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Columbia Exam Questions

Columbia. Microeconomic theory exam. Becker, 1965.

 

The following set of Gary Becker’s microeconomic theory examination questions (found in a folder in the Milton Friedman papers at the Hoover Archives) does not have an institution identification. According to the copy of Gary Becker’s c.v. buried in the website at the Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) in Bonn, Germany, we can be reasonably confident that this course was taught while Becker was still a professor at Columbia University. 

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Final Examination
G6213x
Prof. G. S. Becker
January, 1965

THREE HOURS—Persons whose native language is not English can have an additional 45 minutes.

  1. (40 points) Answer each of the following as true, false or uncertain and justify your answer in the space provided.
    1. Over time in the U.S. since 1929 output of the service industries rose at about the same rate as that of goods. Since the price of services rose at least as rapidly as that of goods, the income elasticity of demand for services would be greater than that for goods.
    2. A weighted average of all price elasticities must add up to one.
    3. Suppose the excise tax on bus travel was reduced and not on plane, train or other travel. This would reduce the use of buses if such travel was a sufficiently strong inferior good relative to other kinds of travel.
    4. The ability of firms of very different sizes to survive in an industry means that the long run marginal cost curve is horizontal over the range of firm sizes that survive.
    5. If an increase in the output of any firm lowered the marginal cost curves of other firms in the same industry (external economies) a competitive industry as a whole might show increasing returns; i.e., have a negatively inclined supply curve.
    6. Short run marginal costs can never be below long run marginal costs.
    7. Suppose that a competitive firm maximizes not income but its sales subject to the constraint that it does not make any losses. Then reduction in the demand for its product might not lead it to reduce output.
    8. Goods X and Y are either substitutes, complements, or independent if an increase in the amount of X either reduces, raises or leaves unchanged the marginal utility of Y.
    9. If the price of a good competitively produced was free to vary and yet did not change much between a seasonal low and a seasonal high in demand, this means that the industry’s long run marginal cost curve was very elastic.
    10. An ad valorem tax, with a tax rate proportional to producer’s price, on a competitive industry that yielded the same revenue at the initial output as a specific tax, fixed amount per unit, would reduce output less than the specific tax.

 

  1. (20 points) Treat charitable contributions as a commodity entering the utility functions or indifference curves systems of the contributor. Assume, as is largely true, that contributions can be deducted from income in arriving at taxable income. Assume a proportional tax rate equal to t.
    1. What would be the effect of an increase in the tax rate for any one person alone on his contributions? How does your analysis compare with the traditional analysis for commodities?
    2. Is he more likely to increase or decrease his contributions?
    3. Suppose now the tax rate increased for everyone. Would your answers to a. and b. be significantly different?

 

  1. (20 points) Suppose the traffic department would like to enforce parking regulations in an efficient way. Assume that each person has the choice of parking illegally or legally; the latter costs X dollars per “day” and the former, if one is caught, causes a fine equal to F dollars per time caught.
    1. Assume first that the sole aim of the traffic department is to discourage illegal parking at minimum cost. Assume also that all drivers simply try to maximize expected money income. How frequently should the traffic department inspect parking in order to achieve its aim?
    2. If all drivers maximized expected utility and had diminishing marginal utility of income, (but there is no utility or disutility from disobeying the law), how would this affect your answer? If they had increasing marginal utility of income?
    3. Suppose the traffic department received all the fines and desired just to maximize its expected income. How would your answer to 1. be affected?
    4. How does your answer to a. and c. depend on F, the size of the fine, and X, the cost of legal parking?

 

  1. (20 points) Suppose the earnings of military personnel were set below the price that would make the number of volunteers equal to the demand by the military, and that draft calls were sent out strictly at random to males aged 18-26 to bring the number entering up to demand

a.

1. How would the composition of drafted personnel compare with those that would enter if military earnings were raised sufficiently to make the number of volunteers equal to demand?

2. How would the total tax burden and its distribution among the population compare?

b. Assume now that drafted personnel could buy a substitute or substitute for someone else (as during the Civil War) instead of entering as a draftee. Assuming the capital market for substitutes works well, in equilibrium

1. How would the composition of men entering and the tax burden compare with that under a drafted and a fully voluntary system?

2. What determines the price that substitutes can get?

 

Source: Hoover Institution Archives.  Milton Friedman Papers, Box 80, Folde.r “University of Chicago, Student doctoral thesis and papers”.

Image Source:  Gary S. Becker from University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf7-00059, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.

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Chicago Exam Questions Problem Sets Suggested Reading Syllabus

Chicago. Price Theory. Reading Assignments, Problems, Exam. Friedman, 1951-52

 

According to the class roll kept by Milton Friedman, we know that Gary Becker attended his graduate price theory course Economics 300A in the Autumn quarter of 1951 (presumably Becker then took 300B during the Winter quarter of 1952, but I could not find that quarter’s roll in Friedman’s papers). This post even has Friedman’s partial answer key for the True/False/Uncertain questions for Economics 300B!

The reading assignments for the two-quarter core price theory sequence taught by Milton Friedman in 1948 , and in 1958 have been posted earlier (1946 300A only).  This post gives the reading assignments with open and gated links where available (some of the papers are only available at the gated jstor.org). These can be compared to the readings for the price theory course Friedman taught at Columbia in 1939-40. 

I have put in boldface the 1951 additions to make a comparison with the 1948 version easier. Worth noting: an asterisk designates optional and not required reading.

Only one item was dropped from the 1948 reading list:

Meyers, A. L. Elements of Modern Economics, ch 5, 7, 8, 9.

The October 1951 version of the Reading Assignments for Economics 300A and B was published as an appendix to J. Daniel Hammond’s “The development of post-war Chicago price theory” in The Elgar Companion to Chicago School Economics, edited by Ross  B. Emmett, pp. 7-24. This Hammond article offers much context and is very much worth consulting.

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October, 1951

Economics 300A and B
Reading Assignments by M. Friedman

(Notes:

  1. It is assumed students are familiar with material equivalent to that contained in George Stigler,  The Theory of Price. [Revised edition, 1952] or Kenneth Boulding, Economic Analysis [Third edition, 1955].
  2. Readings marked with asterisk (*) are recommended, not required.)

Knight, F. H., The Economic Organization, esp. pp. 1-37. HB172.K73.
Keynes, J. N., The Scope and Method of Political Economy, ch. I and II, pp. 1-83. HB171.K45.
Hayek, F. A., “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic Review, Sept., 1945; Reprinted in Individualism and Economic Order. HB1.A6.

Marshall, Alfred, Principles of Economics, Bk III, ch 2, 3, 4; Bk V, ch 1,2. HB171.M36.
Friedman, Milton, “The Marshallian Demand Curve,” Journal of Political Economy, December 1949. YF6.
Schultz, Henry, The Meaning of Statistical Demand Curves, pp. 1-10. HB201.S398.
Working, E. J. “What do Statistical ‘Demand Curves’ Show?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, XLI (1927), pp. 212-27. HB1.Q3.
Knight, F. H. Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, ch 3. HB601.K7. 1940.
*Lange, O., “On the Determinateness of the Utility Function”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol I (1933-34), pp. 218 ff. HB1.R45.
*Allen, R.G.D.,The Nature of Indifference Curves, Ibid, pp 110 ff. HB1.R45.
Hicks, J. R., Value and Capital, Part I (pp 11-52). HB171.H64.
*Wallis, W. A., and Friedman, Milton, The Empirical Derivation of Indifference Functions, in Lange et al, Studies in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics. HB99.C5.
*Friedman, Milton and Savage, L. J., The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk,Journal of Political Economy LVI (August 1948) pp. 279-304. HB1.J7.

 

Marshall, Book V, ch 3, 4, 5, 12, Appendix H. HB171.M36.
Robinson, Joan, Economics of Imperfect Competition, ch 2. HB201.R65.
Clark, J. M., The Economics of Overhead Costs, ch 9. HB195.C62.
Viner, Jacob, Cost Curves and Supply Curves, Zeitschrift fuer Nationaloekonomie, Bd III (Sept, 1931), pp 23-46. H5.Z55.
Friedman, Milton, “The Relationships Between Supply Curves and Cost Curves,” (dittoed) YF9.
Chamberlin, Edward, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, ch 3, sec. 1, 4, 5, 6; ch 5. HB201.C44.
Harrod, R. F. Doctrines of Imperfect Competition, Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1934, sec. 1, pp. 442-61. HB1.Q3.
Stigler, G. J., “Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect,” Lecture 2 in Five Lectures on Economic Problems. HB171.S82.
*Triffin, Robert, Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory, esp. Part II. HD41.T8 and H31.H33, v. 67.
*Robinson, E. A. G., The Structure of Competitive Industry. H045.R732.
*___________________, Monopoly. H041.R65.
*Plant, Arnold, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions,” Economica, Feb, 1934. HB1.E42.
*Dennison, S. R., “The Problem of Bigness,” Cambridge Journal, Nov. 1947. Y03.

 

Marshall, Book IV, ch 1, 2, 3; Bk V, ch 6. HB171.M36.
Clark, J. B., The Distribution of Wealth, Preface, ch 1, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 23.
Mill, John Stuart, Principles of Political Economy, Book II, ch 14. HB171.M667.
Hicks, J. R., The Theory of Wages, ch 1-6. HD4909.H63.
Smith, Adam, The Wealth of Nations, Bk I, ch 10. HB161.S652.
Marshall, Bk VI, ch 1-5. HB171.M36.
Friedman, Milton, and Kuznets, Simon, Income from Independent Professional Practice, Preface, pp. v to x; ch 3, Sec 3, pp. 81-95, ch 4, Sect 2, pp. 118-137, App, Sec 1 & 3, pp. 142-151, 155-61. HD4965.U5F8.
Knight, F. H. “Interest” in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, also in Ethics of Competition. H04965.U5F8.
Keynes, J. M. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, ch 11-14. HB171.K46.
Weston, J.F., “A Generalized Uncertainty Theory of Profit,” American Economic Review, March, 1950, pp. 40-60. HB.A6.

 

Cassell, Gustav, Fundamental Thoughts in Economics, ch. 1, 2,3. Ch. 1, 2, 3. HB 179.C283.
_________________, The Theory of Social Economy, ch 4. HB179.C283.
J. R. Hicks, Mr. Keynes and the ‘Classics’; A Suggested Interpretation”, Econometrica, vol 5, April 1937, pp. 147-159. HB1.E23, v. 5.
Franco Modigliani, Liquidity Preference and the Theory of Interest and Money,” Econometrica, vol 12, No. 1 (Jan 1944) esp. Part I, sec. 1 through 9, sec 11 through 17, Part II, sec 21. HB1.E23, v.12.
A. C. Pigou,The Classical Stationary State, Economic Journal, vol 53, December, 1943, pp. 343-51. HB1.E3, v. 53.
____________, Economic Progress in a Stable Environment,” Economica, 1947, pp. 180-90.HB1.E42, v. 14.
Patinkin, Don, “Price Flexibility and Full Employment,” American Economic Review, XXXVIII, 4, Sept. 1948, pp. 543-64. YP6.

 

Source: Hoover Institution Archive, Milton Friedman Papers, Box 77, Folder 1 “University of Chicago, Economics 300 A & B”.

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Economics 300A
Autumn, 1951
PROBLEMS FOR READING PERIOD

  1. In an anti-trust case against the Aluminum Company of America, Judge Learned Hand argued that the Aluminum Company could be regarded as having essentially a complete monopoly on aluminum despite the existence of a highly competitive market in secondary or reclaimed aluminum (made from scrap) accounting for about one-third of the total aluminum used for fabrication. He justified this conclusion on the grounds that all secondary aluminum derives ultimately from primary aluminum produced earlier and hence that the Aluminum Company through its control of the output of primary aluminum indirectly controlled the quantity of scrap available.

            Evaluate the economic validity of this argument. To simplify your analysis assume that a single firm, say the Aluminum Company of America, has a complete monopoly of primary aluminum; that aluminum for fabrication comes from primary aluminum and secondary aluminum; and that primary and secondary aluminum are perfect substitutes. Indicate in detail how to determine the optimum price for the Aluminum Company to charge and the optimum output for it to produce if (a) the secondary aluminum is refined and sold by a large number of firms under competitive conditions; (b) it has a complete monopoly of secondary aluminum as well.

            Hand’s conclusion presumably is that the price of aluminum would be the same in cases (a) and (b). Is he correct? If not, would it be higher in case (b) than in case (a)? Lower?

 

  1. It is widely argued that entrepreneurs engaged in a number of different activities somehow have a “competitive advantage” over entrepreneurs engaged only in one even if no technical economies are achieved by combining the activities. This general argument and the supposed advantage take many different forms: sometimes it is that one activity provides a “guaranteed” market for another activity; sometimes that one activity provides financing or capital for another; sometimes that a monopoly in one line confers an advantage in another. A recent example of this reasoning is contained in a report by The Chicago Daily news financial columnist on November 20, 1951 that Sears-Roebuck had completed an arrangement with Kaiser-Frazer to market an automobile under the name of “Allstate.” The columnist commented “also there is the Allstate Insurance Company, a wholly owned subsidiary, which would benefit heavily through liability and other policies written in connection with the sales of an Allstate automobile….Some of the gossip around Detroit has been to the effect that the Allstate would have Sears batteries and tires and certain other Sears accessories as original equipment—which would mean more business for these departments of the company.”

(a) The key question is, of course, whether the financial incentive to Sears to market an automobile is greater because it owns the subsidiary companies than it would be if it did not own them. You will find it helpful in answering this question to consider first two intermediate questions: (b) Given that Sears does own the subsidiary companies and that it is going to market an automobile under its name, is it in its own interests to require that the car be equipped with accessories produced by its companies? (c) To require that cars it sells be insured by its own insurance company?

            In answering both questions (a) and (b), consider separately two cases: (1) The subsidiary companies can be regarded as operating under highly competitive conditions; (2) the subsidiary companies can be regarded as having a monopoly of the products they produce. Do the conclusions depend on the assumption made about competitive conditions? Assume throughout that there are no “technical” economies from combining the various activities.

 

Source:  Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Milton Friedman. Box 76, Folder 76.9.

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Economics 300A
Final Examination
December 17, 1951

  1. (15 points)
    (a) Appraise: “Recent studies of domestic consumption in low-cost municipalities demonstrate that the demand for electric current is highly elastic, expanding rapidly as the cost declines. The national average consumption of the United States was 604 kilowatt-hours in 1933. The average charge to consumers on October 1, 1934, for the whole country is reported as 5.4 cents per kilowatt-hour. In Seattle where the average cost is 2.58 cents, the average consumption is 1,098 kilowatt-hours. In Tacoma, the charge is 1.726 cents and the consumption 1,550. In 26 cities of Ontario, the average charge is 1.45 cents and the consumption 1,780. Finally, in Winnipeg, where the average net charge is only 8 mills per kilowatt-hour the average per capita consumption exceeds 4,000 kilowatt-hours.” (Report of the National Resources Board, December 1, 1934, Government Printing Office, 1934, p. 39.)

(b) Will a specific tax (a tax of a specified number of dollars per physical unit) on a commodity raise its price more or less than an equivalent ad valoremtax (a tax of a specified percentage of the price)? Assume that the commodity is produced and sold under competitive conditions.

  1. (15 points) (a) Figure 1 gives the locus of points of tangency between indifference curves and budget lines parallel to ab (and cd). ABCDEFGH is therefore and “expansion path” or curve showing the quantity of X and Y and individual would buy at different incomes and constant relative prices. Fill in the following table with as precise statements as are deducible from Fig. 1 by observation without measurement:

 

 

 

Segment

Income elasticity of

Good is Superior (S), Inferior (I), or Uncertain (U)

X

Y X

Y

AB
BC
CD
DE
EF
FG
GH

(b) ABCDEF in Figure 2 is the locus of points of tangency between indifference curves and budget lines representing different money prices for X but the same money price of Y and money income (i.e. budget lines like ab and ac rotating about a). Fill in the following table with as precise statements as are deducible from Fig. 2 by observation without measurement.

Segment

Income elasticity of Good is Superior (S), Inferior (I), or Uncertain (U)
X Y X Y
AB
BC
CD
DE
EF

 

  1. (20 points) “Monopolistic competition robs the old concept of industry (and also the Chamberlinian group) of any theoretical significance…The value of these groupings is only a concrete, empirical one…Which firms shall be included in any one group will have to be decided, not on an a prioribasis, but after an empirical survey of market realities…In the general pure theory of value, the group and the industry are useless concepts…When the study of competition is freed from the narrowing assumptions of pure competition, only two terms remain essential for the analysis: the individual firms, on the one hand; the whole collectivity of competitors on the other.” (Triffin)

(a) Explain why “monopolistic competition robs the old concept of industry…of any theoretical significance.”
(b) Explain the general position summarized in this quotation and discuss it critically.

  1. (20 points) Find the mistakes (there are at least six) in the accompanying diagram showing long and short run marginal and average cost curves, and explain the general principle corresponding to each particular mistake.

 

  1. The accompanying diagram showing a set of indifference curves between income and work is part of a diagram given by Boulding in Economic Analysis in his discussion of the effects of various types of direct taxation, and reproduced by Schwartz and Moore in the March 1951 American Economic Review. The latter write, “Given O Q2Qas a rate of pay, the equilibrium position is Pwhere the rate of pay is equal to the MRS between leisure and income. Let us assume that we are to collect a tax from this individual equal to OL. One method of collecting the tax would be to levy a poll tax, leaving the rate of pay unaltered, as LP5. Another direct tax would be a proportional income tax represented by OSPwhich would have the effect of lowering (flattening) the rate of ‘take-home’ pay. To extract the same amount of revenue as the poll tax does, this rate of pay must be tangent to an indifference curve at an intersection with LP5. Thus P2Q= OL. Since the rate of ‘take-home’ pay is flatter, Pmust lie below and to the left of P5; i.e. less effort is expended and the worker enjoys a smaller net income. More important, his welfare is diminished because he must be on a lower indifference curve…Given the premises of the conventional indifference curve pattern, this must necessarily be true.”

(a):

(1) Why do the indifference curves in the diagram slope positively?
(2) How can you justify their being drawn concave upwards?
(3) The statement that OQ2Qis “a rate of pay” is of course wrong. OQ2Qis a line. Reword the statement so it is accurate.
(4) What do the authors mean by MRS?

(b) If we suppose the diagram to stand for a “representative” individual, or one of a society of identical individuals all to be taxed alike, the last sentence in the quotation is false: the authors’ welfare conclusion does not follow from their premises and arguments. Point out the fallacy in the proof.

(c) Under what conditions is the authors’ welfare conclusion valid? Can you give a proof of your statement?

 

Source:  Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Milton Friedman. Box 76, Folder 76.9.

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Economics 300B
Winter, 1952
PROBLEM FOR READING PERIOD

Available evidence tentatively indicates that (1) average income of white families living in the same size city is roughly the same in the North and the South; (2) the wage rate of a white worker in any given occupation is higher in the North than in the South for cities of the same size; (3) property income is roughly of equal importance for white families in the North and the South.

For purposes of this question, accept these as correct statements of fact. Can you suggest any way of reconciling the apparent contradiction among them? Presumably, any reconciliation will turn on the larger fraction of negroes and greater discrimination against them in the South than in the North.

Spell out your suggestion in detail, explaining the theoretical links if any between the higher fraction of negroes and greater discrimination, on the one hand, and the indicated results on the other. Indicate how the validity of your suggestion would be tested.

 

Source:  Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Milton Friedman. Box 76, Folder 76.10.

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ECONOMICS 300B
Final Examination
March 12, 1952

    1. (35 points) Indicate whether each of the following statements is true (T), false (F), or uncertain (U), and state briefly the reason for your answer. It is to be understood that in each question the appropriate “other things” are to be held constant.
      1. The imposition of a minimum wage for labor of type X higher than the preceding wage leads to an increase in the number of laborers of type X employed. It follows that labor of type X is hired under monopsonistic conditions. [True]
      2. Under both competition and monopoly in the product market, marginal value product of a factor to a firm is equal to marginal physical product of the firm times marginal revenue to the firm from the sale of the product. [True]
      3. Marginal productivity analysis shows that, in the absence of monopsony, a laborer gets as a wage his marginal value product. If this analysis is correct, it follows that unions can raise wages in the absence of monopsony only if they either make each worker more efficient, or increase demand for the product, or make the demand for the product more elastic. [False]
      4. The law of variable proportions (or diminishing returns) is contradicted by the fact that agricultural output of this country has increased tremendously despite a decrease in the proportion of the working population on farms. [False]
      5. The rate of interest is equal to the rate of time preference of consumers. [True]
      6. At present levels of operation, three quarters of the total cost of the XYZ railroad is overhead cost that does not vary with traffic, only one quarter is variable cost. It follows that marginal cost is much less than average cost. [False]
      7. The demand curve of an individual firm for a factor of production is identical with its marginal value productivity curve for the same factor of production. [False]
      8. The demand curve of a firm for a factor of production is a meaningless concept if the firm is a monopsonistic purchaser of that factor. [True]
      9. A declining long run supply curve is impossible in a competitive industry. [False]
      10. Marginal factor cost is equal to the price per unit of a factor whenever the product market is competitive. [False]
      11. According to the theory of joint demand, the absolute value of the elasticity of derived demand for a factor of production will be smaller the more inelastic the supply of that factor. [False]
      12. The fact that individuals do not choose occupations solely on the basis of their pecuniary attractiveness helps explain why the supply curve of labor for a particular occupation has an elasticity greater than zero. [True]
      13. If all types of services were used only in fixed proportions, a marginal-productivity theory would be neither necessary nor possible. [False]
      14. Our society is often described as a “profit” economy or “profit-maximizing” economy. The word “profit” is here used in the same sense as in the uncertainty theory of “profit.” [False]
      15. “Profit” as defined in the uncertainty theory of profit is the expected return to any factor assuming uncertainty over and above the guaranteed expected income it can obtain if it assumes no uncertainty. [False]
      16. If one income is higher than another before income tax it will also be higher after a progressive income tax, provided only that the marginal tax never exceeds 100%. It follows that if one accepts the theory that individuals act as if they sought to maximize their income, he must also accept the conclusion that such taxes do not alter individual’s actions and hence are not shifted. [False]

17 and 18. A minimum wage law is repealed. The wage rate of a class of workers hired under competitive conditions was equal to the minimum before repeal and falls after repeal. It follows that:

      1. The total wage bill for this class of labor will rise, remain constant, or fall, according as the elasticity of demand for labor of this class is greater than, equal to, or less than unity in absolute value. [True]
      2. The quantity of labor of this class employed will fall, remain constant, or rise according as the elasticity of supply of labor of this class is positive, zero, or negative. [False]
      3. The great technological improvements in the past few decades in the production of synthetic fibers (rayon, nylon, etc.) and associated decline in their relative price has, among other effects, tended to raise the price of meat in general, especially of lamb and mutton. [True]
      4. At the same time, stringent rationing of meat consumption in Great Britain, by tending to offset this effect, has improved the competitive position of the synthetic fiber industry, and so enabled it to expand more than otherwise. [True]
  1. (15 points) “The wages of every class of labour tends to be equal to the net product due to the additional labour of the marginal labourer of that class.
    “This doctrine is not a theory of wages: but is a useful part of a theory.” (Marshall)(a) What does Marshall mean by “net product”? [4] By “Marginal labourer”?[4]
    (b) Explain and evaluate the second sentence in the quotation. [7]
  2. (15 points) It is frequently argued that a tax on a product imposed at the manufacturing level involves a greater burden on consumers than a tax yielding the same revenue imposed at the retail level because the tax is “pyramided,” i.e., the “margins” of wholesalers and retailers are viewed as given percentages of purchase price and so, it is argued, price will tend to rise not only by the tax but also by the “margins” on the tax.
    Evaluate this argument.
  3. (10 points) The price of nylon thread for use in making women’s hosiery was recently lowered drastically when DuPont decided to make much larger quantities available. The resulting decline in the price of hosiery was viewed by at least some manufacturers and retailers as a misfortune and as portending smaller profits for themselves. Were they right? In the short run? In the long run? Justify your answers.
  4. (10 points) A subsidy of $X is paid per acre of land devoted to growing soy beans. Will this lead to a rise or to a decline in the yield per acre on land devoted to growing soy beans prior to the introduction of the subsidy? Justify your answer.
  5. (15 points)
    (a) What is the Pigou effect?[4] What relevance does it have to the theory of the rate of interest?[4]
    (b) List some economic decisions that would be affected by a change in the rate of interest. Indicate why they would be affected and if possible the direction of the effect. [7]

 

Source:  Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Milton Friedman. Box 76, Folder 76.10.

Image Source: Milton Friedman (undated). University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf1-06230, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.

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Chicago Exam Questions Fields

Chicago. Money and banking prelim exam questions, 1969

 

In Milton Friedman’s papers at the Hoover Institution Archives are filed copies of three preliminary exams for graduate students in economics from the Winter Quarter of 1969. Recent posts featured the transcriptions of the price theory prelim and the macroeconomics prelim ( or “income, employment and price level” as was the Chicago wont to say). This post takes a walk on the monetary side, namely, with the prelim for the field of money and banking. This exam was followed in the archival folder by a handwritten table by Friedman with the points awarded for the seventeen candidates who took the exam. Out of a maximum score of 240 possible points, the top exam received 189 points.  Failing grades were for 118 points and below (four examinees). The exams have Friedman’s mostly illegible notes written on them, presumably indications of the correct answers. Perhaps some day there will be a brave soul with greater patience than I possess who will try transcribing these academic scribblings of a few years back. 

The reading list for Milton Friedman’s money course from the Winter Quarter 1970 has been posted earlier.

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MONEY AND BANKING
Preliminary Examination for the Ph.D. and the A.M. Degree
Winter Quarter, 1969

WRITE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON YOUR EXAMINATION PAPER:

Your code number and NOT your name
Name of examination
Date of examination

Results of the examination will be sent to you by letter

Answer all questions. Time: 4 hours

  1. [40] The Federal Reserve has recently altered the method of calculating required and actual reserves. Required reserves are now calculated on the basis of average deposits two weeks earlier. Actual reserves equal average cash in vault two weeks earlier plus deposits at Federal Reserve Banks the current week. (There are a few other minor technical details that can be neglected.)
    Under this new system, the adjustment mechanism of the banking system is in principle dynamically unstable (explosive) for any one week by itself.

(a) Explain why the system is dynamically unstable.
(b) What factors render the system stable in practice?
How does the new system affect:
(c) The Federal Reserve’s ability to control the money supply;
(d) The significance of excess reserves, free reserves, and borrowings.

  1. [25] “Central bankers were highly receptive to the Keynesian analysis of monetary policy because it fitted in with their own preconceptions, which were based on the real-bills doctrine.” Explain why you agree or disagree, in the process summarizing the history of the real-bills doctrine.
  1. [25] A major relationship in most income-determination models is the negative interest elasticity of investment. But during the post war period in the U.S., falling interest rates have been accompanied by declining rates of investment in plant and equipment and a rising volume of residential construction.

(a) Does that suggest that residential construction is more interest-elastic than investment in plant and equipment?
(b) How far, if at all, has the observed pattern been related to central bank policy and the structure of financial intermediaries?

  1. [40 ]

(a) Construct a model for the analysis of economic policy in a closed economy, with an exogenous money supply, an income-elastic tax system, flexible prices, and saving a constant fraction of income.
(b) For a unique equilibrium, which variables do you regard as determined by this model, and which outside the model?
(c) Distinguish between monetary and fiscal policy in terms of your model.
(d) Can monetary policy be used to maintain stable prices? Can fiscal policy? Indicate the conditions in the model necessary for only one or the other to be effective.

  1. [40] Consider the problem of explaining the response in a stationary economy to a change that leads to increased unemployment of resources, such as an unanticipated fall in the demand for goods and services. Suppose that any increases in unemployment are temporary, with dynamic properties of the system such that there will be a return to an “equilibrium” or “natural” rate of unemployment if no further unanticipated shocks occur.

(a) Explain what the “natural rate of unemployment” means.
(b) Assume that the quantity of money is constant. Sketch out an explanation of the time path of output, employment of labor, price of goods, price of labor, and interest rate.
(c) Indicate what each of the following concepts means and how, if at all, each is relevant in explaining the adjustments: search unemployment, labor as a quasi-fixed factor of production, Phillips curve, expectations.

  1. [40] The loss in real value of money during inflation has been likened to a tax. Assume that inflation is fully anticipated. How much is the tax, who bears it, and who receives the proceeds:

(a) If there are 100 percent reserves and the central bank pays no interest on reserves, with commercial banks otherwise regulated?
(b) Same as (a) except there is fractional reserve banking?
(c) If there is fractional reserve banking and the central bank pays no interest on reserves, with commercial banks forbidden to pay a nominal rate of interest deposits higher than would be paid in the absence of inflation?
(d) Same as (c) except banks are also forbidden to charge nominal interest rates on loans higher than would prevail in the absence of inflation?
(e) If there is fractional reserve banking, no interest rate regulation on commercial banks, and the central bank pays interest on reserves totaling to the interest payments earned on its assets?

  1. [30] Assume that the U.S. stops pegging the price of gold and of other currencies, and in reaction to this measure[?], the European common market countries form a currency bloc linked internally by fixed exchange rates and permit the exchange rates of the common market currencies to float relative to the dollar. Assume that all other currencies float relative to the dollar.
    Compare monetary adjustment within the two currency areas (i.e. adjustment of the fifty states of the U.S. as compared to adjustment of the six countries of the common market).

 

Source: Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Milton Friedman, Box 77, Folder 8 “University of Chicago , Econ 331”.

Image Source:  Milton Friedman (undated) from University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf1-06231, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.

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Chicago Courses Suggested Reading

Chicago. Reading list for Price Theory (Econ 300 A&B). Friedman 1958

 

The reading assignments for the two-quarter core price theory sequence taught by Milton Friedman in 1948 have been posted earlier.  This post gives the reading assignments with open and gated links where available (some of the papers are only available at the gated jstor.org) for the same sequence ten years later. I have put in boldface the 1958 additions to make a comparison with the 1948 version easier. Worth noting: an asterisk designates optional and not required reading.

Only one item was dropped from the 1948 reading list:

Meyers, A. L. Elements of Modern Economics, ch 5, 7, 8, 9.

______________________________

September, 1958

ECONOMICS 300 A and B
Reading Assignments by M. Friedman

(Notes:

  1. It is assumed students are familiar with material equivalent to that contained in George Stigler, Theory of Price, or Kenneth Boulding, Economic Analysis.
  2. Mimeographed lecture notes on 300A and B summarize the main points covered in the course.
  3. The American Economic Association Readings in Price Theory contains an excellent selection of articles on our general topic, only a few of which are listed separately below.
  4. Readings marked with asterisk (*) are recommended, not required.)

 

KNIGHT, F. H., The Economic Organization, esp. pp. 1-37.  HB172.K73.

KEYNES, J. N., The Scope and Method of Political Economy, Ch. I and II, pp. 1-83.  HB171.K45.

FRIEDMAN, MILTON, “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” in Essays in Positive Economics.

HAYEK, F.A., “The Use of Knowledge in Society,”American Economic Review, Sept. 1945; reprinted in Individualism and Economic Order. HB1.A6.

 

MARSHALL, ALFRED, Principles of Economics, Bk III, Ch 2, 3, 4; Bk V, Ch 1,2. HB171.M36.

FRIEDMAN, MILTON, “The Marshallian Demand Curve,” Journal of Political Economy, Dec. 1949. YF6. Reprinted in Essays in Positive Economics.

SCHULTZ, HENRY, The Meaning of Statistical Demand Curves, pp. 1-10. HB201.S398.

WORKING, E. J. “What do Statistical ‘Demand Curves’ Show?”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, XLI (1927), pp. 212-27. HB1.Q3.

KNIGHT, F. H. Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, Ch 3. HB601.K7. 1940.

*LANGE, O., “On the Determinateness of the Utility Function”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol I (1933-34), pp. 218 ff. HB1.R45.

*ALLEN, R.G.D., “The Nature of Indifference Curves,” Ibid, pp. 110 ff. HB1.R45.

HICKS, J. R., Value and Capital, Part I (pp. 11-52). HB171.H64.

*HICKS, J. R., A Review of Demand Theory.

*SAMUELSON, PAUL, Foundations of Economic Analysis.

*WOLD, H., Demand Analysis. Ch. 1.

*FRIEDMAN, MILTON, A Theory of the Consumption Function.

*STIGLER, G., “The Early History of Empirical Studies of Consumer Behavior”, Journal of Political Economy, April, 1954.

FRIEDMAN, MILTON, “Income and Substitution Effects of a Change in Price”. (Mimeographed). YF4.

*SLUTSKY, EUGEN, “On the Theory of the Budget of the Consumer”. Readings in Price Theory, pp. 27-56.

MOSAK, J. L., “On the Interpretation of the Fundamental Equation in Value Theory”, in Lange, et. al., Studies in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics. HB99.C5.

*WALLIS, W. A., and FRIEDMAN, MILTON, “The Empirical Derivation of Indifference Functions”, in Lange et al, Studies in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics. HB99.C5.

*FRIEDMAN, MILTON and SAVAGE, L. J., “The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk,” Journal of Political Economy, LVI (August 1948) pp. 279-304. HB1.J7. Reprinted in Readings in Price Theory, pp. 57-96. HB99.C5.

___________, “The Expected-Utility Hypothesis and the Measurability of Utility”, Journal of Political Economy, Dec. 1952, pp. 463-474. HB99.C5.

ALCHIAN, ARMEN, “The Meaning of Utility Measurement”, American Economic Review, March 1953, pp. 26-50.

MARSHALL, Book V, Ch 3, 4, 5, 12, Appendix H. HB171.M36.

*ROBINSON, JOAN, Economics of Imperfect Competition, Ch 2. HB201.R65.

CLARK, J. M., The Economics of Overhead Costs, Ch 9. HB201.R65.

*VINER, JACOB, “Cost Curves and Supply Curves”, Zeitschrift fuer Nationaloekonomie, Bd III (Sept, 1931), pp. 23-46. H5.Z55. Reprinted in Readings in Price Theory, pp. 198-232.

APEL, HANS, “Marginal Cost Constancy and Its Implications”, American Economic Review, XXXVIII (Dec. 1948), pp. 870-885.

SMITH, CALEB, “Survey of the Empirical Evidence on the Economies of Scale”, in Business Concentration and Price Policy, pp. 213-30 and Comment by Milton Friedman, pp. 230-38.

CHAMBERLIN, EDWARD, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, Ch 3, sec. 1, 4, 5, 6; Ch 5. HB201.C44.

*HARROD, R. F. “Doctrines of Imperfect Competition”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1934, sec. 1, pp. 442-61.

STIGLER, G. J., “Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect”, and “Competition in the United States”, in Five Lectures on Economic Problems. HB171.S82.

*TRIFFIN, ROBERT, Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory, esp. Part II. HD41.T8 AND H31.H33, v. 67.

HARBERGER, A. C., “Monopoly and Resource Allocation”, Proceedings, American Economic Review(May, 1954).

*ROBINSON, E. A. G., The Structure of Competitive Industry. HO45.R732.

STIGLER, G. J., “The Statistics of Monopoly and Merger”, Journal of Political Economy, February, 1956.

STIGLER, G. J., “The Kinky Oligopoly Demand Curve and Rigid Prices”, in Readings in Price Theory.

*ROBINSON, E. A. G.,  Monopoly.

*PLANT, ARNOLD, “The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions,” Economica, Feb, 1934. HB1.E42.

*DENNISON, S. R., “The Problem of Bigness,” Cambridge Journal, Nov. 1947. YO3.

 

MARSHALL, Book IV, Ch 1, 2, 3; Bk V, Ch 6. HB171.M36.

CLARK, J. B., The Distribution of Wealth, Preface, Ch 1, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 23.

MILL, JOHN STUART, Principles of Political Economy, Book II, Ch 14.  HB171.M667.

HICKS, J. R., The Theory of Wages, Ch 1-6. HD4909.H63.

SMITH, ADAM, The Wealth of Nations, Bk I, Ch 10. HB161.S652.

MARSHALL, Bk VI, Ch 1-5. HB171.M36.

FRIEDMAN, MILTON and KUZNETS, SIMON, Income from Independent Professional Practice, Preface, pp. v to x; Ch 3, Sec 3, pp. 81-95, Ch 4, Sect 2, pp. 118-137, App, Sec 1 & 3, pp. 142-151, 155-61. HD4965.U6F8.

FRIEDMAN, MILTON, “Choice, Chance, and the Personal Distribution of Income,” Journal of Political Economy, Aug., 1953, pp. 277-90.

KNIGHT, F. H. “Interest” in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, also in Ethics of Competition. HO4965.E46.

KEYNES, J. M., The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, Ch 11-14. HB171.E46.

LERNER, ABBA P., “On the Marginal Product of Capital and the Marginal Efficiency of Investment”, Journal of Political Economy, Feb. 1953, pp. 1-14.

CLOWER, R. W., “Productivity, Thrift, and the Rate of Interest”, Economic Journal, March 1954, pp. 107-15.

WESTON, J. F., “A Generalized Uncertainty Theory of Profit”, American Economic Review, March 1950, pp. 40-60. HB1.A6.

___________, “The Profit Concept and Theory: A Restatement”, Journal of Political Economy, April 1954, pp. 152-170.

CASSELL, GUSTAV, Fundamental Thoughts in Economics, Ch. 1, 2,3. HB179.C283.

___________, The Theory of Social Economy, Ch 4. HB179.C31

HICKS, J. R., “Mr. Keynes and the ‘Classics’; A Suggested Interpretation”, Econometrica, Vol. 5, April 1937, pp. 147-159. HB1.E23, V. 5.

MODIGLIANI, F., “Liquidity Preference and the Theory of Interest and Money,” Econometrica, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Jan. 1944) esp. Part I, Sec. 1-9, Sec 11-17, Part II, Sec 21. HB1.E23, v. 12. Reprinted in American Economic Association, Readings in Monetary Theory, pp. 186-240.

*PIGOU, A. C., “The Classical Stationary State,” Economic Journal, Vol. 53, Dec. 1943, pp. 343-51. HB1.E3, v. 63.

___________, “Economic Progress in a Stable Environment,” Economica, 1947, pp. 180-90. HB1.E42, v. 14. Reprinted in Readings in Monetary Theory, pp. 241-251.

PATINKIN, DON, “Price Flexibility and Full Employment”, American Economic Review, XXXVIII, 4, Sept. 1948, pp. 543-564. YP6. Reprinted in Readings in Monetary Theory, pp. 252-283.

 

Source:  Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Milton Friedman. Box 77, Folder “1. University of Chicago, Econ 300A & B”.

Image Source: University of Chicago Photographic Archive apf1-06230, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library

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Cambridge Chicago Columbia Economic History Economists Germany Harvard NBER Stanford

Chicago. Friedman memo regarding Karl Bode and Moses Abramovitz, 1947

 

In the following 1947 memo from Milton Friedman to T.W. Schultz we can read two talent-scouting reports on potential appointments for the University of Chicago economics department. One candidate, Karl Bode had been vouched for by Allen Wallis, a trusted friend and colleague of Milton Friedman, but we can easily read Friedman’s own less than enthusiastic report on the meager published work examined, certainly compared to Friedman’s glowing report for his friend from Columbia student days, Moses Abramovitz. But comparing the publications listed in the memo, I certainly wouldn’t fault Friedman’s revealed preference for Abramovitz.

Abramovitz went on to have a long and distinguished career at Stanford and Bode left Stanford for government service with his last occupation according to his death certificate “Planning Director, Agency for International Development (A.I.D.)”

Since Karl Bode turned out to have cast a relatively short academic shadow, I have appended some biographical information about him at the end of this post. But for now just the vital dates: Karl Ernst Franz Bode was born November 24, 1912 in Boennien, Germany and he died March 18, 1981 in Arlington, VA.

__________________

Milton Friedman on Bode and Abramovitz

January 10, 1947

[To:] Mr. Schultz, Economics
[From:] Mr. Friedman, Economics
[Re:] Staff appointments

In connection with staff appointments, I thought it might be helpful if I put down on paper for you the information I have on two persons whose names I have casually mentioned: Karl Bode and Moses Abramovitz.

  1. Karl Bode (Assoc. Prof. of Economics, Stanford)

I know about Bode primarily from Allen Wallis. Allen considers him absolutely first-rate in all respects and recommends him very highly.

Bode, who is now in his early thirties, was born in Germany and, though Catholic of Aryan descent, and the holder of a highly-prized governmental fellowship, left Germany almost immediately after Hitler’s accession. He went first to Austria, then to Switzerland, where he took his Ph.D., in 1935, then to England, where he studied at Cambridge and at the London School. Bernard Haley met him while at Cambridge, was highly impressed with him, and induced him to come to Stanford, where he has been since 1937. He has been on leave of absence since early 1945, first with the Tactical Bombing Survey, then with the Allied Military Government in Berlin. He is expected back sometime this summer.

At Stanford, Bode is responsible for American and European Economic History, and, in addition, has taught advanced courses in Economic Theory. His original interest was in International Trade. He has a contract to write a text on Economic History, but I do not know whether on American or European Economic History.

I have obtained a list of his publications, most of which are fragments or reviews. Three of more general interest are:

(a) A. W. Stonier: “A New Approach to the Methodology of the Social Sciences”, Economica, Vol. 4, p. 406-424, Nov., 1937.

(b) “Plan Analysis and process analysis: AER, 33-348-54, June 1943.

(c) “A Note on the Mathematical Coincidence of the instantaneous and the serial multiplier”, Review of Economic Statistics, 26: 221-222, Nov. 1944.

I have read these. They are too slight to permit a reliable and comprehensive judgment about his capacities; but they are sufficient to demonstrate a clear, logical mind.

Allen tells me that Schumpeter, Haberler, Howard Ellis, and of course, the Stanford people all know him and could provide evidence about his abilities.

 

  1. Moses Abramovitz (member of research staff in charge of business cycle unit, National Bureau of Economic Research.)

Abramovitz got his bachelor’s at Harvard, his Ph.D. at Columbia. He has done some part-time teaching of Theory at Columbia. During the war he was with the Office of Strategic Services, where he worked on foreign economic conditions. He was a member of the reparations commission staff at both the Moscow and Paris Conferences.

Abramovitz and I were fellow graduate students at Columbia, and I have known him rather well ever since. I think him extremely capable, with an excellent mind, broad interests, and an extraordinary capacity for forming a sound judgment from conflicting evidence.

His academic and private research background is mostly in Economic Theory and Business Cycles; but the war years gave him a considerable background, and generated a real interest, in foreign economic relations.

Some of his writings are:

Selected Publications:

An Approach to a Price Theory for a Changing Economy, Columbia University Press, 1939.

Monopolistic Selling in a Changing Economy, Q.J.E., Feb., 1938.

Saving vs Investment: Profits vs Prosperity?Supplement on papers relating to the TNEC, Am. Econ. Rev., June, 1942.

Book on Cyclical behavior of inventories completed and scheduled to be published shortly by Nat’l Bureau of Economic Research.

M.F.

ab

* * * * *

PUBLICATIONS OF KARL BODE

A new approach to the methodology of the social sciences. (With A.W. Stonier): Economica, vol. 4, pp. 406-424, November, 1937.

Prosperität und Depression: Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, vol. 8, pp. 597-614, December, 1937.

Review of: Plotnik, M.J. Werner Sombart and his type of economics. 1937. American Economic Review, 28: 522-523, September, 1938.

Review of: Sombart, Werner. Weltanschauung, Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft. 1938. Ibid., 28: 766, December, 1938.

The acceptance of defeat in Germany: Journal of abnormal and social psychology, 38: 193-198, April, 1943.

Plan analysis and process analysis: American Economic Review, 33: 348-354, June, 1943.

Review of: Day, C. Economic Development in Europe. 1942:Journal of economic History, 2: 225-227, November, 1942.

Catholics in the postwar world: America, 71: 347-348, July, 1944

Economic aspects of morale in Nazi Germany: Pacific Coast Economic Association: Papers, 1942. pp. 29-34, 1943.

Reflections on a reasonable peace: Thought, 19: 41-48, March, 1944

Review of: Dempsey, B.W. Interest and usury. 1943: Ibid., 18: 756-758, December, 1943.

German reparations and a democratic peace: Thought, 19: 594-606, December, 1944

A note on the mathematical coincidence of the instantaneous and the serial multiplier: Review of Economic Statistics, 26: 221-222, November, 1944.

 

Source:Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Milton Friedman, Box 79, Folder 1 “University of Chicago, Minutes. Economics Department 1946-1949”.

__________________

Karl F. Bode
AEA 1969 Directory of Members, p. 41.

Bode, Karl F., government; b. Germany, 1912; student, U. Bonn-Germany, 1931-33, U. Vienna-Austria, 1933-34; Ph.D., U. Bern-Switzerland, 1935; Cambridge-England, 1935-37. DOC.DIS. The Concept of Neutral Money, 1935. FIELDS 2abc, 1c, 4a. Chief, Regional Organization & Program Staff, Intl. Cooperation Adm., 1955-60, asst. dep. dir. for planning, 1960-62; chief, Planning Assistance & Research Div., Agy. for Intl. Dev., 1962-67; dir., Research, Evaluation & Information Retrieval, Agy. for Internat. Dev. since 1967. ADDRESS Vietnam Bur., Agy. for Internat. Dev., Dept. State, Washington, DC 20523.

__________________

 Haberler Report of Mises’s Private Seminar

Regular participants of the seminar were several members of the Mont Pelerin Society – notably Hayek, Machlup, the late Alfred Schutz and in the very early days, John V. Van Sickle. Visiting scholars regarded it a great honor to be invited to the seminar – among them Howard S. Ellis (University of California), Ragnar Nurkse (late Professor of Economics in Columbia University, New York) whose untimely death occurred three years ago, Karl Bode (later in Stanford University and now in Washington), Alfred Stonier (now University College in London), and many others. There was Oskar Morgenstern (now Princeton University), the late Karl Schlesinger and Richard Strigl, two of the most brilliant economists of their time…the unforgettable Felix Kaufmann, philosopher of the Social Sciences in the broadest sense including the law and economics – he also wrote a much debated book on the logical foundation of mathematics – who after his emigration in 1938 joined the Faculty of the New School for Social Research in New York where he taught with great success until his premature death twelve years ago.

Source: Mises’s Private Seminar: Reminiscences by Gottfried Haberler. Reprint from The Mont Pelerin Quarterly, Volume III, October 1961, No. 3, page 20f. Posted at the Mises Institute website.

__________________

 From the Preface of Felix Kaufman’s 1936 book

For the critical editing of the manuscript and of the galleys, I wish to thank most heartily a number of friends in various countries, expecially Dr. Karl Bode, presently of St. John’s College, Cambridge and Dr. Alfred Schütz of Vienna. Dr. Bode has also taken upon himself the great labor of preparing both indexes.

Source: Felix Kaufmann. Theory and Method in the Social Sciences. [English translation of Methodenlehre der Sozialwissenschaften. Wien: Julius Springer, 1936.] from Felix Kaufmann’s Theory and Method in the Social Sciences, Robert S. Cohen and Ingeborg K. Helling (eds.). Boston Studies in the Philosophy and  History of Science, 303. Springer: 2014.

__________________

 Reports from The Stanford Daily

The Stanford Daily, Volume 93, Issue 47, 29 April 1938

Several distinguished scholars from other universities will join the Stanford faculty next year…Dr. Karl Franz Bode, formerly on the faculty of St. John’s College, Cambridge University, England, was appointed assistant professor of economics to succeed Dr. Donald M. Erb who was appointed president of the University of Oregon….

 

The Stanford Daily, Volume 100, Issue 02, 23 September 1941, p. 1.

Econ Department Changes Classes… History of Currency Problems, 118, will he given in fall quarter rather than in the spring quarter. It is a five-unit course, taught MTWThF at 11 a.m. in Room 200Q by Karl F. Bode. Economics 1 and 2 are prerequisites….

 

The Stanford Daily, Volume 103, Issue 86, 28 May 1943, p. 1.

Wilbur Names New Faculty Promotions. Promotions and appointments of faculty members for the academic year 1943-1944 were announced yesterday by Chancellor Ray Lyman Wilbur. … Those promoted from assistant professor to associate professor are … Dr. Karl F. Bode, economics….

 

The Stanford Daily, Volume 111, Issue 20, 7 March 1947, p. 3

President Donald B. Tresidder yesterday announced 37 faculty promotions. The promotions include 11 faculty members to full professorships, six to associate professorships, and two to assistant professorships, together with promotion of 18 members of the clinical faculty at the Stanford School of Medicine in San Francisco….

To professorships … Karl F. Bode, in economics…

 

The Stanford Daily, Vol 119, Issue 7, 13 February 1951, p. 1.

Dr. Karl F. Bode, Stanford economics professor on leave for government duty in Germany, has been appointed deputy economic adviser, Office of Economic Affairs, it has been announced by the office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany. Dr. Bode will be stationed in Bonn, Germany. He has been acting chief of the program division in the Office of Economic Affairs.

 

Image Source: Karl Bode from the 1939 Standford Quad.

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Chicago Suggested Reading Syllabus

Chicago. Graduate money reading list. Friedman, 1970

 

The following course outline with its readings is pretty much self-explanatory, though I cannot help but notice that there is quite a bit of Milton Friedman to read in Milton Friedman’s money course. It reminds me of the remark by Samuelson:

One must not make the mistake attributed to Edward Gibbon when he wrote his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Gibbon, it was said, sometimes confused himself and the Roman Empire.

_____________________

Milton Friedman

ECONOMICS 331—MONEY
Reading List—Winter Quarter, 1970

(Note: Readings marked with an asterisk (*) cover the essential substantive material.)

I. Introductory Material

*Milton Friedman, The Optimum Quantity of Money and Other Essays, (Aldine, 1968), Chap. 1.

*Milton Friedman, The Quantity Theory, International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (reprints on reserve).

David Hume, “Of Money,” “Of Interest,” in Essays and Treatises.

H. G. Johnson, “Monetary Theory and Keynesian Economics,” reprinted in W. Smith and R. Teiger (eds.) Readings in Money, National Income, and Stabilization Policy.

D. H. Robertson, Money.

II. The Quantity Equation

*Irving Fisher, The Purchasing Power of Money (Macmillan, 1913), chaps. 1, 2, 3, 4, 8.

*J. M. Keynes, Tract on Monetary Reform (1924), chap. 2; chap. iii, sec. 1.

*Wesley C. Mitchell, Business Cycles, The Problem and Its Setting (New York, 1927), pp. 128-39.

*A. C. Pigou, “The Value of Money” in Lutz, F. A., and Mints, L. W. (eds.) Readings in Monetary Theory.

Alfred Marshall, Official Papers, “Evidence before the Indian Currency Committee (1889),” questions 11758-62 (pp. 267-69); “Evidence before the Gold and Silver Commission (1887-88).” questions 9629-86 (pp. 34-53); testimony to Royal Commission on The Depression of Trade and Industry (1886), answers to question 8(i), pp. 7-15.

Henry Thornton, An Enquiry into the Nature and Effect of the Paper Credit of Great Britain (1802), Library of Economics edition (Allen and Irwin, 1939), chaps. iii and xi.

Jacob Viner, Studies in the Theory of International Trade (Harpers, 1937), pp. 119-289.

III. The Demand for Money

*Phillip Cagan, “The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation,” in Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, esp. 11, 25-35 and 86-91.

*Milton Friedman, “The Quantity Theory of Money: A Restatement” in Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, ed., M. Friedman.

*J. R. Hicks, “A Suggestion for Simplifying the Theory of Money,” Readings in Monetary Theory.

*H. G. Johnson, “Monetary Theory and Policy,” American Economic Review (June, 1962), Part II.

*J. M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, chaps. 13 and 15.

Maurice Allais, “A Restatement of the Quantity Theory of Money,” American Economic Review (December, 1966), pp. 1123-57.

W. J. Baumol, “The Transactions Demand for Cash: An Inventory Theoretic Approach,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (November, 1952).

Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, “Predicting Velocity: Implications for Theory and Policy,” Journal of Finance (May, 1963), pp. 319-54.

Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, “Some Further Investigations of Demand and Supply Functions for Money,” Journal of Finance (May, 1964).

Gregory C. Chow, “On the Long-run and Short-run Demand for Money,” Journal of Political Economy (April, 1966), pp. 111-31.

John V. Deaver, “The Chilean Inflation and the Demand for Money,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (The University of Chicago, Department of Economics, Winter, 1961).

Edgar Feige, The Demand for Liquid Assets: A Temporal Cross-Section Analysis (Prentice-Hall, 1964).

Milton Friedman, “The Demand for Money: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results,” Journal of Political Economy (August, 1959), pp. 327-51.

H. G. Johnson, “Recent Developments in Monetary Theory,” Essays in Monetary Economics.

David Laidler, “Some Evidence on the Demand for Money,” Journal of Political Economy (February, 1966), pp. 55-68.

H. A. Latane, “Cash Balances and the Interest Rate—A Pragmatic Approach,” Review of Economics and Statistics (November, 1954) and (November, 1960).

Allan H. Meltzer, “The Demand for Money: The Evidence from the Time Series,” Journal of Political Economy (June, 1963).

Merton H. Miller and Daniel Orr, “A Model of the Demand for Money by Firms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXX (August, 1966), 413-35.

George R. Morrison, Liquidity Preferences of Commercial Banks (University of Chicago Press, 1966).

Joan Robinson, “The Rate of Interest,” Econometrica, Vol. 19 (1951), reprinted as chap 1 of The Rate of Interest and Other Essays.

James Tobin, “Liquidity Preference and Monetary Policy,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 19 (May, 1947), 130-31.

James Tobin, “Liquidity Preference as Behavior Toward Risk,” Review of Economic Studies (August, 1956), pp. 241-47.

James Tobin, “The Interest Elasticity of Transactions Demand for Cash,” Review of Economics and Statistics (August, 1956).

Clark Warburton, “Monetary Velocity and Monetary Policy,” and Tobin’s rejoinder, Review of Economic Statistics, XXX (November, 1948), 310-17.

IV. The Supply of Money (covered mostly in Econ. 330)

*Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, “Appendix B: Proximate Determinants of the Nominal Stock of Money,” from A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960.

*H. G. Johnson, “Monetary Theory and Policy,” sec. 3.

Phillip Cagan, Determinants and Effects of Changes in the Stock of Money, 1875-1960 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1968).

Phillip Cagan, “The Demand for Currency Relative to the Total Money Supply,” Journal of Political Economy (August, 1958).

William Dewald, “Free Reserves, Total Reserves, and Monetary Control,” Journal of Political Economy (April, 1963).

Milton Friedman, A Program for Monetary Stability, chap. ii.

A. G. Hart, “The ‘Chicago’ Plan of Banking Reform,” Readings in Monetary Theory.

A. J. Meigs, Free Reserves and the Money Supply (University of Chicago Press, 1962).

Lloyd W. Mints, A History of Banking Theory, pp. 9-12, 29-35, 217-22, 247-57, 265-87.

George Tolley, “Providing for Growth of the Money Supply,” Journal of Political Economy (Dec., 1957), pp. 465-85.

U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve Systems Purposes and Function.

Knut Wicksell, “The Influence of the Rate of Interest on Prices,” Economic Journal, 171 (June, 1907), 213-20

V. Liquidity and Financial Intermediaries

*Phillip Cagan, “Why Do We Use Money in Open Market Operations,” Journal of Political Economy (February, 1958).

*Roland N. McKean, “Liquidity and a National Balance Sheet,” Readings in Monetary Theory.

J. G. Gurley, “Liquidity and Financial Institutions in the Postwar Period,” Study Paper No. 14, Joint Economic Committee, January, 1960.

J. G. Gurley and E. S. Shaw, Money in a Theory of Finance.

H. Makower and J. Marschak, “Assets, Prices and Monetary Theory,” Readings in Price Theory.

Alvin Marty, “Gurley and Shaw on Money in a Theory of Finance,” Journal of Political Economy (February, 1961).

Edward Simmons, “The Relative Liquidity of Money and Other Things,” Readings in Monetary Theory.

VI. The Monetary Standard and International Monetary Arrangements

*”Conditions of International Monetary Equilibrium,” Session at 1962 meeting of American Economic Association, with papers by H. G. Johnson, Richard E. Caves, and Peter B. Kenen, and Discussion by J. Marcus Fleming, Harry C. Eastman, and J. Herbert Furth, American Economic Review (May, 1963), pp. 112-46.

*Milton Friedman, “Commodity Reserve Currency” and “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates,” Essays in Positive Economics.

*Lloyd Mints, Monetary Policy for a Competitive Society, chaps. 4 and 5.

Frank W. Fetter, Development of British Monetary Orthodoxy, 1797-1875 (Harvard University Press, 1965).

Milton Friedman and Robert V. Roosa, The Balance of Payments: Free versus Fixed Exchange Rates, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1967.

H. G. Johnson, International Trade and Economic Growth, chaps. 6, 7.

H. G. Johnson, “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, 1969,” Review of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, (June, 1969).

J. M. Keynes, Tract on Monetary Reform, chap. iii, secs. 2, 3, 4; chaps. iv and v (*especially chap. iii, sec. 2; chap. iv, sec. 2).

Egon Sohmen, Flexible Exchange Rates (University of Chicago Press, 1961).

VII. The Process of Adjustment: Inflation, Business Cycles

*Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, “Money and Business Cycles,” Supplement to Review of Economics and Statistics (February, 1963), containing proceedings of Conference on Monetary Economics. Also, comments by H. Minsky, A. Okun, and C. Warburton.

Phillip Cagan, “The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation,” Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money.

Milton Friedman, Dollars and Deficits (Prentice-Hall, 1968), chaps. 1, 4, and 5.

Milton Friedman, “The Inflationary Gap,” in Essays in Positive Economics.

Milton Friedman, “The Monetary Studies of the National Bureau,” in The National Bureau Enters Its Forty-fifth Year, 44th Annual Report, National Bureau of Economic Research, June, 1964, pp. 7-25.

Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, esp. chapter 7.

Arnold C. Harberger, “The Dynamics of Inflation in Chile,” in C. Christ, et al., Measurement in Economics (Stanford University Press, 1964).

Eugene M. Lerner, “Inflation in the Confederacy, 1861-65,” Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money.

Clark Warburton, “The Misplaced Emphasis in Contemporary Business-Fluctuation Theory,” Readings in Monetary Theory.

 

Source: Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Milton Friedman. Box 55, Folder 7.

Image Source:  Milton Friedman (undated) from University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf1-06231, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.

Categories
Chicago Columbia Economists Yale

Yale. James Tobin on Freedom to Friedman in 1964

 

The last paragraph of this letter from James Tobin to Milton Friedman could have been written yesterday (by someone with a good memory for history). While it is fair to say that Friedman’s team has managed to control the ball longer on the clock over the past half-century, Tobin’s team is better at keeping points on the scoreboard. 

___________________

Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics
Box 2125, Yale Station

December 7, 1964

Professor Milton Friedman
Department of Economics
Columbia University
Fayerweather Hall
New York 27, New York

 

Dear Milton:

As you urged in your letter of November 11, I shall read Federal Bulldozer [Sample review of Martin Anderson’s book]. The only redevelopment I am at all familiar with is the one here in New Haven. I think it has, in some net balance, enlarged freedom. Eminent domain no doubt infringes on one dimension of freedom and is subject to abuse. But there are surely aspects of freedom other than freedom from government coercion.

The discussion would be advanced if you would recognize that some government actions might enlarge the scope for individual choice and action for some individuals by diminishing the environmental constraints upon them.

I think also it is useful to distinguish between expansion of the public sector as a purchaser and user of resources and increases in specific and direct governmental controls and regulations. I don’t think that “modern liberals” who favor the former favor the latter. Certainly I don’t. I would not have a minimum wage law, or a Davis-Bacon Act, or the agricultural mess. And, when I want more money for education, I don’t like to be accused of wanting an NRA [National Recovery Administration]. But this confusion is what happens by the indiscriminate use of the term “Big Government.”

It is on the question of freedom of expression that I find the most difficulty understanding you. My reading of history and of the contemporary scene would be that the main threats to freedom of dissent have almost nothing to do with the economic size of government in our kind of society. The main threats have come from the know-nothings, Mitchell Palmers, McCarthys  [cf. a review of the Anderson book on Joseph McCarthy by Alonzo L. Hamby], Klu Kluxers, and the like. It is not the big Federal government that intimidates librarians, textbook writers, broadcasters, civil rights advocates in the South, etc. I do not know of cases where a democracy has crept into totalitarianism by gradually increasing the size and scope of government activity. But I do know of cases, like the Weimar republic, where the failure of conservative governments to use their powers for social and economic ends has delivered the whole country to a totalitarian dictator.

Sincerely,

[signed: “Jim”]

James Tobin

JT:lah

 

Source: Hoover Institution Archives. Milton Friedman Papers. Box 34, Folder 13 “Tobin, James”.

Images Sources:   1962 photo of James Tobin1968 file photo of Milton Friedman.

Categories
Chicago Economic History Economist Market Economists Fields

Chicago. Report of the Bailey-Christ-Griliches Committee, 1957

 

Today’s artifact provides a collection of suggestions from three young faculty members of the University of Chicago department of economics in 1957 regarding (inter alia) thesis writing, linkages with business/law/statistics faculty, long-term staffing, and the creation of a working-papers series. After reading the report, I guess one should not be terribly surprised that all three of these young turks would ultimately end up spending the lion’s share of the rest of their working lives elsewhere than Chicago. Basically what we have below is a young insider’s view of how to proceed in promoting excellence at Chicago, though it does not really have the ring of a majority view of that faculty. For fans of Saturday Night Live, one might say Christ et al. wanted “less cowbell” but the “more cowbell” faction was stronger. [An alternate source for the SNL sketch]

The following report was written by Carl Christ who incorporated assessments by his fellow committee members Martin J. Bailey and Zvi Griliches.  These guys were only ca. 34, 30, and 27 years old, respectively, in 1957. One suspects that the acting chair of the department of economics at the University of Chicago, D. Gale Johnson, was hoping to tap the minds of the younger faculty members for some fresh ideas. Both Friedman and Stigler had already entered mid-life at 45 and 46 years of age, respectively. 

I have added footnotes to the text in square brackets, e.g. [1], where descriptions of the reader’s markings by T. W. Schultz are provided.

_______________________

T. S. Schultz’s handwritten notes attached to Report

I.  Christ-G-B

  1. dust off Master’s (hold)
  2. treatment of the weak
  3. rec[commend?] students with more enthusiasm
  4. more history (underway)
  5. combine workshops?

II. Business –Law-Statistics

O.K.     more cross listing of courses. List of faculties for use in assigning committees (underway)

III. Information

prong 1. Special seminar (tied to more visitors)
prong 2. more 1 & 2 year visitors
prong 3. dist our staff (2 v.G.
prong 4. reprint service (underway)

 

_______________________

copy of T. W. S.

REPORT OF THE BAILEY-CHRIST-GRILICHES COMMITTEE*

            *The committee was appointed by D. Gale Johnson, acting chairman of the Department, pursuant to a motion passed at a department meeting late in the spring quarter of 1957. The report was written by Carl F. Christ, chairman of the committee, and has been approved in substance by Martin J. Bailey and Zvi Griliches, the other two committee members.

 

The committee has met together several times. In addition, each of us has “held hearings” with colleagues on numerous informal occasions. Our original terms of reference centered on a long range view of the question of staffing the department. But in our discussions we have ranged very widely.

We have dealth [sic] with five broad topics, some of which are interconnected. The five are, loosely speaking:

  1. Instruction, training and placement of students.
  2. Relations with the business, law, and statistics faculties.
  3. Information about the department for its members, for the economics profession and for prospective students.
  4. The allocation of resources in economics research.
  5. Kinds of economists the department ought to try to hire.

On some of these topics we have concrete suggestions, on some we have vague suggestions, and on some we merely have questions. This report provides a brief account of our discussions, and in the course of it it the suggestions and questions will appear.

 

(1) Instruction, training and placement of students.

This topic has not been a major one in our discussions. However we have several points under it.

First, the M.A. degree ought to be dusted off and made more respectable and more meaningful to students, so that those who do not choose or are not able to continue for the Ph.D. can go away from here with the feeling that they have made a worthwhile investment, to our credit as well as theirs.

Second, we ought to do a better job with our relatively weak Ph.D. aspirants in two respects: First, in discouraging or prohibiting from Ph.D. work any student who, in our opinion, is not capable of success by our standards. Second, once a student has been permitted to go ahead on his thesis, in encouraging and assisting him so that he is able to finish within a reasonable period of time and to have the feeling that he has been treated fairly. The reason for mentioning this point is that we have come across reports of several students who worked long and hard on theses and went through several revisions, with the result that they felt we had been unreasonably exacting and had unnecessarily delayed their degrees. [1]  If the M.A. degree is made more respectable as suggested above, there should be less difficulty in maintaining our Ph.D. standards and at the same time avoiding long-drawn-out struggles with marginal Ph.D. students. [2]

Third, we ought to be more vigorous and more liberal in recommending our students for jobs. There appears to be some evidence that in making recommendations we typically assume that the prospective employer has standards as high as ours, and so sometimes fail to place some of our people in jobs that instead are filled by less qualified students from elsewhere. [3]

Fourth, we ought to give at least some of our students a better knowledge of history and inability to make use of it in economics. Too many of our students go away with only poor knowledge in this area. At the same time, in Earl Hamilton and John Nef, not to mention others, the department has access to some of the best historical talent that is to be found anywhere. Can it not be turned to the advantage of more students? [4]

Fifth, we ought to economize our resources a bit by combining into one the workshop appearance in the thesis seminar of those students whose workshop performances appear ex post to have served the purpose of the thesis seminar. It might also be possible to combine the Ph.D. oral examination with the seminar appearance in some cases, thus making a further saving.
Sixth, we ought to take more advantage of the resources in the business, law, and statistics faculties, and be prepared to let them do the same with us (see topic 2 below). [5]

 

(2) Relations with the business, law, and statistics faculties.

The committee met for an hour with Allen Wallis, James Lorie, and Arnold Harberger to discuss informally the probable future course of relations between the department and the school. From this it appeared that the school intends to continue to send many of its advanced students to the department for training in price theory and monetary and income theory, and also that the school will welcome students from the department who wish to study topics that are offered in the school. [6] It also appeared that the school intends to invest fairly heavily in staff in the areas of industrial and market organization in the public regulation of business (this interested us because we feel that one of the main weaknesses in the department’s coverage lies here; see topic 5 below). [7]

We discussed the fact that while relations between the department and the school have always been cordial, there has not been as much flow back and forth as desirable, and in particular that some of our students would be interested in the business school’s work fail to follow up this interest because our demands on their time are quite heavy. We concluded that if there were more cross-listing of courses in the catalog and time schedules (the business school now does a better job of this than we do), and if some of their faculty came to our seminars and oral examinations and vice versa, and if there were more preliminary examination committees and thesis committees with members from both the school and the department, then in the course of meeting their degree requirements, any interested economics department students will find it easier to draw on the resources of the business school and vice versa.[8]

A similar approach to law and statistics would appear promising.

 

(3) Information about the department for its members, for the economics profession, and for prospective students.

One of the most commonly recurring themes in our discussions with each other and with “witnesses” in our “hearings” was that we do not provide good enough information for each other and for outsiders about the kind of work that is going on here, and the advantages we believe we have. Our discussions on this point have led to one of the two major suggestions we have to offer (the other appears below in section 5).

The suggestion is to set up a four-pronged program something like the following. (We will quickly list the four prongs, and then return with some comments.) First, set up a sort of special seminar (which might be called the Economics Research Center Seminar) to meet more or less regularly about twice a month, at which the best work that students and faculty and guests are doing would be presented to the department and its guests. Second, have a larger number of one-year or two-year visitors from all over the U. S. and the world, either as post-doctoral fellows or research associates or the like, whose main responsibility here would be to work on their own research and participate in the special seminar, as well as to take part in one or more workshops and research projects. Third, distribute dittoed copies of our essentially finished work to a selected mailing list of economists in the US and abroad, as the Agricultural Economics group already does informally. And fourth, have a reprint series that would carry the best published articles and papers by our faculty, students, and guests.

It is clear that if such a special seminar is set up and no cut is made in the number of meetings of the other workshops and seminars, the faculty workload will increase. Since we feel that it is already pretty high, it seems sensible to suggest that each workshop skip one meeting each month. This should approximately compensate for the extra load created by the special seminar.*

*A crude survey of the faculty attendance at the Agricultural Economics Seminar and the Chile, Labor, Money, Public Finance, and Econometrics Workshops yields the estimate that about 40 faculty-hours (that is, about 20 man-seminars) per week go into these workshops. Assuming that about 10 faculty members would come to each special seminar, about every two weeks, this would require a weekly average of about 10 faculty-hours (or about 5 man-seminars), which would be released if the frequency of meetings of the workshops were reduced about 25%. Another economy measure in this direction is mentioned under topic (2), fifth item.

(In response to the special seminar idea, some colleagues have suggested that the important thing is to circulate advance notice of particularly good work that is about to be presented, so that interested faculty members and others can attend, and that if this can be done, there is no need to have a special seminar; the regular workshop sessions will suffice. If the idea is accepted that particularly good work ought to be publicized within the department before it is presented, then the question of whether to do this via notices of regular workshop meetings or via a special seminar can be discussed as a procedural matter.) [9]

The special seminar idea is tied in with the idea of more visitors, for one of the results we hope for is that the visitors will see our best work, and will spread the word about what kinds of things are being done here, when they leave and go elsewhere. [10]

The reprint series and the distribution of the dittoed manuscripts will, we hope, have a similar effect. Further, but dittoed manuscripts will enable some members of the profession at large to become familiar with our results many months before they can be brought out in published form. [11]

Other simpler measures that might improve the flow of information are the following: Putting out a special department circular or flyer describing the department, the workshops, the interchange of research among faculty and advanced students, and the large amount of faculty attention paid to students; returning to the practice of giving brief descriptions of courses in the catalog (and in the above-mentioned circular), instead of merely course titles as our department has been doing recently; and publishing an annual report for the Economics Research Center. [12]  The matter of job recommendations for our students, which is related to the topic of providing information, was touched on under topic (1) above.

 

(4) The allocation of resources and economics research.

The area of economics that is the most fully developed, the most systematic, the most firmly established, and probably the most reliable for understanding and controlling economic events is the more or less traditional theory of prices, distribution, and the allocation of resources, based on the tools of supply, demand, and marginal analysis. Because it’s postulates (including utility maximization, profit maximization, and a fairly widespread knowledge of market alternatives) appear to be rather unrealistic, this theory has the reputation among many people of being dry, abstract, and of little or no practical value. In the opinion of the committee and of many economists in our department and elsewhere, this theory is a powerful one and can lead to highly useful results when applied to real-world problems. Indeed, one of the most productive kinds of activity for economists appears to be to apply this theory to situations where public and private policies are inappropriate to the goals people have in mind. [13]

In our opinion, the main strength of our department lies in just this kind of activity. We have a group of people who are very devoted to and very good at discovering important, unsolved economic problems that can be solved with the aid of this kind of theory, and solving them. [14]

Our agricultural economists’ approach to the farm problem is one example. Their work on optimum storage rules and on the development of natural resources or others. Our department’s work on economic growth in a sense is another, since when we find that the growth in national product is not fully accounted for by inputs of labor and capital is usually measured, we begin to look for some missing input, either in the form of something that shifts the production function, or in the form of some quality improvements that we have missed in the labor and/or capital: knowledge in either case. This is related to work by Friedman, Becker, in the labor workshop on the value of education as an investment, and to Knight’s concept of human beings as a form of capital. Harberger’s work on depletion allowances, and on the welfare costs of the U.S. tax system, are other examples. Friedman’s and Cagan’s work on the demand and supply of money are examples too, in the sense that attention is focused on the behavior of economic units seeking to maximize their utility or profit in their holding of money and their borrowing and lending operations. Friedman’s and Reid’s consumption work is similar in that into rests on the same view of individual behavior. The whole Chile project is an example par excellence. Friedman’s suggestions for allowing the price system more scope in the fields of education, military recruiting, and the like, for which Friedman and indirectly, the department are so well known, are still others, as is Becker’s free banking scheme, though there is probably more disagreement among economists generally about questions like these that about the other work mentioned above.

While it is clear to us that applications of the familiar theory of allocation of resources very productive, it seems equally clear that the real frontiers of economics lies elsewhere. Some areas that have claimed attention so far are economic history, political science, sociology and social psychology and cultural anthropology, psychology (including learning theory), information theory, statistical decision theory, linear programming, the theory of games. It seems at least as likely that major advances in economics will come by one of these routes or some as-yet-unidentified route as they will come from applications of the familiar resource-allocation theory.

The foregoing statement is so broad that it is almost certain to be true, and almost useless as a guide to research workers interested in major advances. The committee polled itself as to where it thinks pay dirt lies, and where it does not lie, with results something like the following: Among the areas particularly likely to be fruitful are the borderland with learning theory and psychology concerning choice and decision-making  [15], the borderland with statistics concerning decision theory and game theory [16], the borderland with anthropology concerning culture and values [17], the borderland with political science concerning political institutions [18]. Also promising, we feel, are mathematical approaches generally, including mathematical approaches to some of the above mentioned borderlands. [19] None of us wanted to rule out linear programming, though none of us was enthusiastic about input-output.

In summary of this topic, we have two statements: First, the familiar resource allocation theory is a powerful tool and there remains a rich field for its application. Second, it seems to us that if some resources are invested in related but different areas such as those mentioned in the preceding paragraph, there is now a worthwhile chance of that substantial pay-off in the form of new knowledge relevant to economics.

 

(5) Kinds of economists the department ought to try to hire.

Over the past few years several members of the department (and a good many outsiders!) have expressed the view that our department is too homogeneous in several ways. [20] Most of us rely heavily on resource allocation theory, as suggested in the preceding section of this report, and do not emphasize peripheral and possibly frontier areas such as decision theory, learning theory, information theory, psychology, anthropology, and the like. [21] Most of us were trained at Chicago at some stage, are essentially anti-socialist, [22] have essentially similar views about monetary and fiscal policy, have similar views about how far public policy should rely on the price mechanism and how far it should interfere with it, and are primarily theoretically and analytically oriented as opposed to institutionally oriented.

In recent department meetings, our discussion of this matter has often gone something like this: First, we more or less agree that we ought to diversify by seeking a socialist, or an institutionalist, or something of the sort. [23]  Then we considered names of economists who might qualify, and one by one we reject them on the ground that they are not really good economists. The discussion ends when someone says, “There’s really nobody good in that category.”

Granted that we want to maintain a high level of quality in the department, there are at least two difficulties involved in any attempt to diversify. One is that in hiring people we like to feel that we know them pretty well, so as to make informed decisions. And the younger people whom we know the best, by and large, are our own former students and fellow-students. This creates and perpetuates a bias in favor of people trained at Chicago. [24] The bias is not so strong, of course, in the cases of people who have published and made reputations, but even here it appears to exist (look at the people who were brought here as associate professor from elsewhere, and ask how many have had training at Chicago).

A second difficulty is simply that it is hard to separate judgment about the quality of an economist from judgment about his position on questions of research strategy and of economic policy. We agree in principle that high quality is very important, and also that it is possible for powerful and prolific minds to disagree in good faith concerning research strategy and public policy. Still there is a temptation to feel that one’s own views sincerely arrived at are best, and that somehow an economist who disagrees strongly with them cannot really be a very good economist. [25]

It seems to the committee that the real issue is not diversification per se. We see the issue somewhat as follows: As we said in the foregoing section of the report, we believe that the real frontiers of economics lie in directions that are somewhat unorthodox by the lights of the department. [26] We also believe that there are high-quality economists who are unorthodox in the same sense. If these two premises are correct, then our interest as a department in pushing forward the frontiers of economics must prompt us to make a serious attempt to add a few such people to our staff. It is only in this sense the diversification seems to be a worthwhile aim.  [27]

The question of what sort of people the department ought to try to hire includes not only the problem of finding economists of high quality who appeared to have productive unorthodox approaches. [28] It also includes the problem of rounding out the subject-matter coverage of the department.

The committee pulled itself again, this time as to the subject matter areas that the department ought to pay special attention to, in seeking new faculty. The results were as follows.

For replacement of staff lost in recent years, the two high-ranking fields were mathematical economics-econometrics, and industrial and market organization in social control of business. [29]  (The second of these seems less urgent for us, in the light of the business school’s intention to invest in it; see topic 2 above.) Ranking almost as high was the history of economic thought. [30]

For expansion, we thought of business fluctuations, the economics of the firm, and American economic history (the latter mainly so as to free Earl Hamilton to give work in his real specialty, European economic history, without sacrificing our offering in the American field).

The last two sections of the report may be summarized thus (and here is the second major suggestion referred to earlier). It is the feeling of the committee (1) that we should place a high value on quality, and (2) that in view of our belief that the present composition of the department is weak in areas where the frontiers of economics are to be found, we should make a serious attempt to find high quality people whose interests and competence give promise of advancing the frontier, as suggested in the end of the preceding section of the report. We also suggest that the department pay special attention to the fields mentioned in the foregoing paragraph. In particular, we suggest that the department undertake to appoint a person in the mathematical economics-econometrics area beginning in the fall of 1958. [31]

There is no reason why one or more of these things should not be combined in the same person. And, of course, there is no reason why we should pass up opportunities to hire good economists who are essentially orthodox by our lights, if our resources will permit us to do that as well as meet our author needs.

 

Handwritten Markings and Remarks

[1] Vertical line in left margin marks the last two sentences of paragraph.

[2] Question mark in left margin for this sentence.

[3] “a good point” in left margin for second sentence of paragraph.  “need to ask[?] terms of the specific job + not general letters” in the right margin

[4] “good” in left margin. Vertical line in left-hand margin marks the entire paragraph.

[5] “OK” in left margin. Vertical line in left-hand margin marks the entire paragraph.

[6] “good” written in left margin next to this sentence.

[7] Vertical line in left margin marks the last sentence of the paragraph.

[8] “get list from these committees” in left margin for this sentence.

[9] “OK” in left margin for the last sentence of this paragraph.

[10] “OK” in left margin next to this paragraph.

[11] “OK” in left margin for the last sentence of this paragraph.

[12] underlined “merely course titles as our department has” and “publishing an annual report for the Economics”

[13] Four vertical lines in the left margin mark the last sentence of this paragraph.

[14] Vertical line in the left margin marks the entire paragraph.

[15]  Underlined: “borderland with learning theory and psychology concerning choice and decision-making”,  “(1)” in left margin.

[16] Underlined: “statistics concerning decision theory and game theory”,  “(2)” in left margin.

[17] Underlined: “anthropology concerning culture and values”,  “(3)” in left margin.

[18] Underlined: “political science concerning political institutions”,  “(4)” in left margin.

[19] “(5)” with a vertical line in the left margin marking “mathematical approaches generally, including mathematical approaches to some of the above mentioned borderlands.”

[20] “is too homogeneous in several ways” is underlined.

[21]  “decision theory, learning theory, information theory, psychology, anthropology” is underlined.

[22] “anti-socialist” is circled

[23] “socialist” and “institutionalist” are each circled.

[24] Vertical line in left margin marking the second, third, and fourth sentences of this paragraph.

[25] Vertical line in left margin marking this entire paragraph.

[26] “economics lie in directions that are somewhat unorthodox” is underlined.

[27]  Vertical line in left margin marking the last two sentences of this paragraph.

[28] “productive unorthodox approaches” is circled

[29] “mathematical economics-econometrics” is circled  “also Stigler” written in left hand margin with reference to “industrial and market organization”

[30] “history of economic thought” is underlined, connected with short line to bottom margin note “Stigler”.

[31] Curly vertical line in the left margin marks the entire paragraph.

 

Source: University of Chicago Archives. Department of Economics Records, Box 42, Folder 8.
Mimeograph copy without marginal notes also found in Harvard University Archives. Papers of Zvi Griliches, Box 129, Folder “Correspondence, 1954-1959”.

Image Source: Professor Carl F. Christ in Johns Hopkins University yearbook. Hullabaloo 1962.

 

Categories
Chicago Exam Questions

Chicago. Price Theory (Econ 300A and B) Exams. Friedman, Winter Quarter, 1947

 

Norman Kaplan’s handwritten  list of readings for Milton Friedman’s price theory courses (Economics 300A and 300B) taught during the winter quarter of 1947 at the University of Chicago has been posted earlier. That winter quarter was the first time Friedman taught Economics 300B and only the second time he taught Economics 300A. In Friedman’s and Kaplan’s papers at Hoover and Chicago, respectively, I have found examination materials from that quarter.  Friedman’s two quarter sequence was not included in the course announcements for 1946-47, so I have included the announcement for 1947-48.    The 1948 course reading assignments have been transcribed as well.

_________________________

Course Announcement

300A,B. Price Theory. A systematic study of the pricing of final products and factors of production under essentially stationary conditions. Covers both perfect competition and such imperfectly competitive conditions as monopolistic competition, oligopoly, and monopoly. 300A deals primarily with the pricing of final products; 300B, with the pricing of factors of production. Prereq: Econ 209 or equiv. and Econ 213 or equiv or consent of instructor.

300A. Aut: MWF 9:30; Win: MWF 10:30; Friedman.
300B. Win: MWF 9:30; Spr: MWF 9:30; Friedman

Source: Announcements. The College and the Divisions, Sessions of 1947-1948.   Vol. XLVII, No. 4 (May 15, 1947), p. 224.

_________________________

PROBLEM FOR ECONOMICS 300A, WINTER 1947

Assume that a comprehensive system of point rationing is superimposed on a money price system. Each consumer is given an equal number of points although money incomes are very unequal. Point prices exist for every commodity for which a money price exists, and a consumer must pay over both points and money to purchase a commodity. To simplify the analysis, assume throughout (1) that the points are dated, (that is, can be used only during a specific period), (2) that fixed and known quantities of various commodities are available each period.

(a) Indicate (on an indifference diagram or in any other manner) how to determine the quantity of each good that an individual would purchase, given money prices, point prices, his money income, and his point income (i) if it is illegal to transfer points from one person to another and consumers conform to this requirement, and (ii) if points may legally be bought and sold for money. In this case, take as given to the individual consumer also the price of points in terms of money.

(b) If the only thing the government fixed were the number of points each individual receives, and it were to allow the money prices, point prices, and price of points in terms of money to be determined on the market, there would not be a unique set of values of these variables that would establish equilibrium, because the number of variables would be greater than the number of conditions. Explain this statement. Suppose the government tries to remove the indeterminacy by assigning values to some variables on the basis of criteria other than clearing the market. How many variables could the government so set and still have a determinate equilibrium? Does it matter which variables the government sets?

(c) It has been argues that every consumer will gain if non-transferable points, case (a) (i), were made freely transferable into money, case (a) (ii). Do you think this correct? Discuss.

 

Mid-Quarter Examination in Economics 300A
Winter, 1947

  1. (20 points) Define briefly:
    1. Indifference curve
    2. Income effect of a change in price
    3. Equilibrium price
    4. Marshallian demand curve
    5. Marginal rate of substitution
  2. (40 points) Indicate whether each of the following statements is true (T), false (F), or uncertain (U), and state briefly the reason for your answer.

A government subsidy of $100 per year to each grower of potatoes enacted after the end of a particular planting season and expected to be continued indefinitely will lower the price of potatoes (which it is assumed cannot be stored)

_____ a. for that season’s crop.

_____ b. in the long run.

During period when general business is improving, both the price and output of steel rise. This means

_____ a. that the income effect of the rise in price is greater than the substitution effect.

_____ b. that the demand for steel is inelastic.

_____ c. that the demand for steel increases with income.

Removal of rent control would

_____ a. reduce the money wages of maids.

_____ b. reduce the price of trailers.

_____ If the removal of rent controls were to lead to a rise in rents, then the total amount paid in rents would decline if the demand for rental housing were elastic and rise if the demand for rental housing were inelastic.

_____ “Since elasticity measures variation in quantity (demanded or offered) divided by variations in a price, the elasticity of demand for anything will be seven times as large for seven similar demanders as it is for one.” (A. C. Pigou)

_____ A rise in the price of coal will reduce the number of “Okies” trying to go to California.

  1. (40 points) Assume that a system of point rationing is superimposed on a price system. Each consumer is given a specified total number of points, point prices are set on various commodities, and a consumer must pay over both points and money to purchase a commodity. For simplicity, assume that there are only two commodities in the system. Indicate (on an indifference diagram or in any other manner), how to determine the quantity of each of the two commodities an individual would purchase, given money prices, point prices, his money income, and his point income.

(a) If it is illegal to transfer points from one person to another and consumers conform to this requirement. In your explanation, distinguish among the various special cases that may arise.

(b) If points may legally be bought and sold for money. In this case, take as given also the price of points in terms of money.

(c) Suppose that a fixed total quantity of each of the two goods is available; that point prices are fixed by the government, money prices are freely determined so as to clear the market; and that in case (a) some consumers are left with points which they cannot spend because they do not have enough money. The legal prohibition against transferring points is now removed, the point prices and the total number of points issued are unchanged, and the price of points in terms of money is determined in the open market. What, if anything, can be said about the price of points in terms of money under these conditions?

 

Source: Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Milton Friedman. Box 76, Folder 9 “University of Chicago Econ. 300A”.

 

Final Examination 300A
Winter, 1947

Has not been found either in Milton Friedman papers (Hoover Archives) nor at the Norman Kaplan papers (University of Chicago Archives).

 

_________________________

Mid-Quarter Examination in Economics 300B
Winter, 1947

  1. Indicate briefly whether the following statements are correct or incorrect and why.
    1. Economic theorists contend that, under competition, wages are always equal to the marginal product of labor. It seems to follow that if they are right, the simplest way to raise the productivity of labor, and hence to increase the total output of society, is to force employers to pay higher wages.
    2. The value of the marginal product of a laborer employed at the same wage rate is higher if he is employed by a monopolistic firm than if he is employed by a competitive firm. It follows that the monopoly employs labor more efficiently.
    3. A rise in wages will tend to lower the marginal productivity of capital.
    4. The law of diminishing returns is contradicted by the fact that agricultural output of this country has increased tremendously despite a decrease in the proportion of the working population on farms.
  2. Discuss the conditions that may give rise to long-run decreasing cost for an industry. What are the implications of the various conditions for the state of competition in this industry.
  3. Suppose the wage differential between northern and southern laborers of the same grade were eliminated by raising the southern wage rates. Discuss the short- and long-run economic effects, including the effects on employment in the north and south.
  4. A particular industry composed of numerous competing firms each producing a single product has been hiring labor by the hour and is in a position of long-run equilibrium. This industry (and no other) is required, because of a new law, to hire the labor by the year at a guaranteed annual wage equal to the hourly wage prevailing prior to the change times the number of hours in a normal working year. Discuss (1) the short-run effect of this change on (a) the average and marginal cost curve of a typical firm, (b) the output of that firm, (c) the number of man hours of labor employed by that firm; (2) the long-run effects on the number of firms in the industry and the output of the industry.

 

Final Examination in 300B
Winter Quarter, 1947

Part I

  1. The income of farmers from the sale of their products depends on the prices at which the products sell. The general level of agricultural prices, in turn, depends primarily on the income of nonfarm population. But the income of the nonfarm population depends on the prices of nonfarm products which, in turn, depends partly on the income of farmers.
    This kind of analysis is often criticized as circular reasoning and hence as incapable of leading to any useful conclusions. Is this criticism valid? Explain your answer.
  2. Discuss the following quotation from Marshall:

“A useful history of the opposition to machinery is given in Industrial Democracy (by Sidney and Beatrice Webb)…It is combined with the advice (to trade unions) not generally to resist the introduction of machinery, but not to accept lower wages for working on the old methods in order to meet its competition. This is good advice for young men. But it cannot be followed by men who have reached their prime.”

  1. How would you expect prices in local, neighborhood, stores in large cities to compare with prices in the central shopping district (in Chicago, the “loop”)? In your answer, distinguish among different products, and include an evaluation of the statement so often made by neighborhood stores that they can charge lower prices because they pay lower rents.

Part II

  1. There are 100 each of A and B farms. The product schedules of one farm are
Number of laborers Total Product
A Farm B Farm
1 40 40
2 90 80
3 140 115
4 185 145
5 225 170
6 260 190
7 290 205
8 315 215
9 335 220

a) Determine wages, rents, and employment on both types of farms

(i) if there are 900 laborers and full competition
(ii) if with 900 laborers, the laborers on the A farms organize and succeed in setting a wage rate of 40,
(iii) if, with 900 laborers, the laborers on the A farms organize and succeed in raising the standard wage rate to 47.

b) State briefly the general economic principles illustrated by each part of the above problem.

  1. Consider a hypothetical society in which there is no investment, either net or gross. All capital is completely permanent, not subject to change in form but capable of being used for different purposes. There is no lending or borrowing, no selling or buying of capital goods: whoever owns the capital goods is forced by the laws or conventions of society to hold them and is permitted only to rent them out (i.e., all capital is subject to the conventions that now govern human capital). Hence there is no market interest rate that matters, and all saving takes the form of hoarding of cash. The total amount of money in society is fixed in nominal units (say dollars). Wages are initially rigid (by law or otherwise) and the society is in a state of Keynesian unemployment equilibrium, unemployment keeping the real income down to a level at which dissaving equals saving, so total net saving is zero.Now wages are made flexible. Describe the process of adjustment to a new equilibrium position. Does this new position involve unemployment? What is the equilibrium condition on total net saving? What forces operate to bring about the satisfaction of this equilibrium condition?

Source: Kaplan, Norman Maurice. Papers, Box 1, Folder 8, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.

Image Source:  Milton Friedman, from University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf1-06230, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.

Categories
Chicago Economist Market Economists

Chicago. Marschak on potential hires for department, 1946

 

In his magnificent article about the departmental politics behind the appointment of Milton Friedman at the University of Chicago in 1946, David Mitch refers in passing to a February 1946 memo written to the Chancellor and President of the University by Vice-President Rueben G. Gustavson in which the Vice-President reports on a discussion he had with Jacob Marschak about various economists being considered for appointment.

Mitch’s online Appendix to his article provides an excellent selection of archival artifacts to which the transcription of the Gustavson memo below may be added. In this memo it looks like we are observing active lobbying (at least providing his “spin”) on Marschak’s part rather than a senior faculty member summoned by an administrator to provide deep background on prospective hires.

It is worth noting that the names of five future Nobel prize winners in economics can be found in a single 1946 memo. It is also interesting that the last two candidates mentioned in the memo, namely Lloyd Metzler and Milton Friedman, were the only two to turn out to become permanent acquisitions of the department.

 

See: David Mitch, “A Year of Transition: Faculty Recruiting at Chicago in 1946,” Journal of Political Economy 124, no. 6 (December 2016): 1714-1734. [working paper version (ungated)]

__________________________________

Biographical Note of Rueben Gilbert Gustavson

Rueben Gilbert Gustavson was born (April 6, 1892-February 24, 1974) to Swedish immigrants James and Hildegard Gustavson. As a young man Gustavson developed a strong belief in moral responsibility to others. After a childhood injury made following in his father’s footsteps as a carpenter impossible he attended high school where he excelled in his studies. In deference to his father’s wish he learn practical skills Gustavson took courses in typing and stenography. These classes enabled Reuben to gain employment with Colorado and Southern Railroad where he became secretary to the auditor. The monies Gustavson earned working at the railroad enabled him to enroll in at the University of Denver, DU. After obtaining his bachelor’s degree DU Gustavson decided to pursue a master’s degree in chemistry. He received his MS in chemistry in 1917 and briefly became a chemist at the Great Western Sugar Company. He accepted an offer to teach at the Colorado Agricultural College in Fort Collins but became disillusioned when told that as a professor he could not teach and conduct research. Gustavson returned to DU where he remained for the next seventeen years. During that time he spent summer breaks working toward his PhD at the University of Chicago. Initially, specializing in radioactivity the loss of his advisor enabled him to change to biochemistry. Gustavson received his PhD in 1925 and taught at the University of Chicago during the 1929-30 academic year. A disagreement over what Gustavson felt were unethical practices involving student athletes led to him leaving DU. University of Colorado President, George Norlin, invited Gustavson to join the faculty as a professor of chemistry. He was appointed chairman of the chemistry department and remained in that position from 1937-42. In 1942 the Dean of the Graduate School became ill and Gustavson was chosen as a temporary replacement but when the dean died the position became permanent. Now involved in the academic administration of the university Gustavson was chosen to substitute for the new president of the University of Colorado, Robert L. Stearns, during World War II. Stearns was commissioned as an officer in the Army Air Corps. Gustavson accepted the position with the understanding that Stearns would resume the presidency when he returned. After the war Gustavson became the Vice President and Dean of Faculties at the University of Chicago for a short time in 1945-46. During Gustavson’s time at the University of Chicago he worked with Enrico Fermi and Edward Teller on the atomic bomb project. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki convinced Gustavson the only hope for human survival was the promotion of peace through education that taught appreciation of other peoples and cultures. In 1946 Gustavson moved to the University of Nebraska where he remained as Chancellor until 1953. After leaving the University of Nebraska Gustavson became the first president of Resources for the Future where he served from 1953-1959. An outgrowth of his work on the atomic bomb project this organization conducted economic research and analysis to help craft better policies on the use and preservation of natural resources. Gustavson then resumed teaching at the University of Arizona and was a member of the chemistry department from 1960 until his death in 1974.

Source: John Patrick McSweeney. The Chancellorship of Reuben G. Gustavson at the University of Nebraska, 1946-1953. Lincoln: Digital Commons @ University of Nebraska, 1971.

__________________________________

Gustavson Memorandum of Discussion with Jacob Marshak

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Date February 19, 1946

To:     RMH [Robert Maynard Hutchins, President of the University of Chicago (1929-45); Chancellor (1945-51)]; ECC [Ernest Cadman Colwell, President of the University of Chicago (1945-51)]
From: RGG [Reuben G. Gustavson, Vice-President of the University of Chicago (1945-1946)]

Professor Marschak came in to talk to me about possible recommendations for men in the Department of Economics. He discussed the following:

  1. John Hicks of London. He is now at Oxford but is coming to this country. He is about forty years of age. He is quite well known, especially for his book called the “Brainwork of Social Economy.” [sic, The Social Framework: An Introduction to Economics] This book is now being used in the College.
  2. Paul Samuelson is a much younger man than Hicks. He is now an associate professor at M.I.T. He is known for his work in the general theory of disequilibrium.
  3. Arthur Smithies is professor at the University of Michigan. He is now in the Bureau of the Budget at Washington. Marschak describes him as a man who is concerned with economic policies. He takes the empirical approach to the study of economics.

Marschak states that Mr. Hicks is also a good man in local finance [Hicks’ wife, Ursula Hicks, probably mentioned by Marschak]. He says also that T. Koopmans, Research Associate with the Cowles Commission, who has been recommended for an associate professorship, is a very fine man. He is in mathematical statistics. He speaks highly of Lionel Robbins of the London School. Marschak says he is an all-around personality. He has been of great service to the English government during the war.

He thinks very highly of Lloyd Metzler. He was an instructor at Harvard. He as applied the modern methods of Samuelson to international trade.

Professor Marschak also thinks very highly of Milton Friedman, who is a graduate of the University of Chicago.

I shall discuss all these men with Schultz.

 

Source: University of Chicago Library, Department of Special Collections. Office of the President. Hutchins Administration. Records. Box 284, Folder “Economics, 1943-1947”.

 

Image Source: Reuben G. Gustavson from University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf1-06588, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.