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Chicago Exam Questions

Chicago. Money, banking and monetary policy prelim examination, 1956

 

Fourteen graduate students took the prelim exam for the field of money, banking and monetary policy during the summer quarter at the University of Chicago in 1956. These examination questions were found in Milton Friedman’s papers at the Hoover Institution Archives along with the points awarded for each question along with the final grade recommendation by Friedman and the examination committee.

______________________

MONEY, BANKING AND MONETARY POLICY

Preliminary Examination
Summer Quarter, 1956

Write your number and not your name on your examination paper.

Answer all questions. Time: 4 hours. [120 points total]

  1. (a) What is the Keynesian “investment multiplier” in its simplest form? How can it be computed from the consumption function? [5 points]
    (b) Keynes assumed that the consumption function is expressed in wage units and that the average propensity to consume is greater than the marginal propensity. He further assumed as a first approximation that an increase in income is fully reflected in real income with prices stable up to “full employment” and in prices with real income stable, thereafter. What, if any, is the effect of the shift from below full employment to full employment on the numerical value of the “multiplier”? Explain in terms of the properties assigned to the consumption function by Keynes. [15 points]
  1. (a) Compare very briefly the essential parts of the a “fiscal operation” and a “monetary operation,” as they are usually described in the literature, and the way in which they affect prices and employment. Then discuss what the following statement might mean. Is it a meaningful comparison? If not, why not? If so, in what way? “Fiscal policy is more effective than monetary policy.” [10 points]
    (b) Suppose the Treasury engaged in a fiscal operation by running a budget deficit and paid for it by selling bonds to the public. Suppose further the Federal Reserve simultaneously engaged in a monetary operation by selling the public an amount of bonds equal to the deficit. What is likely to be the net effect of these two operations on prices in the short run? In the long run? Explain. What questions of fact did you need to consider in arriving at your answer? [10 points]
  1. “What, by the way of comparison, is likely to be the monetary mechanism of a price-wage spiral? When wages are increased, the immediate finance may be provided either by drawing on firms’ balances which would otherwise have been idle in the short period in question, or by increased borrowing from the banks.” – A. J. Brown
    Discuss, paying special attention to the relation implied between an increase in wages and the willingness of firms to hold smaller cash balances or engage in larger borrowing.
    (a) Discuss both the case of a wage increase in a particular sector and for “all” labor. [5 points]
    (b) Do the two cases differ?
    (c) Does “wages” as used in the second sentence of the quotation refer to “wage rates” or “wage payments”? Does it matter? [5 points]
    (d) If so, why? If not, why not? [5 points]
  2. (a) Sketch the development of the quantity theory of money. [7 points]
    (b) Compared the Cambridge and the Fisherine versions of this theory. [6 points]
    (c) What are the differences and similarities in the formulation of the demand for money between the Cambridge version of the quantity theory and the liquidity-preference function used by Keynes in his General Theory? What are the assumptions underlying these two formulations? What seems to you the most useful formulation of the demand for money? [7 points]
  1. “Inasmuch as the total quantity of purchasing media is expected to increase more or less in parallel with the production of gold and goods, the importance of a given amount of inflationary purchasing media will depend on its relation to the non-inflationary purchasing media in use… The commercial banks are able to [create inflationary purchasing media by acquiring investments in securities and noncommercial loans greater in dollar value than the total of their time deposits and capital], because the banks can create the purchasing media (demand deposits) with which they buy such assets. The inflationary purchasing media thus created are initially in the form of credits (bookkeeping additions) to the accounts of depositors…As these inflationary purchasing media are spent by the original recipients, the funds flow into the channels of trade and are indistinguishable from other demand deposits and currency that represent gold and goods being offered in the Nation’s markets. Thus great additions to the purchasing media used to buy goods can occur without corresponding increases in the goods available in the market; hence the upward pressure on prices and related developments of an inflationary boom.” – American Institute for Economic Research, Current Economic Trends, (June, 1955), p. 7.(a) What is meant by “inflationary purchasing media” in this quotation? [7 points]
    (b) How does their creation allegedly produce “an inflationary boom?” [6 points]
    (c) Evaluate the reasoning implied in the last sentence [7 points].
  1. “There cannot, in short, be intrinsically a more insignificant thing, in the economy of society, then money; except in the character of a contrivance for sparing time and labor. It is machine for doing quickly and commodiously, what would be done without it; and like many other kinds of machinery, it exerts a distinct and independent influence of its own when it gets out of order.” – John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Ashley addition, p. 488.

(a) Formulate your conception of money that is in order [5 points],
(b) sketch the monetary experience of one or more countries [5 points],
(c) indicate clearly when you think money was “out of order,” [5 points] and
(d) explain the results [5 points].

 

From Friedman’s handwritten table we find the following distribution of points by question as well as the final grade awarded for the preliminary examination (failure, MA candidacy, PhD candidacy). The committee final grades awarded are designated in boldface. Friedman judged four exams to be borderline cases.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Total Final Grade
ID no. (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) (d)

1

4 0 7 4 5 2 4 7 6 4 6 4 3 2 1 59 PhD
2 5 8 4 3 7 4 3 5 1 3 1 3 3 5 1 56

PhD

3

4 12 5 6 6 2 5 5 5 3 3 5 4 3 1 69 PhD
5 5 0 7 6 13 3 4 7 0 4 3 4 3 3 1 63

PhD

6

4 3 4 5 3 3 3 2 0 2 0 3 4 2 2 40 MA/F
7 5 8 7 4 10 3 6 6 3 1 4 3 5 5 3 71

PhD

8

3 0 3 0 7 2 1 3 2 0 0 3 5 2 0 31 F
10 4 2 5 4 8 3 3 6 5 3 5 3 2 2 1 56

PhD

11

5 5 5 2 0 0 3 5 0 0 0 25 F
12 5 7 4 6 3 2 3 3 0 3 1 2 1 2 0 42

MA/F

13

4 3 6 6 5 4 3 4 1 1 1 3 3 2 0 46 MA
14 5 4 5 4 2 3 3 4 0 3 1 1 3 1 0 39

MA/F

15

4 5 3 2 5 2 1 3 5 2 4 3 5 4 2 50 MA/PhD
16 5 6 9 4 10 4 4 6 5 3 4 4 5 3 0 72

PhD

Source: Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Milton Friedman. Box 76, Folder 10.

Image Source: University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf1-06231, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library

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Chicago Economics Programs Economist Market

Chicago. Draft memo of a program to rebuild the department of economics by T.W. Schultz, 1956

 

The following draft memo by T. W. Schultz outlines the serious faculty replacement needs of the University of Chicago department of economics in the mid-1950s. Particularly noteworthy, aside from the impressive list of lost faculty, is the appended table listing the sponsored research/3rd party funders of the economics department at that time. One also sees that the department had been authorized to make offers to Kenneth Arrow, Robert Solow and Arthur F. Burns. So much for the best-laid plans of mice and men. A better historian of economics than I might spin a counterfactual tale of a post-Cowles Chicago with Arrow and Solow on the faculty.

Regarding the ICA Chile Enterprise: Economic Research Center, Schultz wrote “The Chilean enterprise will give us a fine ‘laboratory’ in which to test ourselves in the area of economic development– a major new field in economics.” This reminds me of the old Cold-War Eastern European joke about whether Marx and Engels were scientists (“No, real scientists would have tried their experiments on rats first”). What a “fine ‘laboratory'” for testing oneself!

_________________________

A Program of Rebuilding the Department of Economics
(first draft, private and confidential – T. W. Schultz, May 22, 1956)

Your Department of Economics has been passing through a crisis. Whether it would survive as a first rate department has been seriously in doubt, with one adversity following another as was the case up until last year. It is now clear, however, that we have achieved a turning point in that we can rebuild and attain the objective which is worth striving for – an outstanding faculty in economics.

The crisis came upon us as a consequence of a combination of things: (1) the department, along with others in the University, had been denied access to undergraduate students of the University who might want to become economists; (2) Viner left for Princeton, Lange for Poland, Yntema for Ford and Douglas for the Senate; (3) the Industrial Relations Center drained off some of our talent and when it jammed, Harbison left for Princeton; (4) Mr. Cowles’ arbitrary decision to shift “his” Commission to Yale was a major blow; (5) Nef been transferring his talents to the Committee on Social Thought, and (6) add to all these the retirement of Knight.

Meanwhile, there were several external developments which did not reduce our difficulties: (1) a number of strong (new) economic centers were being established – at Stanford, Johns Hopkins, Yale, Vanderbilt, M.I.T. and with public funds at Michigan and Minnesota; (2) our salaries were falling behind seriously relative to some of the other places, and (3) recruiting of established, highly competent economists became all but impossible given the crisis that was upon us and the (then) low repute of the University neighborhood.

The ever present danger of the past few years has been that we would be in the judgment of competent colleagues elsewhere, in the beliefs of oncoming graduate students and in the eyes of the major foundations – not recover our high standing but instead sing to a second or even a third-rate department and in the process lose the (internal) capacity to recruit and rebuild.

We now have achieved a turning point distinctly in our favor.

The major efforts which have contributed most have been as follows:

  1. We have taken full advantage of our unique organization in combining real research with graduate instruction. Our research and instruction workshops are the result. The Rockefeller Foundation gave us three grants along the way – agricultural economics, money and public finance – to test this approach and advanced graduate work. The Ford Foundation has now financed our workshops with $200,000 (eight 5-year grant) (our proposal of January 1956 to The Ford Foundation states the theory and argues the case for this approach on the basis of the experiences we have already accumulated).
  2. We set out aggressively to recruit outstanding younger economists. The workshops were a big aid to us in doing this; so was the financial support of the University. We had the ability to “spot them”. We now have the best group of talented young economists, age 30 and less, to be found anywhere. This achievement is rapidly becoming known to others in keen “competition” is already upon us as a consequence.
  3. We need urgently to run up a lightning rod, a (rotating) professorship with a salary second to none, to attract talent and make it clear we were in business and would pay for the best. The Ford Foundation took favorably to the idea. (Thought so well of it that they will do the same for 3 other privately supported Universities – Columbia, Harvard and Yale!)
    The $500,000 endowment grant from them for a rotating research professorship is our reward.
  4. The foundations have given us a strong vote of confidence: grants and funds received by the Department of Economics during 1955-56 now total $1,220,000. (A statement listing these is attached).
  5. The marked turn for the better in the number and the quality of students applying for scholarships and fellowships is, also, an affirmative indication.
  6. The Economics Research Center is filling a large gap in providing computing, publishing and related research facilities which was formally a function of the Cowles Commission.
  7. The Chilean enterprise will give us a fine “laboratory” in which to test ourselves in the area of economic development – a major new field in economics.

There remains, however, much to be done. We must, above all, not lose the upward momentum which is now working in our favor.

Faculty and University Financial Support

To have and to hold a first rate faculty in economics now requires between $225,000 and $250,000 of University funds a year.

To have a major faculty means offering instruction and doing research in 8 to 10 fields. Up until two years ago we came close to satisfying the standard in our graduate instruction. We then had 11 (and just prior to that, 12) professors on indefinite tenure.

Then, Koopmans and Marschak were off to Yale, Harbison to Princeton and Knight did reach 70. And, then there were 7. On top of these “woes” came the serious illness of Metzler which greatly curtailed his role; and, Nef having virtually left economics. Thus, only 5 were really active in economics with Wallis carrying many other professional burdens. Meanwhile we added only one – Harberger was given tenured this year.

Accordingly at the indefinite tenure level we are down to about one-half of what is required to have a major faculty. Fortunately, several younger men have entered and have been doing work of very high quality.

It should be said that the Deans and the Chancellor have stood by, prepared to help us rebuild.

Major appointments were authorized – Arrow, Stigler, Solow and others. We still are hoping that Arthur F. Burns will come.

The resignations and the retirement, however, did necessarily reduce sharply the amount of financial support from the University.

In rebuilding, at least five additional tenure positions will be required:

  1. Labor economics (from within)
  2. Trade cycle (we hope it will be Arthur F. Burns, already authorized).
  3. Money
  4. Econometrics and mathematical economics.
  5. Business organization
  6. Consumption economics (when Miss Reid retires; next 3 years we shall have the extra strength of Dr. D. Brady with finances from The Rockefeller Foundation)
  7. International trade (pending Metzler’s recovery)
  8. Economic development.

The faculty and the University financial support recommended is as follows:

Tenured positions (for individuals fully committed to economics).

    1. Now in the harness

6: Friedman, Johnson, Harberger, Hamilton (Metzler), Wallis (Nef), Schultz

    1. To be added

5: Burns pending, (labor), (money), and two other fields, most likely econometrics and business organization

 

Budget:

11 [tenured positions]

 

$165,000

Metzler and Nef $15,000
$180,000
III. Supplementary non-tenure faculty $45,000
Altogether $225,000

 

Outside Financial Support for the Department of Economics

Grants

Amount of grant Available 1956-57

A. Received during 1955-56.

1.     Sears Roebuck Fellowships

$4,000

$4,000

2.     National Science Foundation (2 years)

$13,000

$6,500

3.     Conservation Foundation (2 years)

$33,000

$16,500

4.     Rockefeller Foundation: consumption economics (3 years)

$45,000

$15,000

5.     American Enterprise (2 years)

$17,250

$8,625

6.     Ford Foundation: research and instructional workshops (5 years)

$200,000

$30,000

7.     Earhart Fellowships.

$6,000

$6,000

8.     S.S.R.C. Student Grants

$5,000

$5,000

9.     Ford Foundation: 3 pre-doctoral grants

$10,200

$10,200

10.  Ford Foundation: faculty research grant (Hamilton)

$12,500

$8,000

11.  ICA Chile Enterprise: Economic Research Center Fellowships, research support (3 yrs)

$375,000

$125,000

12.  Ford Foundation: endowment for rotating research professor

$500,000

$25,000

13.  Rockefeller Foundation: Latin America (Ballesteros)

$5,000

$5,000

Sub-totals

$1,225,950

$264,825

B. Received prior to 1955-56 where funds are available for 1956-57.

1.     Rockefeller Foundation: workshop in money (3 years with one year to go)

$50,000

$20,000

2.     Rockefeller Foundation: workshop in public finance (3 years with one year to go)

$50,000

$20,000

3.     Resources for the Future (3 years with one year to go)

$67,000

$27,000

4.     Russian Agriculture (2 years with one to go)

$47,000

$22,000

B sub-totals

$214,000 $89,000

A and B totals

$1,439,950

$353,825

 

Source:  University of Chicago Archives. Department of Economics Records. Box 42, Folder 8.

Image Source: 1944 photo of T.W. Schultz from University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf1-07479, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library. Cf. Wikimedia Commons, same portrait (dated 1944) from Library of Congress.

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Columbia Economists Harvard NBER Stanford

Columbia. Economics Ph.D. alumnus. Moses Abramovitz, 1939

 

 

The professional career of Moses Abramovitz shows what a blend of Harvard and Columbia training in economics crowned by an NBER post-doc could get you back in the day. His contributions to the study of long-term growth and to the Stanford economics department’s rise to prominence are truly important legacies.

The first item of the post gives us Abramovitz’s personal quarter-century report to his Harvard classmates of 1932. This is followed by excerpts from Abramovitz’s memoir for his family that provide a rich account of his economics training at Harvard and then Columbia. A link to download the entire memoir is provided below. The post closes with a memorial resolution written by Abramovitz’s Stanford colleagues. But the real treat, is found in Moses Abramovitz’s description of his economics education and economists important for his development. Among other things we learn, the chairman of the Harvard economics department, Harold Burbank, was indeed anti-Semitic enough for Abramovitz not to have dignified him by name. Also we learn that in 1934 “Milton [Friedman] was much less ideological then than he later became, so he was a very pleasant and agreeable companion.”

_______________________

From the 25th reunion report of the Harvard Class of 1932

MOSES ABRAMOVITZ

Home address: 543 W. Crescent Drive, Palo Alto, Calif.
Office address: Dept. of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.
Born: Jan. 1, 1912, Brooklyn, N.Y.
Parents: Nathan Abramovitz, Betty Goldenberg.
Prepared at: Erasmus Hall High School, Brooklyn, N.Y.
Years in College: 1928-1932.
Degrees: A.B. summa cum laude, 1932; Ph.D. (Columbia Univ.), 1939.
Married: Carrie Glasser, June 13, 1937, Brooklyn, N.Y.
Child: Joel Nathan, July 19, 1950.
Occupation: Professor of economics, Stanford University; member research staff, national Bureau of Economic Research.
Offices Held: Member editorial board, American Economic Review, 1951-54.
Member of: American Economic Association; American Statistical Association; American Economic History Association; Royal Economic Society; American Association for the Advancement of Science.
Publications: Price Theory for a Changing Economy; Inventories and Business Cycles; The Economics of Growth; “Capital Formation and Economic Growth,” editor; The Growth of Public Employment in Great Britain (with Vera Eliasberg).

I LEFT Harvard supported by a Sheldon Fellowship and exhilarated by the prospect of a year in Europe—no small piece of luck at any time and a pot of good fortune in 1932. Together with Dave Popper, I saw Paris and the Rhine country as they were before the second deluge. We saw our first Storm Trooper rallies in Heidelberg and, if we were not too innocent, we were certainly too full of good spirits to be greatly disturbed. But those charming days were suddenly cut short. From Nuremberg, I was called home by my father’s death.

Back in New York I began graduate work in economics at Columbia and continued there until 1935. In 1936, I was lucky enough to be brought back to Harvard as an instructor for two years and had the fun and satisfaction of being again in Cambridge as a teacher while my memories of life at college were still warm. At Columbia I had met another young economist whom I had known years before. I shall stick to the essentials. The young economist was a woman. We were married in 1937, so Carrie has had a year at Harvard, too.

In 1938, we were back in New York again, this time to work at the National Bureau of Economic Research. In the years that followed I learned what I know about scientific investigation from Wesley Mitchell and Arthur F. Burns. Together they were in the midst of their wide-ranging investigation of business cycles. They set me to work studying inventory fluctuations. In the fullness of time I got some results and published a book, a hefty volume called Inventories and Business Cycles. It got some notice and caused some controversy, and a certain number of copies continue to serve as ballast for bookcases that might otherwise be disturbed by a fresh breeze.

Early in 1942, I went to Washington to help Bob Nathan and the W.P.B. Planning Committee, first to goad the military into laying out programs big enough to make use of a national productive capacity they could not believe existed, and then to keep them from losing the munitions they really needed under the load of programs too large for even our capacity. A year later I was at O.S.S. working for Professor Langer and Dean Mason on German economic intelligence. My particular job was probably of little use during the war itself, but it produced a collection of materials and a few more or less knowledgeable individuals, and both were needed after the German defeat. I became involved in the negotiations about German reparations and in that way came to see Moscow in the months right after V-E Day. Our work, as we all now know, foundered in the general wreck of American-Soviet relations. Together with many other stalemated delegations on many other subjects, ours eventually came to Potsdam to be witnesses at the beginning of the partition of Germany and Europe.

Since 1948 I have been a professor at Stanford. We have one child, a boy now six. We think living here near San Francisco as comfortable and delightful as it can be; so I rush back east as often as I can to disgorge the lotus and discharge my guilt.

My chief activity is still, as it has been for many years, research in economics—a stubborn, unyielding, frustrating and altogether exasperating subject from which I don’t know how to shake loose. What do I believe? One’s bent of mind is shaped by one’s work. Mine is inclined to skepticism, not beliefs, still less belief. Very likely I have much to learn. Oh yes! I believe both parties are right – in what each says about the other.

Source:  Harvard Class of 1932, Twenty-fifth Anniversary Report (1957), pp.6-8.

_______________________

Undergraduate and graduate student days: memories of Harvard and Columbia

…My fourth course [freshman year at Harvard] was different. It was elementary economics. I was lucky. I drew an excellent instructor named Bigelow. Using Frank W. Taussig’s Principles, he introduced us to the general logic of the neoclassical theories of relative prices of commodities and of the factors of production, land, labor, and capital, to the distribution of income among these primary factors, to the theory of international trade, and to the virtues of free markets. He offered us a list of supplementary readings, one of which was called simply Supply and Demand, by an English economist, H.D. Henderson. It was a thin book, but it was a notable example of the lucid presentation of the logic of the economics of value and distribution. One could see all around one examples in ordinary life of the validity and importance of the theory. The way in which the various parts of the subject hung together in an interdependent system seemed not only analytically deep; it emerged as a beautiful structure, an aesthetic as well as a logical and tested structure. More than any other experience, it was this little book that drew me to go on with economics. When I returned to Harvard in September 1929, therefore, I chose economics as my field of concentration. And, indeed, when the economy began its collapse in October of that year, it confirmed me in my choice. It was a decisive experience.

Concentrating in Economics

Having chosen to concentrate in economics, I was assigned a tutor. Here again I was lucky. He was Edward S. Mason, then a still young assistant professor. But he was destined for both academic leadership and, as my story unfolds, for a real influence on practical affairs. Even more important for me, however, was the fact that this young man was already recognizably “wise,” a man of good judgment in both scholarly decisions and practical matters. He took a liking to me, and he remembered his friends! He was due to turn up with support and help at several critical junctures in my story.

My very first meeting with Mason was an exciting moment. It was late September or early October in 1929, that fateful year. We chatted, and then, more brash than usual, I said, “Well, Professor, when is the stock market going to break?” He answered, without hesitation, “Almost immediately.” And when I returned for our second meeting, it had happened. And then, still brash, I said, “Well, Professor, you must have made a mint of money.” And then I learned something about him and perhaps most academics of the time. He said, “Are you crazy? I have never owned a share of stocks in my life.”

… Like many, but not all, of the young economists of the time, who had no deep commitment to mainstream economics, I saw clearly enough that mainstream theory offered us no guidance in understanding the Great Contraction and Depression, and it was consequently a poor basis for public policy. Something new was needed, a theory that dealt more adequately with recurrent recessions and expansions of business and particularly with the very serious depressions and eventual recoveries which in the U.S. had succeeded one another at intervals of about 15 to 20 years since the 1830s. For the moment, I did not get beyond dissatisfaction with the older wisdom, Real enlightenment came only in 1936 with the publication of J.M. Keynes’s General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. When I had absorbed Keynes’s reasoning, I became an enthusiasticKeynesian and I remain so to this day.

There was also a quite personal effect of these developments on my own work history. They prepared me to join the National Bureau of Economic Research when the chance came in 1937 and to do empirical research on business cycles under the direction of Wesley Mitchell and Arthur Burns, the most notable people doing such work at that time.

Still an undergraduate in 1929, however, at the beginning of the economic contraction and depression, I still had three years of undergraduate work to do. Guided by Mason and later by Douglas V. Brown, I took Taussig’s famous course in price theory at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. Taussig was then the leading American price theorist of his time and by far the most influential person in the Economics Department. In these courses, conducted by Socratic methods, he clearly formed a good opinion about me. I am sure he was of help to me behind the scenes at several junctures. I also remember two enlightening courses, Sumner Slichter on Labor Economics and John Williams on Money and Banking. In Williams’s course, I read Keynes’s earlier books and began to become familiar with his way of thinking. Anyhow, I did well in all these courses and in others in economics, history, and in one really interesting course in literature. That was Irving Babbett on Rousseau and Romanticism. I was apparently a natural-born good student and exam taker. The upshot was that I was graduated summa cum laude and I was given a Sheldon Traveling Fellowship.

For me, this last was more than an honor and more than a year of support and European travel and study at a time when money was so scarce and jobs for new college graduates almost nonexistent. My tutors and professors, including the influential Taussig, had already been encouraging me to think about going on to graduate study in economics and to an eventual academic career. To my parents and my brother, such a course was strange and uncertain. Abe began to call me “meshugana Moishele.” But it was clear that in the end they would support me in any decision I made. And the fellowship, which was tangible proof of the good opinion of the Harvard faculty, confirmed me in a career choice I had already more than half made: It was a decisive event.

[late June of 1932 left for Europe but Moses Abramovitz’s father died in September 1932]

… I resigned my scholarship and in that September of 1932 walked along Nostrand Avenue to Eastern Parkway and took the subway (IRT, Broadway and 7th Avenue Line) to Broadway and 116th Street. Half a block away, one entered Columbia. I walked in and registered and began three years of graduate work in economics. This was a big departure from the program I had thought lay before me, but I cannot remember any feeling of distress or resistance. I was glad to provide some degree of solid continuity for my mother, and I felt confident about the future. Columbia would also be a good start.

 

Columbia as a School of Economics

By forgoing Vienna, Cambridge, and Harvard, I had made a bigger change than I realized when I started in Columbia. Vienna, Cambridge, and Harvard were all centers in which understanding of the domestic economy of a country and of its international economic relations was squarely based on theoretical economics. This, in turn, was a doctrine logically derived from certain basic primary assumptions: that economic agents (consumers, savers, business firms, investors generally) were well informed, foresighted, and rational, and acted to promote their own individual interests, that they faced competitive markets and, as business firms, acted under the pressures of competition; they operated subject to the constraints of income and wealth and of market prices which they could not by their own actions significantly influence. Actions in this context were perceived as leading to an equilibrium of prices, wages, profits, etc., and of consumer satisfactions in which change might be harmful to some but would be more than offset by benefit to others. Thus, there was no room or occasion for public action except such as was necessary to enforce contracts, maintain competition, prevent or punish fraud and generally keep the peace. Changes in technology and in consumer tastes would lead to a new equilibrium of prices, rewards, incomes, etc., but such changes were viewed as “exogenous,” not the result of economic action or motivation and beyond the ken of economics.

The Columbia economists, however, rejected this structure of theory or, at least, its general application. They conceded its usefulness in explaining very simple matters: why a grand piano cost more than a pair of shoes, and, in general, why there is a rough association between the prices of commodities and their costs of production. They were skeptical, however, about the theoretical assumptions that agents were foresighted, well-informed, and rational. They saw markets as characterized by various degrees of monopoly power, with business firms capable not only of profiting by constraining production and raising prices more than costs alone would justify; they also often had the power to shape consumer tastes, for example by advertising, and, most important, to invest in research and development and so to advance and sometimes to retard—technological progress. They tended to see the economy as a whole, not as tending to an equilibrium, but as generating long-term growth of productivity, income, and wealth. This tendency did not, however, emerge continuously and at a stable rate but subject to recurrent fluctuations, loosely called “cyclical,” in which advance was sometimes fast,sometimes slow, and sometimes negative.

As I absorbed all this, I saw the justice of the Columbia outlook and came to appreciate its radical departure from the economics in which I had been trained as a Harvard undergraduate. Columbia economics, as it stood in the Thirties, however, had its own serious limitations. It was well advanced in its understanding of two subjects. One was in the study of the behavior of firms that had acquired and enjoyed various kinds and degrees of monopoly power. This was the province of Arthur Robert (“Columbia”) Burns—not the Arthur Frank (“Bureau”) Burns with whom I later did research on business cycles.

The other subject was another sphere of monopoly power, that of labor unions. Why were they so much less important in the U.S.A. than in Europe? What activities were successfully unionized and which not? And why? This was the area over which Leo Wolman ruled. Wolman later played a considerable role in the Roosevelt Administration, especially in connection with the disorders in the labor market stemming from the organizing drives of the AFL/CIO. He worked as chairman of the Automobile Labor Board, where he tried to keep the peace in that important industry—an effort that won him no friends in the unions. Wolman’s teaching, however, was as far from academic as can be imagined. It came directly from his own experience with labor unions. Although a professor at Columbia, he also worked as the economic advisor of Sidney Hillman, the president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, the men’s clothing union. Wolman learned as much as he advised. He saw clearly that in the flexible and mobile population conditions of the American continent, the only unions that could exercise strong and stable monopoly power were those operating in industries frozen in location. The newsprint industry was an example. The book print industry was not. Where the industry could move, it could flee from a union whose wage and other demands were excessive. Such a condition faced the Amalgamated, and Wolman used his influence to restrain labor’s demands. Even so, the industry moved from New York City to upstate New York, then down South, then to Chicago and on to California. It was the barrier to movement posed by small nation-states that made European unions stronger and more stable than America’s.

These subjects then were well taught at Columbia, and I felt I learned much from A.R. Burns and Leo Wolman. The basic academic tone of the faculty, however, stemmed from Wesley Mitchell. He had been the dominating influence on the faculty since he joined it just before the First World War. According to Mitchell’s own view of himself, his outlook stemmed in part from his early Midwestern origins. He was the son of a physician who was a small town practitioner in central Illinois. The down-to-earth pragmatism of the neighboring family farmers ran strongly in his personality. It was quite natural, therefore, that he should have been drawn to the philosophical schools of William James and John Dewey when these became prominent. Experience, not the logical implications of some generalized ideal, had to be our guide to life. He told about teasing his good Baptist grandmother and her conception of a God of Love who could yet condemn unbaptized infants to the torments of Hell.

[…]

Mitchell carried out his scheme and reported his findings, together with his evidence, in a large book with the simple title, Business Cycles. The book began with a summary of earlier work relevant to the subject together with the “speculations” (one of Mitchell’s favorite characterizations of largely theoretical but inadequately verified ideas). He used these as suggestions of subjects needing investigation. There followed Mitchell’s own quantitative studies of these and other subjects: production (agricultural and other), income, sales, retail, wholesale, manufacturing, etc., commodity prices, the prices of stocks and bonds, and the profits and interest rates they paid. Mitchell’s quantitative descriptions involved tracing the fluctuations of the behavior in these activities and of their long-term trend and seasonal fluctuations so that the fluctuations connected with business cycles could be seen free of the influence of trends and seasonal factors. The book ended with a statement of Mitchell’s views of how the concatenation of the behavior of the separate activities led to expansions of business activities in general followed by similarly general contractions, which in turn produced the conditions that generated another business expansion.

Mitchell’s book made a notable impression on economists. This was partly because now, for the first time, students of economics could base their attempts to explain business cycles and to develop a theoretical model based on definite quantitative information about the typical behavior of the major business activities. But it was partly, perhaps mainly, because it gave economists at large a new vision of how economic research could be carried on. It need not mainly consist of logical deductions from a set of preannounced assumptions. It could instead take the form of observed behavior, together with empirical tests of the hypotheses so formed based on fresh observations independent of those from which the hypotheses originally proposed had been drawn. It was this vision of an empirically based economics that was the spirit of the Columbia program, and it stood in sharp contrast to the program at Harvard, where I was introduced to the subject, and, indeed, with the economics then taught in the other leading universities.

I did not give up my allegiance to Harvard easily. Two episodes illustrate my resistance. Mitchell gave a course on business cycles. I chose to take it. It was a course that, in a sense, was a duplicate of his 1913 book, refreshed by data not available in 1913. But as I listened to Mitchell’s “analysis” of one time series after another—amplitude, lead or lag relative to the “reference” peak or trough (that is, relative to the peak or trough of the general business cycle), rates of expansion or contraction in successive thirds of the fluctuations, and more—I could make nothing of it. After some weeks I dropped the course. Mitchell signed the necessary form without demur and, apparently, never held it against me—a characteristic of his liberal and tolerant attitude.

In other respects, my year was pleasant and rewarding. I found Eli Ginzberg and began a lifelong friendship, the closest and most intimate in my life. Like other graduate students, I occupied a “cubicle” on the top floor of the new Butler Library—just enough space for a table, chair, and file cabinet. A friend said: “It’s all right if I am in there alone, but if I get an idea, I have to move into the corridor.” One day, there was a knock on my door, and in walked Eli. He had just returned from a scholarship, traveling the country and interviewing business executives, union bosses, politicians, etc. On his return, he asked Mrs. Stewart, the all-knowing department secretary, what new people were interesting. She mentioned me, and there he was. He sat down and began to tell me about his travels, the first of many sessions on the same subject.

One early reward of my new friendship was to come to know his parents. They occupied an eighth-floor apartment on 114th Street, directly behind the Butler Library. Eli’s father, Louis Ginzberg, was a professor in the Jewish Theological Seminary at 120th Street. He was perhaps the most notable Jewish scholar of his time, a specialist in Talmudic history and interpretation based on a wide knowledge of ancient Middle Eastern languages and in the history of its peoples. Eli began to bring me to their Friday evening suppers. I found old Louis to be a wise and humorous man, a fine companion and host for a pleasant evening.

On one of my first visits, Eli took me into Louis’s study to show me a lampshade that one of Louis’s students had made. The parchment shade was decorated. All around the shade were drawn the spines of books, and on each spine there appeared the title of one of Louis’s books, perhaps 14 or 15 in all. And then the student had an inspiration. He added one more spine and on it drew the title of Eli’s first book, his Ph.D. dissertation, The House of Adam Smith. At the time, we wondered whether Eli could duplicate his Father’s achievement. In fact, he did so many times over, in quantity at least, if not always in depth—something to which Eli did not aspire.

[…]

Now back to my struggle between Harvard and Columbia economics. In that second year at Columbia, the internal conflict found two new exponents. On the Columbia side was Eli. He was someone of great personal interest to me, but as an economist, he was an eccentric. He was a skeptic about anything theoretical and served mainly as an exemplar of Columbia’s tolerance for talent in whatever way it showed itself. On the Harvard side, there now appeared a powerful supporter. He was Milton Friedman, who had come to Columbia on a scholarship for a year of graduate work. We soon became good friends. It emerged that we two were the only Columbia students who had had a real training in neoclassical price theory, the very bedrock of the economics of the time. The faculty, moreover, refused to sanction a course in the subject, and the students realized what they were missing. Milton and I undertook to do something to fill the gap. We organized a student-run seminar, worked out a list of topics, assigned students to prepare papers, and guided the presentation and discussion. The other students benefitted and so did we. We were having our first teaching experience. For the moment, however, it helped keep my mind running in the grooves of my Harvard training

My friendship with Milton was solidified when a Columbia classmate invited us to join him in a long holiday in his family’s fishing camp on the French River in Northern Ontario, still a wild and unsettled area. It turned out, however, that our friend was ordered to work in his family’s business concern for the summer. We were invited to use the camp ourselves, and we did. So we spent a wonderful six weeks together. We drove north in my Model A Ford roadster until we reached a tiny settlement on the French River called Bon Air. There we parked the car at a general store where we hired some cots, some cooking utensils, a gasoline cookstove, and a canoe, and where we bought some canned and packaged foods as well as eggs and Canadian back bacon. The general store owner piled all these objects in his motorboat and, with the canoe in tow, took us out to our camp 3½ miles down the river on a tiny island in the stream. We were the only inhabitants. There he literally threw our stuff on the shore and took his leave. From now on, we had to depend on our canoe to get back and renew supplies at Bon Air.

Neither of us at first knew anything about canoeing, but we had good teachers by example in the Indians from a reservation across the river. Watching them, we soon learned the J stroke and became fairly competent. We canoed to Bon Air twice weekly and soon organized our camp. We had a privy some 50 yards away. We had the usual first experience trying to cook rice, but we learned to get along. We swam twice a day, and, as we gained confidence in the canoe, took overnight canoe trips down the river. These were fun, especially because of occasional rapids which we could run going down the river but had to portage around on the way back. The one thing we did not try was fishing. In fact, we became known along the river as those strange boys who did not fish, so many men returning in the late afternoon would throw us a fish or two. We had a valuable supplement to our diet of canned goods.

The thing we did do all day long, every day, was talk—about everything, but mostly economics. Milton was much less ideological then than he later became, so he was a very pleasant and agreeable companion; that was especially important in 1934, in the depths of the Depression when Roosevelt’s New Deal was just taking shape, when it included so much that was controversial, and when the menace of Hitler was becoming clearly visible.

As things turned out, however, the most important thing for me in that academic year of 1933-34 was the advent of Carrie [whom he would marry]. But that belongs in a chapter of its own.

…When I finished my graduate course work in 1935, I was given an instructorship at Harvard, I owed it to the sponsorship of Ed Mason, my old tutor. With all this arranged, we determined to get married. I was to have a first year to get started at Harvard, and Carrie was to have a year to complete her Columbia course. We would marry in June 1937. We told our parents and friends. Everyone was pleased.

…You will recall that on completing my graduate work at Columbia, I returned to Harvard as an instructor and tutor in 1936. I spent the first year on my own; then, following our marriage, Carrie joined me there. We lived in a comfortable little apartment at 31 Concord Avenue, near the RadcliffeYard.

It turned out to be an unsatisfactory time, which brought each of us into our only serious confrontations with discrimination. For Carrie it was a brush with what would now be called “sexism.” She heard that Wellesley was looking for a young instructor. She thought correctly that her graduate work and teaching experience qualified her. She appeared for an interview, which was conducted by John Dunlop, a Harvard professor. They reviewed her background, and, he conceded, she was qualified. And then he told her, with expressions of regret, that her application could go no further. Wellesley, a women’s college, wanted only a male.

My own problem was an example of that anti-Semitism that still infected Harvard and most other universities. During my time back at Harvard, I had taught Ec A and a course in Labor Market Economics, and I had tutored a full quota of economics majors in my tutorial rooms in Dunster House. I thought it had gone pretty well.

To this I should add the tale of an amusing development. When I returned to Cambridge in September 1937 together with Carrie, I was told by the department chairman that my salary, then $2,500 a year, would be raised by $200. And then he carefully explained that that was not because, as a married man, my expenses were higher. It was because I was married that he could add Radcliffe girls to my list of tutees. Needless to say, the relation of women to men has since changed radically. Harvard and Radcliffe are now fully merged. Women and men are now equally Harvard professors and Harvard students. The days when Radcliffe girls were thought to be at special and intolerable risk if they met an unmarried tutor have long gone.

In the spring of 1938, I received another summons from the chairman [Harold Burbank]. He received me cordially, and after the usual preliminary politenesses, he explained that it was time we discussed my future at Harvard. His opening was itself a warning about what was to come. “Now, Moe, we are both men of the world.” And then he went on to say that I had done well. I had a promising future. “But you must understand; we could not promote Jakey, so you must not expect to stay on here.” I had formed no such expectation, but I understood perfectly. “Jakey” was Jacob Viner, a truly notable economist. He had done brilliant theoretical work early. He was Taussig’s favorite student. Clearly, Harvard’s president at the time was a bar. He would not accept the appointment of Jews, something widely whispered. They might be scholars, but, by Lowell’s Boston Brahmin standards, they could not be gentlemen. So all this was hardly a complete surprise. But my chairman’s quiet but open expression of anti-Semitism was a shock.

I have often wondered whether it was not really a subtle way of ending my appointment without saying that I simply had not measured up. Perhaps, but that could hardly apply to Viner, who went on to do brilliant work, and who ended his career as a colleague of Einstein at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. Had a Nobel Prize for Economics existed at the time, he would certainly have been a Nobel laureate.

So I left the interview knowing that I had to make plans to move. My opportunity was not long in coming. Later that same spring, I appeared again at Columbia for the defense of my dissertation, the last step on the way to the doctorate. The committee was chaired by Wesley Mitchell, the man whose course on business cycles I had dropped six year earlier. It made no difference to the examination. Apparently, I passed easily. Indeed my thesis won the Seligman Prize for the best of the year. When the committee adjourned, Mitchell asked me to stay behind. He wanted to ask me whether I would be willing to join the National Bureau to work with him on the Bureau’s business cycles project. My salary would be $3,500 year, a thousand dollars above my Harvard salary. In my circumstances it did not take me long to decide. In a couple of days he had my answer. I would be delighted. So now, after our first summer in Maine, Carrie and I moved to New York. I can guess now how the Bureau appointment had come about. My friend Milton Friedman (see Chapter Six), had just joined the Bureau with an appointment like my own, but to work on another subject. Milton was a friend and also the favorite student of Arthur F. Burns, at the time Mitchell’s chief assistant, who was already the really effective head of the business cycles work. My guess is that Milton became aware of Burns’s interest in finding an associate for business cycles to work especially on the cyclical role of inventories. My dissertation included a chapter on inventories. So he probably told Burns, and then events took their course.

 

Source:  Moses Abramovitz, Days Gone By: A Memoir for my Family (2001), pp. 32-34, 41-49, 77-79. (Link to download the memoir as .pdf)

_______________________

Stanford Faculty Memorial Resolution

MOSES ABRAMOVITZ
(1912-2000)

Moses Abramovitz, William Robertson Coe Professor of American Economic History Emeritus, died December 1, 2000, at Stanford University Hospital, just one month before reaching his eighty-ninth birthday.

Known by his family, friends, and colleagues as “Moe,” Abramovitz was one of the primary builders of Stanford’s Department of Economics. He taught at Stanford for almost thirty years, taking leave only during 1962-63 to work as economic advisor to the secretary general of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris. He served as chair from 1963 to 1965, and from 1971 to 1974, both critical junctures in the department’s history. During his tenure at Stanford and after his retirement in 1976, Moe gained international renown and admiration for his pioneering contributions to the study of long-term economic growth.

Moe was born in Brooklyn, New York, to a Romanian Jewish immigrant family. After graduating from Erasmus Hall High School, he entered Harvard in 1928. Like many of his generation, Moe’s interest in economics was stimulated by the experience of the Great Depression. So, in 1932 he continued his undergraduate studies of the subject at Columbia University, where he received his Ph.D. in 1939. At Columbia, Moe began a lifelong friendship with Milton Friedman. In later years, Moe liked to joke that he had been debating with Friedman for more than fifty years, and consistently winning — except when Milton was present. Columbia connections also led Moe to join the National Bureau of Economic Research in 1937, where he helped to launch the business cycle studies for which the Bureau became famous, working with such figures as Wesley Mitchell, Simon Kuznets and Arthur Burns.

Also at Columbia, Moe became re-acquainted with his Erasmus classmate Carrie Glasser, who was also working for her doctoral degree in economics. Moe and Carrie were married in June of 1937, and were devoted to each other until Carrie’s death in October 1999. When Moe came to Stanford in 1948, Carrie began what became a highly satisfying and successful career as a painter, sculptress and collage artist. Their only son, Joel, born in 1946, is a practicing neurosurgeon in Connecticut.

During World War II, Moe served first at the War Production Board, working with Simon Kuznets to analyze the limits of feasible production during wartime. He then moved to the Office of Strategic Services as chief of the European industry and trade section. During 1945 and 1946, he was economic advisor to the United States representative on the Allied Reparations Commission. Moe’s modest but strong character was well displayed in an episode during the postwar reparations debate. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau had proposed a plan to deindustrialize the German economy. An OSS research team headed by Moe wrote a memorandum arguing that this plan would destroy Germany’s capacity to export, leaving it unable to pay for food and other essential imports. At a meeting with Moe and two other OSS economists, Ed Mason and Emile Despres, Morgenthau angrily asked: “Who is responsible for this?” Moe recalled: “Mason looked at Despres, and Emile looked at me. I had no one else to look at. The buck stopped with me. So, rather meekly, I said I was responsible.”

This anecdote and many others may be found in a charming memoir that Moe completed shortly before his death, “Days Gone By,” accessible on the Stanford Economics Department website.

At Stanford Moe began the studies of long-term economic growth that established his reputation among professional economists. A 1956 paper provided the first systematic estimates showing that forces raising the productivity of labor and capital were responsible for approximately half of the historical growth rate of real U.S. GDP, and close to three quarters of the growth rate of real GDP per capita. Subsequently he made seminal contributions in identifying the factors promoting and obstructing convergence in levels of productivity among advanced and developing countries of the world. For these studies and others, Moe received many academic honors. He was elected to the presidency of the American Economic Association (1979-80), the Western Economic Association (1988-89), and the Economic History Association (1992-93). From abroad came honorary doctorates from the University of Uppsala in Sweden (1985), and the University of Ancona in Italy (1992); he took special enjoyment from an invitation to become a fellow of the prestigious Academia Nazionale de Lincei in 1991 — “following Galileo with a lag,” he said, with a characteristic self-deprecatory twinkle.

Committee:

Paul A. David
Ronald McKinnon
Gavin Wright

Source: Stanford Report, July 9, 2003.

Image Source: Harvard Class of 1932, Twenty-fifth Anniversary Report (1957).

 

 

Categories
Funny Business M.I.T.

M.I.T. Faculty skit. Robert Solow as the 2000 year old economist.

 

 

A skit in economics typically involves a humor transplant of some sort. The following script from the faculty contribution to an annual M.I.T. economics skit party (ca.  1979-80 which is when Luis Tiant pitched for the Yankees) took its inspiration from  two greats in American comedy, Carl Reiner & Mel Brooks, who sometimes performed as interviewer and 2,000 year-old man, respectively.

While it is fairly clear that Robert Solow performed and probably wrote the entire skit, the identity of the interviewer still needs to be established. Hint: there is a comment box at the bottom of this post. 

The script comes from a file of such Solovian skits that Roger Backhouse has copied during his archival research and has shared with Economics in the Rear-View Mirror.

_________________

 

Q: You have probably all heard the interviews with the recently discovered 2000-year-old man. We are fortunate to have with us tonight another great find, the 2000-year-old economist, Robert M. Solow. By the way, Dr. Solow, just what does the M stand for?

A: Methuselah, dummy.

Q: Dr. Solow has seen so many skit parties in his life, that he was not very happy about appearing at this one. Do you remember the first skit party you ever went to?

A: No. Skit parties are like hangovers – best thing to do is forget ’em and swear never to do it again. I do have a hazy recollection of an early skit party, I think it was what the one where I first heard the joke about bordered determinants…

Q: What is the joke about border determinants?

A: I don’t know, but they sure laugh[ed] their fool heads off.

Q: Any other recollections about that skit party?

A: Well, you could hear them building pyramids in the background, I remember, and there was this Sphinx-like object, looked a lot like Dick Eckaus… You don’t suppose that, even then???? Nah, forget it.

Q: Turning to more serious issues, what is the biggest change in economics since the old days?

A: Mechanization, by cracky. First the electric typewriter, then the computer, then the Xerox machine [handwritten insert: but not fast enough for (3 or 4 illegible words)]. Nowadays people write papers at the rate they used to wipe their… glasses. I believe Feldstein has solved the problem of hooking the typewriter directly to the Xerox machine, and the whole paper is reproduced without being touched by human hands. There is even a rumor that he has a secret way of getting the paper written without human intervention…

Q: Come come, Dr. Solow, you don’t believe that.

A: Well, have you looked at any of Feldstein’s recent papers? Now in the good old days, stand-up roll-top desks, quill pens, the main-frame abacus, a man thought twice before he wrote a paper. At least he thought once. If only old Tom were here.

Q: Tom who?

A: Tom Gresham. You know: bad working papers drive out good. Not to mention Dave Hume, the inventor of the quantity theory of working papers. As Milton used to say: any way you slice it, it’s still baloney.

Q: Is that Milton Friedman?

A: No, Milton Horowitz, the inventor of the pastrami sandwich. I believe he appears in a footnote in Joskow’s classic mustard-stained work on the subject.

Q: Let’s come to your recent impressions. What do you see as the most important recent development in economics?

A: That’s easy – the increase in the mandatory retirement age to 70. Of course it’s got a long way to go before it does me any good, but I underestimate the DRI Mandatory Retirement Age Monitor estimates the retirement age to be rising at 1.73 years per year, so time is on my side.

Q: Apart from its effects on you personally, why do you think this is an important development?

A: It saves a lot of time at department meetings never to have to make a tenure appointment again. And you know what department meetings are like – even worse than skit parties.

Q: How do you think the change will affect students?

A: They’ll love it. Courses will be the same year after year. Reading lists will never change. Textbooks will go on and on and on. Can you imagine the 200th edition of Dornbusch and Fischer? I hope it’s printed on better paper than the low-grade papyrus of the first edition… I do wonder about Eckaus and that Sphinx…… Exams will be the same year after year. Students hate change. Look at what happened when you fellows tried to change 14.121 this year.

Q: Turning to economic theory, what has been the most important development you have witnessed in the last 2000 years?

A: The two-dimensional diagram.

Q: Be serious.

A: I am serious. Can you imagine Bhagwati, the Picasso of the Production Possibility Locus, trying to fit all those curves in a one-dimensional diagram, which was all we had in the old days? There wasn’t hardly room for anything besides the axis.

Q: Come, come. Bhagwati would find a solution for that little difficulty. Who needs an axis?

A: Maybe so, but can you imagine four-color one-dimensional diagrams? How could we have expensive textbooks without four-color diagrams? How could we have expensive professors without expensive textbooks? How could……

Q: OK, OK. What is the second most important development in economic theory in your lifetime?

A: The subscript.

Q: Don’t you know the difference between trivia and serious economic theory?

A: Sure. Trivia are worth remembering, but serious economics is OK to forget.

Q: Maybe we better stick to trivia…

A: I was just kidding. I really know the answer. There is no difference between trivia and serious economic theory.

Q: Tell us about the most interesting experience you ever heard of an economist having?

A: Easy. Happened to an agricultural economist I knew, feller named Samuelson, farm boy from Gary, Indiana. He was digging on the farm one day, checking out the law of diminishing returns, and he found a potato growing with a nickel in it. Marvelous thing. Folks came from miles away to see a potato with a nickel in it. Old Samuelson frittered away the rest of his life looking for another potato with the nickel in it. Never could find one. He did find a couple with three cents in them, but somehow it wasn’t the same. Never accomplished another thing, old Samuelson. Wonder whatever became of him? He’d be 2009, I reckon. By the way, whatever became of that other farmer, Weitzman?

Q: You mean Chaim Weitzman, the founding father of Israel? His last words were: you don’t have to convince me, Professor [Frank] Fisher, I’m Jewish too.

A: No, I mean Marty Weitzman, old quick and dirty, the lion of Levittown.

Q: Why do you ask?

A: Reminds me of the fellow I used to know, a Secretary of the Treasury named Hamilton……

Q: Reminds you of who? Oh, I get it, they both got killed in the dual.

A: Watch out, Buster – the agreement was that I tell the jokes and you prove the theorems.

Q: All right. Let’s get away from personalities. What do you think of recent macro theories?

A: Not much.

Q: What about rational expectations?

A: If there were any truth in that, it would have been thought up long ago.

Q: Not necessarily. The old-timers could have thought that someone would think of it, without thinking of it themselves.

A: That’s true, but the old-timers were too sensible to think that anyone would think a thought like that.

Q: How about the quantity theory?

A: Ingenious.

Q: Really?

A: Imagine saying that velocity is so stable that only money matters, and so unstable that no use can be made of the theory, and imagine getting away with both statements.

Q: But what is macroeconomics left with then?

A: Well, the old Ioto-Sigma Lamba-Mu [Greek for “IS-LM”] curves were good enough for Aristotle, it’s good enough for me.

Q: Would you care to comment on the theory of built-in stabilizers?

A: If you’re not going to be serious, we might as well go watch a ballgame. I understand Louis Tiant, the 2000-year-old pitcher is going for the Yankees.

Q: Use your 2000-year-old imagination. I’ll give you an example of built-in stabilization – Social Security.

A: How so?

Q: The less likely it is that anyone will ever be able to collect benefits, the likelier it becomes that they make even more money consulting on Social Security. Take [Peter] Diamond, for example.

A: You take Diamond.

Q: No thanks. Imagine a man leaving a perfectly good career in public finance to go into law and economics and make a hash out of both fields.

A: Stick to the straight-man lines, please.

[Handwritten insert begins here]

Q: What do you think of the proliferation of journals?

A: I think it is terrific. Of course it has been going on for a long time – ever since BJEA, the Babylonian Journal of Economic Analysis was challenged by the SEJ, the Sumerian Economic Journal.
What I particularly like is the increased specialization. Like JHR, the Journal of Human Regressions and JME, the Journal of Mathematical Existence.

Q: The Journal of Mathematical Existence – isn’t that the one that started with the famous 2-line proof: I count, therefore I am?

A: Yes and was followed by a 47 page proof that without continuity existence was still generic.
I also like this trend toward paired journals.

Q: Paired journals?

A: Yes, like the two Harvard journals – one publishes theory without measurement and the other measurement without theory.
And then there’s the 2 JPE’s – the Journal of Public Economics and the Journal of Private Enterprise.

[handwritten insert ends]

Q: What do you see as the greatest danger facing the economics profession?

A: The threatened extension of truth-in-lending legislation to truth-in-teaching. We could have the biggest rash of malpractice suits since Nicky Kaldor retired.

Q: I think you’re onto something there. How foresighted of this department to have hired an expert on malpractice like Marilyn Simon [joined faculty 1977-78 academic year], the world-famous author of Unnecessary Surgery – The View from the Inside.

A: Simon only writes about malpractice – [Jeffrey E.] Harris actually does it, I understand.

Q: You seem to have discovered a lot since you turned up around here. Anything else new on the malpractice front?

A: There’s a rumor that the University of Chicago has had to recall all the degrees issued during the last five model years.

Q: You mean…

A: Right. Defective transmission mechanisms.

Q: Gad. Are there any good defenses against malpractice suits in your long and varied experience?

A: You can hire a mathematician for the faculty.

Q: What good does that do?

A: How the hell would I know? All I can say is that every department seems to be hiring mathematicians these days. It’s got to be for something.

Q: I’m looking for some more tried and true defense.

A: There’s always the Long-and-Variable Lags defense. See the Supreme Court decision in Tobin versus Friedman, in which Friedman successfully argued that first it’s true, second he never said it, and third wait till next year.

Q-: How about the Roy Lopez Defense?

A: You mean P–K4, P-K4; N-KB3, N-QB3; B-QN5, P-QR3?

Q: No, I mean Roy Lopez, the middle line-backer for the Princeton Economics Department – anyone sues for malpractice, he breaks their legs.

A: Sounds good. There’s also the classic defense due to Stanley Fischer, that truth should be indexed. Today’s malpractice is tomorrow’s conventional wisdom.

Q: Speaking of conventional wisdom, have you spoken with Professor Galbraith since your return?

A: No, but I have been reading his latest book: Why Are People Poor?

Q: I’ll bite; why are people poor?

A: Not enough income, according to Galbraith.

Q: Does he have a remedy?

A: Move to Switzerland.

Q: I see.

A: I can’t wait until the news reaches Calcutta.

Q: One last question, to return to the subject with which we started. Do you see any trends in student skits?

A: Longer.

Q: Longer and funnier?

A: Longer.

Q: Any final comment?

A: Let me ask you a question. What do you consider the most remarkable thing in this interview?

Q: That’s easy. We never mentioned IBM.

 

Source:  Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library. Economists’ Papers Archives. Papers of Robert M. Solow. Box 83.

Image Source:  Carl Reiner and Mel Brooks performing the 2000 year old man from NPR KNAU, Arizona public radio article “Could You Talk To a Caveman?” (May 9, 2013) .

Categories
Chicago Exam Questions Problem Sets

Chicago. Problems and exam. Income and Employment Theory. Friedman, 1966-67

 

In an earlier post we saw that Milton Friedman resisted the move to relabel the Chicago courses in (aggregate) income and employment theory “macroeconomics”. Below we have the take-home problem sets for 1966 and 1967 together with the final examination questions for the 1966 version of the course transcribed from copies in Friedman’s papers at the Hoover Institution Archives.

Pro-tip: Incomplete transcripts of his taped lectures for the course are filed at the Hoover Archives along with the material posted here. These await the caring editorial hand of some (other) historian of economics.

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ECONOMICS 332
Winter, 1966
Problems for Reading Period

(Due at Final Exam, Monday, March 14, 1966, 1:30 P.M.)

  1. In an economy using fiduciary money, it costs nothing to create additional cash balances. Hence, it is desirable to encourage wealth-holders to hold additional cash balances so long as they get any additional non-pecuniary return from them. One way to do so is through a deliberate policy of announced deflation.
  2. For individuals, additions to cash balances are a substitute for real saving in the form of direct investment or loans to finance direct investment; hence, the larger the additions to cash balances, the lower will tend to be the volume of real capital formation. Since economic growth depends on the volume of real capital formation, it is desirable to discourage the hoarding of cash. One way to do so is through a deliberate policy of announced inflation.
    Both statements offer plausible, yet they lead to precisely opposite policy conclusions. Can you reconcile them? If not, which, in your opinion, is in error? What is the source of the mistake?

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

Milton Friedman

ECONOMICS 332
Final Examination. Winter, 1966
March 14, 1966

[25 Points]

  1. Indicate in each box whether the change in the indicated variable would, under the specified conditions, tend to be an increase (+), decrease (-), no change (0), or is uncertain (?). In each case, of course, assume other relevant variables unchanged.
    Make usual assumptions about behavior functions.

Assumed change

Underemployment
Rigid Wages

Full Employment
Flexible Wages
Employ-
ment
Interest
rate
Real
stock
of
money
Con-sump-tion Price level Interest rate Real stock of money

Consump-tion

(1) Rise in tariff
(2) Increase in government taxes, no change in government expenditures
(3) Reduction in legal reserve requirements of member banks
(4) Discovery of vast oilfields
(5) Substitution of tax on land values for tax on wages, no change in revenue
(6) Emergence of widespread fear of civil disturbances

 

[30 Points]

  1. An earthquake destroys half the physical capital in a country but miraculously there is negligible loss of life. The earthquake was most unusual, was unexpected and no one expects a repetition.
    1. Show graphically the effect on (1) the stock demand and supply for capital; (2) the flow demand and supply curves.
    2. Assuming flexible prices and full employment throughout, what, if anything, can you say about the initial effects on (1) rental rate on capital goods; (2) sales price of capital goods; (3) interest rate [i.e., ratio of (1) to (2)]; (4) real wage rate; (5) fraction of income consumed; (6) absolute level of investment.
    3. What about ultimate effects on these variables?
    4. Assuming initially rigid wages and underemployment, what, if anything, can you say about initial effects on items listed in (b)?

[15 Points]

  1. “The relation between the volume of economic activity and the price level is not simple. As a first approximation, the classical law of supply and demand leads one to expect that the change in the price level will depend mainly on the size of the gap between capacity and actual output” 1966 Annual Report, Council of Economic Advisers, pp. 63-64.
    “Money prices, as opposed to relative prices, can never be governed by the conditions of the commodity market itself (or of the production of goods)” K. Wicksell, Interest and Prices (1898), p. 24.
    In your opinion, does this shift in economic theory over the past 68 years reflect progress or retrogression? Justify your answer.

[15 Points]

  1. Consider a hypothetical economy in which initially, government expenditures (G) are 100, private investment (I) is 50, and private consumption (C) is 350, so that national product (Y) is 100 + 50 + 350 = 500, and tax receipts (T) are 90. Assume that G and T are both reduced by 10 to 90 and 80 respectively, and that wage rates are rigid.
    1. If you neglect any effects on the rate of interest, what would be the resulting values of C, I, and Y? Prove your answer in general by a simple algebraic analysis.
    2. Would you expect any effects on the interest rate if nominal quantity of money is constant? If so, what effect? How would this in turn affect I, C, and Y? Give hypothetical numbers that might correspond to final outcome.
      Again, prove your answer.
    3. What additional complications, if any, are relevant in generalizing these effects of a balanced budget change to actual circumstances?

[15 Points]

  1. Discuss the “real balance effect,” indicating what you think to be its meaning, and what role it has played in discussions of the possibility of under-employment equilibrium. In the course of your answer indicate what economists have been the main contributors to the discussion and what their specific contributions have been.

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

Milton Friedman
Spring Quarter, 1967
Economics 332

ECONOMICS 332
Problem for Reading Period
Due at Final Exam, Wed., June 7, 1967
(Maximum length = 1,000 words)

MONETARY vs. FISCAL POLICY

Define fiscal policy as deliberate changes in the government tax structure or expenditure structure for a given behavior of the quantity of money; monetary policy as a change in the rate of change of the quantity of money for a given tax and expenditure structure.

  1. Using the standard income-expenditure model, and assuming prices are rigid, analyze the effect on real income and interest rates of an increase in taxes which would raise the full-employment surplus (or lower the full-employment deficit) by X billion dollars. Specify the parameters on which the result depends and indicate limiting cases.
  2. Using the same model, indicate how to determine the change in monetary policy that would have the same effect on real income. How would other effects of the two policies differ?
  3. The standard model is in terms of comparative statics, so (1) and (2) would be analyzed in terms of a comparison of two alternative positions at a single date. In addition, the only stock variable in the standard model is the quantity of money. Modify the analysis in (1) in both respects. That is, indicate the time path of adjustment you might expect and why, taking into account any effects on such stock variables as total holdings of government and private securities.
  4. Similarly, analyze the time path of the effect of a decline in the rate of monetary growth by, say, X percentage points, again allowing for effect on stocks.

Source: The Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Milton Friedman, Box 77, Folder “University of Chicago, Econ. 331 [sic]”.

Image Source: Milton Friedman at Pepperdine University in 1977.

 

Categories
Chicago Exam Questions Suggested Reading Undergraduate

Chicago. Undergraduate Money and Banking. Exams, readings. Friedman, 1946-49

 

Besides teaching in the core graduate price theory course at Chicago, Milton Friedman also covered undergraduate money and banking upon joining the faculty of the economics department. Below some material transcribed from a folder of course material found in Milton Friedman’s papers at the Hoover Institution Archives. Where answers were provided to some examination questions, they have been transcribed [and placed in square brackets] and included below.

Fun Fact: According to class rolls kept by Friedman, Marc Nerlove was a student in the Autumn 1951 Money and Banking class taught by Friedman.

_________________

Course Announcement and Description

[Economics] 230. Introduction to Money and Banking. Study of factors which determine the value of money in the short and in the long run; and operation of the commercial banking system and its relation to the price level and general business activity. Prereq: Soc Sci 2 and Econ 210, or equiv. Aut: MWF 10:30 Friedman; Win: MWF 2:30; Mints.

Source:   University of Chicago. Announcements. The College and the Divisions, Sessions of 1947-1948. Vol. XLVII, No. 4 (May 15, 1947), p. 224.

_________________

Text for Economics 230:

L. V. Chandler, The Economics of Money and Banking. Harper & Brothers.

The Book will be used again as a text when the course is given in the Winter Quarter. Give the number in class as that of the Autumn, 1947.
Reserve List & Bookstore.

_________________

Economics 230
Autumn 1947
Library Book List

Robertson, D. H. Money

Gregory, T. E. The Gold Standard and Its Future (3rd)

Board of Governors. Federal Reserve System.Its Purposes and Function

_________________

Economics 230
Autumn 1951

Supplementary Readings and Problem for Reading Period

Readings

Text: Lester Chandler, Economics of Money and -Banking

  1. American Economic Association, Readings in Monetary Theory, edited by Friedrich Lutz and Lloyd W. Mints.
  2. Goldenweiser, E.A., American Monetary Policy.
  3. Gregory, T.E., The Gold Standard and Its Future.
  4. Hardy, C.O., Credit Policies of the Federal Reserve System.
  5. Keynes, J.M., Essays in Persuasion.
  6. Mints, Lloyd W., Monetary Policy for a Competitive Society.
  7. Robertson, D.H., Money.
  8. S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, The Federal Reserve System, Its Purposes and Functions.

 

Problem

            For a convenient date in 1951, estimate the maximum amount of currency and deposits that would have been outstanding if the banking system had used all the possibilities of monetary expansion available under the then existing laws and regulations about reserve requirements of member and non-member banks and about reserve requirements of Federal Reserve Banks. For purposes of the computation, assume (a) an unchanged amount of Treasury currency outstanding; (b) elimination of Treasury deposits with Federal Reserve Banks through purchase of government securities held by the Federal Reserve Banks. With respect to all other factors—such as percentage distribution of public’s money holdings among currency, demand deposits, and time deposits—you are to choose your own assumptions, the choice of reasonable assumptions and the presentation of evidence for them being an essential part of the problem.

_________________

MIDQUARTER EXAMINATION IN ECONOMICS 230
[no date, though likely 1947]

  1. Indicate the factors that principally determine—
    1. (15 points) The ratio of the amount of currency in circulation to the amount of bank deposits.
    2. (15 points) The ratio of the amount of bank deposits to the amount of reserves held by the banking system when there are no legal reserve requirements.
  2. (35 points) In country A, important new discoveries of oil are made, driving down the price of oil in that country relative to the world price. Assume that this is the only important change relevant to international trade. Trace the effects of this change on exchange rates, gold flows, price levels, imports and exports, and incomes, in country A and in the rest of the world on the assumption (a) that a strict gold standard is in operation; (b) that inconvertible paper standards and fluctuating exchanges are in operation.
  3. (35 points) Explain in detail the effects on Bank A and on the banking system as a whole arising from the deposit in bank A of $100 of newly-printed currency. The deposit is made by a worker who has just received the currency from the government. Assume the bank is fully exploiting its lending power.

_________________

Economics 230
Midquarter Examination
November 5, 1948

  1. (25 points) It has been argued that it would be profitable for a member bank to borrow from its Federal Reserve bank even at a rate of interest considerably higher than the rate the member bank charges to its customers; and that this is so because one dollar of additional reserves can support several dollars of additional deposits. For example, if $1 of additional reserves can support $5 of additional deposits, it is argued that it would be profitable (if we neglect the cost of making the loan) for a member bank that can lend at 6% to borrow at any rate up to 30%. Evaluate this argument.
  2. (25 points)
    1. Nondeposit currency currently in circulation in the United States include Federal Reserve notes, silver certificates, United States notes (greenbacks) and National Bank Notes. In addition, there is a large volume of gold certificates outstanding but not in circulation. Indicate brieflythe historical origin of each of these types of currency, and the major episode in our monetary development each one symbolizes.
    2. What is the FDIC? What, in your view, is its essential function (which may not be the same as its announced purpose) in our current monetary structure?
  3. (50 points) Indicate whether the operation described in the first column would, in the first instance, increase (+), leave unchanged (0), or reduce (-) the item listed at the top of each column. For simplicity, assume (a) that nonmember banks are notinvolved in any of the transactions, (b) that the Treasury deposits all funds received in a Reserve Bank and pays for all expenditures by checks on a Reserve Bank, (c) that all nondeposit currency is in the form of Federal Reserve Notes. Take account only of the essentially bookkeeping effects of the operation, not of subsequent effects. For example, in operation (1) the decline in currency outside banks and the Treasury might so disturb the public’s relative holdings of deposit and nondeposit currency as to lead subsequently to a conversion of deposits into nondeposit currency. Do nottake such subsequent effects into account.
    [+1 for each correct, -1 for each wrong, 0 for no entry]

 

Operation Currency outside banks and Treasury Member bank Federal Reserve Bans
Demand Deposits Excess Reserves Deposits Excess Gold Reserves
Purchase of government bond by public
From Federal Reserve Bank
(1) with non deposit currency [-] [0] [0] [0] [+]
(2) by check [0] [-] [-] [-] [+]
From Treasury
(3) with non deposit currency [-] [0] [0] [+] [0]
(4) by check [0] [-] [-] [0] [0]
From public
(5) with non deposit currency [0] [0] [0] [0] [0]
(6) by check [0] [0] [0] [0] [0]
Purchase of government bond by Treasury from
(7) public a [0]
b [+]
[+]
[0]
[+]
[0]
[0]
[-]
[0]
[0]
(8) member bank [0] [0] [+] [0] [0]
(9) Federal Reserve bank [0] [0] [0] [-] [+]
Conversion of demand deposit by public into
(10) non deposit currency [+] [-] [+] and [0]
[-] and [-]
[only if both]
[0]
(11) time deposit [0] [-] [0] [0] [0]

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Final Examination for Economics 230
Autumn, 1946
3 hours and overnight.

Part I

  1. Define briefly the following terms:
    1. Required reserves
    2. Open market policy
    3. Gold points
    4. Rediscount rate
    5. Inconvertible paper currency
    6. Transactions velocity of circulation
    7. The equation of exchange
  2. What techniques are available to the Federal Reserve System for controlling the total volume of currency? How does each technique work? Under what conditions is each technique likely to be effective?
  3. It is often asserted that in returning to gold at the pre-first-world-war parity Britain “overvalued” the pound. What does this statement mean? What kind of evidence would be required to test its validity and how should this evidence be interpreted? If the statement is true, what effects would overvaluation of the pound be expected to have on Great Britain? What factors would operate to remove these effects and to correct the overvaluation? What kinds of governmental policy, if any, would speed up the process of correcting the overvaluation?

Part II

  1. (20 points) What is the 100% reserve proposal? Discuss its advantages and disadvantages as compared with the present system.
  2. (30 points) A newspaper story of January 21, 1946, on President Truman’s budget message, had the following headlines and first two paragraphs:

“TRUMAN MAPS FIRST DEBT CUT SINCE 1930
CASH ON HAND TO OFFSET ’47 DEFICIT

“Washington—President Truman’s first budget proposes to spend $4,300,000,000 more than the government will collect, but for the first time since 1930, it won’t increase the national debt.
“Mr. Truman proposes to withdraw from the Treasury cash balance sufficient funds not only to offset this deficit but also to reduce the debt by $7,000,000.”

In answering this question assume that Government cash balances are held on deposit in member banks, and that no reserves are required for government balances.

(a) What is the monetary effect of financing the deficit by use of cash balances? Would this effect be deflationary or inflationary compared with such alternatives as raising additional revenue from taxes, or borrowing additional sums from (1) the nonbanking public, (2) member banks, (3) reserve banks.

(b) What is the monetary effect of using cash balances to reduce the debt? Discuss the effects if the bonds are purchased from 81) the nonbanking public, (2) member banks, (3) reserve banks.

_________________

FINAL EXAMINATION, ECONOMICS 230, FALL, 1947

Part I

  1. In speaking of monetary developments in the United States at the beginning of the nineteenth century, H. L. Reed remarks, “the country was so inadequately provided with specie that the advantages of a money economy were not sufficiently extended and diffused.” What do you think this statement means? Does it make sense as it stands? If not, can you suggest an interpretation of it that makes sense?
  2. Explain in detail how, in a fractional reserve system, a given deficit in reserves may force a much larger contraction in currency. In your statement, indicate the factors that set a limit to the contraction and contrast the single bank with the banking system.
  3. To what causes does Gregory attribute the breakdown of the Gold Standard in Great Britain in 1931?

 

Part II

  1.    a. Assume that there is a free market in which English pounds exchange for American dollars. Indicate whether each of the following would, by itself, tend to raise or lower the price of a pound in terms of dollars.

1) An increase in tourist travel by Americans in England. [A. Raise]
2) A rise in dividend payments on American common stocks owned by British. [A. Raise]
3) A sudden craze in Britain for American films leading to increased showings of American films. [A. Lower]
4) Increased repayment by Britain of loans from the U.S. [A. Lower]
5) The raising of abnormally large amounts of relief funds in the United States to finance the shipment of special food packages to Great Britain. [A. Raise]

b. If England and the United States were both on a gold standard what words would it be reasonable to substitute for “raise the price of a pound in terms of dollars”? [A. “ship gold to Britain”] for “lower the price of a pound in terms of dollars”? [A.“ship gold to U.S.”]

c. You are asked what the total amount of money in the United States is. Discuss the problems of definition that would arise, indicating the considerations that would be relevant in deciding what to count as money.

d. Marriner Eccles, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, recently proposed to Congress that member banks be required to set up a special reserve of 25 per cent of deposit liabilities in addition to existing reserves. Three members of the Federal Advisory Council—a council composed of private bankers who advise the Federal Reserve Board—testified against the proposal. The N. Y. Times reports them as maintaining that “it would reduce loans needed to finance production, and thus prove inflationary.” Discuss this statement.

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Economics 230
Final Examination
December 16, 1949

  1. (100 points) Indicate whether each of the following statements is true (T), false (F), or uncertain (U) and state briefly the reason for your answer.
    1. Legal reserves held by a bank are a liability of the bank.
    2. Banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System may not count cash in their vault as part of their legal reserves.
    3. Every bank that is a member of the Federal Reserve System must carry Federal Deposit Insurance.
    4. Every bank that carries Federal Deposit Insurance must be a member of the Federal Reserve System.

5 and 6. Bank A sells a government bond to Bank B, both banks being members of the Federal Reserve Stem. This…

    1. …increases total member bank reserves.
    2. …does not change total deposit liabilities of member banks.

7, 8, 9. Bank A, which is a member of the Federal Reserve System sells a government bond to Mr. Jones. Bank A deposits the proceeds in its account with a Federal Reserve Bank. This…

    1. …increases total member bank reserves.
    2. …does not change total deposit liabilities of member banks.
    3. …increases the ratio of reserves to deposit liabilities.
      *  *  *  *  *
    4. Since banks can expand loans by several times the amount of excess reserves, a bank that could make additional sound loans at 5 per cent, could afford to pay much more than 5 per cent to induce individuals to deposit currency in the bank, since such a deposit would increase the bank’s excess reserves.
    5. The economic function of legal reserve requirements is to protect depositors in a bank against undue extensions of loans by banks.
    6. An expansion of investments and an expansion of loans by commercial banks have identical effects on the quantity of money.

13 through 16. Mr. Jones pays his Federal income tax with a check on a member bank. The Federal government uses this check to buy a government bond from a Federal Reserve Bank. This operation…

    1. …reduces total member bank deposit liabilities.
    2. …reduces total member bank reserves.
    3. …increases the ratio of member bank reserves to member bank deposit liabilities.
    4. …increases the excess gold reserves of the Federal Reserve System.
      *  *  *  *  *
    5. The post-war rise in prices in the United States was one of the factors making necessary the recent devaluation of the British pound.
    6. Any phenomena that would lead to an outflow of gold from the United States under a gold standard would lead to a fall in the price of the dollar in terms of foreign currencies under a system of inconvertible currencies and flexible exchange rates.

19, 20, 21. Suppose that under an international gold standard, foreign payments and receipts by the United States balance so that there is no net outflow or inflow of gold.

    1. A sudden increase of gifts by residents of the United States to non-residents would tend to lead to an outflow of gold from the United States.
    2. A reduction in the tariffs imposed by France on goods imported into France would tend to lead to an outflow of gold from the United States.
    3. A large technological advance in Great Britain lowering the price of automobiles produced in Great Britain would lead to an outflow of gold from the United States.
      *  *  *  *  *
    4. Under a gold standard, a decline in the rate of interest will tend to narrow the spread between the gold points.
    5. Under existing laws governing bank reserve requirements, a tendency for people to move from farms and small communities to large cities is, by itself, a factor tending to reduce the total quantity of money.
    6. A lengthening in the average pay-period (through, say, an increase in the proportion of workers paid monthly instead of weekly) is, by itself a factor tending to reduce the price level.
    7. K, in the cash balance equation, will be increased by anything that leads people to expect price to fall.
    8. The numerical value of V in the transactions type of equation of exchange depends on the definition of M.
    9. The equation of exchange demonstrates that an increase in the quantity of money must lead to an increase in prices.
    10. Since one man’s receipts are another man’s expenditures, it follows that the quantity of money can be changed only by capital transactions.
    11. The rediscount rate is used by the Federal Reserve system to discourage purchase of government securities.
    12. Monetary policy can be more effective in preventing inflation than in preventing deflation.

 

  1. (50 points) “In the early history of our country there was a dearth of currency and specie. It was difficult to have cash on hand, especially when most of the specie was used to pay for imports.” (E. R. Taus, Central Banking Functions of the United States Treasury, 1789-1941, p. 22).

Discuss the economic meaning of these sentences. Do they make sense as they stand? If so, explain. If not, can you suggest any interpretation of them that does make sense? In your answer, emphasize analysis, not economic history.

  1. (50 points)

“One method proposed for bringing the reserve position under control while protecting the market for government securities held by banks is to require banks to keep a reserve of government securities against deposits, in addition to present cash reserves…..In all essential respects, raising required reserve ratios by adding a security-reserve requirement is identical with a straight increase of cash reserve requirements, combined with an equivalent purchase of government securities by the Reserve Banks. The only significant difference is that the security-reserve proposal provides the member banks with the equivalent of a subsidy (in the form of interest on the bonds) to compensate for the loss of earnings on additional assets tied up as reserves.”
Do you agree? Justify your answer.

  1. (50 points) Under our present monetary system, a desire on the part of the pubic to hold an increased fraction of its money in the form of currency and a decreased fraction in the form of deposits is said to be a factor making for a decrease in the total amount of money (currency plus deposits) in existence. Explain this statement in detail. In your explanation, distinguish between the effect of an outflow of cash on the individual bank and on the system.
  1. (50 points) Currency in public circulation (“cash in pocket”) was approximately one-sixth of the total amount of money (currency plus demand deposits plus time deposits) in the United States in 1892, it fell fairly steadily to about one-twelfth in 1930, and then rose more or less steadily until it is again approximately one-sixth, or about the same level as in 1892. The initial decline was interrupted by a rise during the first World War; and the subsequent rise was accelerated during the second World War.
    How would you explain the long decline to 1930? The subsequent rise? This tendency for the ratio to rise during war time? (Note that there is no unambiguously “right” answer to this question. So far as I know, those movements have not been exhaustively studied, and hypotheses to explain them have not been tested. You are being asked to construct hypotheses about them).

 

Source:  Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Milton Friedman, Box 76, Folder 8 “University of Chicago, Econ. 230”.

Image Source:  Cropped from a photograph of Milton Friedman, George Stigler, and Aaron Director at the founding meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society, 1947, Milton Friedman papers, Hoover Institution Archives,

 

 

Categories
Chicago Courses

Chicago. Milton Friedman nixes “Microeconomics” and “Macroeconomics”, 1965

 

From an August 9, 1965 memorandum to the faculty of the Chicago economics department we can see that there was actually a faculty meeting in which adoption of  new course titles, “Micro-Economic Theory” and “Macro-Economic Theory”, had been decided. However, Milton Friedman (presumably not at that meeting) protested this concession to the mainstream and ever since Chicago has faithfully remained home of “Price Theory” and “Income Theory” as seen below in the course titles from 2000-2001 and 2010-2011 (along with course descriptions). Incidentally the two sequences have grown a third quarter since the mid-sixties.

I don’t have a copy of the June 12, 1965 protest letter from Friedman to Lewis, but am reasonably confident that someone will eventually find a copy (most likely a carbon copy of the letter in Milton Friedman’s correspondence with Lewis).

_________________

H. Gregg Lewis to Milton Friedman

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
Chicago 37, Illinois
Department of Economics

June 18, 1965

Professor Milton Friedman
Orford,
New Hampshire

Dear Milton:

Thanks for your letter of June 12 regarding the labeling of 301, 302, 331, and 332.

I want to have the decision with respect to the labels reconsidered this summer. Until the decision is reconsidered, I am making no changes in the titles of the courses.

Meanwhile, I would appreciate it if you would suggest alternative titles for the courses that are acceptable to you.

With best wishes to you and Rose.

Sincerely,
[signed] Gregg
H. G. Lewis

HGL/agm

[Friedman’s handwritten notes at bottom of letter:]

301, 302 Price Theory[;] Relative Price Theory

331, 332 Money and Employment Theory[;] Money, Income, Employment[;] Theory of the Price Level and Aggregate Output, Money

Source: Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Milton Friedman. Box 79, Folder 3 “University of Chicago Minutes. Economics Department, 1965-1966”.

_________________

Memo from H. Gregg Lewis to the economics department

August 9, 1965

To: Members of the Department of Economics

From: H. Gregg Lewis

At the last meeting of the Department (June 4, 1965), the Department decided to change the name of Economics 301 and 302 to Micro-Economic Theory and Economics 331 and 332 to Macro-Economic theory. The purpose of this note is to request that the Department reconsider this action and adopt a different pair of names for these two sets of courses (and the corresponding parts of the Ph.D. Core Examination).

The term micro-economics commonly is used to denote the economics of the individual household and the individual firm. It is, therefore, a misleading title for 301 and 302. Furthermore, it is surely misleading to represent 331 and 332 as not involving consideration of the economics of individual households and firms.

For 301 and 302, I recommend that we keep the present title (Price Theory) or change it slightly to Relative Price Theory. For 331 and 332, I recommend that one of the following be adopted:

The Theory of Income, Employment, and Money
or         The Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money
or         The Theory of Income, Employment, Interest, and Money

Source: Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Milton Friedman. Box 79, Folder 3 “University of Chicago Minutes. Economics Department, 1965-1966”.

_________________

Course descriptions from the 2000-2001 Brochure

301 PRICE THEORY I (Becker/ Murphy)

Theory of consumer choice, including household production, indirect utility, and hedonic indices. Supply under competitive and monopolistic conditions. Static and dynamic cost curves, including learning by doing and temporary changes. Uncertainty applied to consumer and producer choices. Property rights and the effects of laws. Investment in human and physical capital. (=Law 436)

[Reading List from one year later: Autumn Quarter 2001]

302 PRICE THEORY II (Reny/ Chiappori)

Economics of uncertainty. Models with asymmetric information. Game theory. PQ: Econ 301 or consent of instructor.

303 PRICE THEORY III (Chiappori/ Rosen)

The theory of production, division of labor and organization of work. The economics of the firm and the theory of supply. Cost functions, product differentiation and spatial equilibrium. Investment theory, firm size, and incentive problems. Externalities and the role of markets and prices. PQ: Econ 301 and 302 or consent of instructor.

330 THE THEORY OF INCOME I (Townsend/ Alvarez)

This course begins the study of income and macroeconomics by embedding firms, households, and financial institutions into the standard general equilibrium model. The course thus studies Pareto optima, Walrasian equilibrium, and the core in economies with separation in space, uncertainty, and/or multiple time periods and incorporates private information, incomplete markets, and other impediments to trade. Various phenomena and applications are stressed: private monies and the potential role of the monetary authority; the evaluation of local, regional, and national level financial systems in their ability to reallocate risk; the determinants of economics growth; growth with increasing inequality and financial deepening; occupation choice under wealth constraints and its impact on growth and inequality; the existence of networks such as industrial conglomerates in economies with moral hazard; optimal fiscal policy; and the role of social security. Examples are drawn from Asia, Latin America, Europe, and Africa and well as the U.S.

331 THE THEORY OF INCOME II (Lucas)

This course will deal with modern capital and monetary theory, and with applications of the theory to issues in fiscal, monetary, and banking policy.

332 THE THEORY OF INCOME III (Mulligan)

The course shares with the other two Theory of Income courses the objectives of (1) explaining human behavior as evidenced by aggregate variables and (2) predicting the aggregate effects of certain government policies. The focus of Economics 332 is to assess the empirical success of prevailing theories. Some hypotheses to be considered are consumption smoothing, intertemporal substitution, the q-theory, the neoclassical approach to fiscal policy, and the intergenerational transfer view of Social Security. The course confronts several empirical issues that are also encountered outside the field of macroeconomics such as the construction of aggregate data, choice of data set, and the measurement of expectations.

 

Source:  University of Chicago, Department of Economics Graduate Program. Brochure 2000-2001. Webpage: Courses.

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Course descriptions from the 201011 Brochure

30100     PRICE THEORY I  (Murphy / Becker)

Theory of consumer choice, including household production, indirect utility, and hedonic indices. Models of the firm.  Analysis of factor demand and product supply under competitive and monopolistic conditions.  Static and dynamic cost curves, including learning by doing and temporary changes.  Uncertainty applied to consumer and producer choices.  Property rights and the effects of laws.  Investment in human and physical capital.  (=LAWS 43611)

30200     PRICE THEORY II  (Becker / Murphy / Sonnenschein)

The first five weeks of this course are a continuation of ECON 30100, Price Theory I.

The second half of the course will be devoted to the Walrasian model of general competitive equilibrium as developed by Arrow and Debreu.  This will begin with a brief development of the consumer and producer theories, followed by the welfare theorems connecting equilibria and optima and a treatment of the classical existence of equilibrium theorem.  The core of an economy, a limit theorem relating the core to the set of competitive equilibria, and models in which agents are small relative to the market will also be considered.  Finally we will study general equilibrium under some alternative assumptions; such as, informational asymmetries and rational expectations equilibrium, public goods and Lindahl equilibrium, financial general equilibrium and asset pricing.  (=LAWS 43621)

30300    PRICE THEORY III  (Reny / Myerson)

The course begins with expected utility theory, and then introduces the fundamental ideas of game theory: strategic-form games, Nash equilibrium, games with incomplete information, extensive-form games, and sequential equilibrium.   Then the course will focus on the effects of informational asymmetries in markets and the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. Topics include: optimal risk sharing, signaling and screening in competitive markets, principal-agent problems, strategic and informational incentive constraints, incentive efficiency, and mechanism design for auctions and bilateral trading.

33000     THE THEORY OF INCOME I  (Alvarez)

This course formulates and analyzes aggregate general equilibrium models to study classical questions in macroeconomics. The course starts with the formulation and analysis of competitive equilibrium in the general equilibrium models, including the 1st and 2nd welfare theorem. The first applications of this model are: social security (using an OLEG model), optimal risk sharing, and asset pricing (using a one period model with uncertainty). Most of the remaining applications focus on dynamic models without uncertainty. To do so we study tools to characterize optimal solutions of control problems: Hamiltonian, calculus of variations and dynamic programming. The main application of these tools is the neoclassical growth model in many variations: determinants of steady state and balanced growth path, endogenous growth, effect of variable labor supply, TFP changes and of investment specific technical progress, habit formation, the q-model of investment, taxation of capital and labor, optimal taxation a la Ramsey, among others.

33100     THE THEORY OF INCOME II  (Stokey)

This course will focus on the use of recursive general equilibrium models to study various macroeconomic questions.  On the substantive side, particular topics include models with idiosyncratic (insurable) and aggregate (uninsurable) risk; issues in dynamic fiscal policy (Ricardian equivalence, tax smoothing, capital taxation); models of asset pricing; issues in monetary policy (money demand, the welfare cost of inflation); time consistency; and aggregate models with price setting. On the methodological side, the course will focus on dynamic programming and other recursive modeling techniques.

33200     THE THEORY OF INCOME III  (Mulligan)

The course shares with the other two Theory of Income courses the objectives of (1) explaining human behavior as evidenced by aggregate variables and (2) predicting the aggregate effects of certain government policies.  Economics 33200 considers some of the prevailing business cycle theories, and their application to the recession of 2008-9.  Some hypotheses to be considered are the q-theory of housing investment, the neoclassical approach to fiscal policy, and whether government spending has a “multiplier.”  The course confronts several empirical issues that are also encountered outside the field of macroeconomics such as the construction of aggregate data, choice of data set, and the measurement of expectations.

Source: University of Chicago, Department of Economics Graduate Program 2010-11, Introduction. Webpage: Graduate Course Descriptions, 2010-11.

Image: Irwin Collier (right) taking a break during an earlier archival expedition to the Hoover Institution Archives…Milton Friedman (left).

 

Categories
Chicago Regulations

Chicago. Committee on Ph.D. Outlines & Requirements, 1949-50 (4)

 

 

This post adds to a series of  items related to the University of Chicago Department of Economics’ Committee on Ph. D. Outlines and Requirements chaired by Milton Friedman (1949-50). The first installmentsecond installment, and third installment were previously posted. This version of the Ph.D. Outlines and Requirements was filed in a different folder in Milton Friedman’s papers at the Hoover Institution Archives from the first three installments. It is essentially the same as seen in the carbon copy dated February 2, 1950 that was transcribed for the third installment. However at the very end of the memo below we now have an explicit sequence of 14 steps required for every successful economics Ph.D. candidate at the University of Chicago going into the second half of the twentieth century.

___________________________

[MEMO #9, February 6, 1950]

[Mimeographed copy. Additions to/changes of the text from the February 2, 1950 carbon draft]

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

TO:   T. W. Schultz                                                                  DEPARTMENT: Economics
FROM: R. Blough, M. Friedman, D. G. Johnson              DEPARTMENT: Economics
[handwritten addition: “J. Marschak”]

DATE:   February 6, 1950

IN RE: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON PH. D. OUTLINES AND REQUIREMENTS

The following summary of specific recommendations is a revision of the summary on pp. 4 and 5 of our earlier report, incorporating comments and suggestions made at the department discussion of the problem. It is proposed that the department approve the following actions and rules:

(1) A Ph.D. Thesis submitted for final approval will ordinarily contain a central core not in excess of 15,000 words in length. This central core must be self-contained but may be supplemented by supporting material. In scope and quality, the central core shall be comparable to first-rate journal article.

(2) Preparation of a statement on the role of the thesis and the standards to which it is expected to conform for distribution to candidates.

(3) Establishment of a thesis seminar. Regular participation in this seminar is to be expected of all candidates writing theses in residence. One or more faculty members is to have directresponsibility for the organization and scheduling of this seminar. A session of the seminar will ordinarily be conducted by the chairman of the tentative or final thesis committee of the student presenting a report (see point 7 below). All other faculty members shall be encouraged to attend.

(4) A Ph.D. candidate, whether or not he writes his thesis in residence, shall be expected to make at least two appearances before this seminar.

(5) The candidate’s first appearance before the seminar shall be prior to his admission to candidacy. In advance of this appearance, the candidate shall prepare a brief report (on the scale of a term paper) explaining his thesis topic, the existing state of knowledge on the topic, its potentialities, and his projected plan of attack on the problem. This report shall be duplicated and circulated to all members of the seminar an all members of the faculty in advance of the meeting of the seminar.

(6) A candidate shall be permitted to make this first appearance preparatory to admission to candidacy if he has passed at least two of the three Ph.D. preliminary examinations.

(7) The candidate shall have responsibility for applying for the appointment of a tentative thesis committee prior to his first appearance at the seminar. He shall be permitted to make such application at any time after he has passed at least two of the three Ph.D. preliminary examinations. The chairman of the department shall name a tentative faculty committee for each candidate, and this committee shall be expected to attend the meeting of the seminar at which it takes place. At least one member of the tentative committee shall be a person whose major field of interest is outside of the field of the proposed thesis. If admission to candidacy is granted, a final thesis committee shall be appointed by the chairman of the department.

(8) The candidate’s final appearance before the seminar shall be a definitive report of his findings. A brief resume of this report shall be duplicated and circulated to all members of the seminar and all members of the faculty in advance of the meeting of the seminar. The candidate’s thesis committee shall be expected to attend this final appearance before the seminar. [Handwritten comment: “This resume may be the central core referred to in 9.”]

(9) The central core of the thesis or its equivalent shall be circulated to all members of the faculty before the final acceptance of the thesis. Final acceptance of the thesis shall be by vote of the members of the faculty upon the recommendation of the thesis committee. [handwritten addition: “This vote may take place prior to the final appearance of the candidate before the thesis committee, if the central core has been circulated prior to such appearance.”]

(10) The final examination by the department shall be on the candidate’s major field. The examination shall be a function of the whole department but in any event shall be attended by members of the thesis committee and other faculty members specializing in the field.

(11) The new procedure [for admission to candidacy]should shall apply to all students [in residence at the time of its adoption, and to students not in residence] who have not been admitted to candidacy prior to July 1, 1950 December 31, 1951. [handwritten addition: “It shall however be optional to students between the date of adoption and December 31, 1951.”]

 

The steps involved in the successful completion of Ph.D. work under the above procedure may be summarized in [handwritten addition: “usual”] chronological order as follows:

  1. Student passes 2 or more preliminary examinations
  2. Student applies for tentative committee
  3. Department chairman appoints tentative committee
  4. Student circulates a brief report on his projected thesis
  5. Student appears before thesis seminar
  6. Advisor certifies that student has satisfied all requirements for admission to candidacy
  7. Department admits student to candidacy
  8. Department chairman appoints final thesis committee
  9. Student gets approval of his committee to circulate resume of findings of his thesis
  10. Student makes final appearance before thesis seminar
  11. Thesis committee recommends acceptance of thesis
  12. Central core of thesis or equivalent is circulated to all members of faculty (this may be identical with step 9)
  13. Faculty by vote concurs in recommendation of thesis committee
  14. Student passes final examination on his major field.
    [hand-drawn arrow to move 14. between 11. and 12.]

 

Source:  Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Milton Friedman, Box 70, Folder “79.2, University of Chicago. Minutes, Economics Department, 1949-1953”.

 

Image Source: Social Science Research Building from University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf2-07466, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.

 

Categories
Chicago Exam Questions Suggested Reading Syllabus

Chicago. Readings and Exam Questions for Graduate Money. Friedman, 1963

 

 

The reading list for Milton Friedman’s graduate money course, Economics 331, for the Winter Quarter of 1970 at the University of Chicago has been posted earlier. Here I have transcribed the (shorter) reading list from late 1963 along with the final exam questions and the take-home essay to be handed in on the day of the exam.

____________________

ECONOMICS 331—MONEY
Autumn Quarter, 1963

READING LIST

Milton Friedman

[NOTE: Readings marked with an asterisk (*) cover the essential substantive material.]

  1. Introductory Material

Milton Friedman*, The Quantity Theory, (forthcoming Encyclopaedia article)
D. H. Robertson, Money
David Hume, “Of Money,” “Of Interest,” in Essays and Treatises

  1. The Quantity Equation

Irving Fisher*, The Purchasing Power of Money (Macmillan, 1913), chaps. 1, 2, 3, 4, 8
A. C. Pigou*, “The Value of Money” in Readings in Monetary Theory [, Lutz, F. A., and Mints, L. W. (eds.)]
J. M. Keynes*, Tract on Monetary Reform (1924), chap. II; chap. III, Sec. I
Wesley C. Mitchell*, Business Cycles, The Problem and Its Setting (New York, 1927), pp. 128-39
Henry Thornton, An Enquiry into the Nature and Effect of the Paper Credit of Great Britain (1802), Library of Economics edition (Allen and Irwin, 1939), chaps. III and XI
Jacob Viner, Studies in the Theory of International Trade (Harpers, 1937), pp. 119-289
Alfred Marshall, Official Papers, “Evidence before the Indian Currency Committee (1889),” questions 11758-62 (pp. 267-69); “Evidence before the Gold and Silver Commission (1887-88).” questions 9629-86 (pp. 34-53); testimony to Royal Commission on The Depression of Trade and Industry (1886), answers to question 8(i), pp. 7-15

  1. The Demand for Money

Milton Friedman*, “The Quantity Theory of Money: A Restatement” in Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, ed., M. Friedman
______________ “The Demand for Money: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results,” Journal of Political Economy (August, 1959), pp. 327-51
H. G. Johnson*, “Monetary Theory and Policy,” American Economic Review (June, 1962), Part II
W. J. Baumol, “The Transactions Demand for Cash: An Inventory Theoretic Approach,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (November, 1952)
James Tobin, “The Interest Elasticity of Transactions Demand for Cash,” Review of Economics and Statistics (August, 1956)
__________, “Liquidity Preference as Behavior Toward Risk,” Review of Economic Studies (August, 1956), pp. 241-47
J. M. Keynes*, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, chaps. 13 and 15
J. R. Hicks*, “A Suggestion for Simplifying the Theory of Money,” Readings in Monetary Theory
Joan Robinson, “The Rate of Interest,” Econometrica, Vol. 19 (1951), reprinted as chap 1 of The Rate of Interest and Other Essays
Allan H. Meltzer, “The Demand for Money: The Evidence from the Time Series,” Journal of Political Economy (June, 1963)
[handwritten marginal note:
(Allan H. Meltzer, ) “The D. for M: A Cross Section Study of Bus Firms” Q.J.E., Aug. 1963]
Phillip Cagan*, “The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation,” in Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, esp. pp. 25-35 and 86-91
H. A. Latane, “Cash Balances and the Interest Rate—A Pragmatic Approach,” Review of Economics and Statistics (November, 1954) and (November, 1960)
James Tobin, “Liquidity Preference and Monetary Policy,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 19 (May, 1947), 130-31
Clark Warburton, “Monetary Velocity and Monetary Policy,” and Tobin’s rejoinder, Review of Economic Statistics, XXX (November, 1948), 310-17
John V. Deaver, “The Chilean Inflation and the Demand for Money,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (The University of Chicago, Department of Economics, Winter, 1961)
Edgar Feige, “The Demand for Liquid Assets: A Temporal Cross-Section Analysis,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (The University of Chicago, Department of Economics, Spring, 1963)
George R. Morrison, “Liquidity Preferences of Commercial Banks,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (The University of Chicago, Department of Economics, Winter, 1963)

  1. The Supply of Money

Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz*, “Appendix B: Proximate Determinants of the Nominal Stock of Money,” from A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 [copies on reserve]
H. G. Johnson*, “Monetary Theory and Policy,” Section III
Phillip Cagan, “The Demand for Currency Relative to the Total Money Supply,” Journal of Political Economy (August, 1958)
A. J. Meigs, Free Reserves and the Money Supply (University of Chicago Press, 1962)
William Dewald, “Free Reserves, Total Reserves, and Monetary Control,” Journal of Political Economy (April, 1963)
Lloyd W. Mints, A History of Banking Theory, pp. 9-12, 29-35, 217-22, 236-40, 247-57, 265-87
Milton Friedman, A Program for Monetary Stability, chapter 2
Knut Wicksell, “The Influence of the Rate of Interest on Prices,” Economic Journal, 171 (June, 1907), 213-20
Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Function
A. G. Hart, “The ‘Chicago’ Plan of Banking Reform,” Readings in Monetary Theory
George Tolley, “Providing for Growth of the Money Supply,” Journal of Political Economy (December, 1957), pp. 465-85

  1. Liquidity and Financial Intermediaries

Edward Simmons, “The Relative Liquidity of Money and Other Things,” Readings in Monetary Theory
Roland N. McKean*, “Liquidity and a National Balance Sheet,” Readings in Monetary Theory
Phillip Cagan*, “Why Do We Use Money in Open Market Operations,” Journal of Political Economy (February, 1958)
J. G. Gurley, “Liquidity and Financial Institutions in the Postwar Period,” Study Paper No. 14, Joint Economic Committee, January, 1960
H. Makower and J. Marschak, “Assets, Prices, and Monetary Theory,” Readings in Price Theory
J. G. Gurley and E. S. Shaw, Money in a Theory of Finance
Alvin Marty, “Gurley and Shaw on Money in a Theory of Finance,” Journal of Political Economy (February, 1961)

  1. The Monetary Standard and International Monetary Arrangements

Lloyd Mints*, Monetary Policy for a Competitive Society, chaps. 4 and 5
Milton Friedman*, “Commodity Reserve Currency” and “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates,” Essays in Positive Economics
H. G. Johnson, International Trade and Economic Growth, chaps. 6 and 7
J. M. Keynes, Tract on Monetary Reform, chap. III, secs. 2, 3, 4; chaps. IV and V (*especially chap. III, sec. 2; chap. IV, sec. 2)
J. M. Keynes, “Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill,” in Essays in Persuasion
Egon Sohmen, Flexible Exchange Rates (University of Chicago Press, 1961)
“Conditions of International Monetary Equilibrium.”* Session at 1962 meeting of American Economic Association, with papers by H. G. Johnson, Richard E. Caves, and Peter B. Kenen, and Discussion by J. Marcus Fleming, Harry C. Eastman, and J. Herbert Furth, American Economic Review (May, 1963), pp. 112-46

  1. The Process of Adjustment: Inflation, Business Cycles

Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz*, “Money and Business Cycles,” Supplement to Review of Economics and Statistics (Feb., 1963), containing proceedings of Conference on Monetary Economics. Also, comments by H. Minsky, A. Okun, and C. Warburton
Clark Warburton, “The Misplaced Emphasis in Contemporary Business-Fluctuation Theory,” Readings in Monetary Theory
Friedman, “The Inflationary Gap,” in Essays in Positive Economics
Phillip Cagan, “The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation,” Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money
Eugene M. Lerner, “Inflation in the Confederacy, 1861-65,” Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money
Arnold C. Harberger, “The Dynamics of Inflation in Chile,” in C. Christ, et al., Measurement in Economics (Stanford University Press, 1963)

[Handwritten note at the end of the section:
Reuben A. Kessel and Armen A. Alchian, “Effects of Inflation”, J.P.E., Dec. 1962]

____________________

ECONOMICS 331 – Autumn, 1963
M. Friedman

Problem for Reading Period

[Due on Final Exam 1:30 P.M., December 13, 1963.]]

In recent years, commercial banks have frequently complained about competition from other financial intermediaries, notably savings and loan associations, and have pressed the Reserve System to raise the maximum rate member banks are permitted to pay on time deposits.

At least one representative of savings and loan associations has argued that commercial banks are being extremely short-sighted, that they are not in any way harmed by the expansion of savings and loan associations, and are only hurting themselves by competing vigorously for time deposits and offering higher interest rates to get them. Indeed, the argument goes, the commercial banks would be wise to get out of the time deposit business altogether.

The fundamental constraint on the commercial banks, it is argued, is the total volume of reserves made available to them by the Federal Reserve System. True because of lower reserve requirements on time than on demand deposits, commercial banks can have larger total deposits if they expand the fraction which are in the form of time deposits. However, competition from financial intermediaries forces commercial banks to pay a rate of interest on time deposits that roughly matches earnings from them. And time deposits do absorb some reserves. Hence, with a given volume of reserves made available by the Fed, the expansion of time deposits reduces the aggregate amount of demand deposits, on which banks pay no interest and with respect to which they have no competitors. Each bank thinks it gets time deposits at the expense of financial intermediaries or other banks, but all banks together get them only at the expense of demand deposits.

Analyze this argument. Do so, first, on the assumption that the volume of reserves made available to commercial banks would be precisely the same whether the commercial banks did or did not offer time deposit facilities. Next, indicate whether this assumption is or is not plausible; if so, why; if not, why not and in what direction it is wrong.

____________________

ECONOMICS 331
Final Examination – Autumn 1963

M. Friedman
December 12, 1963

  1. Indicate briefly but specifically the key idea you got out of each of the following readings on the reading list.
    1. W. C. Mitchell, Business Cycles
    2. J. R. Hicks, “A Suggestion for Simplifying the Theory of Money”
    3. Phillip Cagan, “Why Do We Use Money in Open Market Operations”
    4. J. M. Keynes, Tract on Monetary Reform.
  2. “In the early history of our country there was a dearth of currency and specie. It was difficult to have cash on hand, especially when most of the specie was used to pay for imports.” (E. R. Taus, Central Banking Functions of the United States Treasury, 1789-1941, p. 22.)
    Discuss the economic meaning of these sentences. Do they make sense as they stand? If so explain. If not, can you suggest any interpretation of them that does make sense? In your answer, emphasize analysis, not economic history.
  3. In class, it was pointed out that (a) it is widely believed that “easy” money tends to make for low interest rates and “tight” money for high interest rates yet (b) in fact interest rates generally tend to be rising or high when the stock of money is expanding rapidly and to be falling or low when the stock of money is expanding slowly or declining, whether the comparison is made among countries at one point in time [e.g., currently, Brazil or Chile vs. the U.S.; Japan vs. Switzerland], or over time for one country [e.g., 20’s vs. 1929-33 in U.S.].
    1. Give the theoretical analysis underlying (a).
    2. Give a theoretical analysis to rationalize (b). Indicate whether this analysis is consistent with that given in (1.).
  4. Suppose U.S. Federal taxes are cut next year by an amount equal to $11 billion a year. Along strictly monetary theory lines, using as your framework the equation of exchange, analyze the effect on money income, prices, and interest rates under three alternative sets of circumstances:
    1. The cut in taxes is accompanied by an equal increase in the deficit, which is financed by increasing the stock of money at a rate of $11 billion a year more than it would otherwise have been increased.
    2. The cut in taxes is accompanied by an equal increase in the deficit, which is financed by borrowing from the general public with no effect on the stock of money.
    3. The cut in taxes is accompanied by an equal cut in expenditures, so there is no change in the deficit.

You are, of course, not expected to give quantitative answers but to indicate direction of effect and the economic parameters on which the magnitude of effect depends.

  1. Indicate the effect each of the following would have on the U.S. money supply under two alternative suppositions: A. The U.S. is on a gold standard; B. The U.S. is on a fiduciary standard with freely floating exchange rates.
    1. Increase in U.S. tariffs
    2. Increase in foreign tariffs
    3. Decline in legally required reserve ratio of commercial banks
    4. Rise in yield on productive investment and hence increase in demand for loanable funds.

 

Source:  Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Milton Friedman. Box 77, Folder 8 “University of Chicago, Econ 331”.

Image Source:  Milton Friedman (undated) from University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf1-06231, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.

Categories
Funny Business M.I.T.

M.I.T. Economics Christmas skit with basketball theme, 1961

 

Spoiler alert: you are about to encounter one of the least funny economics skits in the history of the genre, so this artifact is regrettably low on entertainment value.  Still the six acts have a certain seven-acts-of-man structure: Act I (the department recruits), Act II ( advising the first-year student), Act III (graduate student complaints), Act IV (choosing guest speakers), Act V (general examinations), Act VI (job market). 

After reading the skit, you might need a palate cleansing or better: for that purpose here are a few links to the key word “Funny Business” at Economics in the Rear-view Mirror that take you to some of the greatest hits of economics skits.

____________________

ANOTHER TWO POINTS FOR THE FACULTY,
ANOTHER FOUL ON THE STUDENTS

A Christmas Drama (with suggestions for a cast), December 15, 1961

ACT I

(The curtain rises on a scene of [Edgar Cary] Brown, [Franklin Marvin] Fisher, [Charles Poor] Kindleberger and [Abraham J.] Siegel seated around a table reading applications.

SIEGEL: Here’s a guy who may be OK…No…the place is no good. A cow college. They average only 50 points a game.

BROWN:  Here’s a good one.

FISHER: What’s his record?

BROWN: Pretty darn good. Worth at least tuition plus $500. Maybe $750.

FISHER: What’s his record?

BROWN: Pretty darn good. He’s from Podunk. And they’re pretty good. He was the best they had.

FISHER: How did he score, for crying out loud?

BROWN: He’s six-feet-five, weighs 195 pounds, and fast; he averaged 23.7 points a game. He has a great set shot, never misses from the foul line, and superb off the backboard. He’s just what we need in Graduate Economics at M.I.T.

 

ACT II

(An office: Siegel is advising a student.)

SIEGEL: For the first year I would take pretty standard fare: theory, history, statistics, finance, and international, plus of course the workshop. There’s no use trying to take too much. Pace yourself.

STUDENT (perhaps [Stephen Herbert] Hymer?): I don’t have much math. Why do I need to take statistics?

SIEGEL: Ando is very good. He doesn’t always make things completely clear, but you have to take statistics if you want to be able to handle averages, to work out the point per game and point per shot records; and you need probability to help compute odds on all the league games. Statistics is a must.

STUDENT: Why the history, finance and international?

SIEGEL: International is important. You ought to know how to schedule the Harlem Globetrotters, and who has the best chance in the Olympics. One of our best graduates played on the Oxford team against Poland and Czechoslovakia. That was Chuck Cooper, and it got him a job as Walter Heller’s assistant at the Council. Finance is important. When the gamblers start bribing players you need to know how to invest the funds. And history is vital. On the general exams they always ask who was James Naismith, the man who invented basketball. That’s for every student. The good students they ask when it was invented…of course 1891. And the very best students they ask where…past, Springfield, Mass. Remember, it’s not Springfield, Illinois. That’s Abe Lincoln.

STUDENT: OK. But tell me about the last one.

SIEGEL: Theory isn’t much. [Paul Anthony] Samuelson teaches about how to make inputs for two points, and when to dribble.

STUDENT: Samuelson teaches drivel?

 

ACT III

(A group of students, griping.)

STUDENT 1 (Francis Michel Bator?): This place is no good. It’s theory, theory, theory all the way. Anyone knows that the way to win at basketball is to practice. Practice makes perfect. Theory makes perfect fools. All you do is study and take exams. “Who was James Naismith? Who was Adam Yea-Smith? When do you chop down the tree?” Bah! I say we ought to study policy. With a two-point lead and three minutes to go, should you freeze the ball or plop in an input for an output of two points?

STUDENT 2 ([Paul Narcyz] Rosenstein-Rodan?): They tell me [Robert Merton] Solow has been converted from theory to policy. He is no longer interested in questions like whether the best set shot is an inverted rectangular parabola, but real issues, like the queuing problem: how many substitutes does a team need to field five men for an hour, with one personal foul every six minutes and four personal fouls per man disqualifying. If you have too many players on the bench you get unemployment. The team needs growth. Maybe you ought to add a man and play six.

STUDENT 3 ([Robert] Evans?): What’s bad is to have to play far away from the Sloan building. Those workshops on top on Walker and over in the Armory are OK, but they are too far away. We need the Ford Foundation to give us a workshop right here.

STUDENT 1: Haven’t you heard? The talk is that the new building to go up in the back lot is a library. But as I see its dimensions unfold- 90 feet by 50 – and transparent backboards and netting and grandstands, I can’t believe it’s a library. It must be a basketball court.

 

ACT IV

(A meeting of the G.E.A.)

RALPH BULL (played by [Robert Lyle] Bishop?): Do any of you fellows have suggestions for speakers besides Cousy, Russell, Jungle Jim Lusketoff, and that 6.8 outstanding economist, [John Kenneth] Galbraith, who can stand with his head coming up through the basket?

STUDENT B: What about Milton Friedman? He is under the five feet which some say is the minimum allowable in a monetary theorist, but he sure is good at the far-fetched shot.

STUDENT B: Why not get Clifford Odets?

RALPH BULL: Clifford Odets? Why him?

STUDENT B: Don’t you remember the famous line in “Awake and Sing”? “My brother Sam joined the Navy. He don’t know from nothin’, that dumb basketball player.” I want to know whether the emphasis is “that dumb basketball player” or “the [sic] dumb basketball player”. Are there any smart basketball players?

 

ACT V

KINDLEBERGER: As chairman of this exam, let me tell you that you have the right to pick the order of your exam. Do you want to start with Theory, or Statistics?

STUDENT (Samuelson?): I think I’ll start by jumping against Fisher, your professorship, sir. Ando’s the smaller, so I’ll take him last when I’m tired.

KINDLEBERGER: All right. (Student and Fisher face each other. Kindleberger blows whistle and throws imaginary ball. Cheers of amazement from faculty.)

FISHER: Very well. I have decided to let you combine Theory and Economic History.

STUDENT: Hey, Ref, your Ph.D.ship, sir, I’m not responsible for History. Isn’t that a foul?

KINDLEBERGER: I didn’t see nuthin’.

FISHER: Consider the population explosion of the last 150 years. Discuss the relative roles of (a) men and (b) women in this affair.

ANDO [Albert Keinosuke] : Good shot. That’s two points for our side.

STUDENT: I don’t know that, your cap-and-gownship, sir, but I know the roles are neither reflexive, symmetric, or transitive.

KINDLEBERGER: (blows whistle) Foul. You used big words in a generals. That’s only permitted the faculty.

FISHER: I’ll give Albert my free throw.

ANDO: (taking the foul shot) Please discuss the role of the nearly decomposable take-off in the application of a priori oligopoly theory to the A&P case.

STUDENT: Hey! You guys are ganging up on me.

ANDO: Well, you outnumber us in class.

STUDENT: (driving hard for basket) It can be set up as a nine-dimensional matrix problem and the latent roots dispensed with. I think the take-off is fine if done along the turnpike, watching out for model changes in passing cars.

ANDO: Fantastic! (Faculty huddle.)

KINDLEBERGER: That was a good answer. We’ve decided to give you an Excellent minus for being a good scorer, but to ask you to leave the Institute for fouling out on personals.

KINDLEBERGER, ANDO, FISHER: Rah, team!

 

ACT VI

DOMAR [Evsey David]: Well, you have the degree wrapped up, and now want a job. Not bad. You got a good grade on the orals, and would have gotten a top grade if you hadn’t thought that Stilt Chamberlain played for the Celtics and failed to distinguish Slippery Sam Jones from Casey Jones. Your thesis was entirely satisfactory, on a good topic: How to Get to the Boston Garden from Madison Square Garden: An Application of the Turnpike Theorem. And you even did languages: basketball communication in the Ivy League, or basketball with a broad A. Now the job. What do you think? Big Ten? Ivy League? Small liberal arts? Girls’ rules like Wellesley or Vassar? Or maybe the real big time: Kentucky, Long Island University, St. Joseph’s in Brooklyn, Notre Dame. L.I.U. is to economics like M.I.T. was to economics.

STUDENT (perhaps [Max Franklin] Millikan?): I don’t now if I’m ready for the Big Time.

DOMAR: What about applying some of your basketballmetrics for the government? They need our graduates. Or for an oil company. Maybe you would like to take a ball and a whistle and go abroad, demonstrating technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. There are jobs like that.

STUDENT: No. I guess I’m fussy. What I’d like is just what all the gang would like, to stay here at Cambridge with Harvard and the Celtics, and to referee like you and [Robert Lyle] Bishop and Samuelson, always blowing off your whistle and shouting foul, going first class to conferences, and shouting foul, foul, foul at the students.

 

Source:  M.I.T. Archives. MIT Department of Economics records, Box 2, Folder “GEA 1961-67”.

Image Source:  Boston Celtics players Tom Heinsohn, Bill Russell, Bob Cousy, Bill Sharman and Frank Ramsey in 1960. “Twelve of the greatest Celtics players of all time”  from Boston.com website (March 18, 2018)