most promising means to restore a balanced Budget. Moreover, with proper precautions, it should not be difficult to effect drastic reduction of expenditures at the appropriate time. The emergency character of inflationary appropriations should be emphasized in the acts themselves; and Congress should record the intention of balancing expenditures and revenues over a period of, say four or five years. Incidentally, no emergency expenditures would permit of more opportune retrenchment than those for relief of distress.

We find it difficult, at the present juncture, to give due attention to the problem of preventing or modifying the next boom. Obviously, we should attend to getting out of the present emergency first. It demands emphasis, however, that successful resort to fiscal methods for terminating deflation will present the very serious problem of keeping recovery within safe bounds. A merely salutary inflation treatment will fail to satisfy many groups. There will certainly be demand for more inflation and more “prosperity” than we can afford or sanely endure. Fiscal inflation must be regarded as a means for meeting an acute emergency for industry as a whole. It should not be viewed as a means of solving the agricultural problem, nor as a method for deflating the rentier. It is properly a most temporary expedient, to be abandoned (and reversed) long before many individual industries and classes have obtained the measure of relief which justice might prescribe.

We have suggested that for the period of the ensuing five years all Federal expenditures, including those of an emergency character, should be covered by tax revenues. To minimize the total necessary outlay, outlays should be very generous now; parsimonious inflation is an illusory economy. It would also be eminently wise to avoid now any new taxes which fall at the producer’s (or dealer’s) margin. The levies on income, however, should be advanced immediately to the maximum levels which an imperfect, but improving, administrative system can support. While such levies will be rather unproductive for a time, they will have no very deterrent effect upon business; and, having gotten them into the statutes during a period of least political resistance, we may be assured of large revenues at the appropriate time. Even after recovery, additional commodity taxes should be resorted to only if more equitable levies prove inadequate to full completion of the “5-year plan.” Indeed, by 1940, our Federal debt should stand at a figure far below that contemplated by existing legislation. We should have high income taxes when incomes are high.

Sound fiscal management during the next few years should give close attention to indexes of production, employment, and wholesale prices. We shall not undertake at this time to indicate any definite rules. There is no immediate problem of excessive inflation—rather, a danger of doing nothing or of a too modest beginning. For the not distant future, however, most careful and intelligent management will be imperative. Once there is clear evidence of revival, of increased and profitable production, the mechanism of credit expansion will begin to operate, and to carry on the task which fiscal inflation has begun. As soon as this happens, retrenchment must be started; emergency expenditures must be reduced as rapidly as is possible without undermining recovery. We should not attempt, by deliberate inflation, to bring prices to any level which we choose to regard as normal; nor should artificial stimulus be continued until production and employment attain really satisfactory levels. Fiscal measures should only be used to give to recovery a sure start. When this is done, the real task will be that of preventing the recovery from becoming a boom; and a beginning must be made in this task long before any alarming signs appear. The seeds of booms are sown by innocent expansion of credit during years of seemingly wholesome revival. The task of control is easily neglected at such times; and there is grave danger that both the Reserve Board and the Treasury will adopt inadequately deflationary tactics in this period when it is so easy to have no policy at all.

In summary, it is our unequivocal position that drastic but temporary fiscal inflation can now be productive of tremendous gains, with no possible losses of compensating magnitude; further, that after genuine revival of business has occurred, and especially if it is attained by artificial stimulation, there will soon be urgent need for prompt and decisive action of a deflationary character.

Garfield V. Cox.         Lloyd W. Mints.
Aaron Director.         Henry Schultz.
Paul H. Douglas.       Henry C. Simons.
Harry D. Gideonse.   Jacob Viner.
Frank H. Knight.       Chester W. Wright.
Harry A. Millis.          Theodore O. Yntem.[sic]

Source: U. S. Congress (Seventy-Second Congress, First Session). Payment of Adjusted-Compensation Certificates in Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives (April 11 to 29, and May 2 and 3, 1932), pp. 524-527.

Image Source:  Authentic History Center website: Page “Hoover & the Depression: The Bonus Army.”