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Harvard. General Examination in Microeconomic Theory. Spring, 1993

Economics in the Rear-view Mirror has been provided a copy of nearly all the 1990s general exams in micro- and macroeconomic theory from Harvard through the collegial generosity of Minneapolis Fed economist Abigail Wozniak. With this post you now have the Spring 1993 graduate general exams in microeconomic theory.

While these exams lie outside of my personal comfort zone as a historian of economics (1870-1970), for fledgling historians of economics of today and tomorrow these are indeed legitimate historical artifacts definitely worth transcription. I am rather slow in digitizing them because transcription of mathematics for this blog requires latex inserts. Latex expressions involve considerably longer roundabout production than the application of my talents for touch-typing/OCR to non-mathematical text. Patience! The Rest is Yet to Come! 

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Previously Transcribed Harvard Graduate General Exams

Spring 1989: Economic Theory

Spring 1991: MicroeconomicsMacroeconomics

Spring 1992: Micro- and Macroeconomics

Fall 1992:  Micro- and Macroeconomics

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Graduate Microeconomic Theory Sequence, 1992-93

Economics 2010a. Economic Theory

Michael D. Whinston and Eric S. Maskin

Covers the theory of individual behavior including the following topics: constrained maximization, duality, theory of the consumer, theory of the producer, behavior under uncertainty, consumer choice of financial assets, externalities, monopolistic distortions, game theory, oligopolistic behavior, asymmetric information.

Prerequisite: Economics 2030 or equivalent; can be taken concurrently.
Half course (fall term). Tu., Th., 10-11:30.

Economics 2010b. Economic Theory

Andreu Mas-Colell and Stephen A. Marglin

General equilibrium, stability, pure and applied welfare economics, uncertainty, descriptive and optimal growth theory, income distribution, methodology.

Prerequisite: Economics 2010a.
Half course (spring term). Tu., Th., 10-11:30.

Source: Harvard University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Courses of Instruction 1992-1993, p. 248.

________________________________

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

Economics 2010b: FINAL EXAMINATION and
GENERAL EXAMINATION IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY

Spring Term 1993

For those taking the GENERAL EXAM in microeconomic theory:

  1. You have FOUR hours.
  2. Answer a total FIVE questions subject to the following constraints:

— at least ONE from Part I;
— at least TWO from Part II;
EXACTLY ONE from Part III.

For those taking the FINAL EXAMINATION in Economics 2010b (not the General Examination):

  1. You have THREE HOURS
  2. Answer a total of four questions subject to the following constraints:

— DO NOT ANSWER ANY questions from Part I;
— at least TWO from Part II;
— at least ONE from Part III.

PLEASE USE A SEPARATE BLUE BOOK FOR EACH QUESTION

PLEASE PUT YOUR EXAM NUMBER ON EACH BOOK

Part I (Questions 1 and 2)

  1. Suppose that there are J firms producing good \ell differentiable cost function c(w,q) where w is a vector of input prices and q is the firm’s output level. The differentiable aggregate demand function for good \ell is x(p), where p is good \ell’s price. Assume c(w,q) is strictly convex in q and that (p)≤0. Also assume that partial equilibrium analysis is justified.
    1. Suppose that all factor inputs can be adjusted in the long-run, but that input k cannot be adjusted in the short-run. Suppose that we are initially at an equilibrium where all inputs are optimally adjusted to the equilibrium level of output \bar{q} and factor prices \bar{w} so that, letting z_{k}\left( \bar{w} ,\bar{q} \right) be the conditional factor demand function for factor k, we have z_{k}=z_{k}\left( \bar{w} ,\bar{q} \right). What can be said about the short-run versus long-run output response of the firm to a differential change in the price of good \ell? What does this imply about the short-run versus long-run equilibrium response of p to a differential exogeneous shift in the demand function (hold the number of firms fixed in both cases)? (Hint: Define a short-run cost function c_{s}\left( w,q,z_{k}\right)  giving the minimized cost of producing output q given factor prices w when factor k is fixed at level z_{k}).
    2. Now suppose that all factor inputs can be freely adjusted. Give the weakest possible sufficient condition, stated in terms of marginal and average costs and/or their derivatives, that guarantees that if the price of input k\left( w_{k}\right) marginally increases, then firms’ equilibrium profits decline for any demand function x\left( \cdot \right) with x^{\prime }\left( \cdot \right)  \leq 0. Show that if your condition is not satisfied, then there exist demand functions such that profits increase when the price of input k increases. What does your condition imply about the firm’s conditional factor demand for input k?
  2. A. Consider a one-shot two-player game in which player 1 has a set of possible moves M1 (with n1 elements) and player 2 has a set of possible moves M2 (with n2 elements). Players move simultaneously. How many strategies does each player have?

B. Now suppose that the game is changed so that player 1 moves before 2, and 2 observes 1’s move, but that the game is otherwise the same as before. That is, the sets of moves are still M1 and M2, and player 1’s and 2’s payoffs as functions of moves \psi_{1} \left( m_{1},m_{2}\right) \text{ and } \psi_{2} \left( m_{1},m_{2}\right), respectively, are unchanged. How many strategies does each player have in the altered game?

C. The game of part B may have multiple subgame-perfect equilibria. Show, however, that, if this is the case, there exist two pairs of moves \left( m_{1},m_{2}\right)\text{ and } \left( m^{\prime }_{1},m^{\prime }_{2}\right) (where either m_{1}\neq m^{\prime }_{1}\text{ or } m_{2}\neq m^{\prime }_{2} ) such that either

(*) \psi_{1} \left( m_{1},m_{2}\right)  =\psi_{1} \left( m^{\prime }_{1},m^{\prime }_{2}\right)
or
(**) \psi_{2} \left( m_{1},m_{2}\right)  =\psi_{2} \left( m^{\prime }_{1},m^{\prime }_{2}\right).

D. Suppose that, for any two pairs of moves \left( m_{1},m_{2}\right)\text{ and } \left( m^{\prime }_{1},m^{\prime }_{2}\right)  such that m_{1}\neq m^{\prime }_{1}\text{ or } m_{2}\neq m^{\prime }_{2}, (**) is violated, i.e., \psi_{2} \left( m_{1},m_{2}\right)  \neq \psi_{2} \left( m^{\prime }_{1},m^{\prime }_{2}\right). In other words, player 2 is never indifferent between pairs of moves. Suppose that there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium in the game of part A in which \pi_{1} is player 1’s payoff. Show that in any subgame-perfect equilibrium of part B, player 1’s payoff is at least \pi_{1}. Would this conclusion necessarily hold for any Nash equilibrium of part B? Why or why not?

E. Show, by example, that the conclusion of part D may fail if either

(a) \psi_{2} \left( m_{1},m_{2}\right)  =\psi_{2} \left( m^{\prime }_{1},m^{\prime }_{2}\right)  holds for some pair \left( m_{1},m_{2}\right)  ,\left( m^{\prime }_{1},m^{\prime }_{2}\right) with m_{1}=m^{\prime }_{1}\text{ and } m_{2}=m^{\prime }_{2}; or

(b) we replace the phrase “pure-strategy equilibrium” with “mixed-strategy equilibrium.”

Part II (Questions 3, 4, & 5)

QUESTION 3 (General Equilibrium with Gorman Preferences)
(20 points)

Suppose you have a population of consumers i = 1,….,I. Ever consumer i has an endowment vector of commodities \omega_{i} \in R^{I} and preferences expressed by an indirect utility function v_{i}\left( p,w_{i}\right).

(a) (5 points)

Let \left(\bar{x}_{1},\cdots,\bar{x}_{I}\right) be a Pareto optimal allocation. The utility levels of this allocation are \left(\bar{u}_{1},\cdots,\bar{u}_{I}\right). The second welfare theorem asserts the existence of a price vector \bar{p} and wealth levels \left(\bar{w}_{1},\cdots,\bar{w}_{I}\right) supporting the allocation. What does this mean? Express \left(\bar{u}_{1},\cdots,\bar{u}_{I}\right) in terms of the indirect utility functions.

Assume for the next two parts of this question (b and c) that the indirect utility functions take the (Gorman) form v_{i}\left( p,w_{i}\right)  =a_{i}\left( p\right)  +b\left( p\right)  w_{i}. Note that b\left(\cdot\right) does not depend on i. In the following, neglect always boundary allocations. Use of pictures is permissible and helpful.

(b) (5 points)

Show that for the above family of utility functions all the Pareto optimal allocations are supported by the same price vector.

(c) (5 points)

Use the conclusion of part (b) to argue that the Walrasian equilibrium allocation is unique. (Assume preferences are strictly convex.)

For the last part of the question (d) assume that indirect utilities are of the form v_{i}\left( p,w_{i}\right)=b_{i}\left(p_{i}\right)w, that is, the preferences on commodity bundles are homothetic (but possibly different across consumers).

(d) (5 points)

Argue by means of an Edgeworth box example (or in any other way you wish!) that the multiplicity of Walrasian equilibria is possible even if preferences are restricted to be homothetic.

QUESTION 4 (Revelation of Information Through Prices)
(20 Points)

Suppose there are two equally likely states s_{1},s_{2} and two traders. In each state there is a spot market where a good is exchanged against numeraire. The utilities of the two traders are (the second good is the numeraire):

STATE 1 STATE 2
TRADER 1 2 ln x11x21

4 ln x11 + x21

TRADER 2

4 ln x12 – x22

2 ln x12 + x22

The total endowment of the first good equals 6 in the first state and 6+\varepsilon    in the second state. All the endowments of this good are received by the second trader. Assume that the endowments of numeraire for the two traders are sufficient for us to neglect the possibility of boundary equilibria. The price of the numeraire is fixed to 1 in the two states. The prices of the non-numeraire good in the two states are denoted \left( p_{1},p_{2}\right)  .

(a) (5 points)

Suppose that when uncertainty is resolved both traders know which state of the world has occurred. Determine the spot equilibrium prices \left(\hat{p}_{1}\left(\varepsilon\right) ,\hat{p}_{2}\left(\varepsilon\right)  \right) in the two states (as function of the parameter \varepsilon).

(b) (5 points)

We assume now when a state occurs Trader 2 knows it while Trader 1 remains uninformed (i.e. s/he must keep thinking of the two states or equally likely). Under this information set up determine the spot equilibrium prices \left( \bar{p}_{1}\left(\varepsilon\right) ,\bar{p}_{2}\left(\varepsilon \right)\right) in the two states.

(c) (5 points)

We are as in (b), except that now we allow Trader 1 to deduce the state of the world from prices. That is, if p_{1}\neq p_{2} then Trader 1 is actually informed while if p_{1}=p_{2}, s/he is not informed. A system of equilibrium spot prices \left( p^{\ast }_{1}\left(\varepsilon\right) ,p^{\ast }_{2}\left(\varepsilon\right) \right) is a rational expectation equilibrium if at the equilibrium Trader 1 derives information from \left( p^{\ast }_{1}\left(\varepsilon\right) ,p^{\ast }_{2}\left(\varepsilon\right) \right) in the manner described. Let \varepsilon \neq 0. Exhibit a rational expectations equilibrium. Comment.

(d) (5 points)

Show that if \varepsilon = 0 then there is no rational expectations equilibrium.

QUESTION 5 (20 Points)

There are three participants in a public good decision problem with two outcomes. If the public good project is not carried out then the utility is zero for everybody. If it is carried out then the utility is 3 for the “project-lovers” and -1 for the “project-haters.” The cost of the project is zero.

We consider first the following decision mechanism. People are asked if they are PL (project-lovers) or PH (project haters). If at least one participant announces PL the project is carried out and the self-declared PH are exactly compensated for their loss. The resources for the compensation comes from a tax imposed on the self-declared PL (equal across them).

(a) (5 points)

Show that the above mechanism is not straightforward. Define your terms.

(b) (5 points)

Suppose now that participants know each others characteristics (i.e. if they are project-lovers or project-haters). Consider the situation where everybody self-declares truthfully. Argue that this is an equilibrium (i.e. it does not pay to any participant to deviate) if there is one but not if there are two PLs. Which are the equilibrium situations in the latter case?

We now change the set-up somewhat. Suppose that the designer knows how many PLs there are and that the participants know that the designer knows (or, simply you can assume that both designer and participants have this information). Say that the number of PLs is \alpha \in \left( 1,2,3\right)  . (Hence there is at least one PL.) Then the decision mechanism is as above except that for the project to be carried out it is now required that at least \alpha self-declare as PL.

(c) (5 points)

Show that for this mechanism it does not always pay to self-declare truthfully (that is, the truth is not a dominant strategy).

(d) (5 points)

Suppose that it is understood (Precisely, it is common knowledge) that no participant will ever use a dominated announcement. Show then that it cannot hurt to self-declare truthfully (technically, the truth is dominant after one round of deletion of dominated strategies. There is a subtle point here—that you may want to discuss—namely, if “dominated” should be understood as “weakly dominated” or “strongly dominated.” The distinction does not matter for the case \alpha =1 but it does for the case \alpha =2.)

Part III (Questions 6 and 7)

  1. (a) How does the following idea (or vision, in Schumpeter’s sense of the term) get reflected in the neo-Keynesian model presented in this course?

…there is a subtle reason drawn from economic analysis why…faith may work. For if we act consistently on the optimistic premise, this hypothesis will tend to be realized; whilst by acting on the pessimistic premise, we keep ourselves for ever in the pit of want. (Keynes, Essays in Persuasion, pp. vii-viii)

(b) Why does Knight’s dictum [following] fail to characterize the neo-Keynesian model?

…competition among even a very few [entrepreneurs]will raise the rate of contractual returns [wages] and lower the residual share [profits], if they know their own powers. If they do not, the size of their profits will again depend on their “optimism,” varying inversely with the latter. (Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, p. 285.)

(c) Is it true, as Joan Robinson once wrote, that in a neo-Keynesian conception of the world businessmen are free to make the rate of profit anything they wish?

(d) More generally, how can investment demand be exogenous in a model where income and expenditure must be equal as a condition of equilibrium? What features of the theory allow investors’ preferences and investment demand to play a role in neo-Keynesian theory which differs from the role played by consumers preferences and consumption demand in neoclassical theory?

  1. Economic theories are, among other things, theories of knowledge—implicitly if not explicitly. What is the neoclassical theory of knowledge? Which do you regard as the more serious of the many objections to this theory of knowledge? Why in your view has the theory been able to survive the objections?

Source: Department of Economics, Harvard University. Past General Exams, Spring 1991-Spring 1999, pp. 84-88. Private copy of Abigail Waggoner Wozniak.

 

Categories
Economics Programs Fields Harvard

Harvard. Report of Economics Department Visiting Committee. Brimmer, 1974

 

The first African American to have served as a governor of the Federal Reserve System  (1966-1974) was the Harvard economics Ph.D. (1957), Andrew F. Brimmer (1926-2012). Brimmer was a loyal alumnus who served his doctoral alma mater on the Harvard Board of  Overseers and as a member/chair of the visiting committee for the economics department

This post provides the 37 page text of the 1974 Visiting Committee Report on conditions in the Harvard economics department. The topics of radical economics, hiring, tenure and promotion, and the deep dissatisfaction of about half of the economics graduate students with Harvard’s Ph.D. curriculum are all covered in this fairly remarkable document.

_________________________

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO VISIT THE
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

[Andrew F. Brimmer, Chairman (April 15, 1974)]

I. Introduction

General Impression: The Committee found the Department of Economics under a great deal of stress, and it left with considerable concern for its future effectiveness. The Committee observed some disagreements within the senior faculty, but the major division appears to be between the latter as a group and perhaps half the graduate students. The factors giving rise to this division are numerous and complex, but one element stands out above all others: a substantial proportion of the graduate students are convinced that the senior faculty has little interest in teaching them and is not concerned with their welfare. A strong sense of alienation pervades the Department, and the frustration is evident on the part of a significant number of nontenured faculty members as well as among graduate students. On the other hand, the undergraduate concentrators seem to be much more contented than they were a few years ago.

The Committee was deeply troubled about this state of affairs—because on previous visits it had found a far different situation. For example, in its Report for the academic years 1969-71, it concluded:

“…The Department of Economics is in excellent condition. In addition to first-class leadership and fine internal condition, it enjoys the best of reputations. Its graduate school received the top rating in the recent canvas made by the American Council on Education. As we were able to see for ourselves during the visitations, the standard of teaching is very high and the work produced impressive….” 1/

1/ “Report of the Committee to Visit the Department of Economics for the Academic Years, 1969-71,” November 22, 1971, Number Two, p. 7

Against that background, the condition of the Department at the time of the last visit was particularly disturbing. A significant proportion of the members had served on the Committee during previous visits, and they were able to compare the present atmosphere to that which prevailed on previous occasions. For them, the sharpness of the deterioration in attitudes and relationships within the Department was particularly distressing.

Having reported these pessimistic impressions at the very outset, it must also be stressed that the Department of Economics at Harvard remains at the very forefront of the economics profession, For instance, at the time of the Committee’s visit, a senior member of the faculty [Wassily Leontief] was absent—because he was in Europe to accept the 1973 Nobel Prize in Economics, thus joining two other colleagues in the Department [Simon Kuznets (1971), Kenneth Arrow (1972)] who have received this signal honor. In a number of fields (especially in Economic Theory and Econometrics), the Department is at or close to the apex of the profession. Its members are also conducting first-class work in most of the applied fields. Moreover, as discussed more fully below, the Department has appointed a number of committees to re-examine its program. The expected recommendations—if adopted—will undoubtedly correct some of the deficiencies noted in this report. Thus, while economics at Harvard is going through a number of strains, it is by no means on the edge of dissolution.

The Visitation: The Committee met in Cambridge on the evening of December 10 and all day December 11, 1973. Fifteen of the 20 members of the Committee were present for all or a substantial part of the visit. An agenda identifying the main topics to be covered—along with supporting material—had been distributed in advance.

The issue of “Radical Economics” at Harvard was a matter of considerable interest to a number of Committee members, and several had requested that it be given a high priority on the agenda. Reflecting this interest, a number of contemporary items of information were circulated. In addition, an excerpt, “Much Ado About Economics,” from James B. Conant’s My Several Lives, was sent to Committee members. In this chapter, Dr. Conant discussed the controversy evoked by the report of the Committee which visited the Department of Economics in 1950. In its public report, the Committee (through its chairman) criticized the Department for a lack of “balance with respect to the viewpoints of its members.” In essence, The Committee at that time found that the Department had a number of “Socialists,” “Keynesians,” and “advocates of Government control of the economy”; but it found no one on the faculty with opposing views. It concluded that the situation should be corrected. The criticism against the Department which attracted the present Committee’s interest was the charge that political bias on the part of senior members of the faculty influenced the decision not to give tenure to one or more younger members identified as “radical economists.” So, while the specific facts were different, the basic issues were quite similar.

Several other specific issues had been identified in advance, and one or more members of the Visiting Committee had been asked to take responsibility to see that they were not overlooked. Among these were: (1) the quality of undergraduate teaching; (2) the quality of instruction in the first-year graduate courses, and (3) the Department’s affirmative action program.

During its visit, the Committee met separately with representatives of the tenured and non-tenured-faculty. It also met separately with undergraduates. The Committee was invited to a specially-called meeting of the Graduate Economics Club, and a number of faculty members also attended. Several of the Committee members also attended some of the classes which were then in session. On the basis of these contacts, the Committee formed a number of impressions and reached a number of conclusions. These are discussed in the following sections. The Committee also made several suggestions to the Department, and some of these are indicated in the text. Finally, the Committee weighed several recommendations, but agreement could not be reached on some of them. The outcome of that discussion is reported in the final section of this report. At the Chairman’s request, several of the Committee members prepared written accounts of their impressions, and others communicated orally with him following the visit. The Chairman drew extensively on these accounts — as well as on notes taken during the visit — in the preparation of this report.

 

II. Structure of the Department

The Department of Economics at Harvard is a fairly large organization. As shown in Table 1, there were 132 persons holding appointments in the Department during the 1973-74 academic year. Fifty-two of these had primary appointments in the Department, and seven held joint appointments with other units of the University. Three were visitors from other institutions. There were also 70 teaching fellows all of whom were graduate students. There were also 11 persons from other faculties offering instruction in the Department. Four of these had their primary appointments in the Kennedy School and two in the Business School.

Table 1. Faculty of the Department of Economics
Academic Year, 1973-74
Economics Faculty Other Faculty Offering Instruction
Professional Chairs 10 Kennedy School
Professors 10 Professors 2
Associate Professors 6 Associate Professors 1
Assistant Professors 14 Lecturer 1
Lecturers 12 Sub-Total 4
Sub-Total 52
Joint Faculty Business School
Professors 5 Professor 1
Assistant Professors 2 Assistant Professor 1
Sub-Total 7 Sub-Total 2
Visiting Faculty Other Schools
Professor 2 Professors 3
Lecturers 1 Associate Professors 2
Sub-Total 3 Sub-Total 5
Total 62 Total 11
Teaching Fellows 70
Grand Total 132

The size of the Department has been fairly stable in recent years — following a noticeable expansion during the first half of the 1960’s. For example, in the Fall of 1959-60, there were 55 members; by the Fall of 1966-67, there were 118. So the 132 in the Department during 1973-74 represented a gain of 12 per cent over the last seven years. It should be noted, however, that all of the members reported do not devote full time to the Department. The average teaching fellow spends about one-third of this time in the classroom while the remainder is devoted to research (primarily in the preparation of dissertations). Most of the Assistant Professors teach roughly half time and are involved in some variety of research for the remainder. Those members holding joint appointments are also engaged in on-going research for a significant part of their work load. Finally, during any given period, a number of the members will be on leave to pursue independent projects. For the 1973-74 academic year, eight faculty members were scheduled to be on leave for the full year. Three others were to be absent in the Fall term and four others during the Spring. A number of faculty members also had reduced teaching loads because they had bought off a fraction of their time via research grants. The figures in Table 2 show the number of faculty members on a full-time equivalent basis for each rank.

As indicated in Table 3, roughly half of the Economics Department’s faculty (excluding teaching fellows) have tenure. However, quite contrary to the impression frequently gotten by casual observers—the tenured members of the Department carry a sizable share of the teaching load at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. Moreover, as shown in Table 4, the proportion of undergraduate courses taught by the tenured faculty has risen significantly over the last ten years. In contrast, the proportion of graduate courses taught by the senior members has declined somewhat. During the 1972-73 academic year (not shown in Table 4), tenured faculty taught 20 of the 36 undergraduate courses offered. There were 18 tenured members in residence during the year, and 16 of them taught at least a one-semester course offered primarily for undergraduates. Moreover, all of them were available to advise on theses and to supervise independent work. Nevertheless, teaching fellows still carry a significant share of the total teaching load in the Department.

Table 2. Number of Economics Faculty Members on a Full-Time Equivalent Basis,
By Rank
Academic
Year
Full
Professors
Assoc. & Ass’t. Professors Lecturers Teaching
Fellows
1973-74 15.75 11.05 4.25 2.6
Est. for 1974-75 14.25 12.00 2.00 19.1

 

Table 3. Tenure Status of the Economics Faculty
Academic Years 1970-71 and 1971-72
Academic
Year
Total
Faculty
Tenured Professors Non-Tenured Professors
Number Per Cent Number Per Cent
1970-71 71 29 41 42 59
1971-72 53 25 47 28 53

 

Table 4. Number of Economics Courses Taught, By Status of Faculty,
Selected Academic Years
Term and Status
of Faculty
Number of Undergraduate Courses
(Exc. Junior & Senior Tutorials)
Number of Graduate
Courses
1953-54 1962-63 1971-72 1953-54 1962-63 1971-72
Fall Term
Tenured 6 8 14 23 25 25
Non-Tenured 8 6 11 5 5 12
Total 14 14 25 28 30 37
Tenured as per cent of total 43 57 56 82 83 68
Spring Term
Tenured 7 6 15 24 29 27
Non-Tenured 10 11 11 5 5 11
Total 17 17 26 29 34 38
Tenured as per cent of total 41 35 58 83 85 71

 

III. Trends in Enrollment

Undergraduates: The Department has continued to attract a substantial proportion of all undergraduates to its courses. For example, it is estimated that nearly half of all undergraduates were attracted at least to Economics 10—the introduction to economics. Fall term enrollment in this course in recent years is shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Fall Term Enrollment in Economics 10
Year Number Year Number
1965 774 1970 553
1966 828 1971 570
1967 734 1972 706
1968 732 1973 987
1969 535

These figures indicate that enrollment in the introductory course has surpassed the previous peak set in the Fall of 1966. In fact, while enrollment declined by over one-third between 1966 and 1969, the recovery in enrollment since the low point was reached amounted to more than four-fifths through the Fall of 1973.

The Department continues to attract about 7 per cent of all undergraduates as concentrators. Trends over recent years are shown in Table 6.

Table 6. Undergraduate Enrollment
Academic
Year
Number of Economics Concentrators
(3 years)
Per Cent of All Concentrators Harvard/
Radcliffe
Ratio
Course Enroll. Below 300 Level
(Student Sem.)
Economics as Per Cent of Arts & Sciences
1968-69 346 7.4 4.4 3,510 6.4
1969-70 292 6.4 5.5 3,437 6.4
1970-71 288 6.2 4.2 3,588 6.8
1971-72 301 6.4 4.5 3,542 7.0
1972-73 315 6.7 3.8 N.A. N.A.

These results have been achieved in the face of expanding competition from new concentration options offered elsewhere in Harvard and Radcliffe Colleges. The Department’s share of concentrators has been rising somewhat in recent years. However, it still remains well below what it was in the past-for example, 9.8 per cent in 1953 and 8.6 per cent in 1966. Moreover, economics continues to appeal substantially less to Radcliffe students than it does to those in Harvard College. Thus, the figures reported above suggest that men are about four times as likely to concentrate in economics as are women. This situation has existed for many years, and the presence of several women on the economics faculty seems not to have enhanced the Department’s appeal to women undergraduates. In the years ahead, the Department plans to place special emphasis on broadening enrollment of Harvard and Radcliffe undergraduates.

The figures presented above also show that the Department’s courses above the introductory (but below the graduate) level have been competing reasonably well in comparison with other undergraduate offerings.

Graduate Students: The figures in Table 7 show trends in graduate student enrollment and doctorates granted in recent years.

Table 7. Graduate Enrollment and Doctorates Awarded
Academic Year Graduate Students Doctorates Awarded
1968-69 159 28
1969-70 183 28
1970-71 171 33
1971-72 151 37
1972-73 161 28
1973-74 158

These data suggest that roughly one-sixth to one-fifth of the graduate students enrolled complete the requirements and receive the doctorate each year. As a rule, the typical Ph.D. candidate spends about two years taking courses and in other ways preparing for the generals examinations—normally taken toward the end of the second year. The next phase of the work involves the preparation of a dissertation and a special examination. The median time covered by this phase was in the neighborhood of 32 months for the group completing the Ph.D. degree in 1964-65, compared with 57 months for those doing so in 1954-55. Since the mid-1960’s, the median time probably has been shorted further.

As shown in Table 8, the range of specialization of those completing the Ph.D. in economics at Harvard continues to be quite wide. Among the various fields, however, Economic Development continues to be the most popular field. It accounted for about one-fifth of degrees granted during the four years shown. Money and Banking and Econometrics (the next most popular fields) each accounted for about one-tenth of the degrees awarded. Several of the traditional fields (such as Economic Theory, International Trade, Labor Economics, and Public Finance) each accounted for about 5 per cent of the total number of degrees. The emergence of several newer fields of interest—such as Urban Economics, Environmental Economics, and Socio-Economic Structure—should also be noted.

Table 8. Fields of Specialization of Ph.D. Recipients, Selected Years
Special Field 1965-66 1967-68 1971-72 1972-73
TOTAL 29 35 37 28
1. Agriculture 1 1
2. Chinese Studies 1 1
3. Comparative Economic Systems 1
4 Economic Development 4 12 6 6
5. Economic Growth 2
6. Economic History 1 2 3 1
7. Economic Theory 2 1 2 3
8. Econometrics 4 5 3
9. Environmental Economics 1
10. Health Economics 1 1
11. Industrial Organization 1 1 3
12. Input-Output Economics 2
13. International Trade 3 2 2 1
14. Labor Economics 2 2 3
15. Managerial Economics 1
16. Mathematical Economics 2 1
17. Money and Banking 1 3 4 4
18. Public Finance 2 2 2 1
19. Public Utilities 1
20. Regional Economics 1 2
21. Socio-Economic Structure 1
22. Soviet Economics 1 1
23. Statistics 1
24. Transportation 2 1 1
25. Urban Economics 4 2
26. Water Resources 1

 

IV. Departmental Atmosphere

As I have indicated above, the Committee encountered a greatly disturbed environment. One member of the Committee, who had participated in several previous visits, took special note of the strengths as well as the weaknesses within the Department:

“…As for the divisions in the department, the major one by far is between the senior faculty and about 50% of the graduate students. This is the problem that particularly distressed me, and the one which really threatens the future effectiveness of the department. There are, to be sure, disagreements within the senior faculty on issues dramatized by the decision (not to grant tenure to Professor Samuel Bowles). But I do not believe that — absent the unrest of the graduate students — they are beyond normal academic expectations or outside the capacity of the department for accommodation and compromise. Within the senior faculty there is still the civility and mutual respect needed for a functioning, self-governing department. I say this partly because I have recently visited another economics department where this condition does not obtain.

“The undergraduates seemed reasonably content with the program. …A minority of them are concerned about the loss of radical economists, but there was not as strong an undergraduate voice on this issue as might have been expected. As elsewhere, undergraduate radicalism is much weaker than it was five years ago.

“The complaints of junior faculty seemed to me much the same in kind and intensity as on previous visits. They have to do with the impersonality of the place, the lack of community, the inaccessibility of senior faculty, the division of the department into research empires which communicate very little with each other. In addition, junior faculty often express sympathy with the complaints of graduate students about the curriculum and the quality of instruction. At the same time, junior faculty do recognize the very great advantages of the Harvard environment for their own research and intellectual development. And they also participate with devotion and enthusiasm in the teaching programs of the department, and in the work of the various committees for curricular reform.

“The critical problem is the alienation of the graduate students. The most distressing thing is not that there are radicals among them, but that the general shortcomings of graduate instruction have alienated so many students of all persuasions. The radicals have evidently been able to capitalize on this discontent to make recruits among successive waves of students. Otherwise it is hard to understand how a movement which has waned rapidly in economics on other campuses and in other departments at Harvard continues to be so strong. It may also be true that some of the appeal of Bowles et. al. was that they cultivated a solicitude for students in contrast to the indifference perceived in “straight” faculty.

“In my own department radical dissent regarding the methodology of economics, the organization of our program, and the substance of economics has been expressed with emphasis but almost never with hostility and distrust toward the faculty as individuals or as an institution. So I found the tone of hostility and distrust at the Harvard (Graduate Economic Club) meeting very distressing. And of course I was quite impressed that about half of the graduate students were there, and that among them only one person said he was having a really good educational experience. I realize that the 50% present were not representative, but that’s a lot of students in itself and evidently the satisfied students didn’t have strong enough feelings to show up.

“The criticisms of first year courses are not new. We heard a couple of years ago that the theory course was a heavy dose of technical mathematics with no attempt at elucidation of basic economic content. Since then the course has shifted teachers again (frequent shifting is one of its problems), but remains a problem. It is much too large (maybe 80) for effective teaching. For the richest university, that is disgraceful.

“The general reputation of the senior faculty is that they are inaccessible, unapproachable, that they know and see only the few students who have gained access to their empires. No one serves for graduate students the functions performed by junior faculty for undergraduates, as teachers, advisers, tutors, friends. This really must be changed, even at some expense in research output and in outside activities of faculty. As things stand, I would not advise a bright … senior to go to the Harvard department unless he was of such a specialized interest and talent that he clearly could become a student protégé of one of the giants of the Harvard department.

“Perhaps the reduction in size of the graduate student body and the appointment of more non-tenure associate professors who will be active in graduate instruction will improve the situation. But that will not be enough. The senior faculty seems to me overly complacent about the situation, perhaps because they have been so close to it so long that they have forgotten what a decent and civilized community of faculty and graduate students is like.

“Unfortunately it will take time to recreate one at Harvard even if the faculty tries to do so. I don’t think it takes a drastic reformation of the curriculum so much as greater dedication to teaching, the use of smaller classes, assistants in first year courses, etc.”

Still another member of the Visiting Committee addressed himself to the atmosphere in the Department:

“…At the very outset, I think (one must not get) the impression of a deeper split within the senior faculty than actually exists. The division of opinion over Bowles involved only a small minority (not-by the way—a bloc that would hold together on many issues) and represented the sort of difference of opinion that any large faculty must expect to have. Had it not been for the size and intensity of the reaction from graduate students, nothing much would have followed from the Bowles decision. The real split in the department is between most of the senior faculty and a substantial fraction of the graduate student body. That, in turn, is a compound of radical dissidence and much broader student discontent with the teaching and conduct of the graduate program. The most striking aspect of the situation, in some ways, is how little the senior faculty seems to care. To give a clear picture of the department, I think (one must note) the contrast between the turbulence down below and the disaffection of some assistant professors on the one hand, and the fact that at the top things are really quite serene, large amounts of excellent research are getting done, and the faculty is justifiably pleased with its place and performance in the profession. That dichotomy is very important. The Overseers should realize that actions taken to fix some of the bad things may have unexpected effects on the good things…”

In a letter written following the visit, another member of the Committee also captured the essence of the prevailing conditions:

“… The distressing morale situation in the Economics Department shook me profoundly. I know enough to recognize the normal level of gripes in the special pleadings to which one is always open in such a situation, but the reactions of the various academic people on the Committee and that Law School professor at the (Graduate Economics Club) meeting confirm to me that things are really bad.

“…The argument about the radical professors probably pinpoints the entire problem, which is one of alienation between the tenured faculty (most of them, anyway) and all the rest of the department – faculty and students. There is a feeling that nobody cares…. Add to that the clear and unhappy failure to cope with the challenges it must meet (and perhaps was itself the cause of these problems), and the impatience and frustration of the younger people with the conventional … ‘received doctrine’ is only natural.

“…I have never heard the word ‘disappointment’ used so often. One shocking comment at the lunch with the non-tenured faculty was that, ‘It’s almost impossible to get a senior faculty person to read our research papers, but that’s easy in comparison with getting them to look at a reading list of a course we are preparing.’ The conscious and persistent rejection of discussion or Socratic teaching techniques in the classroom is hardly the proper way to help students to master a complex and essentially analytical rather than descriptive subject.

“The contrast with my days as an undergraduate is striking. We knew, took classes with, and spent time with all the great stars of our time—Hansen, Williams, Schumpeter, Mason, Leontief, Chamberlin, Haberler, Machlup, etc. All but the largest classes were full of active discussion and argument. The younger faculty was in ferment about Keynesianism and was just jamming it down the throats of the older faculty—who listened, argued, and clarified. I have never stopped going back to my class notes or the annotations in our books. The whole thing has never lost its relevance, fascination, or utility over the … years. This is what Harvard should do and must do to justify its reputation and importance, but that is precisely what it is not doing now.”

One member (who has visited the Department on several other occasions) focused on another impression shared by a number of others on the Committee. Following the visit, he wrote:

“…For the first time (in several years of) visitations (they were annual prior to the recent innovation)…I feel that the department is in great need of leadership. This conclusion is the result of a number of factors. Among them:

“1. While the department is unquestionably the finest in the country, the aura of leadership stems primarily from research activities. Teaching is another and a considerably spottier story. While the samples we observed were highly selective, they were not good.

“2. The furor over the radical economists does not seems to me to be related nearly as much to the facts as to the way in which the situation has been handled. That Harvard is alone among all universities in being in this position would tend to support this conclusion.

“3. The Harvard Economic Research Institute was a device for channeling research funds to the department. It has been allowed to run down completely. As much as faculty members may like the idea of additional funds being available, there seems no plan for replacing this source. Without such a plan and organized approach, it seems unlikely to me they will be replaced.

“4. I gather Ed Mason’s international activity is about to go out of business. I do not know the full story.

“5. The feeling persists among students (and this is not new) that the Economics Department lacks a ‘personality’ and interest in the student as an individual. As a result, they feel ‘at sea’.

“6. The impression I had from the students, at least, is that the number of socially relevant policy courses is limited (probably wrong) and that it is only the radical economists who are interested in teaching them (probably also wrong) and that these are the kinds of subjects on which students want to spend their time (with which I completely sympathize). If the students are right, this is a bad state of affairs. The fact that this is their perception of reality also seems to me a poor state of affairs.

“I am sure that each of these has its rationale and history. Yet, however much each requires the kind of careful handling one normally associates with management of professional staffs, none of these situations is necessary. Taken together, they worry me. My impression is that if we had time to study the issues truly important to the department’s future, we might well find they lacked the kind of forceful handling they should have….”

The assessment of the Department by a new member of the Committee was as follows:

“…My impression of the concern expressed by both the undergraduate and graduate students was threefold: (1) radical economics; (2) ‘relevant’ courses; and (3) a demonstrated concern for and interest in teaching and students. It seemed that the ‘radical’ economists were lecturing on topics of great interest to the students and were good, concerned teachers. Thus, I would like to emphasize that the Department not only broaden its course offerings but make evident, in a visible, systematic and continuing fashion that a priority function is teaching undergraduates and graduates…”

Again, it must be emphasized that the Committee’s exposure was necessarily short, and it may not have gotten a fully rounded picture of the prevailing situation. On the other hand, the fact that Committee members who have seen the Department over several years got the same impression must be given a great deal of weight.

 

V. Undergraduate Instruction Program

The Committee encountered few criticisms with respect to the undergraduate program offered by the Department of Economics. This was in noticeable contrast to the situation just a few years ago. At that time, students complained about the quality of tutorial programs and the lack of an opportunity to pursue joint majors with other substantive fields. During the 1972-73 academic year, the Department greatly expanded the amount of instruction provided on an individual or small group basis. As part of the initial effort, 20 sophomores received individual tutoring with highly favorable results. As a consequence, individual tutorial will become a permanent option — while group instruction will also be available for those students who prefer it. All concentrators have the option to participate in junior tutorial, and the option is being elected by an increasing number of such students. A senior thesis workshop has been in operation for more than a year. This program (led by a senior faculty member) provides an opportunity for seniors pursuing honors to explain and defend their research proposals well in advance of the March date on which the theses are due.

For the last few years, the Undergraduate Instruction Committee (UIC) has circulated questionnaires in all undergraduate courses in Economics to permit students to evaluate each course. The questions have focused on matters such as (1) the lecturer’s ability to hold interest; (2) overall evaluation of lectures; (3) overall evaluation of reading material; (4) helpfulness of sections; (5) preparation of section leaders; (6) fairness in grading; (7) attainment of initial expectations, and (8) overall impression of course. Each of these elements is rated on a scale of 9 for excellent, 7 for good, 5 for average, etc. The mean evaluation of undergraduate courses (weighted by enrollment) taught in the Fall term of 1971-72 was 6.65. (The standard deviation was 1.63) The highest score was achieved by junior tutorial groups, and several intermediate lecture courses followed fairly closely behind. A rough summary of the students’ evaluation of courses taught in the academic year 1972-73 (unweighted by enrollment) suggests that the overall assessment was about the same as in the previous year.

During the Committee’s visit, however, representatives of the Undergraduate Instruction Committee made two recommendations affecting the undergraduate program. The first related to the procedures of the Faculty Subcommittee on the Undergraduate Curriculum. The UIC expressed apprehension over the possibility that the Faculty Subcommittee might recommend major changes in the objectives and curriculum of the Economics Department without providing an ample opportunity for economics concentrators to discuss the proposals. The UIC strongly urged against such a course. After meeting with UIC, members of the Visiting Committee reported this concern to the chairman of the Faculty Subcommittee and were assured that no definitive action would be taken without proper consultation with undergraduate concentrators.

The second recommendation concerned the place of “radical” economics at Harvard. The UIC stated that:

“…it is clear to the committee that the Department of Economics should provide opportunities for undergraduate study in all major areas of economic theory. ‘Radical’ (Marxist) economic theory, as taught by Professors Bowles, Gintis, MacEwan, and Marglin, is a major alternative to neoclassical economic theory. The possibility exists that none of these faculty members will be teaching at Harvard during the academic year 1974-75. In light of this fact, this committee urges that the Department of Economics make certain that “radical” professors of economics be present on the Harvard Department of Economics faculty for 1974-75.”

In assessing the status of the undergraduate program, a member of the Committee observed:

“…The undergraduate program seems to be in better shape, perhaps because some of the assistant professors and teaching fellows are, against all odds, devoted to teaching. It seems to me that there is a genuine issue to be faced in the (recommendation)…. I have only little sympathy for the notion that “radical” or Marxian economic theory deserves a major place in the curriculum. But I do think that a department that goes in one or two years from a complement of four actively teaching radicals to none is in grave danger of violating a legitimate expectation of continuity held by students. If any number of undergraduates were attracted into the field by the hope of doing some specifically “radical” courses and research, then it is perhaps unfair to them to withdraw that opportunity so suddenly. If that is the content of the UIC recommendation, I think there is merit in it. There may be a similar point to be made on behalf of graduate students.

The Visiting Committee assured the representatives of UIC that their recommendations would be included in its report.

 

VI. Graduate Instruction Program

The Visiting Committee heard the most vocal expressions of discontent from graduate students. The strident tone of these comments was new—even to persons who had been on the Committee for several years. In explaining the apparent sharpness of the changed environment, one must give weight to the observations made by the chairman of the Department of Economics: since the Committee did not meet during the 1972-73 academic year, it perhaps had not kept abreast of emerging graduate student attitudes. Moreover, when the Committee visited the Department during the last few years, the “radical” students had boycotted the Committee’s meeting with graduate students. This time they chose to participate in the discussion through the Graduate Economic Club (G.E.C.).

In fact, the special meeting called by that organization (and to which the Committee and faculty members were invited) was the best session of the entire visit—at least in the opinion of several members of the Committee. The co-chairman of the G.E.C. had obviously worked hard to organize the meeting, and a substantial proportion of the graduate students enrolled participated. Three key issues were listed on the agenda: (1) the first-year program (including the Economic History requirement, theory courses, mathematics instruction, class size, and teaching quality); (2) curriculum content and the “firing” of radical professors, and (3) the structure and control of the Department. The presentations were crisp, and the discussion — while full — was highly focused.

The meeting took place against the background of considerable student unhappiness over the graduate program. One expression of that attitude is embodied in a long letter prepared by the Graduate Economics Club and addressed to entering graduate students. The opening section of that letter sets the general tone:

“The Graduate Economics Club is an organization open to all economics graduate students, whose purpose is to represent, and provide a forum for, the views of students in the department. We are writing to welcome you to the Economics Department. We only wish we could report that it was a more pleasant experience. In general, most of us have found that the first year at Harvard was the worst year of our lives. The teaching is often terrible, the professors distant and uninterested in new students. Many of us found that we were forced to work extremely hard at courses that were poor by any standard. The department makes little attempt to ease new students’ adjustment to Cambridge, so many entering graduates find the initial months are alienating and lonely. Student-faculty relations are often poor, in part as a result of academic and political disputes which have riven the department in the last three or four years.

“Harvard can be a very exciting place to work. Cambridge is a lively, stimulating city: the intellectual and cultural resources available here are extremely broad ranging. Once they come to know the department and the city, most students find Harvard an enjoyable place to study. It is largely the first few terms here that prove so difficult. In an effort to make the first year somewhat better for you than it was for us, a fair number of students have discussed how we might have treated our first year here differently. This letter is an attempt to condense what we now that might help you. Not all of us agree with all of what is included, but most of us agree with most of it….”

The letter then took up three main subjects: (1) the formal academic requirements and the older students’ collective judgment as to the best way to handle them; (2) housing and living arrangements, and (3) an account of the “political” conflicts evident in the Department of Economics in the last few years. The first and third of these subjects were also dominant themes of the G.E.C.’s meeting in which the Visiting Committee participated.

The formal requirements for the Ph.D. established by the Department of Economics specify that candidates must pass examinations in five fields: Economic Theory, Economic History; Quantitative Methods, and two “special” fields chosen by the student. By long-standing practice, many students “write-off” the Economic History and Quantitative Methods requirements by taking specified courses. An additional requirement is enrollment in one working seminar in which a paper must be prepared.

These requirements—and the way in which they have been administered—have engendered numerous complaints by graduate students. In response, the Graduate Instruction Committee was instructed by the faculty of the Department of Economics to review a number of aspects of the doctoral program and to recommend improvements. Six curriculum review committees (which included student members as well as both tenured and non-tenured faculty) were established for this purpose. These were: (1) Committee on the Structure of the Doctoral Program and Examinations; (2) Committee on the First-year Program; (3) Committee on Economic Theory and its History; (4) Committee on Economic History; (5) Committee on Special Fields, and (6) Committee on the Relations Between the Economy and Society. The Graduate Instruction Committee prepared several memoranda to give guidance to the various review committees and to identify the main issues and questions on which it was hoped the latter would focus. At the same time, however, it was made clear that the review committees should not feel constrained by such memoranda but should feel free to define the scope of their own deliberations and recommendations. The key issues on which the committees were urged to focus are summarized in Appendix I to this report.

It was thought unnecessary and unduly complicated to require formal coordination of the work of the various review committees. However, consultation among them was encouraged. This was especially true of the committees dealing with the structure of the doctoral program and relations between economics and society. Most of the committees were asked to report during the Fall term. The tasks were well underway at the time the Visiting Committee was at Harvard, and the Department expects to consider the various recommendations before the end of the 1973-74 academic year. It was generally expected that significant changes will be recommended in several of the areas under review.

 

VII. Controversy over Radical Economics

As indicated above, the debate over Harvard’s receptivity to the presence of “radical” professors on the faculty and the inclusion of “radical economics” in the curriculum held a great deal of interest for members of the Visiting Committee. Background material on the subject had been shared with committee members in advance, and a considerable amount of time during the visit was spent on the issues involved.

To put the matter in perspective, it might be well to summarize the emergence of the debate in the Economics Department in recent years. Apparently in the mid-1960’s, a number of younger faculty members and graduate students concluded that conventional training in economics (in which Harvard was in the forefront) did not address most of the social problems of the day which they thought important. Acting on this conviction, they began to work within the Department for a reform of the curriculum. Some of the senior faculty members were sympathetic with these goals. Partly as a result of these efforts, students were added to the Graduate Instruction Committee (G.I.C.)—first two students and then three on a committee of 13 members. Evidently these changes did little to resolve the student’s discontent. It is reported that recommendations by the G.I.C. favorable to students were not endorsed by the faculty as a whole.

In the generally unsettled atmosphere at Harvard during 1969-70, graduate student protest over the economics curriculum also rose considerably. To meet the criticism, the form of the general examination requirements was relaxed somewhat. Yet, many students still found the content of the curriculum unsatisfactory. Again, it seems that some faculty members (not all of them without tenure) shared this feeling. By the Spring of 1971, this continuing disappointment led to the Graduate Economics Club (GEC) to pass “…a resolution calling for full democratization of the economics department. As the first steps towards implementation the GEC demanded equal representation on the Graduate Instruction Committee and the non-tenured faculty committee….” The faculty (after what was apparently a vigorous debate) turned down these propositions in late March, 1971.

In the wake of this outcome, discussions were held among small groups of students and faculty which focused on the general examination requirements and on the graduate program generally. One of the committees formed at that time addressed itself to the role of “socio-economic structure” and Marxist theory in the curriculum. These two subjects were later approved by the faculty (in the Spring of 1971) as special fields in the Ph.D. program. However, no major changes were made in the content of the generals examinations, and no commitment was made to invite any Marxist economists to join the permanent faculty. Also in the Spring of 1971, the student representatives left the Graduate Instruction Committee—protesting what they considered token representation and lack of influence. Finally, in the Fall of 1971, the Graduate Economics Club adopted a resolution specifying that “… a Marxist theorist shall be hired to teach a curriculum in Marxist theory, to begin no later than the Fall of 1972….”

The faculty made no immediate response to this resolution. However, the issue came into sharp focus during the early months of 1972. At that time, a debate got underway over the question of the tenure of Associate Professor Samuel Bowles—a question which the Department had to answer by the end of the calendar year. The term appointment of Assistant Professor Arthur MacEwan was also moving to the stage at which a decision with respect to his future status would have to be made by the same deadline. These two men were viewed by the students as “…the last two remaining non-tenured radical faculty members….” A campaign to win tenure for them was launched by both undergraduate and graduate students. As part of this effort, a petition urging that they be retained and that more radical economists be brought to Harvard was circulated in the Spring of 1972. More than 700 persons signed the petition. In the Fall of that year, a substantial proportion of Professor Bowles former students (reportedly 75 per cent of them—virtually all of those who could be reached) orally or in writing supported the effort to obtain tenure for him. But, after a long (and apparently sometimes divisive) debate, the majority of the Department voted against a tenure appointment for Professor Bowles. A few weeks later, Professor MacEwan’s term appointment was not renewed, and he was not promoted to Associate Professor. Previously two other “radial” economists (Herbert Gintis and Thomas Weisskopf) had failed to receive promotions.

Immediately, these decisions were attacked as “politically” motivated by many of the students and some of the faculty. These charges of bias were denied vigorously by members of the senior faculty. However, the reverberations of those actions reached well beyond the boundaries of Harvard University. For example, at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association (AEA) in Toronto in late December, 1972, a resolution was proposed condemning the action of the Harvard economics faculty. The chairman and other representatives of Harvard spoke against the resolution which was not adopted. However, a modified version was approved. It held that:

  1. The American Economic Association urges that hiring decisions in economics departments be free of political bias. The Association strongly condemns political discrimination in hiring decisions against radical economists or any others.
  2. The American Economic Association urges all departments to set up university procedures whereby allegations of discrimination on the basis of political differences can be systematically investigated.
  3. The American Economic Association strongly opposes discrimination in government grant allocation on the basis of political views.

As indicated above, strong voices were heard on both sides of the debate over the Bowles appointment. The formal view of the faculty majority was given by Professor James Duesenberry, Department Chairman, in his report covering the 1972-73 academic year:

“…Our pleasure…was marred by criticism, from students and others, of the department’s failure to recommend Associate Professor Samuel Bowles for a tenure appointment. The non-tenure associate professorship is a new rank at Harvard and Professor Bowles was the first person appointed to it and therefore the first to reach the time at which a decision as to a tenure recommendation had to be made. There was perhaps some misapprehension as to the likelihood of tenure appointments for associate professors. There are at present six associate professors and it is a source of regret that only a fraction of this extraordinarily able group of economists can be offered tenure appointments. In Professor Bowles’ case it was alleged that the Executive Committee’s decision was biased because of Professor Bowles’ ‘radical’ views. Since bias like beauty is in the eye of the beholder, that is a difficult charge to answer. I can only say that in my twenty years on the Executive Committee the primary consideration has always been the search for persons who could be expected to maintain and enhance the outstanding professional position of the department. Failure to recommend a particular associate professor for a tenure appointment is not an indication of bias unless it can be alleged that the person in question has scholarly abilities and accomplishments which are obviously superior to those of any other persons—at Harvard or elsewhere—who might be appointed.

“Alternatively it might be argued that ‘radical economics’ should receive more attention. The department already has one ‘radical’ full professor (appointed before his conversion to be sure, but here none the less). The amount of weight to be given to any subfield or approach in our discipline is always a matter of opinion and dispute, but it does not seem obvious that the accomplishments of the relatively new radical approach are so overwhelming as to outweigh the many other claims on our limited number of appointments….”

Several other senior faculty members who thought Bowles should have been given tenure—although their reasons differed—have also spoken on the issue. Professor Stephen A. Marglin (a member who was voted tenure before he began to identify with the “radical” economists) urged his colleagues to give Bowles a tenure appointment—and also to bring more radicals to Harvard. By so doing, he though radical economics would have a chance to develop. Professors Kenneth J. Arrow, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Wassily Leontief were also willing to give radical economics an opening: and they, too supported tenure for Bowles. Professor Arrow has been quoted as saying that Bowles’ appointment would broaden the Department, and he felt that his work was “good enough” judged by standard that “hardly had anything to do with radicalism.”

Partly as a response to this debate, Herbert Gintis (who was lecturing in the School of Education after he failed to win reappointment three years earlier) was invited back to the Department of Economics as an Assistant Professor, with the understanding that he would be recommended for promotion effective with the 1974-75 academic year. Beginning in September, 1974, Gintis and Bowles (along with two other “radical” economists — Stephen A. Resnick and Richard Wolff) will go as a team to the Economics Department of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.1/With their departure, Stephen Marglin will be the only “radical” economist with tenure — in a Harvard community numbering more than 60 economists. Moreover, he is scheduled to be on leave for the 1974-75 academic year.

1/ Subsequent to the Committee’s visit, it was learned that Gintis may remain at Harvard. As this report was being written, the matter was still uncertain.

 

VIII. Continuing Controversy Over the Scope of Economics at Harvard

Aside from the debate over the role of radical economists at Harvard, a number of faculty members (both tenured and non-tenured) are concerned about the scope and content of the curriculum—and think it should be broadened considerably. The curriculum review committees discussed above were appointed for this purpose. Several tenure appointments will become available to the Department in the next few years, but opinions differ as to how they should be filled. The Department chairman, in his report covering the 1972-73 academic year, identified the fields of labor, industrial organization, economic development, and economic history as ones in which additional strength is needed.

More fundamentally, however, at least a few senior faculty members apparently believe that the differences in view with respect to the content of the economics program are so wide that a basic reorganization of the Department may be in order. So far, Professor Galbraith is the only one to express his views in writing. However, Professors Arrow, Albert Hirschman, Leontief, and Marglin are reported to have thought — during the Spring of 1973 — that the possibility of forming a new department or a separate track within the existing Department was worth exploration2/By late fall, Professor Galbraith (who chairs the Committee on the First-Year Graduate Program) had in circulation a proposal to establish an Experimental Program and Committee within the existing Department of Economics. If adopted, this program would provide students an alternative path to the Ph.D. paralleling the more traditional route. Under the umbrella of the new faculty Committee which would oversee the alternative route, appointments would be made and associated research would be conducted. Subject matter of interest to faculty and students working in the Committee’s area might include problems of the arts, discrimination, income maintenance, and poverty. Perhaps one-quarter of the graduate students might elect to pursue this new track. The proposal also visualizes that the committee would have the right to recommend appointments — tenure and non-tenure — about in proportion to its share of the teaching load (both undergraduate and graduate). While the Executive Committee of the Department would vote on such recommendations, there would be a broad presumption that the Committee’s recommendations would be accepted.

2/ A member of the Visiting Committee thought the report should note that this group of senior faculty “…is the group that supported Bowles, and that it is in fact a group that has very little else in common. Galbraith’s and Hirschman’s view of economics has very little overlap with Arrow’s and Leontief’s, and Marglin is his own kind of (man). This appears to more an alliance based on political attitude and temporary happenstance than a genuine current of thought.”

At the time the Visiting Committee was in Cambridge, this proposal had generated considerable reaction. It had apparently won strong support among some of the senior faculty as well as among the non-tenured group and graduate students. But it apparently had also encountered strong opposition — especially on the part of some of the tenured members. Since a version of the proposal will probably be submitted to the Graduate Instruction Committee this spring, the Department may have to vote on it before the end of the 1973-74 academic year.

 

IX. Affirmative Action Program

The Visiting Committee made a special effort to appraise the effort being made by the Department of Economics (in keeping with University policy) to recruit women and members of minority groups. The subject was discussed primarily with the Department Chairman, but other senior members of the faculty also contributed. The non-tenure recruitment procedures used during 1972-73 were described by the Department Chairman as follows:

“The Department of Economics normally plans to hire 4 or 5 assistant professors each year. In the 1972/73 recruiting season, the non-tenure appointment committee obtained names and short vitas of prospective new Ph.D.’s from over twenty leading departments of economics. Additional names were supplied to us on an informal basis by a number of smaller graduate departments. Members of the committees and other members of the department then contacted department chairmen, placement officers, and others to develop a shorter list of the outstanding prospects from this year’s Ph.D. crop. In making these inquiries chairmen and placement officers were pressed as to the availability of women and minority candidates. At the time of the 1972 Christmas meetings of the American Economics Association the “short list” included 40 names of which 6 were women. There were no minority candidates who seemed suitable for our department. At the AEA meetings members of our department interviewed all candidates on the short list who could be contacted, as well as others who requested interviews.

“On the basis of interviews and further correspondence with other universities, a number of candidates were included in these invitations. In the end five offers of assistant professorships were made and accepted through these procedures, of whom one was a woman. It may be worth noting that it was necessary for us to make a considerable effort to find a post for her husband at another university in the city in order to obtain the services of the one woman we have recommended for an assistant professor appointment.

“In addition to the appointments made through these procedures, we have recommended that two persons now holding lectureships in the university be appointed assistant professors. One of these is our head tutor who had been teaching in Social Studies but will now undertake an important teaching assignment in our department. In his case we feel that he should assume professorial status. Because of the importance of continuity in his post as head tutor, we have not considered any other candidates.

“A second appointment has been recommended for a lecturer in the School of Education who has previously taught in our department but who will now switch the bulk of his teaching from the School of Education to the Department of Economics.

“We have also recommended two associate professor appointments. One of these is to be promoted from assistant professor upon completion of his term. We had no women assistant professors reaching the review point this year. The other recommendation is for an appointment to associate professor in the field of labor economics as a stop-gap replacement for Professor Dunlop. An extensive search by a special committee did not reveal any women or minority candidates who could be seriously considered for this position.”

On balance, several members of the Visiting Committee thought that the Department’s procedures (while clearly aimed in the right direction) did not show the kind of vigorous effort required to achieve the Harvard goal. At least one academic member of the Committee thought that the Department’s efforts fell appreciably short of those made by several other institutions — which had also been much more successful in competing for an admittedly scarce supply of women and minority group economists.

Another member of the Committee, who had been asked to give special attention to the matter, observed as follows:

“…The first evening… we discussed … Affirmative Action Plan. But I had a strong feeling that it was a farce. The message seemed to be: Look how hard we’ve tried. We’ve done everything we could, but there simply aren’t any qualified women or blacks. As (another member) said to me informally, they really seem to believe women are inferior. This member of the Visiting Committee would urge a much stronger effort to recruit women at the assistant professor level so as to increase the number in the pipeline for higher level positions later….”

 

X. Concluding Observations

At the conclusion of its visit and after considerable discussion — the Visiting Committee decided not to draw up a list of specific recommendations. Instead, it chose to describe as fully as possible the situation it encountered in the Economics Department. It was assumed that the Harvard faculty itself is best suited to cope with its own problems.

On the other hand, several general observations should be made. In the first place, it was obvious to virtually every member of the Committee that the curriculum being offered by the Department of Economics is greatly in need of reformation.3/ The subject matter ought to be broadened to provide greater scope for students and faculty to work on problems — and search for solutions to them — that are not easily encompassed within the corpus of traditional economics as taught at Harvard. It was realized, of course, that the Department of Economics at Harvard is far less narrow than almost any other department in the forefront of the profession. Yet, a number of the men who have provided this broad thrust over the years have recently retired and others are scheduled to do so in the near future. Consequently, the Visiting Committee thinks it is vital that the upcoming opportunities to make tenure appointments be used to assure that Harvard’s historic concern for economic welfare (broadly defined) be kept alive in the years ahead.

3/ A member of the Committee noted that “…the Harvard curriculum is not atypical for university departments aspiring to high status in the profession’s pecking order. So it is a problem of the criteria by which the profession judges, not specifically of the Harvard Department. Nevertheless, there may be good reason for Harvard to assume some leadership in searching for a broader curriculum. Of course, there may be no good answer….”

The Visiting Committee refrained from expressing a judgment on the appropriateness of the decision not to give tenure appointments to specific members of the faculty identified as radical economists. The reason was simple: in the final analysis, the faculty itself has to decide who will be given status and the right to enjoy its privileges and carry on its responsibilities. On the other hand, the Committee feels strongly that “political” bias or other forms of discrimination should have no weight in judging candidates for tenure. Again, however, these judgments have to be made by the faculty.

But one member of the Visiting Committee also felt strongly that some kind of machinery should be created that would enable some outside body (perhaps even outside the University) to review faculty decisions in which those affected adversely feel they are the victims of discrimination — “political” or otherwise. Two or three other members of the Committee expressed some sympathy with this general view — although not necessarily with the specific elements outlined. On balance, however, the Committee decided not to endorse the proposition or transmit it as a recommendation. 4/ Nevertheless, everyone was sensitive to the difficult issues involved. Several members thought that the general position on political bias embodied in the resolution adopted by the American Economic Association (reported above) is one the Harvard Economics Department might well adopt as its own.

4/ The tone of the opposition to the proposal was captured by one member: “…I have my doubts about any proposal for outside review….Appointments may in fact sometimes be made on a discriminatory basis, and I would be interested in suggestions for protective machinery. I fear, however, that the solution mentioned here may be so open to abuse as to be worse than the problem. I wish I had a better alternative to suggest….”

The Committee was deeply impressed with the criticism of the graduate curriculum which it heard. For that reason, it was pleased to note the work now underway in the various review committees to reassess the program. It appears that a number of important recommendations will be made to the faculty — which if adopted could significantly enhance the appeal and usefulness of the program to graduate students. At the same time, it is also obvious that the senior faculty members in the Department must devote far more time directly to the education of the students who look to them for inspiration and guidance.

Finally, the Committee is convinced that a much greater — and far more systematic — effort should be made to seek out promising women and members of minority groups as potential faculty members. The Committee is under no illusions that this is an easy task. But, unless the Department’s procedures are revamped and more resources devoted to the assignment—it appears doubtful that the Department of Economics will make a significant contribution toward helping Harvard University achieve the goals established in its affirmative action program.

Andrew F. Brimmer
Chairman

April 15, 1974

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

APPENDIX I
SUMMARY OF ASSIGNMENTS OF CURRICULUM REVIEW COMMITTEES

[Incomplete]

As indicated above, the Department of Economics has established six curriculum review committees to work on the improvement of a number of aspects of the doctoral program. The principal guidance given to these task forces by the Graduate Instruction Committee is summarized below.

Committee on Structure of the Doctoral Program and Examinations: This committee “will be responsible for reconsidering the procedure whereby a candidate becomes a doctor of philosophy and is expected to contemplate if not to recommend very fundamental changes in the organization of the program.” Its mandate includes:

  1. Reconsideration of the length and chronology of the doctoral program.
    1. Currently the Economic Department expects candidates to take general examinations at the end of their second year and special examinations one and a half to two years later. What is the actual chronology in recent years? Is this norm sound, or should the Department develop a program of different length and segments?
    2. Should candidates be involved in teaching and research sooner than at present, say during the second year, although this may require some extension of the time devoted to preparing for the general orals?
  2. Consideration of possible course requirements. At present there are none (formally), but it may be advisable to require candidates to take a specified minimum number of courses for letter grades.
  3. Reconsideration of the offering of advanced courses and seminars. There are now a large number of advanced courses and seminars, many with small enrollments. Who takes these courses: second-year students, post-generals students, students from outside the Department? Would it suit the needs of the faculty and students better if some or all of them were replaced by less formal and more flexible tutorials, group or individual?
  4. Is the Department meeting the needs of post-generals students with respect to advanced instruction, stimulation, and guidance? How should that phase of the program be strengthened?
  5. Reconsideration of the role and concept of the thesis. Current legislation is intended to encourage theses that are more like a long paper or short monograph than like a comprehensive treatise, but this seems to be largely a dead letter. Which concept is sound, and how can it be implemented?
  6. Reconsideration of the final examination. For the last few years, the grading and conduct of the special examination have been separated from the acceptance and grading of the thesis. Has this change made the special examination a more useful educational experience than previously? Would other changes improve it further?
  7. Finally, is the graduate program properly attuned to the job market or the requirements for a career in economics? What kinds of jobs do Harvard graduates find, and have they been equipped properly for such jobs? Are any procedures needed for adjusting the program to meet the changing demands on economists?

This list of topics, though long and demanding, was not meant to be exhaustive. The committee was encouraged to feel free to raise questions of its own and to make recommendations about any aspects of the program.

 

Committee on the First-Year Program: Some matters and questions that this committee was asked to consider are:

  1. The efficacy and adequacy of the current procedures for advising first-year students.
  2. Whether the courses and programs now available to entering students provide enough flexibility in view of their widely varying levels of preparation and fields of interest. Is the first year concentrated excessively on the three required fields?

 

  1. [sic, “3.” apparently skipped over or omitted] Whether there is need for more information about the level and contents of graduate courses than is provided by the catalog listing and, if so, how to provide it. Are the current pamphlets about the general nature of the program and the degree requirements adequate? Indeed, should the organization and contents of the catalog listing being revised substantially?
  2. Is there need for additional physical facilities, in particular, for a common room?

 

Committee on Economic Theory and Its History: Some of the issues called to the committee’s attention are:

  1. Level of the requirement. At present the instructors and examiners in economic theory and its history do not have any guidance except vague traditions for determining the level of attainment to expect. It is somewhere between the acquaintance with fundamental concepts expounded in the intermediate undergraduate economic theory course and the highly technical proficiency (also vaguely conceived) expected of a candidate who offers advanced economic theory as a special field.
    A clear, and if possible, operational definition would be highly desirable. This task consists, really, of two parts: first, a policy decision on the appropriate level of advancement, and second, the discovery of a way to express that decision in clear and operational terms, perhaps a syllabus.
  2. The scope of the field. Just what topics are to be included in the field of economic theory and its history is nowhere laid down. It is not at all clear how much acquaintance the faculty expects candidates to have with the present of economic doctrine, either first-hand or second-hand. There is considerable disagreement about how much [… end of copy]

 

NOTE:  PAGES STARTING WITH A-5 ARE MISSING.

Missing are “(4) Committee on Economic History; (5) Committee on Special Fields, and (6) Committee on the Relations Between the Economy and Society.”

Source: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. John Kenneth Galbraith Papers. Series 5. Harvard University File, 1949-1990. Box 527. Folder “Harvard Department of Economics Report of the Visiting Committee, 1975”.

Categories
Economics Programs Economists Harvard Radical

Harvard. Leontief and Galbraith report on conflict within department, 1972

In December 1972 the conflict about opening the Harvard economics faculty to include “broader and necessarily ‘softer’ questions of social structure, social functions and social reform” exploded beyond the confines of the economics department. This post provides two letters/memos sent to Harvard’s President Derek C. Bok written by Wassily Leontief and John Kenneth Galbraith, respectively, that supported curriculum reform involving the continued appointments of young radical economists. It would appear from Leontief’s account that a relatively silent majority of the younger mathematical economists in the department was able to block the recommendation of their more senior colleagues to expand course offerings to meet the demand of students for courses outside the confines of “orthodox technical economics”…a revolution that devoured its own parents.

_____________________

Background tip:

Talk presented by Tom Weisskopf “The Origins and Evolution of Radical Political Economics” (September 25, 2012).

_____________________

Photocopy Leontief to Harvard President Derek C. Bok

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Wassily Leontief
Professor of Economics

309 Littauer
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
(617) 495-2118

December 21, 1972

Mr. Derek Bok
President
Harvard University
Massachusetts Hall 1

Dear Derek:

I am writing in response to your request for my views on the conflict that for some time has been straining the relationships within the Executive Committee of our Department on the one hand and Executive Committee and the graduate student body on the other. It developed along rather familiar lines and finally broke into the open.

The controversy, as I see it, centers on the question whether the Department of Economics should widen the range of its intellectual concerns and of its teaching responsibilities beyond the narrowly delineated field of orthodox technical economics by inclusion of broader and necessarily “softer” questions of social structure, social functions and social reform: questions raised for example in the old Marxist and the new radical economics.

While a minority in the Executive Committee favors a move in this direction, arguing that it would reflect the natural growth and extension of our discipline, the majority opposes it on the grounds that this would amount to politicalization of the field and lowering of intellectual standards. Somewhat paradoxically, the minority favoring a change comprises mostly senior members of the Department while the core of the majority group consists of the younger mathematical economists. Needless to say, the students are on the side of the minority. While the minority did most of the talking, the majority was content with voting.

Last spring a mixed faculty-student committee appointed by the Chairman proposed a modest curriculum reform that would reflect the interest in the new subjects. After a stiff fight, the report was first accepted, then watered down, and finally scuttled.

The division within the Department was clearly reflected in a series of votes on new appointments. Three years ago, the junior staff contained four radical economists: Herb Gintis, Tom Weisskopf, Art MacEwan and Sam Bowles. All were let go. Gintis is now lecturer in the Department of Education, Tom Weisskopf was avidly acquired by the Department of Economics of the University of Michigan, Sam Bowles failed a week ago to receive a permanent appointment, and Art MacEwan was denied this week a second three-year appointment. The slate is clear except for Steve Marglin, who was elevated to full professorship before his interests had shifted into the field of institutional analysis and criticism.

Adverse votes are invariably based on lack of intellectual distinction and creditable contributions to knowledge by the candidate; this notwithstanding the fact that several permanent slots were filled in the past by scholars of admittedly indifferent stature on the ground that a vacancy had to be filled in some narrowly defined specialized field.

Reluctantly the minority on the Executive Committee came to the conclusion that its advice and counsel will be disregarded in the future as it was in the past; that crucial decisions will be made on the basis of an often silent, but invariably effective majority vote. The rising tension finally led to acrimonious exchanges at the last meeting of the Executive Committee.

The obvious frustration of the graduate students finds its expression in sharp verbiage used by the radical minority and sullen indifference and cynicism among the rest. I hardly need to add that the students are quite aware of the division within the Executive Committee.

This is where we stand now. At best one could observe that as a whole the senior teaching staff of the Economics Department is much less effective than one could have expected it to be considering the distinction of its individual members. At worst, the continuation of the conflict might result in resignations and damage all around.

After you called me up, Jim Duesenberry asked several members of the Department to serve on a committee that would review the intellectual problems involved and try to find some way out. The proposed composition of the committee (Arrow, Bergson, Dorfman, Galbraith and me) assures that its report will give full weight to the minority point of view.

I myself feel that nothing short of a clear-cut reversal in the present trend can prevent further deterioration of the situation. Needless to say, I will do all I can to bring about a constructive and peaceable solution of the difficult problems we are facing. Some counsel and some help from you and John [probably economist John T. Dunlop who was serving as Dean] most likely will be needed. Let me add that some of my colleagues who up to now held an opposing point of view have offered their full cooperation.

I have dictated this letter but had no time to proofread it since Estelle and I are leaving for London two hours from now. In case of need, please do not hesitate to call me. My secretary, Mary Conley, will know all the time where I can be reached.

With best wishes from Estelle and me to Sissele and you.

Sincerely,
[signed]
Wassily Leontief

WL:mc

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

Carbon copy Galbraith to Harvard President Derek C. Bok

December 22, 1972

President Derek C. Bok
Massachusetts Hall

Dear Derek:

This I hope will diminish the concern you may have had following my telephone call of the other evening. My personal anger, as usual, has been difficult to sustain although I surely intend to stay with this problem until things are put right. I’ve met with the young radicals and I think they are persuaded that Toronto is not a good forum and that neither Arrow nor I is the man they most want to embarrass. John has operated with usual skill and panache. He accepts the idea of a commission to consider and act before things get worse, and I am drafting up the terms of reference for discussion with Jim Duesenberry. I’ve gone over the rough outlines with Wassily. With considerable approval, I’ve raised the question of conflict of interest with external corporate enterprises. I enclose a document on that subject.

In any case, a Merry Christmas.

Yours faithfully,

John Kenneth Galbraith

JKG:kv

Enclosure

 

Source: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. John Kenneth Galbraith Personal Papers. Series 5. Harvard University File, 1949-1990. Box 526. Folder “Harvard Dept. of Economics, Discussion of appointments, outside interests and reorganization, 1972-1973 (1 of 2)”.

Image Source: Wassily Leontief from Harvard Class Album 1957.

Categories
Amherst Chicago Economists Harvard M.I.T. Placement

Chicago. Zvi Griliches asking Frank Fisher for junior appointment leads, 1961

 

In a 1961 memo Zvi Griliches reported to his Chicago colleagues some scouting results regarding a possible junior appointment in economics. He spoke econometrician-to-econometrician with his colleague Frank Fisher at M.I.T. about the most interesting graduate students in the Cambridge area on the job market that year. Four names were mentioned, two unsurprising enough were the names of economists “unable” to be drawn from the gravitational pull of Cambridge. 

Griliches ended his memo with the remark “This year Domar happens to be MIT’s ‘placement officer’ and this is likely to put us at some competitive disadvantage.” Does this mean that Griliches thought the monopsonist Evsey Domar would deliberately discriminate against the University of Chicago?

_______________

Four graduate students discussed by Zvi Griliches and Frank Fisher

Beals, Ralph E. Dept. of Econs. Amherst College, Amherst, MA 01002. Birth Yr: 1936.  Degrees: B.S., U. of Kentucky, 1958; M.A., Northwestern U., 1959; Ph.D., Mass. Institute of Technol., 1970. Prin. Cur. Position: Clarence Francis Prof. of Econs., Amherst Coll., 1966.  Concurrent/Past Positions: Assoc., Harvard Institute for Int’l. Develop., 1973.  Research: Int’l. trade, commercial policy & industrialization in Indonesia.

[According to the Prabook website: Ralph E. Beals was Assistant professor economics, Amherst (Massachusetts) College, 1962-1963; associate professor, Amherst (Massachusetts) College, 1966-1971. ]

Hohenberg, Paul M. RPI, Dept of Econ, Troy, NY 12180. Birth Yr: 1933.  Degrees: B.Ch.E., Cornell U., 1956; M.A., Tufts U., 1959; Ph.D., Mass. Institute of Technol., 1963. Prin. Cur. Position: Prof. of Econs., Rensselaer Poly. Institute, 1977.  Concurrent/Past Positions: Vis. Assoc. Prof., Sir George Williams U., Montreal, 1972-74; Assoc. Prof., Cornell U., 1968-73.  Research: Urbanization & econ. change in Europe and U.S.

Marglin, Stephen A.  Birth Yr: 1938.  Degrees: A.B., Harvard U., 1959; Ph.D., Harvard U., 1965. Prin. Cur. Position: Prof. of Econs., Harvard U.

Temin, Peter. Mass Inst of Tech, Dept of Econ, Cambridge, MA 02139. Birth Yr: 1937.  Degrees: B.A., Swarthmore Coll., 1959; Ph.D., Mass. Institute of Technol., 1964. Prin. Cur. Position: Prof. of Econs., Mass. Institute of Technol., 1970.  Concurrent/Past Positions: Assoc. Prof., Mass. Institute of Technol., 1967-70; Asst. Prof., Mass. Institute of Technol., 1965-67. ResearchEcon. history; telecommunications policy.

 

Source:  Biographical Listing of Members. The American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 6 (Dec., 1993).

_______________

Memo on possible appointments written by Zvi Griliches

November 8, 1961

[To:] A. Rees
[From:] Z. Griliches
[Re:] The possible appointments.

I had a long telephone conversation with Frank Fisher last week about “whom we should look at.” It is his opinion that the single best young man coming up now in the Cambridge area is:

Stephen A. Marglin—He is a mathematical theorist, with several papers to his credit. He has spent a year at Cambridge, England and is currently in his second year of a three year Junior Fellowship at Harvard. I had already invited him to give a talk to the workshop and he will be here on January 16 to talk on “The Social Rate of Discount and the Opportunity Costs of Public Investment.” Frank thinks that we would have a very hard time getting him, in particular for next year, but that he is clearly the best.

The best current MIT student that will be coming to the market is, in Fisher’s opinion:

Ralph Beals—who is a third year graduate student specializing in the fields of monetary policy and econometrics. He has been working with Solow and Albert Ando and his interests in the monetary area have appartently been stimulated by Solow’s and Ando’s involvement in the Monetary Commission stuff.

In addition, Fisher mentioned that there are also two ver good “economic historian types” finishing there this year:

Peter Pemin[sic, “Temin”]—who is working with Gerschenkron at Harvard, and
Paul Hohenberg—who is working withKindelberger on the sources of the econonmic development of France in the 19thcentury.

This year Domar happens to be MIT’s “placement officer” and this is likely to put us at some competitive disadvantage.

cc:       H. Johnson, M. Friedman, T. Schultz✓, G. Stigler, W. Wallis.

Source:  University of Chicago Archives. Department of Economics Records, Box 42, Folder 3.

Image Source:  Zvi Griliches from the University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf1-06565, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.

 

Categories
Economists Harvard Seminar Speakers

Harvard. Galbraith’s Special Tuesday Evening Seminar, 1973

 

One of the delights of working with the papers of John Kenneth Galbraith is that the man was simply incapable of writing a straight memo. Some flash of wit or felicitous use of the English language always breaks in. The following announcement gives us some insight into the sort of university service that Galbraith most gladly provided. Soft power was his instrument of choice for departmental politics.

___________________

SPECIAL TUESDAY EVENING SEMINAR

As in earlier years, Professor Galbraith will conduct a series of evening discussions for first year graduate students and others who are interested. Meetings will be in the Littauer Lounge at 7 o’clock, and participants are urged to arrive reasonably on time. They may leave when they wish. Following very brief introductory comments by Professor Galbraith and guests, the subject will be open for discussion. No competently presented argument, however inconvenient, will be denied a hearing. Discussion will continue as long as the audience or the supply of useful ideas endures. This year’s subject and dates are listed below. The guest list is still tentative.

 

October 2, 1973—THE ECONOMICS OF THE PRESENT INFLATION

Guests:
Hendrik S. Houthakker
James S. Duesenberry
John Dunlop

October 16, 1973—THE CORPORATION: IS IT RESPONSIBLE: HAS IT BOUGHT THE COUNTRY

Guests:
Theodore Levitt
Marc Roberts
Abram Chayes
Richard Caves

October 30, 1973—WHAT AND HOW SHOULD ECONOMICS BE TAUGHT AND A Ph.D. EARNED OR ACQUIRED

Guests:
Dale Jorgenson
Robert Dorfman
Sam Bowles
Art McEwan

November 13, 1973—WHAT ARE THE ECONOMICS OF SEX DISCRIMINATION, ARE WOMEN ECONOMIC ARTIFACTS

Guests:
Carolyn Bell
Betsy Munzer
Hazel Denton
Arthur Smithies
Lester Thurow

December 4, 1973—ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE

An evening for or against the book. (On this evening, a reasonable quantity of champagne of indifferent quality will be supplied from the accrued royalties, if any)

Guests:
John Kenneth Galbraith
Steve Marglin
Zvi Griliches

 

Source: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. John Kenneth Galbraith Papers. Box 78. Series 5. Harvard University File, 1949-1990. Folder: “Courses, Non-credit seminar1973”.

Image Source: John Kenneth Galbraith in academic regalia from the Harvard Class Album, 1968.

Categories
Harvard Suggested Reading Syllabus

Harvard. Undergraduate microeconomics reading list. Marglin, 1969-70

 

 

In the year after being granted tenure at Harvard, Stephen A. Marglin taught an undergraduate microeconomics course to which he invited Professors Galbraith, Arrow, Gintis and Dorfman for a discussion with his students. He included a copy of his reading list in his invitation to Galbraith which are both transcribed below. 

Marglin’s biography was featured in a few Harvard Crimson articles over the years (the common theme to these articles is “What’s a nice radical economist like you doing in a place like this?”): May 12, 1975; March 12, 1980 ; May 21, 1982 ; June 1, 2009.

 

____________________________________

Invitation from Marglin to Galbraith to participate in a discussion with his microeconomics students in January 1970

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Stephen A. Marglin
Professor of Economics

1737 Cambridge Street, Room 410
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
(617) 868-7600 Ext. 3759

December 19, 1969

Professor J. Kenneth Galbraith
Littauer Center 207
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

Dear Ken:

The “confrontation” you kindly agreed to participate in for the benefit of Ec 20 and Ec 21 students has been fixed for Friday January 9, 1970 2-4 PM, in Emerson 105. In addition to yourself Ken Arrow and Herb Gintis have agreed to participate. Bob Dorfman, who teaches Ec 21, has agreed to help guide the discussion.

The meeting will rely heavily on students’ questions, but not completely. To get the ball rolling, I am working with my section-men to prepare questions that they will ask in the beginning. These will hopefully elicit from each of your short statements on the issues we believe to be most important. I expect these questions and your answers will occupy the first 45 minutes or so of the meeting, with the rest of the time for the students.

I am enclosing a copy of the reading list to give you an idea of the scope and depth of the course. I appreciate very much your willingness to participate in this meeting. I expect it will be extremely worthwhile for my students, the teaching fellows, and for me personally.

Yours sincerely,
[Signed: “Steve”]
Stephen A. Marglin

cc: Robert Dorfman
SM:lw
(enclosure)

____________________________________

Harvard University
Economics 20a
Microeconomic Theory

Fall 1969-70
Professor Marglin

Reading List I

  1. Consumption
    1. Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition, pp. 29-50
    2. Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations Analysis, (2nd edition), pp. 169-202
  2. Production
    1. Dorfman, The Price System, pp. 14-42
    2. Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition, pp. 109-147
    3. Dorfman, “Mathematical or ‘Linear’ Programing: A Nonmathematical Exposition,” reprinted in Kamerschen, Readings in Microeconomics, (abbreviated DRK henceforth), pp. 547-576
    4. Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” reprinted in Boulding and Spivey, AEA Readings in Price Theory, (henceforth abbreviated AEA), pp. 331-351
  3. Competitive Markets
    1. Dorfman, The Price System, pp. 76-88
    2. Viner, “Cost Curves and Supply Curves,” reprinted in DRK, pp. 197-228, and in AEA, pp. 198-232
  4. Restricted Competition
    1. Sraffa, “The Laws of Returns Under Competitive Conditions,” reprinted in AEA, pp. 180-197
    2. Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition, pp. 319-337, 373-396
    3. Dorfman, The Price System, pp. 89-104
    4. Modigliani, “New Developments on the Oligopoly Front,” DRK, pp. 355-378
  5. Capital and Interest
    1. Fisher, The Theory of Interest, pp. 61-287
    2. Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition, pp. 189-216
    3. Duesenberry, Business Cycles and Economic Growth, pp. 49-133
  6. General Equilibrium
    1. Dorfman, The Price System, pp. 105-125
    2. Lange and Taylor, On the Economic Theory of Socialism, pp. 59-129
  7. Welfare
    1. Dorfman, The Price System, pp. 126-146
    2. Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition, pp. 338-370
    3. Bator, “The Simple Analytics of Welfare Economics,” reprinted in DRK, pp. 503-544
  8. Income Distribution
    1. Budd (editor), Inequality and Poverty, Introduction
    2. Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ch. 5 (“Of Property”)
    3. Clark, J.B., The Distribution of Wealth, ch. 1
    4. Budd (editor), Inequality and Poverty, Part 1, pp. 1-49
  9. Criticisms of Conventional Theory
    1. Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, ch. 2, 4, and 5
    2. Galbraith, The Affluent Society, ch. 10 and 11.
    3. Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Skim Book 1; read Book IV more carefully.
    4. Nordquist, “The Break up of the Maximization Principle,” reprinted in DRK pp. 278-295
    5. Veblen, “The Limitations of Marginal Utility,” reprinted in Mitchell (editor), What Veblen Taught, pp. 151-175
    6. Cohen and Cyert, Theory of the Firm, pp. 329-351
    7. Simon,” A Behavioral Model of Economic Choice,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1955 (omit appendix). Reprinted in Simon, Models of Man, pp. 241-256
    8. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, pp. 1-36, 108-160
    9. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Part II, pp. 61-163
    10. Galbraith, The New Industrial State
    11. Baran and Sweezy, Monopoly Capital
    12. Rawls, “Distributive Justice”, pp. 58-72, 79-82

 

Source: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. John Kenneth Galbraith Personal Papers. Series 5. Harvard University File, 1949-1990. Box 526, Folder “Harvard University Department of Economics: General Correspondence, 1967-1974 (2 of 3)”.

Image Source: Stephen A. Marglin from Harvard Crimson June 1, 2009.