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Chicago Economists Methodology

USDA Graduate School. Frank Knight Lecture on Economics Methodology, 1930

 

In an obscure publication of a series of special lectures at the United States Department of Agriculture held in 1930, I found the following interesting methodological reflections of Frank Knight that are reproduced below. An earlier post provided E.B. Wilson’s thoughts on the application of scientific methods in economics (see link below) which more or less staked out precisely the opposite position to Knight. 

_____________________

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
GRADUATE SCHOOL
SPECIAL LECTURES ON ECONOMICS
DELIVERED BEFORE THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
FEBRUARY – MARCH 1930

 

Contents: The following lectures were delivered before the students of the Graduate School in February and March 1930, and are issued in this form for present and former students of the school.

Scientific Method in Economic Research
by Dr. E. B. Wilson, President, Social Science Research Council.

Evaluating Institutions as a Factor in Economic Change
by Prof. John R. Commons, University of Wisconsin.

Analytical Methods in Agricultural Economics Research
by Dr. John D. Black, Harvard University.

Fact and Interpretation in Economics
by Dr. F. H. Knight, University of Chicago.

[…]

FACT AND INTERPRETATION IN ECONOMICS

By Dr. F. H. Knight, University of Chicago.

My task on this occasion is one to be approached with misgivings, and I do approach it with doubts. I do not see clearly and surely in the field of economic methodology, and the airing of doubts, or viewing with alarm is likely to be thought an ungracious performance. Nobody loves a bear! But after all doubts have their place. We do not get where we want to be by driving with enthusiasm and power and speed in the wrong direction. And I do feel strongly that some present trends in economic activity carry more than a threat of wasted energy. If the effort to solve a problem is to be fruitful it must be put forth in the light of a correct conception of the nature of the problem itself, and there can be no real gain from conceiving a problem more simply than it realty is, and thus make the solution appear easier.

My reference is of course to the current enthusiasm for making the study of economics “scientific,” meaning factual, concrete and quantitative, or specifically, statistical. I have to raise questions and suggest doubts as to whether the proper content of this study, or “science” can really be facts, whether it can really be a “science” if we use the term in the sense it carries in speaking of the natural sciences. As the subject announced is intended to suggest, I must argue that Economics deals rather, primarily, with meanings with what facts mean rather than facts themselves. Consequently, while of course we have to consider facts and be careful to get them “right” we have to approach them, and look at their rightness and wrongness in very different terms from those proper to the natural scientist; for the economist or other social scientist, in this view, facts are preliminary, not the real subject matter of the study. The main theme of these remarks will then be the contrast in character and method between the natural sciences and those which deal with man in society, with particular reference, of course, to economics.

At the outset, however, I want further to say that I understand the feelings of those who want to make economics an objective and quantitative science, and sympathize with them deeply. The “backwardness” of the studies dealing with man, in comparison with those dealing with nature, is superficially an obtrusive fact, and one which seems superficially to point its own moral. In the face of the contrast between the solid achievements of the natural sciences in the past few centuries, and the relative lack of advance in the understanding or control of social relations since the Ancient Greeks, it is natural to conclude that the way to reform the social sciences would be to imitate those which appear so much more successful in their task. And in particular, it is natural to hit upon the theory that the social sciences have “remained” in the “speculative” stage, while the natural sciences have taken to careful detailed observation, measurement and experimentation. In the face of this situation, to repeat the thought in more vernacular terms, it is most natural to develop a certain impatience, to insist on getting out of the stage of speculating and arguing what to do, and do something, and to put content into this by making it mean to get the facts, bring them into relation with each other and see how they may be used for prediction and control, as the physical sciences have been so successful in doing.

However, a little examination will show that the case is not so simple as that. To begin with, we have long had natural sciences of man and they tell us nothing about social events. The physics, chemistry, biology, physiology and pathology of the human organism are extensively studied and well developed and beyond a few broad and obvious statements, mostly negative, they do not reveal anything about the course of history, or make possible the prediction and control of social movements. We know that human beings will always eat, and that if they live in certain climatic zones they will have some protection from the elements. Perhaps we may add speech and recreation as biological traits. But such general information is of no concrete use to the economist, for example. To be useful to him it must go so much farther, into so much greater detail, as to what people will eat, wear, etc., and how much, and how, that the problems become different in kind as well as degree. As soon as we try to make general statements in this field, we find that any general import they have runs in terms of something quite other than the facts observed by the senses. The uniformity, as suggested already, is in the meanings, not in the concrete content of behavior. Even in the matter of food, it is men’s knowledge or beliefs about what is desirable or “fit” to eat rather than that actual physical qualities of materials which are decisive.

The best illustration in principle is in the field of communication. The sounds and characters are physical facts, but there is practically no discoverable relation between these and what they are used to convey. If we know anything for sure, we can say we know there is no connection between language differences and either physical differences in the peoples or the content of thought or emotion they wish to communicate. It appears that any person could equally well learn any language and, that with slight reservations, not important in this connection, any language can equally well express any content that is expressible.

The function of the natural sciences is to describe the properties and “behavior” of things as they appear to our senses, that is, physical things and materials in space, and behavior which reduces to rearrangement of matter in space. The essence of it is the descriptive point of view. It tells what happens, not why anything happens. From the “pure” science point of view itself (separated from practical significance) it enables us to understand the complex manifold of events in the outer world by reducing them to a manageable number of elemental general principles, especially and perhaps at last entirely, those of mechanics. It does this by finding “uniformities” or “repetitions” in events, by showing that under similar conditions similar consequences follow. Thus Newton showed that the movements of the heavenly bodies exemplify the same phenomenon of “falling” that is familiar for objects near the earth’s surface; and Darwin showed that the production of the infinite variety of plant and animal forms might be viewed as a working out of the same principle as the production of new varieties through selective breeding by the gardener or fancier.

Back of this function of science of enabling us to understand things, of explaining and so satisfying our intellectual cravings, is, as we all know, the practical function or functions, of making possible prediction and control. The fundamental point here, which seems to be overlooked in proposing to make the social sciences “scientific” is that the natural sciences themselves are based on the assumption of a sharp antithesis between man and nature. Man is the controller, nature the to-be-controlled. In fact, quite aside from this practical relationship between user and used, workman and tool, the same insuperable opposition really holds in the mere logical relationship between knower and known, or understander and thing, or matter understood. But it is clearest in the practical view. All our notions of prediction and control, by man over nature, through science are bound up in a conception of nature as passive, over against ourselves as possessed of mind, will and initiative. It is never trying to control man. More specifically, we view nature as an aggregate of things and materials in space, purposeless and inert in themselves, completely amenable to “control” from without in the particular sense of being movable from one place to another, which movement may liberate potential energy stored up in them, or modify the process of storing up or releasing such energy in some way.

When we examine the notion of prediction we find that it reduces either to the fact of “inertia,” the property of things by which they stay where they are or keep on moving as they are moving at any time, unless “acted upon” in the sense of having motion (or some new motion) imparted to them from without, or to the release of potential energy. The notion of control is always relative to movement because the only way in which human beings can act upon the external world or produce any change in it is through our voluntary muscles, which can directly produce only the, change of moving some bit of matter from one point in space to another. All changes which man produces and which constitute his “control” over nature are the results in nature of such movements of matter if they go beyond the immediate fact of motion itself. Most of our knowledge of nature, the content of the sciences, which gives variety and significance to our control activities, consists of facts regarding the processes (always the same under the same conditions) according to which energy is stored up in or released from natural materials in connection with their spatial relationships. The amount of energy communicated to natural objects by our muscles directly is generally negligible, though such a movement as striking a match may start energy changes which will explode a magazine or burn up a city.

The point here is merely that science itself depends on the assumption that just as things do not move or change their state of motion of themselves, they do not change their behavior in storing up or releasing energy of themselves, but do change as to these processes in uniform ways in response to outside acts of the form of moving them about in space in relation to each other. These uniformities are physical. A natural process, for instance, may be set off by a sound. It is said that avalanches have been started by sound waves. But in nature, the same sound will always produce the same effect. Sounds, and other causes, act as what they physically are, and not as symbols or bearers of meaning. Let us consider the contrast between this situation and that presented by the problem of applying scientific method in the field of the study of man.

In the first place, we must again note, human beings are undoubtedly natural objects, things in space, and as such they seem to be subject to all the laws and principles which science finds to hold for other objects under the same conditions. The same principles of physics and chemistry and physiology apply in the human body as elsewhere, as far as the most careful measurement reveals. But in addition some other principles seem to apply which do not hold good elsewhere. Men are more than mechanical objects which release energy in uniform ways in response to external movements of matter. They initiate changes, out of all discoverable uniformity of relation to external changes of any kind; and when they do respond to external changes, the nature of the response has relatively little uniform relation to the physical nature of the stimulus but is chiefly a matter of what we call the meaning of the stimulus-event which puts the whole occurrence, as the philosophers say, in a different universe of discourse. These meanings and the responses to them depend on the history, which is a thing made up of meanings, of social groups and the particular life-history of the individual in the group; and they are very largely free from “dependence” on anything which research has yet disclosed. As far as can be judged in the present state of knowledge (in the speaker’s opinion) the problem of understanding and explaining these phenomena must be approached in a quite different way from that of understanding and explaining physical nature. (In the scientific sense I mean; ultimately, philosophically, the problem of explaining nature is itself likely very different from that of science, for as already noted science does not pretend to give any answer to any question of why things are as they are.)

The root of the difficulty in regard to explaining and controlling human beings is the fact that the explainers and controllers are likewise human beings. It is impossible to regard human beings as of one kind when understanding and exercising control and of another and totally different kind when being understood and controlled and yet the two roles call for different characteristics. I shall return to this point presently. For the moment I wish to go a little more into detail about the “more,” in the statement that man is more than an object in space behaving in relation to other objects in accordance with universal mechanical principles.

It is possible to look at a human being in several strongly contrasting ways, and describe him in different sets of terms. We may look at him, for example, in psychological terms, and “explain” his acts by relating them to mental states. Many changes can be wrung on this theme. The philosopher Hegel gave a logical or dialectical interpretation of history, and the British psychologists of the early nineteenth century explained human nature in terms of association of ideas.

Another possible approach is in terms of “institutions,” a term which is being much used in economics these days, and very loosely used, and largely misused. An institution in the proper sense is a phenomenon of the nature of the language. It is neither a mechanical response to a physical stimulus nor a deliberately contrived procedure for achieving an end. Language is of course a tool, it is seen to be one after it has developed, but no one ever contrived it (in so far as it is a pure type of institution). It is believed by students of the subject that language actually developed primarily as a vehicle of emotional expression and acquired its more utilitarian functions secondarily. In any case, the methodological point is that the student of language treats it as an entity on its own account, indeed without very express reference to human beings or their interests and acts. It seems to have its own laws of relationship and of change, much like an organic species. It is a figure of speech, but a descriptive one, to call the human group the soil in which a language, or other institution, grows. Just as the plant one gets depends on the seed sown and not to any great extent on the soil, so it seems that institutions grow and change without much reference to the human beings who carry them on — though sensitive to contact with other related institutions with which they may hybridize, again much like plants.

There is much justification for an “institutional” approach to what we call economic phenomena. If we look at the facts of wealth and the processes of its production, distribution and consumption, and ask “why” these things are as they are, it is a very defensible answer to hold that they are customs which have grown up, much in the way in which a language grows, and to be “explained” only by giving the details of the history of that growth. Such an interpretation should, it seems clear to me, be kept very distinct from the “statistical” approach to the same problem. Economic statistics stand as a method at the opposite pole from institutional history. There is little or no distinctly human content of any kind in them. They relate almost entirely to commodities as such, and to external means of economic life rather than that life itself.

It is to be noted that the traditional or orthodox economic thought, in the British utilitarian line, is very different from both of these; in fact institutionalism and business statistics represent reactions in opposite directions from the utility-and-cost, supply-and-demand economics. The conception of human nature involved in the latter is interesting and needs to be clearly understood. Man is not looked on as a physical behavior mechanism, or a psychological being, or as the bearer of institutions, but as a being who has wants and limited means for satisfying them, and who is confronted with the problem of making the means go as far as possible. The means and ends of action are data, the procedure itself problematical. This standpoint will be clearer if it is contrasted, on the one hand, with a mechanical view of human nature, in which the response is completely determined by the conditions and hence is not in any sense problematic, and, on the other hand, with a view (or with a type of situation) in which action is conceived in terms of means and end but the end is also conceived of as problematical. As I myself see the matter the view of “unsophisticated common-sense” is in the main that of the classical economics. We assume that people in general know what they want, and are confronted with the problem of getting it, in the maximum degree, with the limited means at hand, which problem they “solve” more or less completely, through intelligence or luck. The problem itself, the ends to be realized and the means and conditions are given in the person and his situation, but his activity in “solving” it is peculiar in that it involves effort and in general a greater or smaller margin of error, these being absent from mechanical reactions.

When we look critically at human behavior, it seems to me that we are forced to recognize that the ends of action are problematic in about as great a degree as the means. Life seems to be an exploration as much as it is a quest in which we know what we are trying to find. This conception might be designated by speaking of the ethical man, in contrast with the economic man and the mechanical or behavioristic man, a variation of which would be the institutional man.

The difficulty is that all these views, and still others which I cannot here even list, have some degree of validity, and yet it is most difficult to make them seem consistent with each other. The philosopher Kant gave effective statement to a part of the problem, the conflict between the mechanical and ethical view of human nature, in his famous statement that man is at once subject to universal causality and a self-legislating member of a kingdom of ends. As I see the “facts” – which are facts in the sense that everyone treats them as such when he is not expressly trying to prove some theory – the situation is much more complicated, and hence much “worse” from the standpoint of our intellectual cravings and practical needs for simplicity. We seem to have to reconcile ourselves to the fact that man is at once not merely two but a great many different kinds of being, kinds which seem logically contradictory. He is different kinds under different circumstances, or capriciously or accidentally, and he is even several kinds in the same situation. He is a cause-and-effect mechanism and a bearer of culture or “soil” in which institutions grow according to their own laws of growth, a being of irrational judgments and a being who deliberates and decides intelligently (more or less!) and this both regarding procedures for reaching ends which he accepts unconsciously and also about ends to be chosen and pursued. For anything like completeness we should have to add still other items to the list, such as that he is commonly and in all sorts of degrees a dreamer and mystic and even an intrinsically “contrary” being and often takes a perverse delight in being thwarted and punished and in having grievances against the world and all and sundry in it.

It is indeed a formidable if not forbidding task to theorize about such a creature or formulate generalizations in terms of which his actions can be predicted and controlled. But it is hardly in conformity with the scientific attitude to insist on false simplification or refuse to face the facts because they present difficulties. The contrast between the problem of prediction and control in the case of a mechanism and in the case of human beings may be seen in a number of kinds of simple illustrative cases. In the first place, the entire theory of science depends, as noted above, on the repetitiveness of events and uniformity of relationships; the same effects follow the same causes. But in the mere external facts of the case this is not true of human beings. Physically, chemically and physiologically they are alike, enough to infer from one case to another, within limits, though it must be remarked that even in this field the science of medicine is seriously embarrassed by unaccountable differences in the reaction of different cases to the same treatment. Moreover, the doctor, if candid and shrewd, relies perhaps as much on psychological treatment wisely varied to fit the case as he does on drugs and physical therapeutic agents. On the plane of social behavior, however, even this minimum of uniformity seems conspicuously absent. Experiment with one human being simply does not tell how another will respond to the same experiment, as nearly identical as it is possible to make the repetition.

And worse, it is in the very nature of the creatures that the same one will not ordinarily respond in at all the same way if an experiment is repeated. Let anyone try the simplest experiment, such as telling another a story or sticking him with a pin or offering him a present of a five dollar bill, and then repeat the “stimulus.” It is, as just stated, the very nature of a human being not to be at all the same person with reference to a repeated situation as to its first occurrence. A gun or a trap which has been discharged or sprung is, when reloaded or reset, the same as before, but you cannot restore a person to the original condition, even to the degree within which it is possible to find another like him. People are different from mechanical objects in that they have a history. In part this difficulty may be avoided by taking them in groups, but groups also are always unlike and each group has a history. None of us is like his forefathers, even in the tenuous sense in which he is like his contemporaries. Our “situations” are very different, and our responses are different even where the situations appear similar.

This does not mean that the case is hopeless, that there is no place for intelligence in human relationships, or even that it is impossible to effect improvement through diligent observation and study. Our everyday experience proves the contrary. With all our bewilderment, we do have a fair knowledge of what to expect of our fellow-beings in ordinary situations and of how to treat them to secure cooperation and orderly living. It is a question of method. We do not acquire our common-sense knowledge of how to get along with our fellows in the same way as our common-sense knowledge of how to respond to and use natural objects, and it is reasonable to suppose that in the one case as in the other improvement will be secured by refinement along the general line of common-sense procedure. The essential fact in understanding our fellow human beings is primarily that we communicate with them. Thus in a sense we get inside of them instead of merely observing them from without. Of course our communication is based upon external observation, but the essential difference remains.

It is impossible to elaborate upon this difference here, and it should not be necessary. The heart of it is the contrast between a more direct instinctive but unformulated knowledge, based on familiarity on the one hand, and, on the other, reduction to rule in terms of physical units. A good illustration is the learning of a language. We can and do, without great difficulty, learn the meanings of sounds and characters and recognize them with fair accuracy and with little effort. But to base such knowledge on physically measured specifications as to the precise wave-forms or shapes would be quite out of the question practically, though a certain amount of such study may be interesting afterwards. The principle holds throughout the field of human phenomena and relationships. We describe people and works of art and literature and other products with a fair degree of intelligibility, and recognize them by their traits, though we could not make a beginning at putting this knowledge in accurate, scientific, physical terms. (Of course the artist who wishes to simulate effects in a physical medium does have to know in a sense how the lines and colors go, but his knowledge is also an immediate feel of how to do the thing and nearly as far remote from the ideal of mechanical “directions” as is the interpretative recognition of the layman.

My concrete suggestion is that if economics and the social sciences want to make more rapid progress they must give up the visionary ideal of building a society from blueprints and dimensions as we build a house and quit trying to imitate engineering and the sciences upon which it is based and turn rather to the study of their own data and. the processes by which we do come to have some intelligence in relation to these data on the level where progress, has already been achieved. That is, we should learn from “art” in the broad sense, and from the way in which the arts are learned and taught rather than from physical science and engineering technique.

It is to be admitted that in an important sense this is less satisfying. Our minds to crave the definite rule, the fool-proof formula. But it is a question of facing facts, and the actual character of the problem. It will never be as simple and definite a matter to improve the grammar or the morals of a social group as it is to build a bridge or compound a chemical. But we shall not make the task easier by insisting on applying methods which would admittedly be more satisfactory if they could be applied but which simply will not work because it is not that kind of a problem.

In conclusion I wish briefly to call especial attention to two sets of facts. The first is that in controlling human beings the “techniques” employed include such things as teaching, persuading, exhorting, or finally deception and coercion (which may presumably be practiced for “good” as well as “bad” ends). The point is that such concepts hove no meaning in connection with the procedure for controlling physical objects. When these procedures are sometimes applied to the higher animals it is evident that we are treating them like human beings rather than like mechanisms.

The second fact, or set of facts, is closely related to the first, but of even wider significance. It is that as words like persuade and still more deceit and coercion imply, the moral implications of the control of human beings are decidedly dubious. There is not time to develop either of these points as they deserve. But in a society as expressly and vociferously grounded on the ideal of freedom as ours is, it should not be necessary to elaborate this second one at great length. I am astounded at the facility with which discussions on “controlling” society and individuals pass over the essential questions of who is to do the controlling and how society is to control its controllers. In the economic field specifically I wish personally to register hearty agreement with whoever it was who made the suggestion that we ought to be subsidizing schools of resisting salesmanship instead of schools of salesmanship. And similarly in the political field. It is questionable much of the time whether our so-called criminals are either less ethical or less defiant of the actual law and constitution than are the officials supposed to safeguard the one by enforcing the other. It does not seem to me very intelligent to get all excited over developing techniques for “control” without having some advance information as to who is to use them and “on” whom they are to be used. Particularly since in view of the type of people who do get into power in democracies it seems fairly certain that the scientist himself will generally be in the group the techniques are used “on” and not the group they will be used “by”.

Irresistibly we are thrown back on the general philosophical problem already suggested but too large and too technical to go into here, the relation between controller and controlled, and between student and subject-matter. In the natural sciences it is taken for granted that these are wholly separate and directly opposed. It is “man” who studies and uses “nature!” It is a pernicious fallacy to carry over this type of thinking into the field where the student and subject-matter are of the same kind, and still more where they are identified. If the one-sided relationship is not preserved, we find ourselves committed to such absurdities as that when the scientist is experimenting with a piece of apparatus it is also in the same sense experimenting with him. The whole problem of control in society must be thought through in different terms. In any society which has aims and ideals, in any society which is not owned outright by an absolutely ruthless despot, “control” is a matter of mutual relationships, not of the one-sided character referred to by terms like control. Its members are controllers of nature and to be made in the highest degree controllers of themselves, not tools or pawns for some ruler.

The real problem of social control is the problem of securing agreement as to policy and as to the functions of individuals in promoting it where policy has to be social, and of securing the minimum of interference (“control”) for each individual in the field of what are properly his private affairs. At no important point is this problem at all similar to that confronting an engineer or any real controller. Such “control” as is legitimate in society must be “with the consent of the controlled” which makes it a categorically different phenomenon. The only exceptions admissible are the cases of individuals proven incompetent to participate in “free” society, and even those are still to be treated as far as possible as ends in themselves or ultimately perhaps as “enemies,” but in any case, never (in the modern civilized world), as means and instruments to the purposes of others, which is the position taken for granted with regard to natural objects when we talk in the scientific sense of knowledge, prediction and control.

 

Source: United States Department of Agriculture Graduate School. Special Lectures on Economics. Washington, D.C.: 1930. Pages 37- 45.

University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf1-03516Image Source: , Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.

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Chicago. Hayek’s Seminar “Equality and Justice”, 1950-51

 

When Friedrich Hayek came to the University of Chicago in 1950, he organized a faculty seminar to run for two consecutive quarters on the subject “Equality and Justice”. A draft of his letter announcing the seminar as well as its schedule and suggested bibliography are transcribed below. I have added in brackets any handwritten additions found in this material that otherwise was typed.

_____________________

Hayek’s Seminar Announcement to Colleagues

To

Walter J. Blum ✓

Ronald S. Crane ✓

Aaron Director ✓

Milton Friedman ✓

Robert M. Hutchins ✓

Harry Kalven Jr. ✓

Wilber C. Katz ✓

Frank H. Knight ✓

Edward H. Levi ✓

Hans J. Morgenthau ✓

Charner M. Perry ✓

Max Rheinstein ✓

Leo Strauss ✓

W. Allen Wallis ✓

[handwritten additions]

Peter H. von Blanckenhagen [sp?] ✓

Daniel J. Boorstin ✓

John U. Nef ✓

Robert Redfield ✓

Edw. Shils

Yves R. Simon ✓

James R. Smith ✓

Abram L. Harris

 

October 23, 1950

            The first meeting of the seminar on “Equality and Justice”, which I shall be conducting for the Committee on Social Thought, will be held on Wednesday, October 25, at S.S.302. For the following few weeks the seminar will be held on alternate Wednesdays at the same time and place (alternating with Mr. T.S. Elliot’s seminar) and from November 22 on each Wednesday during the Fall, Winter, and Spring quarters.

A provisional program for the discussions of the seminar is enclosed.

It is my hope that the seminar can be conducted with the participation of members of all the various departments concerned, particularly a number of lawyers, economists, and philosophers, and that the discussion will be to some extent a iscussion among faculty members in front of the students, though of course without excluding the students from active participation. My belated arrival in Chicago has unfortunately made it impossible for me to discuss this plan with all those I had hoped personally to invite, and I can thus only at this very late moment inform you of the plan and say that I very much hope that you will be sufficiently interested to take part and that I shall be greatly honored by your presence.

(F.A.Hayek)

_____________________

COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL THOUGHT
Seminar
on
Equality and Justice

Provisional Outline of Program (Oct. 18, 1950)

1) Oct. 25

Introduction: The problems and outline of program [Hayek]

A. Historical

2) Nov. 8

The Classical and Scholastic Tradition: Commutative and Distributive Justice [Simons]

3) Nov. 22

[3a) Nov. 29]

The Egalitarianism of the American and French Revolutions [Boorstin & Simon]
[Rousseau, Kant & the Utilitarians (Bentham & J. S. Mill)]

B. Systemic

(a) Ethical (The Morals of Equality)

4)

The Meanings of Equality [Hayek]

5)

Value Judgments and the Analysis of Conflicts of Value Tests of Moral Rules [What is the Test of a desirable Society? Shils]

6)

Does Justice Presuppose Abstract Principles? The “feeling of right” and the Logic of the Law

(b) Legal (The practice of equality)

7)

Equality before the law, the Rule of Law (Government of Laws not of Men), Certainty of the Law

8)

Safeguards: Rights of Men, Division of Powers, Due Process

9)

The Continental Tradition of the “Rechtsstaat” [, “Verwaltungsrecht”, Common Law, Case Law, (illegible phrase)     Rheinstein]

10)

Natural Justice and Positive Law [Strauss]

(c) Economic (The Effects of Equality)

11)

Equality of Opportunity,” “Equal Starting Point” [Equality & Education]

12)

[12a]

Equality and Incentives, “Equal Pay for Equal Work”
[Equal Bargaining Power]
“Equalising Wages”
[(I.L.O.) F.E.P.C., “Parity”, Whole Produce of Labour, Equality and Progress, Technological Change, Capital Formation]

13)

Just Price” [Knight]

14)

Equality and the Family, Inheritance, Effects of Property on Inequality, “Unearned Income”

15)

Progressive Taxation

16)

Equality and Trade Unionism (Corporativism) [Director]

17)

The Contribution of Welfare Economics [Friedman]

18)

International Aspects of Equality, esp. Migration.

[Property and Inheritance]

[1) Reward & Merit]

_____________________

COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL THOUGHT
SEMINAR ON “EQUALITY AND JUSTICE”
(1950-51)

Bibliography

Lord Acton, The History of Liberty, 1904.
C. Bouglé, Les idées égalitaires, 1899.
E. F. Carrit, “Liberty and Equality,” Law Quarterly Review, 56, 1940.
F. S. Cohen, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals, 1933.
A. V. Dicey, Relation between Law and Public Opinion, 1904.
F. D. Graham, Social Goals and Economic Institutions, 1945.
J. B. S. Haldane, The Inequality of Man.
F. A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, 1944 (esp. Chapt. VI).
“          Individualism and Economic Order, 1948 (First Essay)
“          “Scientism and the Study of Society,” Economica, 1942-44.
A. Huxley, Proper Studies, (Essay on Equality).
F. H. Knight, The Ethics of Competition, 1936.
“          Freedom and Reform, 1948.
J. S. Mill, Liberty, 1859.
“          Utilitarianism. 1863. (Chapt. on Justice).
Roscoe Pound, Spirit of the Common Law, 1921.
H. Sidgwick, Elements of Politics.
H. C. Simons, Economic Policy for a Free Society, 1948.
T. V. Smith, The American Philosophy of Equality, 1927.
J. F. Stephen, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, 1874.
J. Stone, The Province and Function of Law, 1950.
R. H. Tawney, Equality, 1931.
A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1835.
“          Ancient Regime and the Revolution, 1856.
A. T. Williams, The Concept of Equality in the Writings of Rousseau, Bentham and Kant, 1907.
D. M. Wright, Democracy and Progress, 1948.

_____________________

COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL THOUGHT
Seminar on “Equality and Justice”
(Wednesday 8-10 p.m., SS 302)

PART II: Winter Quarter 1951

Provisional Date

Jan. 3

1. THE MEANINGS OF EQUALITY

D. Thompson, Equality, Cambridge University Press, 1949
R. H. Tawney, Equality, 3rd ed. London (Allen & Unwin) 1938
H. Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, Oxford 1907, vol. I, ch. VIII
E. Brunner, Justice and the Social Order, New York (Harper) 1945
C. Bouglé, Les idées égalitaires, Paris 1899
G. Roffenstein, “Das soziologische Problem der Gleichheit”, Schmoller’s Jahrbuch, XLV, 1921

Jan. 17

2. VALUE JUDGMENTS AND SCIENCE. ANALYSIS OF CONFLICTS OF VALUE. TESTS OF DESIRABILITY OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS.

Max Weber, On the Methodology of the Social Sciences, ed. E. Shils, 1949.
Jan. 24

3. PRINCIPLES AND MORAL JUDGMENT. MORAL SENSE AND THE “FEELING OF JUSTICE”

J. H. Muirhead, Rule and End in Morals, Oxford 1932
J. Bonar, Moral Sense, London (Allen & Unwin) 1930
E. Riezler, Das Rechtsgefühl, Berlin (Walter de Gruyter) 1921
G. Ryle, “Knowing how and knowing that”, Proceed. Aristot. Soc., N.S. 46, 1945
Jan. 31 4. THE ETHICS OF SOCIALISM AND OF LIBERALISM
J. A. Hobson, Economics and Ethics (D. C. Heath) 1929
W. B. Gallie, “Liberal Morality and Socialist Morality”, Philosophy, XXIV, 1949
F. Tönnies, “Ethik und Sozialismus”, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft, 1905
K. Pearson, The Moral Basis of Socialism. London 1885
Feb. 7 5. NATURAL JUSTICE AND POSITIVE LAW. CONCEPTS OF LAW AND JUSTICE
M. R. Cohen, Law and Social Order, 1933
J. Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law, New York 1943
F. R. Bienenfeld, Rediscovery of Justice 1947
L. Duguit, Manuel de Droit Constitutionel, 1923
G. del Vecchio, La Guistizia, 1924 (trsl. Die Gerechtigkeit, Basel 1940)
F. S. Cohen, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideas, 1933
Feb. 21 6. THE “RULE OF LAW” (“RECHTSSTAAT”, “ETAT DU DROIT”, “STATO DI DIRITTO”) EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW. GENERALITY OF THE LAW (“RELEVANT DISTINCTIONS”). CERTAINTY OF THE LAW
J. Stone, The Province and Function of Law, Harvard Univ. Press 1950
W. I. Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, 3rd ed. 1943
W. Friedman, Legal Theory, 2nd ed. London 1949
F. A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, 1944
A. V. Dicey, Law of the Constitution, 7th ed. 1908
R. Gneist, Der Rechsstaat, Berlin 1872
F. Darmstaedter, Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Rechtsstaates, 1930
F. Battaglia, “Stato Etico e Stato di Diritto”, Rivista Internationale di Filosofia di Diritto, XVII
G. Leibholz, Die Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz, Berlin 1925
C. A. Emge, “Sicherheit und Gerechtigkeit”, Abh. d. preuss. Akad. d. Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, 1940, No. 9
H. W. R. Wadem, “The Concept of Legal Certainty”, Modern Law Review, IV, 1941
Feb. 28 LAW AND THE COURTS: DIVISION OF POWERS, APPLICATION AND CREATION OF THE LAW. DUE PROCESS
Literature as under 5 and 6
Mar. 7 8. ADMINISTRATION AND DISCRETION
J. Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of the Law, Harvard University Press, 1927
W. Robson, Justice and Administrative Law
J. Roland Pennock, Administration and the Rule of Law, New York, Farrar & Rinehart 1941

 

Source:  Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Friedrich A. von Hayek. Box 112, Folder 16.

Image Source: University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf1-02719, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.

Categories
Chicago Economists

Chicago. Simons urges the recruitment of Milton Friedman, 1945

 

 

The atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki was less than two weeks history and the declaration of the surrender of Imperial Japan only five days old. Nothing says “back to business as usual” at the university better than active lobbying on behalf of one’s preferred candidate for an upcoming vacancy, as we see in the following memo for the 33 year old Milton Friedman written by Henry C. Simons to the Chicago economics department chair, Simeon E. Leland. The copy of this memo comes from the President’s Office at the University of Chicago. Simons’ grand strategy was to seamlessly replace the triad Lange-Knight-Mints with his own dream team of Friedman-Stigler-Hart. He feared that outsiders to the department might be tempted to appoint some convex combination of New Dealer Rexford Tugwell and trust-bustin’ George W. Stocking Sr., economists of the institutional persuasion who were swimming on the edges of the mainstream of the time.

Economics in the Rear-view Mirror also has transcribed excerpts from an earlier 77 page (!) memorandum (10 April, 1945) to President Robert M. Hutchins from Simeon E. Leland entitled “Postwar Plans of the Department of Economics–A Wide Variety of Observations and Suggestions All Intended To Be Helpful in Improving the State of the University”.

____________________________

 

Henry C. Simons Urges his Department Chair to Recruit Milton Friedman

August 20, 1945

To: Simeon E. Leland           Economics

From: Henry C. Simons        Economics

 

If Lange is leaving, we should go after Milton Friedman immediately.

It is a hard choice between Friedman and Stigler. We should tell the administration that we want them both (they would work together excellently, each improving what the other did), Friedman to replace Lange, Stigler to replace Knight and to be with us well ahead of Knight’s retirement. We might also say that we want Hart to replace Mints at Mints’s retirement, and also to be with us in advance, but are happy to have him financed by C.E.D. [Committee for Economic Development] for the present.

Yntema evidently is thinking of getting Friedman shortly. We should exploit this possibility. Milton has now a great yen for a University post and would probably turn down an offer from C.E.D., even at much financial sacrifice, if a good academic post were the alternative (as it might be, at Minnesota or elsewhere). He is rather footloose—not anxious to go back either to the Treasury or to the National Bureau. We should grab him now, offering temporary joint appointment with C.E.D. and full-time, permanent appointment when he is through with C.E.D.

Friedman is young, flexible, and available potentially for a wide variety of assignments. He is a first-rate economic theorist, economic statistician, and mathematical economist, and is intensely interested over the whole range of economic policy. He has been outstanding in every organization where he has worked—here with Henry Schultz, at the National Bureau, at the Treasury, and now recently in the Army project at Columbia. Moreover, he is one of those rare cases of able young men who have enjoyed large experience and responsibility in Washington without being at all disqualified thereby for academic work.

The obvious long-term arrangement is a joint appointment with the Cowles Commission. Marschak would, I’m sure, like to have him; and Milton would like to settle into a major project of empirical research, e.g., on enterprise size and productional efficiency. Bartky may be expected strongly to support the appointment, for its strengthening of the University in statistics. The School of Business could well use Milton, to give its few advanced courses in statistics, if Yntema continues to price himself out of the University. Moreover, Milton probably would be delighted to work partly in the Law School, and be extremely useful there. In the Department, he would be available for statistics, mathematical economics, pure economic theory, taxation, and almost any field where we might need additional courses.

If University officers want outside testimony, they could get it from Randolph Paul or Roy Blough (as regards the Treasury), from Arthur F. Burns (National Bureau), from Abraham Wald, Allen Wallis, and Barky (as regards war research), and from Bunn at Wisconsin (as regards possible usefulness to the Law School)—not to mention George Stigler, Harold Groves, Wesley Mitchell, Simon Kuznets, Erwin Griswold, et al.

Perhaps the best thing about Milton, apart from his technical abilities, is his capacity for working as part of a team. He is the gregarious kind of intellectual, anxious to try out all his ideas on his colleagues and to have them reciprocate. He would doubtless be worth his whole salary, if he neither taught nor published, simply for his contribution to other people’s work and to the Department group as a whole. But he is also intensely interested in teaching, and far too industrious not to publish extensively. Our problem would be not that of finding ways to use him but that of keeping him from trying too many tasks and, especially, of leaving him enough time for his own research.

It would, I think, be good policy and good tactics to submit a major program of appointments, including [Frank W.] Fetter, Friedman, Stigler, Hart, and an economic historian (Innis or Hamilton), in the hope of getting them all within a few years, some on joint appointments with, notably, the Cowles Commission, the Law School, the School of Business (?) and, temporarily, the C.E.D. Research Staff. Such a program would serve to protect us against administration pressure for less good appointments (e.g.,  Stocking [George Ward Stocking, Sr., Ph.D. Columbia, 1925]), and from Hutchins’s alleged complaint that, while he wanted to consider major appointments in economics, the Department simply would not make recommendations. We should, in any case, err on the side of asking for more appointments than we can immediately get. Otherwise, available funds may go largely elsewhere—e.g., into Tugwell-like, lame-duck appointments, and into Industrial Relations, Agricultural Economics, and other ancillary enterprises, at the expense of the central field of economics.

There is, I trust, substantial agreement within the Department, on the men mentioned above. This fact, if fact it is, should be made unmistakably clear to the administration.

Incidentally, if we are going to explore possibilities of an appointment in American economic history (and I’m probably alone in opposing), we should do so only in co-operation with the History Department and with (from the outset) joint plans for joint appointments.

 

HCS-w

 

Source: University of Chicago Archives. Office of the President. Hutchins Administration. Records. Box 73, Folder “Economics Dept., 1943-45”.

Image Source: University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf1-07613, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.

Categories
Chicago Fields Regulations

Chicago. Doctoral Field Exams Schedule for the Friedmans, Stigler, Wallis. 1935

Milton Friedman, Rose Friedman née Director, George Stigler, and W. Allen Wallis all took some of their doctoral field examinations at the University of Chicago in the Spring Quarter of 1935. The names of the examiners and the other examinees can be seen from the mimeographed page I found in George Stigler’s papers at the University of Chicago Archives. I have included in this post the field examination requirements for doctoral students in economics from the annual Announcements published for the 1934-35 academic year.

______________________

 Three Field Examinations for Doctorate

“The candidate is expected to have general training in the important fields listed below and to specialize in three fields, one of which must be Economic Theory, including Monetary and Cycle Theory, and another must be the field of his thesis. The fields to be chosen (in addition to Economic Theory) may be taken from (1) Statistics; (2) Accounting; (3) Economic History; (4) Finance and Financial Administration; (5) Government Finance; (6) Labor and Personnel Administration; (7) Trusts and Public Utilities; (8) International Economic Relations; (9) some other field proposed by the candidate. A field proposed by the candidate may be in Economics or in another social science, the arrangement in either case being made with the Department of Economics. It is desired to develop that program of work which best meets the needs of the individual student. This usually involves the election of some courses in other departments and possibly the development of a field in another social science as a substitute for one of the fields in economics.

“The candidate’s grasp of his three fields of specialization is tested by preliminary written examinations which must be passed to the satisfaction of the Department before admission to candidacy. The final oral examination is on the field of concentration and on the thesis. The written examinations can be taken in one quarter or they can be divided between two quarters, not necessarily consecutive quarters, at the option of the candidate. The written examinations are given in the sixth, seventh, and eighth weeks of the Autumn, Spring, and Summer quarters. The written examination in general economic theory, including monetary and cycle theory, is in two parts and will require five hours in all. The written examination in each of the other fields requires from three to four hours. Notice of intention to take any written examination must be filed with the Department at least three weeks before the examinations begin. In written examinations for the doctorate the questions cover both the theoretical and administrative aspects of the field.”

 

Source: Announcements. The University of Chicago. The College and the Divisions for the Sessions of 1934-35, pp. 283-4.

______________________

 

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

SCHEDULE FOR PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS FOR THE DOCTORATE

Spring Quarter, 1935

The schedule below shows the preliminary examinations requested for the current quarter. Will the Chairman of each Committee please be responsible for turning in the complete examination by at least one week before the date on which it is to be given?

Dates Examinations Committees Students Enrolled
Saturday, May 11
8:30, S.S.R. 417
Economic Theory
(New Plan)
Viner, Chairman
Schultz
Yntema
Knight
Friedman, M.
Shohan, C.J.
Stigler, G.J. (Brookings)
Wallis, W.A.
1:30, S.S.R. 417 Monetary and Cycle Theory Mints
Cox
Saturday, May 18
8:30, S.S.R. 417
Financial System and Financial Administration Mints, Chairman
Cox
Meech
Gideonse
Curtis, C.H.
Shohan, C.J.
Saturday, May 18
8:30, S.S.R. 417
Government Finance Leland, Chairman
Simons
Stigler, G.J. (Brookings)
Saturday, May 18
8:30, S.S.R. 417
Statistics Schultz, Chairman
Cover
Yntema
Director, R.
Friedman, M.
Jacoby, N.H. (Springfield)
Saturday, May 25
8:30, S.S.R. 417
Economic History Wright, Chairman
Nef
Knight
Ostrander, F.T. (Williams)
Shohan, C.J.

 

Source: University of Chicago Archives, George Stigler Papers Addenda, Box 33, Folder “1935 Univ. of Chicago, Class Notes (Gray binder)”.

Image Source: Rose and Milton Friedman. From The Prodos Blog.

 

Categories
Chicago Economists

Chicago. Historical Enrollment Trends, Economics Faculty by Age and Educational Background. 1944-45.

__________________________

On April 10, 1945, the chairman of the University of Chicago’s economics department, Professor Simeon E. Leland, submitted a 77 page (!) memorandum to President Robert M. Hutchins entitled “Postwar Plans of the Department of Economics–A Wide Variety of Observations and Suggestions All Intended To Be Helpful in Improving the State of the University”.

In his cover letter Leland wrote “…in the preparation of the memorandum, I learned much that was new about the past history of the Department. Some of this, incorporated in the memorandum, looks like filler stuck in, but I thought it ought to be included for historical reasons and to furnish some background for a few of the suggestions.” 

In a recent post I provided a list of visiting professors who taught economics at the University of Chicago up through 1944 (excluding those visitors who were to receive permanent appointments). For this post I have selected a few supporting tables from the memo providing data on the age distribution and educational backgrounds of the economics faculty along with time series on enrollments and registrations.  A later post provides talent-scouting lists for possible permanent, visiting and joint appointments.

______________________________

In making his plea for administration support for new additional hires, Chairman Leland began by noting that in 1944 Professor Chester Wright “was transferred to the emeritus status”. Negotiations with Professor H. A. Innis of the University of Toronto to succeed Wright were taking place but Leland did not appear to be overly confident, having written “If he [Innis] does not [accept a Chicago offer], due to the scarcity of men in Economic History, the post occupied by Professor Wright will be very difficult to fill.”

Looking ahead over the six years before the retirements of Knight and Kyrk were scheduled, Leland hoped to get support to begin the process of hiring younger faculty (only three of the staff were under 40 years of age as of the end of 1944), so that  (1) gaps in the existing program would not occur and (2) promising new fields could be covered.

Furthermore Leland argued “…the Department does not seem to have enough young men as instructors and assistant professors. As a result, the chores of running a department, including sharing in administration and advising students, fall heavily on the older, higher-salaried men on the staff.”

 

Ages of Staff Members
(as of December 31, 1944)

Name

Rank Age

Came to University of Chicago

Bloch, Henry Simon

Instructor

29

1939

Douglas, Paul Howard

Professor*

52

1920

Harbison, Frederick Harris

Assistant Professor

33

1940

Knight, Frank Hyneman

Professor

59

1917-19; 1927

Kyrk, Hazel

Professor; also Home Economics

59

1925

Lange, Oscar

Professor

40

1938

Leland, Simeon Elbridge

Professor; also Political Science

47

1928

Lewis, Harold Gregg

Instructor*

30

1939

Marschak, Jacob

Professor

46

1943

Mints, Lloyd Wynn

Associate Professor

56

1919

Nef, John Ulric

Professor; also History

45

1929

Schultz, Theodore William

Professor

42

1943

Simons, Henry Calvert

Associate Professor

45

1927

Viner, Jacob

Professor

52

1916

This list does not include part-time instructors (3), research associates (3), lecturers, or members of the college staff (3).

*On leave for military service

______________________________

To reassure the President that the department was not in danger of “inbreeding” the following table was included in the memo. Leland’s first comment was that the educational backgrounds of the economics faculty included some 18 U.S. and 13 foreign institutions. While noting a significant concentration of Harvard and/or Chicago training of the economics faculty, only five of the fourteen actually had advanced training at Chicago and of those just two held Ph.D.’s from Chicago as of 1945 (Kyrk and Leland).

 

Educational Institutions Attended by Members of the Department of Economics

 

Name and Rank Degrees or Advanced Training Other Work
A.B. A.M. Ph.D.
H. S. Bloch
(Instructor)
Nancy* Nancy Strasbourg*
Paris’
Nancy (Dr. en Droit)
Acad. Int’l. Law
The Hague
P. H. Douglas
(Professor)
Bowdoin Columbia Columbia Harvard
F. H. Harbison
(Asst. Prof.)
Princeton Princeton Princeton
F. H. Knight
(Professor)
Tennesee(B.S.)
Milligan (Ph.B.)
Tennessee Cornell University American University, Harriman, Tennessee
H. Kyrk
(Professor)
Ohio Wesleyan*
Chicago (Ph.B.)
Chicago
O. Lange
(Professor)
Poznan* Cracow (LL.M.) Cracow (LL.D.) London
S. E. Leland
(Professor)
De Pauw Kentucky Chicago Harvard Law School
H. G. Lewis
(Instructor)
Chicago Chicago* Chicago*
J. Marschak
(Professor)
Oxford Heidelberg Technolog. Institut, Kiev
Berlin
L. W. Mints
(Assoc. Prof.)
Colorado Colorado Chicago*
J. U. Nef
(Professor)
Harvard (B.S.) Paris*
London*
Montpellier*
Brookings
T. W. Schultz
(Professor)
South Dakota State Wisconsin Wisconsin
H. C. Simons
(Assoc. Prof.)
Michigan Michigan* Iowa*
Chicago*
Columbia*
Berlin*
J. Viner
(Professor)
McGill Harvard Harvard

*Work taken at this level; no degree conferred.

______________________________

 

Two time series were included in Leland’s memo to provide evidence for an upward trend in the demand for economics courses: enrollments and course registrations.

It is difficult to forecast the postwar enrollment in Economics. Since 1928 there has been a steady upward trend in the number of students majoring in the Department, as is shown in the following table. Even the depression only slightly retarded the growth of our student body. Part of the increase was due to the emphasis given our subject matter by the events of the Thirties. Another factor responsible for the gain in students was the strength of the faculty—its reputation in the United States and abroad.

 

Total Number of Different Graduate Students Majoring in the Department of Economics Who Have Been in Residence a Part or All of the Years Indicated Below

 

Years

Number of Students
1943-44

57

1942-43

77

1941-42

133
1940-41

162

1939-40

156
1938-39

144

1937-38

133
1936-37

113

1935-36

111
1934-35

98

1933-34

114
1932-33

111

1931-32

125
1930-31

113

1929-30

118
1928-29

101

 

The trend of registrations in the Department for “200- and 300-level courses” (roughly corresponding to former undergraduate and graduate registrations) is shown in the following table. Data are shown only since 1931-32 inasmuch as statistics prior to that date included introductory courses for College freshmen and sophomores. This inflates all statistics prior to 1931 and destroys their validity for comparative purposes. The peak of enrollment in Economics came in 1938-39. It is believed that comparable enrollments will reappear soon after the cessation of hostilities.

 

Registration in Courses Offered by the Department of Economics

Years

Quarters

Summer Autumn Winter

Spring

First Term

Second Term

1944-45

74
1943-44 62 202 138

185

1942-43

252 237 249 207 153
1941-42 214 206 329 396

406

1940-41

264 225 455 529 516
1939-40 262 224 431 589

583

1938-39

277 244 560 516 689
1937-38 249 214 477 447

592

1936-37

243 206 407 438 457
1935-36 245 218 367 503

534

1934-35

239 206 325 460 398
1933-34 183 174 361 371

396

1932-33

278 244 337 427 244
1931-32 233 224 443 411

339

 

Source: University of Chicago Library, Department of Special Collections. Office of the President. Hutchins Administration Records. Box 73, Folder “Economics Dept., “Post-War Plans” Simeon E. Leland, 1945″.

 

Categories
Bibliography Chicago

Chicago. Public Policy, Reform and Ethics. Frank Knight, 1940

Slightly over eleven pages of bibliography for two courses offered in the Fall Quarter of 1940 by Frank Knight on Economics and Social Policy (we would probably say “Public Policy” now) and the Ethics of Social Reform are found in an economics department folder in the papers of the University of Chicago President, Robert Maynard Hutchins. There is no cover letter that explains why a copy of Knight’s Economics 304 classified bibliography should have been sent to President Hutchins. 

I just wonder how Knight was able to distill this bibliography into lectures that fit into a single quarter and what was his subset of “required readings” for these courses.

___________________________________

[Course descriptions]

  1. Economic Theory and Social Policy.—A critical examination of the economic system based on property and competition; its strength and weakness as a mechanism for the reconciliation and promotion of individual and social interests, in comparison with possible alternative types of organization. Prerequisite: Economics 301 [Price and Distribution Theory (Viner)] and 302 [History of Economic Thought (Knight)] or consent of the instructor, Autumn, Tu., Th., 3:30:5:30, Knight.
  1. Ethics and Social Reform (identical with Philosophy 424).—Study of the ethical, methodological, and economic problems involved in the formuation of social policy. Prerequisite: Graduate work in economics, or philosophy, or consent of the instructors. Autumn, W., 7:30-9:30 P.M., Knight, [Charner M.] Perry.

Source: The College and the Divisions for 1940-41. Announcements, The University of Chicago, Vol. XL, No. 10 (April 25, 1949), p. 335.

___________________________________

C O P Y

Economics 304
Classified Bibliography
Fall Quarter, 1940

 

I.  Methodology

Cohen, Morris R. “The Social Sciences and the Natural Sciences” in The Social Sciences and Their Interrelations, Edited by Ogburn and Goldenweiser, pp. 437-465.

Ibid. Article “Scientific Method,” in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.

Copeland, Morris A. Psychology and the Natural-Science Point of View. Psychological Review 37-6 (Nov., 1930), pp. 461-487.

Ibid. Economic Theory and Natural Science Theory, AER XXI-1 (March, 1931), pp. 67-79.

Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Article on Economics. Sections on approaches, various authors.

Hutchinson, T. W. The Significance and Basic Postulates of Economic Theory. See also Knight, F. H.

Keynes, J. N. The Scope and Method of Political Economy.

Knight, F. H. “Economic Theory and Nationalism”, last essay in Ethics of Competition. Part IV of this essay “Social Sciences and Social Action” was reprinted slightly abridged in Int. Jl. of Ethics, XLVI (October, 1935), pp. 1-33.

Ibid. “Nature of Economic Science in Some Recent Discussion” (review article on Ralph William Souter, Prolegomena to Relativity Economics), q.v., AER, XXIV, pp. 225-38.

Ibid. “’What is Truth’ in Economics” (review article on Hutchison, T.W., JPE, XLVIII (Feb., 1940), pp. 1-32.

Ibid. “Professor Parsons on Economic Motivation”, Canadian Jl. of Ec. and P.S. 6-3, (August, 1940), pp. 460-465.

Lundberg, George A. “Is Sociology too Scientific?” 9 (September, 1933), pp. 298-322. Also other writings.

Mayer, Joseph. “The Techniques, Basic Concepts, and Preconceptions of Science and Their Relation to Social Study.” Philosophy of Science 2 (October, 1935), pp. 431-483. Also by the same author “Social Science Methodology,” (Review of Rice Case Book) Journal of Social Philosophy I-4 (August, 1936), pp. 360-81. “Broader Value Concepts in Economics,” Journal of Social Philosophy, V-3 (April, 1940), pp. 250-69.

Nogaro, Bertrand. Le Méthode de L’Économie Politique, (rev. FHK, Annals A.A., Nov., 1939).

Parsons, T. “Some Reflections on the Nature and Significance of Economics”, QJE, XLVIII, (1938) pp. 511-45. (Rev. article on Robbins and Souter, q.v.)

Ibid. “The Motivation of Economic Activity”, Canadian J. of Ec. and P.S., 6-2 (May, 1940), pp. 187-202. See also “Reply to Professor Knight, Can. J. of Ec. and P.S., 6-3 (August, 1940), pp. 466-472.

Rice, Stuart A. (Ed.) Methods in Social Science, Case Book, 1931.

Robbins Lionel. An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science. (2nd ed., revised, 1935). (See also Knight rev., Int. Jl. of Ethics, XLIV, pp. 358-61.) (Rev. L. M. Fraser, Ec. J., 42, 1932, pp. 555-570—“How do we want Economists to Behave?”) See also Parsons, Souter.

Souter, Ralph W. Prolegomena to Relativity Economics, 1933. (Cf. Parsons, Knight).

Ibid. “The Nature and Significance of Economic Science” in Recent Discussion, QJE, 47, 1932-3, pp. 377-413.

 

R= on reserve.            PC = private copies at desk.

II. The Modern Economic Order.

See practically any textbook in Principles of Economics.

Clark, J. B. Distribution of Wealth. Especially Chapter I, also Preface.

(R) Knight, F. H. Syllabus for Social Science II, U. of C. (Editions before 1936.) PC

Marshall, Alfred. Principles of Economics. Esp. Bk. I.

(R) Marshall, L. C. The Coordination of Specialists through the Market. (Part 3 of “Industrial Society”)

(R) Roberson, D. H. The Control of Industry.

(R) Slichter, S. H. Modern Economic Society.

Taussig, F.W. Principles of Economics, Vol. 2, Chapters 67 and 68.

(R) Taylor, F. M. Principles of Economics.

 

III. (and IV.) Criticisms of the Economic Order.

See textbooks on Principles of Economics, relevant chapters; books on socialism by advocates; also “Labor” literature; also later heading “Collectivism.”

(R) Carlyle, T. Past and Present.

(R) Cole, G. D. H. The Simple Case for Socialism. Chap. I.

Davenport, Economics of Enterprise, esp. Chapters 7, 9, 11, 26, and 28.

(R) Davis, Jerome. Capitalism and its Culture.

(R) Hobson, Work and Wealth. (Also other works.)

(R) Laidler, H. W. Socialism in Thought and Action. (Especially Chapters I and II, PC)

Morris, William. News from Nowhere. (And other works.)

(R) Ruskin, John. Crown of Wild Olive. (Also other works.)

(R) Veblen, T. Theory of the Leisure Class; Theory of Business Enterprise, also other works.

(R) Ward, H. F. Our Economic Morality and the Ethic of Jesus.

(R) Webb, S. and B. The Decay of Capitalist Civilization.

 

V. Note: For Topic V (Ethics: Economic and Political Ideals),
See reading List for Economics 405. next following.

Economics 405

R = reserve, Harper Ell. PC = private copies at Desk, H.Ell.

Acton, Lord. History of Freedom and other Essays.

(R) Albee, E. History of Utilitarianism.

Anderson, B. M., Jr. Social Value. (Summarized in Value of Money, Chapter I.)

Arnold, Matthew. Prose and Poetry. Ed. A.L.Bouton (Scribner’s)

Essays in Division II, Society; Sweetness and Light, etc. P.C.

Ayres, C. E. The Nature of the Relationship between Ethics and Economics.

Ibid. Moral Confusion in Economics, Int. Jl. of Ethics, Vol. XLV (Jan., 1935) pp. 170-199. Also Knight, F. H. “Intellectual Confusion on Morals and Economics,” Int. J. of Ethics, Vol. XLV (Jan., 1935), pp. 200-220. PC (Bound together).

Bagehot, Walter, Physics and Politics.

Bonar, James. Philosophy and Political Economy.

(R) Bosanquet, B. The Philosophical Theory of the State.

(R) Burns, C. Delisle. Political Ideals. PC

(R) Bye, R. T. and Blodgett, R. H. Getting and Earning. (Rev., FHK in Ethics “Economists on Economic Ethics” (Oct., 1937), pp. 98-108.

Carritt, Edgar F. Morals and Politics.

Clarke, Mary E. A Study in the Logic of Value.

(R) Dewey, John. Liberalism and Social Action.

Ibid. Theory of Valuation (Rev., FHK in Am. J. of Soc.)

(R) Dewey and Tufts. Ethics.

Doob, L. The Plans of Man.

Dunning, Wm. A. Political Theories. (Index: Nature, Natural, etc.)

Eliot, T. S. The Idea of a Christian Society.

Elzbacher, E. Anarchism.

(R) Federal Council of Churches. Our Economic Life in the Light of Christian Ideals.

(R) Fosdick, Dorothy. What is Liberty? (Rev., FHK, JPE XLVIII (August, 1940), 586-589.)

Gooch, G. P. Political Thought in England from Bacon to Halifax.

(R) Gore, Charles, Bishop. Property: Its Rights and Duties.

Green, T. H. Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (and other writings).

(R) Halévy, E. The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism.

(R) Ibid. Original French edition (La formation du radicalism philosophique), preferable, account omission of notes in translation.)

(R) Hasbach, Wilhelm. Die Allgemeinen philosophischen Grundlagen der…politischen Ökonomie.

Hayek, F. A. V. (Ed.) Collective Economic Planning.

Ibid. Economics and Knowledge, Economica (Feb., 1937).

Herskowitz, M. W. Anthropology and Economics.

(R) Hetherington, J. W. and Muirhead, J. H. Social Purpose.

(R) Hobhouse, L. T. Elements of Social Justice.

Ibid. Liberalism (Home Univ. Lib.)

Ibid. The Rational Good.

Ibid. The Metaphysical Theory of the State.

(R) Ibid. Morals in Evolution. (On reserve in Psychology Lib.)

(R) Hocking, W. E. The Lasting Elements of Individualism. (Rev., FHK, Int. Jl. of Ethics XLVIII (Oct., 1937) pp. 109-116.

Hook, Sidney. John Dewey.

Huxley, T. H. Evolution and Ethics, etc.

(R) Jodl, Friedrich. Geschichte der Ethik.

(R) Knight, F. H. Ethics of Competition. (Especially first two and last essays). Section 4 “Social Science and Social Action” of final essay “Economic Theory and Nationalism” (PC) reprinted in Int. Jl. of Ethics, 46 (October 1936), pp. 1-33.

(R) Ibid. Ethics and Economic Reform. Economica, 1939. I. The Ethics of Liberalism; II. Idealism and Marxism; III. Christianity, published in the issues for February, August, and November, respectively. PC

Levy, Herman. Economic Liberalism.

(R) Lippman, Walter. The Good Society. (Rev., FHK, JPE XLVI (Dec., 1938) pp. 864-872)

Lyon, L. S. Government in Economic Life.

MacIver, Robert M. Society: a textbook of Sociology.

Mackenzie, F. (Ed.) Planned Society.

Mackenzie, J.S. Outlines of Social Philosophy.

Malinowski, B. The Foundations of Faith and Morals.

Marriot, J. A .R. Economics and Ethics.

May, Mark and Doob, L. Competition and Cooperation.

Mayer, Joseph. “Social Science Methodology.” (Rev., of Rice Case Book) Journal of Social Philosophy I-4 (Augusts, 1936), pp. 360-81.

Ibid. Broader Value Concepts in Economics. Journal of Social Philosophy. V-3 (April, 1940), pp. 250-69.

Ibid. Techniques and Basic Concepts of Science and their Relation to Social Study, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 2-4 (Oct., 1935), pp. 431-83.

Mecklin, John M. Social Ethics.

Mezes, S. E. Ethics, Descriptive and Explanatory.

(R) Mill, J. S. Liberty, Utilitarianism, and Representative Government.

(R) Myrdal, Gunnar. Das politische element in der Nat. Ökon. Doktrinbildung.

(R) Osborne, H. Foundations of the Theory of Value.

Parsons, T. The Structure of Social Action.

(R) Ibid. The Place of Ultimate Values in Sociological Theory. Int. Jl. of Ethics, Vol. XLV (April, 1935), pp. 282-316. PC

Paulsen, Friedrich. A System of Ethics.

Perry, Charner M. “The Arbitrary as Basis for Rational Morality” Int. Jl. of Ethics, Vol. XLIII (Jan., 1933), pp. 127-144. Criticisms by various authors.

(R) Ibid. Knowledge as a Basis for Social Reform, Int. Jl. of Ethics, XLV (April, 1935), pp. 253-281. PC

Perry, R. B. The General Theory of Value. Discussion in Int. Jl. of Ethics, 40 (1930) 465-95. By various critics. Also other writings.

Pipkin, C. W. The Idea of Social Justice.

(R) Pound, R. Law and Morals.

Ibid. Introduction to the Philosophy of Law.

Ibid. The Limits of Legal Action. Int. J. Ethics. PC

Ibid. Articles in Encyclopedia of Social Sciences “Jursprudence”; “Common Law,” “Contract.”

Pribram, Karl. Die Entstehung der individualistischen Sozial-philosophie.

Radcliffe-Brown, A. R. The Functional Approach in Anthropology (?)

Rashdall, Hastings. Theory of Good and Evil.

Ibid. Ethics (Peoples’ books).

(R) Ritchie, D. G. Natural Rights

(R) Russell, Bertrand. Power. (Rev., FHK “Bertrand Russell on Power.” Ethics, XLIX (April, 1939), pp. 253-285 PC)

(R) Sabine, George H. History of Political Theory. (Especially Chapter XXXI on Liberalism, Chs. VIII, XXI on Natural Law; Index, Freedom, Natural Law, Utilitarianism.)

Schiller, F. C. X. Article “Value” in Hastings Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics.

Schmoller, Gustav. The idea of Justice in Political Economy. Annals of the A.A., Vol. IV-5 (March 1894) pp. 1-41.

Seth, James. Ethical Principles.

Sidgwick, Henry. Methods of Ethics.

Ibid. Elements of Politics.

Spann, O. The History of Economics.

(R) Spencer, H. Man versus the State

(R) Ibid. Data of Ethics.

(R) Stamp, Josiah (Lord). Christianity and Economics. (Rev., FHK Ethics. Vol. L-2 pp. 226-27.

Ibid. Motive and Method in a Christian Social Order.

Stephen, Sir Leslie. The English Utilitarians. Three volumes.

Sutherland, Alexander. Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct.

Taylor, A. E. The Problem of Conduct.

Thilly, Frank. Ethics.

Urban, W. M. Valuation.

Ibid. Article “Value Theory and Esthetics” in Schaub, Philosophy Today. (Also other articles.)

Wallas, Graham. The Great Society.

(R) Ward, Harry F. Our Economic Morality and the Ethic of Jesus. (For Econ. 304.)

Ward, Leo R. (C. S. C.) Philosophy of Value. (Valuable for Bibliography.)

Westermarck, Edward. Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas.

Wissler, Clark. Man and Culture.

Wootton, B. Plan or no Plan.

 

ECONOMICS 304
VI. CO-OPERATION

Encyclopedia of Social Sciences Article. Sections by various authors. Use for Bibliography.

Fay, C. R. Co-operation at Home and Abroad.

Warbasse, Peter. Various writings. (Leading American apostle of co-operation.)

Woolf, Leonard S. Co-operation and the Future of Industry.

 

VII. POLITICO-LEGAL ACTION; GENERAL THEORY

Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. Articles on “Political Science,” (by Hermann Heller) and on “Politics” (by Lindsay Rogers). See cross references and bibliographies.

Pound, Roscoe. Law and Morals.

Ibid. Introduction to the Philosophy of Law.

Ibid. Limits of Legal Action, Int. Jl. of Ethics. XXVII (Jan., 1917), pp. 150-167. PC

Clark, J. M. Social Control of Business. Part II.

 

VIII. GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF BUSINESS

Backman, Jules. Government Price-Fixing.

Ibid. Articles

Blaisdell, Thomas C. The Federal Trade Commission

Childs, Marquis W. Sweden: The Middle Way.

Clark, J. M. Social Control of Business. Especially Part III.

Ibid. Preface to Social Economics.

Hardy, C. O. (et al) Wartime Control of Prices.

Hawtrey, R. G. The Economic Problem.

Herring, E. Pendleton. Public Administration and the Public Interest.

Lippincott, Benjamin E. (ed.) Government Control of the Economic Order.

Lippmann, Walter. The Good Society.

Lyon, Abramson, and Watkins and Associates. Government in Economic Life.

Lyon, L. S. and Others. The National Recovery Administration.

National Industrial Conference Board. (Myron W. Watkins) Public Regulation of Competitive Practices.

Pigou, A. C. Economics of Welfare. Chaps. in Part III.

Robertson, D. H. Control of Industry.

Soltau, R. H. The Economic Functions of the State.

Salter, Sir Arthur. The Framework of an Ordered Society.

Davis, Joseph S. On Agricultural Policy, 1926-1938. (1939, pp. 494)

Black, John D. Agricultural Reform in the United States. (1929, pp. 511).

 

IX. TAXATION AND RELIEF

Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences Articles on “Public Finance” (by E. R. A. Seligman) and “Taxation” (by R. M. Haig). “Inheritance Taxation” (by Wm. J. Schultz). “Income Tax” (by E. R. A. Seligman). See Cross Reference and Bibliographies.

Ibid. Articles on “Charity” (by K. L. M. Pray); “Institutions, Public” (by S. P. Breckenridge), “Public Welfare” (by E. C. Lindeman). “Poor Laws” (by Ch. W. Pipkin). See Cross References, Bibliographies.

Bastable, C. F. Public Finance.

Brown, Harry G. Economics of Taxation.

Douglas, Paul H. Social Security in the United States. (1936, 384 pages)

Epstein, A. Insecurity, a Challenge to America.

Pigou, A. C. Economics of Welfare. Chaps. in Part IV.

Ibid. A Study in Public Finance.

Seligman, E. R. A. Essays in Taxation.

Simons, H. C. Personal Income Taxation.

Warner, A. G., Queen, S. A., and Harper, E. B. American Charities and Social Work.

Wedgewood, Josiah. The Economics of Inheritance.

Woodbury, R. M. Social Insurance and Economic Analysis.

Commerce Clearing House. Social Security Act as Amended 1939.

 

X. COLLECTIVISM: ECONOMIC PLANNING

Balogh, T. H. The National Economy of Germany. E. J. 48 (1938), pp. 461-497. PC

Cole, G. D. H. Principles of Economic Planning.

Ibid. The Simple Case for Socialism

Dickinson, H. D. The Economics of Socialism.

Ibid. Price Formation in a Socialist Community. Ec. J. 43 (1933) pp. 237-250. PC

Dobb, M. Political Economy and Capitalism: Some Essays in Economic Tradition. (1937, pp. 360). (Rev. A. P. Lerner, JPE, Aug., 1939. Reply and Rejoinder JPE, April, 1940).

Durbin, E. F. M. Economic Calculus in a Planned Economy, Ec. J. 48 (1938) pp. 676-690. PC

Florinsky, M. T. Fascism and National Socialism.

Hall, R. L. The Economic System in a Socialist State. (Rev. F. H. Knight in JPE April, 1938, pp. 241-50—with Pigou.)

Hayek, F. A. v. (Ed.) Collectivist Economic Planning.

Ibid. Freedom and the Economic System. (Pub. Policy Pamph. 29)

Knight, F. H. The Place of Marginal Economics in a Collectivist System. AER, Supp. 36 (March, 1936), pp. 255-266. PC

Ibid. Socialism: The Nature of the Problem. Ethics 50 (April, 1940), pp. 253-289.

Lange, Oskar and Taylor, Fred M. On the Economic Theory of Socialism. (Lange articles previously published Rev. Ec. Studies, Vol. IV.; Taylor, AER, 19 (March, 1929), pp. 1-8.

Loucks, W. N. and Hoot, J.W. (Eds.) Comparative Economic Systems.

Mackenzie, Findlay. Planned Society.

Martin, P. W. “Some Aspects of Economic Planning.” in Economic Essays in Honor of Mitchell, pp. 315-354.

Mises, L. von. Socialism.

Pigou, A. C. Socialism versus Capitalism. (Rev. F. H. Knight, JPE April, 1935.

Robbins, Lionel. Economic Planning and International Order.

Soule, George. A Planned Society.

Speier, Hans. Freedom and Social Planning, Am. Jl. Soc. (Jan., 1937)

Sutton, E. The Relation between Economic Theory and Economic Policy. PC

Sykes, E. R. Contemporary Economic Systems.

Welk, Wm. G. Fascist Economic Policy.

Westmeyer, R. E. Modern Economic and Social Systems.

Wootton, Barbara. Plan or no Plan. (F. H. Knight rev. “Barbara Wootton on Economic Planning,” JPE XLIII (Dec., 1935), pp. 809-14.

Source: University of Chicago Archives. Office of the President. Hutchins Administration Records. Box 72, Folder 9 “Economics Department, 1939-1943”.

Image Source: University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf1-03515, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.

Categories
Chicago Economists

Chicago. Memorandum on a Fiscal Stimulus, 1932

Today’s post is a jewel of fiscal policy thought in a memorandum from the University of Chicago written in 1932 at the trough of the Great Depression in the United States. Looking at the signers of the memorandum that argues for aggressive fiscal stimulus (economists covering the ideological spectrum from Aaron Director through Paul Douglas), one is reminded of Ben Bernanke’s bon mot from the last big financial crisis: “There are no atheists in foxholes or ideologues in a financial crisis”.

Note: Bernanke’s crack appears to be a minor variation on Jeffrey Frankel’s twist.

Backstory

After WWI, veterans lobbied for “adjusted compensation” to partially make up the difference between their combat pay and the significantly higher wages that had been paid to workers at home during the War. Veterans preferred the term “adjusted compensation” to the term “bonus” (the latter term being construed as implying something that goes beyond full and fair compensation). In 1924 veterans were finally granted “adjusted universal compensation” in the form of certificates that credited $1.25 for each day served abroad plus $1.00 for those days served in the U.S. These certificates were essentially 20-year insurance policies equal to 125% of the service credit to be redeemed in full on the veteran’s birthday in 1945. (Exceptions for immediate cash payments were granted for amounts less than $50 and in order to settle estates of deceased veterans for payments of less than $500). More details can be found at this link

In 1932 the question arose whether an early payout of these certificates would be a prudent and effective fiscal stimulus and Congressman Samuel Barrett Pettengill (Democrat) of Indiana sent the questionnaire that follows to academic economists across the country to solicit their advice in the matter.

A month later protesting “Bonus Marchers” (ca 20,000 veterans) set up camps in Washington, D.C. that they were evicted from by regular troops of the U.S. Army let by General Douglas MacArthur. It wasn’t until 1936 that the WWI veterans were paid their adjusted compensation.

Responses to Congressman Pettengill’s inquiry were published in the Hearings of the House Committee on Ways and Means for:

Edwin Walter Kemmerer,  Princeton University
Frank Whitson Fetter, Assistant Professor of Economics, Princeton University
Thomas Nixon Carver, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
S. J. Coon, Dean of the College of Business Administration, University of Washington
Harry E. Miller, Professor of Economics, Brown University
C. W. Hasek, Head of the Department of Economics and Sociology, Pennsylvania State College
Walter W. McLaren, Department of Economics, Williams College
Harry L. Severson, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics and Sociology, Indiana University
Hiram L. Jome, Professor of Economics, DePauw University
Warren B. Catlin, Department of Economics and Sociology, Boudoin College
E. E. Agger, Professor of Economics and head of the Department of Economics, Rutgers University
Edwin R. A. Seligman, Columbia University
H. A. Millis et al., Department of Political Economy, University of Chicago
Jacob H. Hollander, Johns Hopkins University
William C. Schleter, University of Pennsylvania
Albert Bushnell Hart, Harvard University (historian)

 Today’s post begins with the cover statement of the memorandum found with the copy in the Papers of the President of the University of Chicago, Robert Maynard Hutchins, Box 72.  It is followed by Congressman Pettengill’s list of questions, as well as the Chicago memorandum submitted by H. A. Millis and eleven of his University of Chicago colleagues.

A cursory sweep of the web discovered that this Chicago memorandum has been reprinted as Appendix B in J. Ronnie Davis’s 1967 Virginia Ph.D. dissertation, “Pre-Keynesian economic policy proposals in the United States during the Great Depression.” A scanned version of the Congressional Hearings in which the Chicago memorandum was published can be found at Hathitrust.org. I have compared the published version from the House Ways and Means Committee Hearings with the typed copy filed with the papers of President Hutchins at the University of Chicago Archives. Other than minor differences in spelling (e.g. the capitalized form “Federal” is used in the published version), the memorandum was published by the House Ways and Means Committee exactly as received.

__________________________________

 

A MEMORANDUM PRESENTED TO A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS, APRIL 26, 1932.

Two members of the staff of the Department of economics, at the University of Chicago, received letters from a member of the House Committee on Military Affairs, requesting answers to certain questions. Inasmuch as the views of a large number of economists were desired, the letter was circulated among and read by twelve men of the Chicago faculty; and steps were taken to prepare a memorandum covering the points raised….The memorandum, with the names of the twelve professors participating in its formulation, is reproduced in its entirety. Because of the character of the issues raised, it seemed better to prepare the memorandum in the form it has taken than to answer the specific questions, the one after the other.

Source: University of Chicago Archives. Hutchins Box 72. Folder 6 “Economics Department, 1932-1933”.

__________________________________

 

STATEMENT OF HON. SAMUEL B. PETTENGILL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

Mr. Pettengill. Mr. Chairman, I am not on the calendar this morning and therefore in justice to those who are here I have asked for only one minute.

Some time ago, before I knew when the Ways and Means Committee was to have hearings on this matter, on my own initiative I sent a questionnaire to 50 of the leading economists of the country on the Patman and the Thomas bills; also with reference to the benefit of “reflation” and the danger of inflation.

I have a very interesting file here, including letters from Mr. Kemmerer and Mr. King who have appeared before the committee.

In order to shorten the record as much as possible, I have briefed the replies somewhat. The entire letters, of course, are available.

[…]

Mr. Pettengill. Mr. Chairman, as I have stated, I endeavored to get the benefit of the best and most disinterested economic thought of the country with reference to the advisability of either borrowing money or printing money with which to liquidate the adjusted service certificates. In the main, I sent my letters to the economics department of our leading colleges and universities. In order to make their replies more intelligible to you, as many of them answered numbered questions in my letter, I attach, first, my original letter.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

Dear Sir: I am writing you and other leading economists in the country with reference to the problem confronting Congress with regard to the proposed payment of the soldiers’ bonus. I trust that I will be able to secure a symposium of opinion by authorities such as yourself which will be of real value to Congress.

As you know, at the end of this fiscal year we will have an accumulated deficit of some $3,000,000,000. It is, I think, the largest peace-time deficit of any country in the world. It is rapidly getting larger. We are going into the red now $7,000,000 a day. United States obligations have recently sold below 85.

On the other hand, commodity, wage, land, and security prices are slowly drifting to levels so disastrous that they threaten the most widespread repudiation of debts and tax defaults, which may wipe out, along with the debtors, classes holding the obligations of individuals, corporations, States, and municipalities now totaling some one hundred fifty to two hundred billion dollars, which is about one-half the Nation’s wealth. For example, the conservative Washington Post, April 11, said:

“The dollar increases in value every day … unless this vicious movement is checked it will result in panic. The extension of credit will not be sufficient. Heroic emergency measures that will arrest the fall of prices seem to be in order. … This economic malady has reached a point where it can not be expected to cure itself without leaving horrible scars. … Some powerful agency must be thrown into the breach to restore the value of goods and services against this exaggerated value of money. … Emergencies of this kind call for drastic action. … It is time for the leaders in Government and financial circles to focus their minds upon realignment of values. The people would not countenance the manufacture of fiat money to make prices rise, But some method of currency expansion on a sound gold basis may be necessary.”

            The question is the advisability of paying the so-called soldiers’ bonus as an antideflationary, inflationary, “reflationary” or stabilizing measure. The name, of course, is not important.

A number of different bills have been proposed. H. R. 1, introduced by Mr. Patman, of Texas, calls for borrowing the $2,400,000,000 necessary to make payment.

  1. Do you think we can, or should, borrow this?

Sentiment here, however, is crystallizing around (for or against) Mr. Patman’s substitute, H. R. 7726; I inclose copy.
This bill simply proposes to print money to pay the debt. Is this sound, advisable, or defensible, in view of the existing emergency? And in the light of present gold reserves?

 It has been suggested that it could be strengthened as follows:
Call in the outstanding adjusted-service certificates now redeemable in 1945. Collateralize them together with 40 per cent gold which is said to be now available over and above the amount necessary for circulation now outstanding. Issue currency against this hypothecation and pay the veterans off. Then set up a sinking fund to retire the currency (together with the certificates) in whole or in part in 1945, or gradually before that time.

With reference to “excess reserves” see Federal Reserve Bulletin, March, 1932, page 143: “On the basis of these excess reserves, the Federal reserve banks could issue $3,500,000,000 of credit if the demand were for currency and $4,000,000,000 if it were for deposits at the reserve banks.”

  1. What credit do you give this statement as a basis for the proposed bonus payment?

There are, of course, all sorts of social and political features around this problem, but I direct your attention to its economic and fiscal aspects. It is a problem of the most tremendous consequences and Members here who are patriotically trying to do their best to cut the present vicious circle for the good of the entire country (not the veterans alone) need, and will appreciate, the advice of men like yourself, whose life study makes your judgment so valuable.

  1. Is the suggested alternative sound?
  1. Does it in reality add any element of safety to H. R. 7726, the outright issue of nonretirable currency?
  1. Can it be improved? If so, how?
  1. It is said the Europe holds $2,000,000,000 of deposits in this country. With their experience with “printing-press” money, would they become frightened for the solvency of the dollar, and cause disastrous liquidation and withdrawals here in America? Could such liquidation of foreign-held obligations be stopped unless we “went off gold,” or had available the precautionary device of authorizing the Treasury to change the amount of gold in our dollar along the lines advocated by Irving Fisher? If foreign exchange began to go against us, would it help Europe pay us her public and private debts, as an offset against our investment and deposit obligations held by Europeans?
  1. Would the introduction of $2,400,000,000 new currency into the pockets of the people necessarily result in the rise of commodity and other levels thus causing merchants to place orders for the products of farm and factory, thus starting production and accelerating employment?
  1. The Glass-Steagall bill, as you know, for the period of one year, authorized placing 60 per cent Government bonds plus 40 per cent gold behind Federal reserve money. This, of course, as I understand it, is 60 per cent “greenbackism,” placing one promise to pay (Government bond) behind another promise to pay (currency) to the extent of 60 per cent. Assuming that the adjusted-service certificates are also promises to pay, can the Glass-Steagall bill and the suggested method of handling the payment of the bonus be distinguished, from the standpoint of soundness?

The Glass-Steagall bill, as it appears to me, does not seem to have stopped the deflationary trend, for the reason that its potential currency expansion is based upon borrowing, and banks and individuals are not borrowing (or lending).
Recently I have heard Willford I. King, professor of economics, New York University, testify before the House Banking and Currency Committee. Although not directing his particular attention to the “bonus” he was quite clear that the currency must be expanded at the present time in order to start commodity prices upward and permit debts and taxes to be paid, as well as to start buying, and employment. However, he was equally clear that for such currency something of equal value should be taken in by the Government, e. g., Government bonds, thus temporarily substituting noncirculating certificates of indebtedness (bonds) for circulating certificates (currency). Then, he said, when commodity prices reach the desired level, e. g., 1926 commodity index, the process would be reversed, the bonds resold, and the currency retired. It was his opinion that such a device is necessary in order to stop the elevator at the right floor—i. e., prevent inflation beyond a certain point.
Neither the Patman nor the suggested alternative plan seems to me to contain this safeguard. That is, the adjusted-compensation certificates when once taken in would not be available for reissue.

            I need not state that every member here is anxious to solve the problem, not from the standpoint of helping the needy veteran and his family at the expense of the rest of the community, but only from the standpoint of benefiting the entire Nation, on the theory that a distribution to the veteran would, of course, be passed on at once in the payment of taxes, interest, land contracts, doctors’ and merchants’ bills, etc., and with the expectation that this would stop and reverse the trend of values. If the plan or any other conceivable plan at this time would bring only disaster to the Nation and thus to the veteran and his family we have no alternative except to wait until the present economic storm blows over.

Your thoughtful consideration of this matter is most earnestly requested. Your prompt reply will be a distinct public service.

I desire, of course, to use the substance of your reply, but will not quote you, by name, without your permission. Please let me know if you do give this permission.

Sincerely yours,

Samuel B. Pettengill, Member of Congress.

 

Source:  U. S. Congress (Seventy-Second Congress, First Session). Payment of Adjusted-Compensation Certificates in Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives (April 11 to 29, and May 2 and 3, 1932),pp. 508, 511-513

______________________________

 

The University of Chicago,
Department of Economics,
April 26, 1932.

Hon. Samuel. B. Pettengill,
            House Office Building, Washington, D. C.

My Dear Mr. Pettengill: The inclosed memorandum has been prepared in an attempt to answer the questions put in your letter of April 13. It has been developed in a committee of two, in conference, and in round table. It is approved by all of the University of Chicago economists who participated in the discussion and formulation; their names appear at the end of the memorandum.

It has seemed better to answer your questions in a memorandum divided into five sections rather than to answer them specifically, the one after the other. I think all of your questions, save that relating to Professor King’s testimony, are answered. No direct reference is made to King’s position because it has seemed better to take a positive stand rather than to criticize.

You ask permission to use the replies to your questions. This is, of course, granted, but our preference would be to have the whole rather than a part of the memorandum given publicity.

Trusting that the memorandum will be of some assistance to you, I am

Very truly yours,

H. A. Millis.

 

(The memorandum referred to follows:)

I.

Severe depression and deflation can be checked, and recovery initiated, either by virtue of automatic adjustments, or by deliberate governmental action. The automatic process involves tremendous losses, in wastage of productive capacity, and in acute suffering. It requires drastic reduction of wage rates, rents, and other “sticky” prices, notably those in industries where readjustments are impeded by monopoly and exceeding politeness of competition. It must also involve widespread insolvency and financial reorganization, with consequent reduction of fixed charges, in order that firms may be placed in position to obtain necessary working capital when and where expansion of output becomes profitable. Given drastic deflation of costs and elimination of fixed charges, business will discover opportunities for profitably increasing employment, firms will become anxious to borrow, and banks will be more willing to lend.

As long as wage cutting is evaded by reducing employment, and as long as monopolies, including public utilities, resist pressure for lower prices, deflation may continue indefinitely. The more intractable the “sticky” prices, the further credit contraction will go, and the more drastic must be the ultimate readjustment. We have developed an economy in which the volume and velocity of credit is exceedingly flexible and sensitive, while wages and pegged prices are highly resistant to downward pressure. This is at once the explanation of our plight and the ground on which governmental action may be justified. Recovery can be brought about, either by reduction of costs to a level consistent with existing commodity prices, or by injecting enough new purchasing power so that much larger production will be profitable at existing costs. The first method is conveniently automatic but dreadfully slow; and it admits hardly at all of being facilitated by political measures. The second method, while readily amenable to abuse, only requires a courageous fiscal policy on the part of the central government.

(We agree entirely with your remarks as to the inadequacy of the Glass-Steagall bill and similar expedients. Little is to be gained merely by easing the circumstances of banks, in a situation where, by virtue of cost-price relations, everyone, including the banks, is anxious to get out of debt. Such measures may retard deflation and prepare the way for recovery; but they cannot much mitigate the fundamental maladjustments between prices and costs.)

II.

If action is needed to raise prices (and we believe it is), it should take the form of generous Federal expenditures, financed without resort to taxes on commodities or transactions. For the effect on prices, the direction of expenditure is not crucially important. Heavy Federal contribution toward relief of distress is the most urgent and, for reflation, perhaps the most effective measure. Large appropriations for public and semipublic improvements are also an attractive expedient, provided projects are chosen which can be started quickly and opportunely stopped. Generous bonus legislation would be the most objectionable of all available devices for releasing purchasing power. Purchase of the certificates at their present value, instead of at maturity value, is perhaps relatively unobjectionable.

Bonus legislation invites comparison with a program of Federal subsidy to agencies engaged in administering emergency relief. Both measures involve a sort of outright gift, the provision of funds to individuals or for their support. One involves allocation according to need, when need is dreadfully acute; the other ignores this criterion completely. Furthermore, funds spent for relief would certainly be spent for commodities, and very promptly, while less needy veterans might only use additional cash further to increase hoarded savings. Of the possible consequences of bonus concessions for the future of pension legislation, mere reminder should suffice. Congress has already capitulated to the veterans and their votes on the grounds that the Treasury was full, and the community prosperous. It is now on the verge of capitulating again, on the grounds that the Treasury is empty, and the community impoverished.

III.

It is impossible to estimate in advance how much Federal expenditure might be required to bring genuine revival of business. We are persuaded, however, that the automatic adjustments have already proceeded to a stage where the necessary inflationary expenditures would be handsomely rewarded, in greater production, larger employment, and higher tax revenues.

One should recognize at the outset a danger that any measures of fiscal inflation may be too meager and too short lived. Inadequate, temporary stimulation might well leave conditions worse than it found them. We might experience temporary revival and then serious relapse, followed by more drastic deflation than would otherwise have been necessary. If we indorse inflation, we should be prepared to administer heavy doses of stimulant if necessary, to continue them until recovery is firmly established, and to discontinue them when the emergency is ended. It is obvious that the bonus measures fail utterly to provide this necessary flexibility.

IV.

The question of how emergency expenditures, for whatever purposes, should be financed, is difficult and highly controversial. The wisest policy for the present, however, would seem to be one guided largely by psychological considerations. It is likely that adequate stimulus could be imparted, and recovery assured, without creating an excessive drain upon our gold reserves. Inflationary measures, in whatever form, will probably accelerate for a time the export of gold; but this strain we may well be able to endure until revival of business is assured. Domestic hoarding of gold, on the other hand, might force us to suspension of our currency laws; and this possibility dictates caution as to the technique of inflation. The problem is simply that of selecting the procedure which will be least alarming.

On other grounds, the issue of greenbacks seems most expedient; but this method must be ruled out unless one is ready to abandon gold immediately, for it would create the greatest danger of domestic drain. Large sales of Federal bonds in the open market would be much less alarming; but the probable effect upon the prices of such bonds must give us pause, especially since a marked decline might jeopardize the position of many banks. It would certainly be better for the Government to sell new issues directly to the reserve banks or, in effect, to exchange bonds for bank deposits and Federal Reserve notes. Much may be said, indeed, for issuing the bonds with the circulation privilege, thus permitting the Reserve Banks to issue Federal Reserve Bank notes in exchange; for this procedure does not much invite suspicion, has supporting precedent, and would greatly reduce the legal requirements with respect to gold.

It is well to face the possibility, though it seems remote, that adequate fiscal inflation might force us to abandon gold for a time. We must be prepared to see a sort of race between depletion of the gold holdings of the reserve banks and improvement of business. If definite business revival is attained before the gold position becomes acute, the hoarders will have missed some great investment bargains; if inflation must be carried beyond the limits tolerated by gold, the hoarders will reap a profit. Moreover, if other gold-standard countries follow our example, as is quite probable, the threat to our adherence to the gold standard will prove negligible.

But we would insist again that, once deliberate reflation is undertaken, it must be carried through, whatever that policy may mean for gold. To withdraw artificial support before genuine recovery is achieved, might create a situation worse than that which would have obtained in the absence of remedial efforts. If the time comes, as it probably will not, when we must choose between recovery and convertibility, we must then abandon gold, pending the not distant time when world recovery will permit our returning to the old standard on the old terms. The remote possibility of our being forced to this step, however, should not influence our decision now. The supposedly awful consequences of departure from gold are, as England has shown us so clearly, nothing but fantastic illusions.

V.

It is easy to be too greatly alarmed about the possibility of extreme and uncontrolled inflation. With improvement of business, Federal revenues will automatically increase. Expenditures may then be financed to a lesser extent by borrowing, and thus with less inflationary influence. Indeed, one might maintain that temporary inflation is the most promising means to restore a balanced Budget. Moreover, with proper precautions, it should not be difficult to effect drastic reduction of expenditures at the appropriate time. The emergency character of inflationary appropriations should be emphasized in the acts themselves; and Congress should record the intention of balancing expenditures and revenues over a period of, say four or five years. Incidentally, no emergency expenditures would permit of more opportune retrenchment than those for relief of distress.

We find it difficult, at the present juncture, to give due attention to the problem of preventing or modifying the next boom. Obviously, we should attend to getting out of the present emergency first. It demands emphasis, however, that successful resort to fiscal methods for terminating deflation will present the very serious problem of keeping recovery within safe bounds. A merely salutary inflation treatment will fail to satisfy many groups. There will certainly be demand for more inflation and more “prosperity” than we can afford or sanely endure. Fiscal inflation must be regarded as a means for meeting an acute emergency for industry as a whole. It should not be viewed as a means of solving the agricultural problem, nor as a method for deflating the rentier. It is properly a most temporary expedient, to be abandoned (and reversed) long before many individual industries and classes have obtained the measure of relief which justice might prescribe.

We have suggested that for the period of the ensuing five years all Federal expenditures, including those of an emergency character, should be covered by tax revenues. To minimize the total necessary outlay, outlays should be very generous now; parsimonious inflation is an illusory economy. It would also be eminently wise to avoid now any new taxes which fall at the producer’s (or dealer’s) margin. The levies on income, however, should be advanced immediately to the maximum levels which an imperfect, but improving, administrative system can support. While such levies will be rather unproductive for a time, they will have no very deterrent effect upon business; and, having gotten them into the statutes during a period of least political resistance, we may be assured of large revenues at the appropriate time. Even after recovery, additional commodity taxes should be resorted to only if more equitable levies prove inadequate to full completion of the “5-year plan.” Indeed, by 1940, our Federal debt should stand at a figure far below that contemplated by existing legislation. We should have high income taxes when incomes are high.

Sound fiscal management during the next few years should give close attention to indexes of production, employment, and wholesale prices. We shall not undertake at this time to indicate any definite rules. There is no immediate problem of excessive inflation—rather, a danger of doing nothing or of a too modest beginning. For the not distant future, however, most careful and intelligent management will be imperative. Once there is clear evidence of revival, of increased and profitable production, the mechanism of credit expansion will begin to operate, and to carry on the task which fiscal inflation has begun. As soon as this happens, retrenchment must be started; emergency expenditures must be reduced as rapidly as is possible without undermining recovery. We should not attempt, by deliberate inflation, to bring prices to any level which we choose to regard as normal; nor should artificial stimulus be continued until production and employment attain really satisfactory levels. Fiscal measures should only be used to give to recovery a sure start. When this is done, the real task will be that of preventing the recovery from becoming a boom; and a beginning must be made in this task long before any alarming signs appear. The seeds of booms are sown by innocent expansion of credit during years of seemingly wholesome revival. The task of control is easily neglected at such times; and there is grave danger that both the Reserve Board and the Treasury will adopt inadequately deflationary tactics in this period when it is so easy to have no policy at all.

In summary, it is our unequivocal position that drastic but temporary fiscal inflation can now be productive of tremendous gains, with no possible losses of compensating magnitude; further, that after genuine revival of business has occurred, and especially if it is attained by artificial stimulation, there will soon be urgent need for prompt and decisive action of a deflationary character.

Garfield V. Cox.         Lloyd W. Mints.
Aaron Director.         Henry Schultz.
Paul H. Douglas.       Henry C. Simons.
Harry D. Gideonse.   Jacob Viner.
Frank H. Knight.       Chester W. Wright.
Harry A. Millis.          Theodore O. Yntem.[sic]

 

Source: U. S. Congress (Seventy-Second Congress, First Session). Payment of Adjusted-Compensation Certificates in Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives (April 11 to 29, and May 2 and 3, 1932), pp. 524-527.

Image Source:  Authentic History Center website: Page “Hoover & the Depression: The Bonus Army.”

Categories
Columbia Economists

Columbia. History of Economics Department. Luncheon Talk by Arthur R. Burns, 1954

The main entry of this posting is a transcription of the historical overview of economics at Columbia provided by Professor Arthur R. Burns at a reunion luncheon for Columbia economics Ph.D. graduates [Note: Arthur Robert Burns was the “other” Arthur Burns of the Columbia University economics department, as opposed to Arthur F. Burns, who was the mentor/friend of Milton Friedman, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, chairman of the Board of Governors of the Fed, etc.]. He acknowledges his reliance on the definitive research of his colleague, Joseph Dorfman, that was published in the following year:

Joseph Dorfman, “The Department of Economics”, Chapt IX in R. Gordon Hoxie et al., A History of the Faculty of Political Science, Columbia University. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955.

The cost of the luncheon was $2.15 per person. 36 members of the economics faculty attended, who paid for themselves, and some 144 attending guests (includes about one hundred Columbia economics Ph.D.’s) had their lunches paid for by the university.

_____________________________

[LUNCHEON INVITATION LETTER]

Columbia University
in the City of New York
[New York 27, N.Y.]
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

March 25, 1954

 

Dear Doctor _________________

On behalf of the Department of Economics, I am writing to invite you to attend a Homecoming Luncheon of Columbia Ph.D.’s in Economics. This will be held on Saturday, May 29, at 12:30 sharp, in the Men’s Faculty Club, Morningside Drive and West 117th Street.

This Luncheon is planned as a part of Columbia University’s Bicentennial Celebration, of which, as you know, the theme is “Man’s Right to Knowledge and the free Use Thereof”. The date of May 29 is chosen in relation to the Bicentennial Conference on “National Policy for Economic Welfare at Home and Abroad” in which distinguished scholars and men of affairs from the United States and other countries will take part. The final session of this Conference, to be held at three p.m. on May 29 in McMillin Academic Theater, will have as its principal speaker our own Professor John Maurice Clark. The guests at the Luncheon are cordially invited to attend the afternoon meeting.

The Luncheon itself and brief after-luncheon speeches will be devoted to reunion, reminiscence and reacquaintance with the continuing work of the Department. At the close President Grayson Kirk will present medals on behalf of the University to the principal participants in the Bicentennial Conference.

We shall be happy to welcome to the Luncheon as guests of the University all of our Ph.D.’s, wherever their homes may be, who can arrange to be in New York on May 29. We very much hope you can be with us on that day. Please reply on the form below.

Cordially yours,

[signed]
Carter Goodrich
Chairman of the Committee

*   *   *   *   *   *

Professor Carter Goodrich
Box #22, Fayerweather Hall
Columbia University
New York 27, New York

I shall be glad…
I shall be unable… to attend the Homecoming Luncheon on May 29.

(signed) ___________

Note: Please reply promptly, not later than April 20 in the case of Ph.D.’s residing in the United States, and not later than May 5 in the case of others.

_____________________________

[INVITATION TO SESSION FOLLOWING LUNCHEON]

Columbia University
in the City of New York
[New York 27, N.Y.]
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

May 6, 1954

 

TO:                 Departments of History, Math. Stat., Public and Sociology
FROM:            Helen Harwell, secretary, Graduate Department of Economics

 

Will you please bring the following notice to the attention of the students in your Department:

            A feature of Columbia’s Bicentennial celebration will be a Conference on National Policy for Economic Welfare at Home and Abroad, to be held May 27, 28 and 29.

            The final session of the Conference will take place in McMillin Theatre at 3:00 p.m. on Saturday, May 29. The session topic is “Economic Welfare in a Free Society”. The program is:

Session paper.

John M. Clark, John Bates Clark Professor. Emeritus of Economics, Columbia University.

Discussants:

Frank H. Knight, Professor of Economics, University of Chicago
David E. Lilienthal, Industrial Consultant and Executive
Wilhelm Roepke, Professor of International Economics, Graduate Institute of International Studies, University of Geneva

 

Students in the Faculty of Political Science are cordially invited to attend this session and to bring their wives or husbands and friends who may be interested.

Tickets can be secured from Miss Helen Harwell, 505 Fayer.

_____________________________

[REMARKS BY PROFESSOR ARTHUR ROBERT BURNS]

Department of Economics Bicentennial Luncheon
May 29th, 1954

President Kirk, Ladies and Gentlemen: On behalf of the Department of Economics I welcome you all to celebrate Columbia’s completion of its first two hundred years as one of the great universities. We are gratified that so many distinguished guests have come, some from afar, to participate in the Conference on National Policy for Economic Welfare at Home and Abroad. We accept their presence as testimony of their esteem for the place of Columbia in the world of scholarship. Also, we welcome among us again many of the intellectual offspring of the department. We like to believe that the department is among their warmer memories. We also greet most pleasurably some past members of the department, namely Professors Vladimir G. Simkhovitch, Eugene Agger, Eveline M. Burns and Rexford Tugwell. Finally, but not least, we are pleased to have with us the administrative staff of the department who are ceaselessly ground between the oddity and irascibility of the faculty and the personal and academic tribulations of the students. Gertrude D. Stewart who is here is evidence that this burden can be graciously carried for thirty-five years without loss of charm or cheer.

We are today concerned with the place of economics within the larger scope of Columbia University. When the bell tolls the passing of so long a period of intellectual endeavor one casts an appraising eye over the past, and I am impelled to say a few retrospective words about the faculty and the students. I have been greatly assisted in this direction by the researches of our colleague, Professor Dorfman, who has been probing into our past.

On the side of the faculty, there have been many changes, but there are also many continuities. First let me note some of the changes. As in Europe, economics made its way into the university through moral philosophy, and our College students were reading the works of Frances Hutcheson in 1763. But at the end of the 18th century, there seems to have been an atmosphere of unhurried certainty and comprehensiveness of view that has now passed away. For instance, it is difficult to imagine a colleague of today launching a work entitled “Natural Principles of Rectitude for the Conduct of Man in All States and Situations in Life Demonstrated and Explained in a Systematic Treatise on Moral Philosophy”. But one of early predecessors, Professor Gross, published such a work in 1795.

The field of professorial vision has also change. The professor Gross whom I have just mentioned occupied no narrow chair but what might better be called a sofa—that of “Moral Philosophy, German Language and Geography”. Professor McVickar, early in the nineteenth century, reclined on the even more generous sofa of “Moral and Intellectual Philosophy, Rhetoric, Belles Lettres and Political Economy”. By now, however, political economy at least existed officially and, in 1821, the College gave its undergraduates a parting touch of materialist sophistication in some twenty lectures on political economy during the last two months of their senior year.

But by the middle of the century, integration was giving way to specialization. McVickar’s sofa was cut into three parts, one of which was a still spacious chair of “History and Political Science”, into which Francis Lieber sank for a brief uneasy period. His successor, John W. Burgess, pushed specialization further. He asked for an assistant to take over the work in political economy. Moreover, his request was granted and Richmond Mayo Smith, then appointed, later became Professor of Political Economy, which, however, included Economics, Anthropology and Sociology. The staff of the department was doubled in 1885 by the appointment of E. R. A. Seligman to a three-year lectureship, and by 1891 he had become a professor of Political Economy and Finance. Subsequent fission has separated Sociology and Anthropology and now we are professors of economics, and the days when political economy was covered in twenty lectures seem long ago.

Other changes stand out in our history. The speed of promotion of the faculty has markedly slowed down. Richmond Mayo Smith started as an instructor in 1877 but was a professor after seven years of teaching at the age of 27. E. R. A. Seligman even speeded matters a little and became a professor after six years of teaching. But the University has since turned from this headlong progression to a more stately gait. One last change I mention for the benefit of President Kirk, although without expectation of warm appreciation from him. President Low paid J. B. Clark’s salary out of his own pocket for the first three years of the appointment.

I turn now to some of the continuities in the history of the department. Professor McVickar displayed a concern for public affairs that has continued since his time early in the nineteenth century. He was interested in the tariff and banking but, notably, also in what he called “economic convulsions”, a term aptly suggesting an economy afflicted with the “falling sickness”. Somewhat less than a century later the subject had been rechristened “business cycles” to remove some of the nastiness of the earlier name, and professor Wesley Mitchell was focusing attention on this same subject.

The Columbia department has also shown a persistent interest in economic measurement. Professor Lieber campaigned for a government statistical bureau in the middle of the 19th century and Richmond Mayo Smith continued this interest in statistics and in the Census. Henry L. Moore, who came to the department in 1902, promoted with great devotion Mathematical Economics and Statistics with particular reference to the statistical verification of theory. This interest in quantification remains vigorous among us.

There is also a long continuity in the department’s interest in the historical and institutional setting of economic problems and in their public policy aspect. E. R. A. Seligman did not introduce, but he emphasized this approach. He began teaching the History of Theory and proceeded to Railroad Problems and the Financial and Tariff History of the United States, and of course, Public Finance. John Bates Clark, who joined the department in 1895 to provide advanced training in economics to women who were excluded from the faculty of Political Science, became keenly interested in government policy towards monopolies and in the problem of war. Henry R. Seager, in 1902, brought his warm and genial personality to add to the empirical work in the department in labor and trust problems. Vladimir G. Simkhovitch began to teach economic history in 1905 at the same time pursuing many and varied other interests, and we greet him here today. And our lately deceased colleague, Robert Murray Haig, continued the work in Public Finance both as teacher and advisor to governments.

Lastly, among these continuities is an interest in theory. E. R. A. Seligman focused attention on the history of theory. John Bates Clark was an outstanding figure in the field too well known to all of us for it to be necessary to particularize as to his work. Wesley C. Mitchell developed his course on “Current Types of Economic Theory” after 1913 and continued to give it almost continuously until 1945. The Clark dynasty was continued when John Maurice Clark joined the department as research professor in 1926. He became emeritus in 1952, but fortunately he still teaches, and neither students nor faculty are denied the stimulation of his gentle inquiring mind. He was the first appointee to the John Bates Clark professorship in 1952 and succeeded Wesley Mitchell as the second recipient of the Francis A. Walker medal of the American Economic Association in the same year.

Much of this development of the department was guided by that gracious patriarch E. R. A. Seligman who was Executive Officer of the Department for about 30 years from 1901. With benign affection and pride he smiled upon his growing academic family creating a high standard of leadership for his successors. But the period of his tenure set too high a standard and executive Officers now come and go like fireflies emitting as many gleams of light as they can in but three years of service. Seligman and J. B. Clark actively participated in the formation of the American Economic Association in which J. B. Clark hoped to include “younger men who do not believe implicitly in laisser faire doctrines nor the use of the deductive method exclusively”.

Among other members of the department I must mention Eugene Agger, Edward Van Dyke Robinson, William E. Weld, and Rexford Tugwell, who were active in College teaching, and Alvin Johnson, Benjamin Anderson and Joseph Schumpeter, who were with the department for short periods. Discretion dictates that I list none of my contemporaries, but I leave them for such mention as subsequent speakers may care to make.

When one turns to the students who are responsible for so much of the history of the department, one is faced by an embarrassment of riches. Alexander Hamilton is one of the most distinguished political economists among the alumni of the College. Richard T. Ely was the first to achieve academic reputation. In the 1880’s, he was giving economics a more humane and historical flavor. Walter F. Wilcox, a student of Mayo Smith, obtained his Ph.D. in 1891 and contributed notably to statistical measurement after he became Chief Statistician of the Census in 1891, and we extend a special welcome to him here today. Herman Hollerith (Ph.D. 1890) contributed in another way to statistics by his development of tabulating machinery. Alvin Johnson was a student as well as teacher. It is recorded that he opened his paper on rent at J. B. Clark’s seminar with the characteristically wry comment that all the things worth saying about rent had been said by J. B. Clark and his own paper was concerned with “some of the other things”. Among other past students are W. Z. Ripley, B. M. Anderson, Willard Thorp, John Maurice Clark, Senator Paul Douglas, Henry Schultz and Simon Kuznets. The last of these we greet as the present President of the American Economic Association. But the list grows too long. It should include many more of those here present as well as many who are absent, but I am going to invite two past students and one present student to fill some of the gaps in my story of the department.

I have heard that a notorious American educator some years ago told the students at Commencement that he hoped he would never see them again. They were going out into the world with the clear minds and lofty ideals which were the gift of university life. Thenceforward they would be distorted by economic interest, political pressure, and family concerns and would never again be the same pellucid and beautiful beings as at that time. I confess that the thought is troubling. But in inviting our students back we have overcome our doubts and we now confidently call upon a few of them. The first of these is George W. Stocking who, after successfully defending a dissertation on “The Oil Industry and the Competitive System” in 1925, has continued to pursue his interest in competition and monopoly as you all know. He is now at Vanderbilt University.

The second of our offspring whom I will call upon is Paul Strayer. He is one of the best pre-war vintages—full bodied, if I may borrow from the jargon of the vintner without offense to our speaker. Or I might say fruity, but again not without danger of misunderstanding. Perhaps I had better leave him to speak for himself. Paul Strayer, now of Princeton University, graduated in 1939, having completed a dissertation on the painful topic of “The Taxation of Small Incomes”.

The third speaker is Rodney H. Mills, a contemporary student and past president of the Graduate Economics Students Association. He has not yet decided on his future presidencies, but we shall watch his career with warm interest. He has a past, not a pluperfect, but certainly a future. Just now, however, no distance lends enchantment to his view of the department. And I now call upon him to share his view with us.

So far we have been egocentric and appropriately so. But many other centres of economic learning are represented here, and among them the London School of Economics of which I am proud as my own Alma Mater. I now call upon Professor Lionel Robbins of Polecon (as it used sometimes to be known) to respond briefly on behalf of our guests at the Conference. His nature and significance are or shall I say, is, too well known to you to need elaboration.

[in pencil]
A.R. Burns

Source: Columbia University Libraries, Manuscript Collections, Columbiana. Department of Economics Collection, Box 9, Folder “Bicentennial Celebration”.

_____________________________

[BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FOR ARTHUR ROBERT BURNS]

 

BURNS, Arthur Robert, Columbia Univ., New York 27, N.Y. (1938) Columbia Univ., prof. of econ., teach., res.; b. 1895; B.Sc. (Econ.), 1920, Ph.D. (Econ.), 1926, London Sch. of Econ. Fields 5a, 3bc, 12b. Doc. dis. Money and monetary policy in early times (Kegan Paul Trench Trubner & Co., London, 1926). Pub. Decline of competition (McGraw-Hill 1936); Comparative economic organization (Prentice-Hall, 1955); Electric power and government policy (dir. of res.) (Twentieth Century Fund, 1948) . Res. General studies in economic development. Dir. Amer. Men of Sci., III, Dir. of Amer. Schol.

Source: Handbook of the American Economic Association, American Economic Review, Vol. 47, No. 4 (July, 1957), p. 40.

 

Obituary: “Arthur Robert Burns dies at 85; economics teacher at Columbia“, New York Times, January 22, 1981.

Image: Arthur Robert Burns.  Detail from a departmental photo dated “early 1930’s” in Columbia University Libraries, Manuscript Collections, Columbiana. Department of Economics Collection, Box 9, Folder “Photos”.

Categories
Chicago Economists

Chicago. James Buchanan’s Dissertation Outline, 1947

James McGill Buchanan, Jr.’s Ph.D. in economics at the University of Chicago was awarded in the summer quarter of 1948. The title of his dissertation was “Fiscal Equity in a Federal State”. From the Milton Friedman papers at the Hoover Institution we have the following transcription of the mimeographed dissertation outline submitted by Buchanan that was discussed in the economics department faculty meeting of October 24, 1947. The agenda of that faculty meeting along with Milton Friedman’s handwritten additions (in square brackets) are included at the end of this posting. The procedure for admission to Ph.D, candidacy is described in a 1949 memo written by Milton Friedman to members of the Department’s Ph.D. Thesis Committee.

_____________________________________

If you find this posting interesting, here is the complete list of “artifacts” from the history of economics I have assembled. You can subscribe to Economics in the Rear-View Mirror below. There is also an opportunity for comment following each posting….

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2. Present Procedure
[1949, University of Chicago, Economics]

a. Admission to candidacy. As I understand it, we have no very formalized procedure or requirements. Students typically discuss possible thesis topics with one or more faculty members, construct outlines of the projected thesis, ordinarily get the reaction of one or more faculty members to it, revise it accordingly, and then formally submit the thesis topic and outline to the Department for approval and admission to candidacy. The submitted outline is occasionally extremely detailed, occasionally very general, and is sometimes accompanied by a general statement of objective and purpose, sources of material for the thesis, etc.

[…]

Source: Undated memo (early 1949) written by Milton Friedman to members of the Committee on Ph.D. Thesis Outlines and Requirements from Hoover Institution Archives. Milton Friedman Papers, Box 79, Folder 5 “University of Chicago Minutes, Ph.D. Thesis Committee”.

_____________________________________

Dissertation Outline, James M. Buchanan, October 1947

J. M. Buchanan

EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL ADJUSTMENT

I. The Problem —

A. The federal political structure

1. Federalism in political theory. Varying degrees of dual sovereignty. The question of the finality of a federal structure. Is it a final point in political organization or merely a stage in an evolutionary process?

2. The historical development of federalism in the United States. Trends toward centralization and opposing tendencies. The expanding role of government on the whole. The expanding sphere of activity of the central as opposed to subordinate units. Projection of future trends.

3. The case for federalism as a permanent political structure in the United States. Its value as a means of a division of power, as a protection against a tyranny of the majority, etc.

4. Statement of viewpoint on federalism taken in this study.

B. The national economy —

1. The historical development of the expanding scope of the economy. The extension of the market, the trend toward economic centralization, in the sense that the nation has become the unit which defines the area of the allocation of resources.

2. The extent to which the economy is national — increasing specialization, increased resource mobility, etc.

C. Conflicts which arise in the financing of government due to the superimposition of a federated political structure on a national economy.

1. The heterogeneity of the subordinate units of government. Resource heterogeneity. Cultural, social differences. Income disparities leading to differentials in tax burdens and service standards. The basic fiscal inequity inherent in such a structure.

II.            A Theoretical Solution –

A. What is fiscal equity in such a structure?

1. Definition and limitation. For present purposes concept narrowed to that of “equal treatment for equals and unequal treatment for unequals”. Abstraction from any attempt to determine equity as between unequals since such a concept not needed for problems considered.

B. Application of the concept —

1. Necessity of benefit calculation for any determination of equity among individuals in separate subordinate governmental units. Difficulties in benefit calculation, aside from special cases. Assumption of per capita general expenditure as best measure of benefit.

2. Definition of the “fiscal residuum” or “net tax” – Net value of services available less net value of taxes paid. Considerations of “government” as the total of all layers in structure, federal, state, and local.

C. Arithmetical Examples –

Examples illustrating possible application of the equity criteria in hypothetical cases. Illustration that “equal treatment for equals and unequal treatment for unequals” will impose geographical financial neutrality upon the individual.

III.           A study of Comparative Fiscal Treatment of Similarly Situated Individuals in High Income and Low Income States –

A. Selection of states considered – one with high per capita income, one with low. (Tentatively have selected New York and Mississippi.)

B. Assumptions and abstractions –

1. Assumption of the State-Local fiscal problem as solved or non-existent. Application of criterion to 2-level structure only. State-local considered as one unit. Seek only interstate differentials, not intrastate here.

2. Assumption of money income as measure of economic position. Abstraction from non-pecuniary advantages of geographical location. Individuals considered in similar economic circumstances if money income, pproperty value, same. Physical property same. Family obligations same.

C. Selection of hypothetical individuals to be compared. Determination of income ranges to be covered.

D.            Expenditure pattern of individuals considered.

1. Proportion of income saved, spent at various income levels.

2. Distribution of expenditure at various income levels.

3. Property holdings at different income levels.

E. Determination of tax burdens of individuals considered.

1. Examination of tax structures of states in question.

2. Assumptions as to final incidence of state taxes. More than one set of assumptions can be made and results collocated.

3. Tax burden of hypothetical individuals in each income group in each state can be determined by application of assumptions as to incidence to expenditure patterns.

4. Indication that validity of the study does not depend upon validity of the assumptions as to incidence since no attempt is made to compare dissimilarly situated individuals. (Such a comparison will necessarily show in the computation, however, and for this reason the assumptions should be as realistic as possible.)

F. Determination of value of benefits of government service provided —

1. Necessity to use per capita general expenditure as best benefit measure.

2. Use of value input only not value output. Value output will differ as administrative efficiency of state varies.

G. Calculation of fiscal residua of similarly situated individuals considered —

1. Possibility of abstracting from federal taxes and expenditures since similarly situated individuals supposedly treated similarly by federal government.

H.            Calculation of the interstate differential in fiscal residua of the hypothetical similarly situated individuals considered.

IV.           Existing and proposed attempts at solution.

A. Vertical Integration

1. Examination of the various proposals made to integrate and unify the whole financial structure; plans for realignment of functions, central collection, local administration, complete centralization, etc.

B. Horizontal Integration and Coordination –

1. Readjustment of geographical boundaries, consolidation of non-efficient units. The “regionalism” approach.

C. The grant-in-aid as the adjusting device.

1. The existing structure of grants-in-aid in the United States – a short summary of the more prominent characteristics of the system.

2. Proposals for extension of the system –

a.            Further use of the conditional grant

(1)  Merits of the conditional grant

(2)  Drawbacks

(a)  Effects on budgetary independence of subordinate units.

(b) Central direction and interference.

b.            The concept of a “minimum standard”

(1)  Idea of the “national interest”

(2)  Attempts at defining “minimum standards”

(3)  Violation of equity criteria

(4)  Federal assumption of a function.

D.            Realistic Appraisal of Various Proposals from Standpoint of Political and Administrative Feasibility.

V.            Policy Implications of the Criterion of Equity Proposed in this study.

A. The practicability of direct application.

1. Difficulty of measurement

2. Political and administrative barriers.

B. Effect of the Acceptance of the Theoretical Validity of the Criterion upon Practical Policy.

1. Early elimination of matching requirements in grant-in-aid distribution.

2. Early abandonment of the concept of “minimum standards”.

3. Broadening of purpose for which grants are made.

4. Further extension of so-called “equalization” grants.

5. Elimination of the idea of “charity” in intergovernmental fiscal adjustment.

6. Greater federal reliance on the income tax as a source of revenue.

C. The proposals of the Canadian Royal Commission and Possible Application of Similar Proposals to the United States.

VI.           Possible Objections to the Equity Criterion Proposed and its Policy Implications.

A. Theoretical Objections

1. The central government as the adjusting unit.

2. The inclusion of fiscal treatment by government in the criteria for the optimum allocation of resources.

3. The nation as the economic unit.

B. Administrative Objections.

1. Violation of principle of fiscal responsibility.

VII.          Conclusion.

____________________________

 

Department of Economics
AGENDA
Friday, October 24, 1947, at 3:30 p.m. in SS424

I. Students’ Business

A. Admission to Candidacy for the Ph.D. Degree

James M. Buchanan

Subject: Equity Considerations in Intergovernmental Fiscal Adjustment.
Field: Government Finance
Committee: [Blough, chairman, Perloff, Knight]

Henry Woldon Hewetson

Subject: An Examination of the Distance Principle of Railway Freight rate making with references to Canadian Conditions.
Field: [Transportation]
Committee: [Sorrell, Koopmans, Friedman]

[Inserted:

Harriett D. Hudson.

Progressive Mine Workers of America
Committee: Douglas, ch; Nef; (illegible name) Lewis]

Norman Maurice Kaplan

Subject: Models for Socialist Economic Planning
Field:
Committee: [Marschak, ch.; ch. Harris; A. P. Lerner; Friedman

Raymond H. McEvoy

Subject: Effects of Federal Reserve Policies, 1929-36
Field: Money, Banking, and Monetary Policy
Committee: [Mints, Hamilton, Metzler]

Wallace E. Ogg

Subject: A Study of Maladjustment of Resources in Southern Iowa
Field: Agricultural Economics
Committee: [Johnson, Hardin (pol sci), Lewis]

B. Admission to candidacy for the Alternative Master’s Degree (without thesis.)

Raymond H. McEvoy

C. Admission to candidacy for the Regular Master’s Degree

Peter Senn

Subject: Federal subsidization of the Banks
Field:
Committee:

D. Petitions

Guy Black—for permission to substitute work in Mathematics for the regular requirement of a second foreign language.

Keith O. Campbell—for approval to take Political Science as one of the fields for the Ph.D. Degree.

Gershon Cooper—to substitute the following courses in math. for the German language requirement for the Ph.D. Degree: Mathematics 216, 220, and 228.

Bernard Gordon—to substitute a mathematical sequence of Calculus I and Calculus II in place of one of the language requirements for the Ph.D. Degree.

Dale A. Knight—to use Political science as one field for the Ph.D. Degree.

Chih-wei Lee—to take English as the second language.

[John K. Lewis]

II. Encyclopedia Britannica Economic Articles

III. Language requirements for Foreign students.

IV. Report of Master’s Degree Committee, Spring and Summer, 1947

V. New Business

 

Source: Hoover Institution Archives. Milton Friedman Papers. Box 79, Folder “79.1 University of Chicago Minutes Economics Department 1946-1949”.

Image SourceThe Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. Biography of James M. Buchanan.

 

Categories
Chicago Suggested Reading

Chicago. History of Economic Thought. Frank Knight, 1946

This is now the fifth course reading list  I have posted from the valuable collection of University of Chicago lecture notes taken by the economist Norman Kaplan. The other four syllabi are from courses taught by Douglas, FriedmanLange, and Mints. Today we have the “Working Bibliography” that Frank Knight provided students taking his graduate course on the history of economic thought. I have managed to add a good number of links to the items he cited just as I have for the analogous course offered at Harvard by Joseph Schumpeter in 1940.

Incidentally, the distinguished economic historian Stanley Engerman is the person to whom we all owe an enormous debt of gratitude. Professor Engerman was a colleague and friend of Norman Kaplan at the University of Rochester. After Kaplan’s death Engerman helped sort through the papers left in his deceased colleague’s office, spotted the extraordinary collection of extensive student notes for Kaplan’s years at the University of Chicago and then had the notes shipped to the University of Chicago Archives. 

___________________________

[Course Announcement]

[Economics] 302. History of Economic Thought. Brief survey of the whole field of economic thought and a more intensive study of the “classical school” of British economists, whose doctrines are studied in relation to the problems and discussions of today. Prereq: Econ 301 or equiv. Win: TuThu 3:30-5; Knight.

 

Source:  University of Chicago, Announcements–The College and the Divisions, Sessions of 1945-1946, p. 216.

___________________________

 

ECONOMICS 302
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT
Winter 1946

Working Bibliography

General Character of the Course: A very brief survey of economic thought prior to the “classical school,” with chief attention devoted to the latter, especially to the price and distribution theory of Smith, Ricardo, Senior and Mill. Limited reference to Historical or Socialistic Schools. Matter outside the classical doctrine to be obtained chiefly from reading.

General Works (“Manuals”)

Ferguson, John M., Landmarks of Economic Thought.

Gray, Alexander, The Development of Economic Doctrine.

Two recent books very readable, and excellent within their scope. Gray has nothing on the historical schools. Neither is adequate on the classical writers.

 

Roll, Erich, History of Economic Thought. Somewhat Marxist slant.

Haney, L. H., History of Economic Thought. The fullest book covering the field; table of contents gives a fairly good arrangement of authors into groups or tendencies.
[1920 edition]

Ingram, J. K., A History of Political Economy. Briefer than Haney, and usable.

Spann, O., History of Economics. Translated from the German. Valuable for its intense opposition to the viewpoint of the classical school in favor of an organismic or universalistic standpoint. [Original: Othmar Spann, Die Haupttheorien der Volkswirtschaftslehre, 17th ed. 1928.]

Schumpeter, Joseph, Epochen der Dogmen- und Methodengeschichte, contained in Grundriss der Sozialökonomik Vol. I. [English translation]

Oncken, A. Geschichte der National Ökonomie. (Down to Adam Smith).

Gide, C., and Rist, C., History of Economic Doctrines (in French, or Translated from the French). (Begins with the Physiocrats). A competent but uninspired book. Emphasis on French work and on the socialistic schools.

Scott, William A., The Development of Economics. Covers modern period, beginning with background of classical economics. Excellent summaries, notable omissions (esp. Mathematical economists).

Whittaker, Edmund, A History of Economic Ideas. The best book in the field in content but massive, confusing, and repetitious through organization on the topical principle. First half deals with institutional and intellectual history rather than analytical economic thought. [Cf. his Schools and Streams of Economic Thought. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1960.]

Heimann, Eduard, History of Economic Doctrines. An Introduction to Economic Theory. Oxford University Press, 1945. Pp. ix, 263 (245). More introduction than history.

Salin, Edgar, Geschichte der Volkswirtschaftslehre. Covers the field briefly in an interpretive, historical-philosophical manner.

Encyclopedias; esp. Palgrave, Dictionary of Political Economy. (Ed. Henry Higgs 1926) and the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences; on men and movements, and especially, Bibliographies. [Palgrave, 1912-1915.  Vol I (A-E), Vol II (F-M), Vol III (N-Z)]

See Bibliographical Notes in Haney (above) 3d Revised Edition, 1936, pp. 803-809.

 

On the Whole Period before the Classical School

Monroe, A. E. Early Economic Thought. Lengthy excerpts from some twenty important writers.

Oncken, A. See under General Works.

Sewall, H. R. The Theory of Value before Adam Smith, Publications of the American Economic Association, 1901.

Dunning, W. A., History of Political Theories, Ancient and Modern; also ibid. From Luther to Montesquieu. (Pre-classical economic thought being essentially political thought.)

 

Greco-Roman Economics

Simey, Miss E., article entitled “Economic Theory among the Greeks and Romans.” Economic Review, 1900. Copies on reserve. Best short account.

Laistner, M. L. W., Greek Economics. Valuable introduction and excerpts.

Calhoun, G. M., Business Life of Ancient Athens. Introduction and text valuable for background.

 

Medieval

Ashley, W. J. English Economic History and Theory, Vol. 1, pt. I, Chap. 3, and Vol. I, Pt. II, Chap. 6. Best general account.

O’Brien, Geo., An Essay on Medieval Economic Teaching. Highly important, especially because written from a Catholic point of view.

Tawney, R. H., Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. Chapter One, on The Medieval Background

 

Mercantilism

Heckscher, Eli F., Mercantilism, 2 vols. [Volume One; Volume Two]

Horrocks, J. W., A Short History of Mercantilism.

Schmoller, Gustav, The Mercantile System. Ashley Economic Classics. Invaluable also as a specimen of the German historical economics. Inquire at desk. E11.

Ashley, W. J. The Tory Origin of Free Trade Policy, in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 11. Also in Surveys Historical and Economic.

Johnson, E. A. J. The Predecessors of Adam Smith.

Mun, Thomas, England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade. Ashley Economic Classics

Furniss, E. S., The Position of the Laborer in a System of Nationalism.

Viner, J., English Theories of Foreign Trade before Adam Smith, in Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 38, nos. 3 and 4. Reprinted in Studies in the Theory of International Trade, Harpers, 1937.

 

Physiocrats
(Given very little attention in this course.)

Higgs, Henry, The Physiocrats.

Ware, Norman, article on “The Physiocrats” in American Economic Review, 1931.

Bloomfield, Arthur I., Foreign Trade Doctrines of the Physiocrats. American Economic Review, Volume XXVIII, no. 4, December 1938 (Reprint on Reserve).

Turgot, A. R. J., Formation and Distribution of Riches. (Ashley Economic Classics.)

 

Classical School

Whitaker, A. C., Labor Theory of Value in English Political Economy. Nearly essential, if obtainable (Purchase).

Bowley, Marian, Nassau Senior and Classical Economics (Purchase, alternative to Whitaker). Better, but more difficult.

Cannan, Edwin, Theories of Production and Distribution. Valuable, but laborious reading.

Cannan, Edwin, Review of Economic Theory. Used selectively, more available than his other book.

Taussig, F. W. Wages and Capital (London School Reprint).

Knight, F. H. The Ricardian Theory of Production and Distribution. Reprint from the Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science.

Cannan, Edwin, (ed.), Lectures of Adam Smith.

Smith, Adam, Wealth of Nations.  Full text, Everyman’s Library (2 vols.) or Modern Library (Reprint of Cannan edition—1 vol.) most available. Abridged edition edited by W. J. Ashley gives portions covered in the course conveniently in one small volume.  Cannan edition (2 vols.) the definitive edition, but expensive and bulky for class use.

Ricardo, David, Principles of Political Economy. Available in Everyman’s Library (1 vol.)  Gonner edition best. (London, C. Bell and Sons: Bohn’s Libraries). [Sraffa edition]

Senior, N. W., Outline of Political Economy. Reprinted 1938, Allen and Unwin.

Mill, J. S., Principles of Political Economy. Ashley ed., Longmans, 1 vol.

 

Subjective Value or Marginal Utility School

Smart, Wm., Introduction to the Theory of Value.

Jevons, W. S. Theory of Political Economy.

Wieser, F., Natural Value.

Smart’s prefaces to Böhm-Bawerk’s two main volumes and to Wieser, Natural Value.

Böhm-Bawerk, Capital and Interest and Positive Theory of Capital.

Weinberger, Otto. Die Grenznutzenschule.

Mises, Ludwig, Bemerkungen zum Grundproblem der subjektivistischen Wertlehre, contained in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, Band 59, Heft 1.

 

Historical and Institutional and Socialistic Schools

See articles in Palgrave’s Dictionary of Political Economy and in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.

 

 

Source: University of Chicago Archives. Norman Maurice Kaplan Papers. Box 1, Folder 10.

Image Source:  University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf1-03516, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.