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Harvard. Reading List and Final Exam for Games and Strategy. Schelling, 1963

 

Thomas Schelling was hired by the Harvard economics department as a professor in 1958. According to the Harvard course catalogues, he taught the undergraduate course “Games and Strategy” nine times during the 1960’s.  This post provides the syllabus/reading list and final exam for that course from the first term of the 1963-64 academic year.

Materials from Schelling’s course “Economics and National Security” that he taught in 1960 and from his 1970 course “Conflict, Coalition and Strategy” have been transcribed and posted earlier here at Economics in the Rear-view Mirror.

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Course Announcement

Economics 135. Games and Strategy

Half course (fall term). M., W., F., at 10. Professor Schelling

Theories and experimental studies of rational decision in conflict, collusion, coalition, bargaining, collective decision, arbitration, and uncertainty.

Source: Official Register of Harvard University. Vol. LX, No. 21 (September 4, 1963): Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Courses of Instruction for Harvard and Radcliffe 1963-1964, p. 103.

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Economics 135
Games and Strategy
Fall, 1963

Reading Assignments

PART I. COPING WITH AN INTELLIGENT ADVERSARY

  1. Rapoport, Anatol: Fights, Games and Debates, Chapters 7, 8, 9; pages 130-165. (35 pages)
  2. Williams, John D.: The Compleat Strategyst, Chapters 1, 2; pages 1-85, and Chapter 3, pages 86-91 then scan rest of chapter. (91 pages)
  3. Hitch, Charles J. and McKean, Roland: The Economics Defense in the Nuclear Age, Chapter 10, “Incommensurables, Uncertainty, and the Enemy,” pages 182-205. (23 pages)
  4. Read, Thornton: “Strategy for Active Defense,” Papers and Proceedings of the AEA, American Economic Review, Vol. 51, No. 2, May 1961, pp. 465-471.
  5. Alchian, Armen A.: “The Meaning of Utility Measurement,” American Economic Review, Vol. 43 (March 1953) pages 26-50. (25 pages)

(OPTIONAL: R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions, Chapters 1-4, pp. 1-87.)

PART II. COERCION AND DETERRENCE

  1. Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, Chapters 1, 2, 5, 7, 8; pages 3-52, 117-161, 175-203. (121 pages)
  2. Ellsberg, Daniel: “The Theory and Practice of Blackmail,” (38 pages) mimeograph
  3. Schelling: “The Threat of Violence in International Affairs,” Proceedings, 57th Annual Meeting, American Society International Law. (INT. 16.8)
  4. Stevens, Carl M.: Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiation, chapters 3 and 5, pages 27-56 and 77-96. New York: McGraw Hill, 1963.

PART III. MUTUAL RESTRAINT

  1. Kenneth: Conflict and Defense, Chapters 1, 2, 6, pp. 1-40, 105-122. (58 pages)
  2. Schelling: Chapters 3, 4, 9, 10; Appendix A; pages 53-118, 207-254, 257-266. (121 pages)
  3. Cassady, Ralph, Jr.: “Taxicab Rate War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1, pages 364-8 (December, 1957). (5 pages)
  4. Valvanis, Stephan: “The Resolution of Conflict When Utilities Interact,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 2 (June 1958) pages 156-69. (13 pages)
  5. Rapoport, Chapter 10, pp. 166-79 (14 pages)
  6. Boulding, Chapters 12, 13, pp. 227-73.
  7. Schelling: “War Without Pain and Other Models,” World Politics, XV, (April, 1963) pp. 465-487.

PART IV. COLLECTIVE DECISION AND ARBITRATION

  1. Farguharson, Robin: “Sincerity and Strategy in Voting,” mimeograph (February 5, 1955) (7 pages)
  2. Black, Duncan: “On the Rationale of Group Decision Making,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 56 (February, 1948), pages 23-34 (12 pages)
  3. Steinhaus, Hugo: “The Problem of Fair Division,” Econometrica, Vol. 16 (January, 1948), pages 101-109. (9 pages)
  4. Dahl, Robert A.: A Preface to Democratic Theory, Chapter 2, pages 34-60, with special attention to notes 9 and 12, pages 42-43 and 43-44. (26 pages)
  5. Rapoport, Chapter 11, pp. 180-194. (15 pages)
  6. Rapoport, Chapter 12, pages 195-212. (17 pages)

PART V. EXPERIMENTAL GAMES

  1. Flood, Merrill M.: “Some Experimental Games,” Management Science, Vol. 5 (October, 1958) pages 5-26. (22 pages)
  2. Kaplan, Burns, and Quandt: “Theoretical Analysis of the Balance of Power,” Behavioral Science, Vol. 5 (July, 1960), pages 240-52. (12 pages)
  3. Schelling: Chapter 6, pages 162-72. (11 pages)
  4. Rapoport: Chapter 13, pages 213-25. (12 pages)

READING PERIOD

  1. Burns, Arthur L.: “A Graphical Approach to some Problems of the Arms Race,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 3, pages 326-42. (16 pages)
  2. Thibaut, John W. and Kelley, Harold H.: The Social Psychology of Groups, Chapter 7, pages 100-125. (26 pages)
  3. Goffman, Irving: “On Face-Work,” Psychiatry: Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes, Vol. 18 (August 1955), pp. 213-31.
  4. Twain, Mark, “The Man that Corrupted Hadleyburg,” in The Complete Short Stories of Mark Twain.

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003. Box 8, Folder “Economics, 1963-64”.

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FINAL EXAMINATION
ECONOMICS 135
January 29, 1964

ANSWER ALL FIVE QUESTIONS: The first two questions should take no more than ten or twenty minutes each, allowing at least forty-five minutes each for the last three.

  1. The following entry was submitted to the PUNCH “Toby competition” calling for an “unpleasing codicil to a will,” and received a runner-up award in the issue of July 6, 1960:

To my daughter, Judith Georgina Margaret, I leave my house, land and all my worldly possessions therein on the condition that it should be run as either an hotel, a college for gardeners or a rest-house for disappointed Beatniks.

My cash and capital are to be put into a trust. My widow, three daughters and nine grandchildren will each have an equal share in the trust. No income or capital can be drawn from the trust until the will is contested by a legatee. If this happens, the contesting legatee will lose his share to the others. If the others pay compensation for this loss, all capital will go untied to a charity.

Describe and discuss in game-theoretical terms the arrangement described in the second paragraph. Draw a matrix to represent it. (For purposes of the matrix, you may reduce the number of legatees to two.) Include, with respect to the two-person matrix, any pertinent references to a “solution,” “equilibrium point,” dominant or dominated strategies, or “efficiency” of outcome.

  1. It has been observed that for many people an important criterion in sending or not sending a Christmas card to someone is whether or not they expect to receive one from the person. They would be embarrassed if they received one and had not sent one, but would rather not bother sending one unless they were going to receive one. They might also not wish to embarrass the recipient by sending a card he did not expect and implying he had been negligent. It may not be going too far to suppose that some people, in deciding whether or not to send a card, recognize that the other person, in deciding whether or not to send his card, is wondering whether or not he will get a card.
    Draw a matrix corresponding to this situation, explaining your choice of numerical payoffs, and analyze the situation in familiar fashion.
  2. Two companies, Vitamins, Inc. and Hormones, Inc., sell to groups of potential customers that partially overlap. Some potential consumers of vitamins can meet their needs with hormones, but not all of them; and some potential consumers of hormones can meet their needs with vitamins, but not all of them. Prices are such that the two commodities are pertinent[sic, “perfect”?] substitutes for each other within the overlapping market. Advertizing is the principle form of competition between the two companies. Advertizing also increases, for Vitamins, Inc., sales to those who have no interest in hormones, and similarly for Hormones, Inc.
    The total advertizing budgets for the two companies are fixed by long-term contracts. In the short run they can vary the content of their advertizing. Specifically, the vitamin company can emphasize those uses of vitamins that compete with hormones or those uses that do not. If it emphasizes the uses that do compete, it tends to increase its share of the common market; if it emphasizes the virtues peculiar to vitamins it will increase consumption of vitamins by those who have no interest in hormones but will tend to lose in the market common to both. And similarly for the hormone company. A good deal of research has been done by both companies, leading to advertizing policies that take the rival’s advertizing campaign into account.

V has settled on the following policy:

      1. If H puts less than 20% of its budget into competitive advertizing, V will put none into that form;
      2. If H puts 20% or more into the competitive form, V will put the same percentage into competitive advertizing as H does.

H has arrived at the following policy:

      1. If V puts less than 25% into competitive advertizing, H will put twice that percentage into competitive advertizing;
      2. If V puts 25% or more into competitive advertizing, H will put exactly 50% into that form.

The Problem:

    1. Sketch the “partial equilibrium curves,” and analyze what may happen if each of the two firms simply reacts to what it sees the other doing.
    2. If H gets sophisticated and understands V’s behavior (but V goes on just reacting to what Hdoes), what policy do you expect H to follow, with what result?
    3. If both get sophisticated and realize the nature of their interacting policies, how does your analysis change?
    4. Reinterpret this problem in terms of two countries with fixed defense budgets, allocating their military resources into “offensive” and “defensive” components.
  1. A three-man board composed of A, B, and C, has held hearings on a personnel case involving an officer of the company. This officer was scheduled for promotion but, prior to final action on his promotion, he took a decision that cost the company a good deal of money. The question is whether he should be (1) promoted anyway, (2) denied the promotion, or (3) fired.
    The board has discussed the matter at length and is unable to reach unanimous agreement. In the course of discussion it has become clear to all three of them that their separate opinions are as follows:

A considers the officer to have been a victim of bad luck, not bad judgment, and wants to go ahead and promote him but, failing that, would keep him rather than fire him.
B considers the mistake serious enough to bar promotion altogether; he’d prefer to keep the officer, denying promotion, but would rather fire than promote him
C thinks the man ought to be fired but, in terms of personnel policy and morale, believes the man ought not to be kept unless he is promoted, i.e. that keeping on an officer who has been declared unfit for promotion is even worse than promoting him.

To recapitulate, their preferences among the 3 outcomes are:

Promote Keep Fire
A 1st 2nd 3rd
B 3rd 1st 2nd
C 2nd 3rd 1st

They must proceed to a vote. Voting is by majority. These are the two alternative procedures for voting, and they must first vote on which procedure to use. These alternative procedures are:

    1. Decide first, by majority vote, whether or not he is guilty of a mistake. If (I) he is not found guilty, promote him; if (II) he is found guilty, decide by another majority vote whether to (i) fire him or (ii) to keep him.
    2. By majority vote decide first, as a matter of principle, on the proper course of action if he is guilty — (I) to fire him or (II) to keep him without promotion. Then, once the appropriate penalty has been decided, decide by another majority vote whether he is guilty or not,

(i) promoting him if not guilty, otherwise
(ii) proceeding in accordance with the penalty decided on (I or II) in the first vote.

They must first elect one of the two procedures. They do this, too, by majority vote. They first hold a majority vote to choose procedure 1 or 2; they then vote in accordance with the procedure so selected.

Assume that (a) everyone’s preferences among the three outcomes are fully evident as a result of discussion, (b) everyone is shrewd enough and willing to vote in whatever fashion will attain his own preferences, and assumes everyone else will do the same, (c) voting is silent, by simultaneous ballot, and (d) no “deals” can he made among the three voters as to how they will vote.

The question:

      1. What happens to the officer? Promoted, just kept, or fired?
      2. Which of the two voting procedures, 1 or 2, did they elect to use?
      3. What would have happened to the officer if board-member A had preferred not to promote him?
      4. What might have happened if A and B could make a deal and vote accordingly?
      5. Describe some third majority-vote procedure which if it were used, would lead to the officer’s being kept (pursuant to the board’s preferences in the above table).
  1. Goffman says, “To study face-saving is to study the traffic rules of social interaction. …By face-work I mean to designate the actions taken by a person to make whatever he is doing consistent with face. …Thus poise in one important type of face-work, for through poise the person controls his embarrassment and hence the embarrassment that he and others might have over his embarrassment.”

See how far you can go in treating “poise” and “embarrassment” by a Richardson-process interaction model along the lines of Boulding or Valavanis.

Source: Papers Printed for Midyear Examinations [in] History, History of Religions, …, Economics, …, Naval Science, Air Science (January, 196) in the bound volume Social Sciences, Final Examinations January 1964 (HUC 7000.28, no. 150).

Image Source: Harvard Kennedy School Magazine, Summer 2012.

 

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Economist Market Economists Johns Hopkins Yale

Yale. Evsey Domar’s Letter of Support for Promotion of Thomas Schelling to Full Professorship, 1957

For anyone whose experience in academic hiring and promotions has only been acquired over the past several decades, it might come as a shock that outside letters to support a department’s vote to offer a full professorship back in the 1950s would hardly exceed the length of a very modest thread of tweets today. To be honest, a thumbs-up emoji would have been an adequate response to Yale’s request for Evsey Domar’s opinion on the work of Thomas C. Schelling. 

Since the two letters transcribed for this post are so short, I figure that this is as good an opportunity as any to add a brief bio written for the 1962 Radcliffe Yearbook. The poor quality of the yearbook image is a pity, but at least we have a classic Harvard professorial pose complete with a bow-tie and a cigarette held à la Madmen.

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From the 1962 Radcliffe Yearbook

THOMAS C. SCHELLING, Professor of Economics, graduated from high school just after the Great Depression. Upon entering the University of California in Berkeley, he decided to major in economics: “Somehow I felt that the social conflicts, the severe poverty, even the problems of war, were partly solvable by a knowledge of economics.” He graduated with an A.B. in 1944 and got his Ph.D. at Harvard in 1951.

Professor Schelling’s varied career background includes two years with the Marshall Plan (in Copenhagen and in Paris, 1948-50); Associate Economic Adviser to the Special Assistant to the President (1950-51); Officer-in-charge, European Program Affairs, Office of the Director for Mutual Security, Executive Office of the President (1951-53); Yale University (1953-58); the RAND Corporation (1958-59). He has been at Harvard since 1959, on the faculty and says, “Harvard students are more interesting to teach than those at Yale.”

Primarily interested in the relationship between economics and national security, Professor Shelling recently collaborated on Strategy and Arms Control, published in 1961. Other works include National Economic Behavior, International Economics, and numerous articles in various periodicals.

Although teaching and consultation in foreign policy (he is a member of the Scientific Advisory Board, U.S. Air Force) take up most of his time, Professor Shelling is now turning his research interests to the problems of bargaining and conflict management, particularly as these problems affect foreign affairs.) Professor Schelling feels that, although a nuclear test moratorium would be a good thing, test bans without some system of control or inspection are unworkable. Furthermore, he feels that cessation of tests alone is not a potent form of disarmament. As for the testing itself, we don’t really know whether testing is necessarily harmful.

Source: The 1962 Radcliffe Yearbook, p. 91.

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Yale Requests Domar’s Opinion of Schelling

Yale University
Department of Economics
New Haven, Connecticut

Lloyd G. Reynolds, Chairman

February 18, 1957

Professor Evsey Domar
Department of Political Economy
Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore 15, Maryland

Dear Evsey:

The Department here has voted to promote Thomas C. Schelling to the rank of Professor of Economics. We are now about to begin putting the appointment through the regular committee procedures. It is customary at this stage to invite a number of leading scholars in other institutions to appraise the qualifications of the candidate. I should be grateful if you could take time to write me your impression of Schelling—the quality of his thinking and scholarship, his probably contribution to economics over the long run, his professional standing in comparison with other men of about his own age, and his general suitability for a professorship here.

We shall value your judgment and I am sure will find it helpful in putting the matter before our faculty for action.

Sincerely yours,
[signed] Lloyd

LGR/shd

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Copy of Domar’s Response

25 February 1957

Professor Lloyd G. Reynolds
Chairman
Department of Economics
Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut

Dear Lloyd:

This is in response to your letter of February 18 regarding the qualifications of Thomas C. Schelling.

I have known him approximately since 1944 or 1945 and have read most of his writings. He is an exceptionally capable young man, endowed with creative intelligence and with common sense. I have the highest opinion of him as an economist and great hopes regarding his contribution to economics.

In comparison with other men of his age he stands out very close to the top. I would support his promotion most wholeheartedly.

Sincerely yours,

Evsey D. Domar
Professor of Political Economy
The Johns Hopkins University
(on leave, spring term, 1956-57)

EDD:am

Source: Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Economists’ Papers Archive. Evsey D. Domar Papers, Box 8, Folder “Yale University (1 of 2)”.

Image Source: Thomas Schelling portrait, 1964. Harvard University. Office of News and Public Affairs. Hollis Images olvwork369281.

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Economists Harvard War and Defense Economics

Harvard. Reactions to Galbraith’s call for students to boycott professors doing classified government research, 1967

 

Looking through my files of material from the Gottfried Haberler papers at the Hoover Institution Archives, I came across an unpublished, heavily sarcastic “letter to the editor” of the Harvard Crimson by the economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron in reaction to John Kenneth Galbraith’s statement at an anti-war event at Radcliffe in which he suggested that students could reasonably consider boycotting the classes of professors engaged in classified research to protest that war. One of Galbraith’s targets was clearly his colleague Arthur Smithies. (“I assume that Professor Smithies would suppress all protest. Many will doubt the wisdom of this course as also, I trust, the wickedness of the secret work on which he is engaged.”) While the rules of English grammar are such that Galbraith did explicitly state “many will doubt…the wickedness of [Smithies’] secret work…”, it is a pretty cheeky way to simultaneously mention that there are indeed some who will see Smithies’ secret work in a wicked light.

The post ends with a later Harvard Crimson article that reports on Smithies’ career, with considerable emphasis on his work for the U.S. government (including the C.I.A.) on South Vietnam’s economy. We also see below that Thomas Schelling was so little amused by Galbraith’s boycott proposal as to have written a letter for actual publication in the Harvard Crimson.

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“Galbraith Asks Campus Blacklist of Recruiters”

The Boston Globe. 14 November 1967 pp. 1,9.

            Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith urged Monday that college students oppose the Vietnam War by publicly blacklisting war-linked campus recruiting agencies and by boycotting professors engaged in classified government research.

Speaking at Radcliffe College, Galbraith explained his blacklist as a “proclamation” on which signatories would state their intention to refuse to work for agencies, such as Dow Chemical Co. or the C.I.A.

A boycott of professors engaged in classified research, he said, would be a “particularly effective way of expressing your opposition.”

The former U.S. ambassador to India, publicly backed “moderate” student demonstrations before a packed Harvard Radcliffe group in Hilles Library.

He cautioned the students against protests that are “violent or in egregiously bad taste.”

These, he said, would “provide a welcomed handle for the opposition.”

Galbraith said he had discussed his blacklist and boycott proposals with colleagues and many found them favorable. He called both courses “legitimate means of dissent within the university framework of conduct rules.”

He originated the black-list concept at talks with business and government leaders who indicated that recruiters are “greatly concerned with campus recruiting demonstrations,” Galbraith said.

Turing to anti-war referenda, Galbraith advised they would have more chances of success if they were worded “for political reality rather [than] for candor.”

The San Francisco anti-war referenda would have had a good chance for approval had it been stated in “milder” terms, he said. (This referendum, which asked: ‘should the U.S. immediately withdraw from Vietnam?’ drew a 38 percent affirmative response.)

“It would be an enormous mistake to assume your protest efforts have been futile,” he told students. Only three years ago, he said the State and Defense Departments” would have assumed wide spread acceptance of escalation.

“But now, in the wake of widespread university opposition to the war, there has been a snowballing effect of mounting opposition.”

His talk was sponsored by the Committee for Effective Action, a student group “opposed to the war but frustrated by the means of opposing it,” explained its spokesman. This was the first of an expected four or five meetings with the faculty.

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Letter from John Kenneth Galbraith

The Harvard Crimson, November 16, 1967

To the Editors of the CRIMSON:

My distinguished colleague may be out of touch with recent discussion, but the issue is probably worth explaining. Students here and elsewhere have been told how they may not react to university involvement in military activities of which they disapprove. With other Faculty members I assume that this carries an obligation to say how they may react. I suggested (initially in Michigan and later here) that they organize to avoid employment in corporations of whose products they disapprove and classes of professors whose secret contracts they deplore. (I also suggested that this last was inapplicable under Harvard policy and that there be combined effort to find other forms of legitimate and effective protest.) I assume that Professor Smithies would suppress all protest. Many will doubt the wisdom of this course as also, I trust, the wickedness of the secret work on which he is engaged.

John Kenneth Galbraith
Paul M. Warburg Professor of Economics

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Unsent, but circulated, reaction to Galbraith’s proposal
by Alexander Gerschenkron

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

M-7 Littauer Center
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Alexander Gerschenkron
Walter S. Barker Professor of Economics

November 16, 1967

The Editor
The Crimson
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Sir,

It is with greatest possible interest that I have read of Professor Galbraith’s suggestion that students should boycott lectures of those members of the Faculty who are known to engage in classified research. This is a most original and stimulating idea, which is not surprising as nothing less novel and exciting could be expected from Professor Galbraith’s fertile mind.

The only thing that disturbs me are problems of implementation. Professor Galbraith abstained from discussing them, probably feeling that what mattered was to cast abroad a fine idea, while the rest could be safely left to more pedestrian minds. May I try to fill out the gap? Obviously, the first thing that is needed is to provide some machinery in order to discover just who is engaged in classified research. I suggest therefore, that the Student-Faculty Committee should immediately establish a special Sub-Committee charged with carrying out the requisite investigations. It should be called “Student-Faculty Sub-Committee on Un-Left Activities.” This Sub-Committee should interrogate members of the faculty. A difficulty to be faced will no doubt stem from the lack of subpoena powers on the part of the Sub-Committee. But the problem should not be insoluble. The Administration should be put under pressure to agree that those members of the Faculty who 1) refuse to appear before the Un-Left Sub-Committee or, 2) if appearing, refuse to name those colleagues whose connection with classified research is known to them, or 3) refuse to answer questions concerning their own classified research, should be informed by the Administration that such refusals constitute contempt of the Un-Left Sub-Committee, and, by the same token, must be regarded as acts of gross misconduct. In all fairness, the offenders should be given a fortnight to reconsider, but should they stubbornly persist in their hostile attitude, their connection with the University should be severed without further delay.

On the other hand, should the Administration hesitate to accede to the Sub-Committee’s fair and reasonable demands, which as Professor Galbraith likes to say are surely justified by the extraordinary situation in which the country finds itself, occupation of University Hall by the students should be the first natural step, if necessary, to be followed by other more stringent measures.

Thus Professor Galbraith’s idea appears to be altogether practicable. In conclusion, I cannot help praising his wise restraint. He could have suggested, for instance, that also lectures of those Faculty members who either themselves express Un-Left opinions or associate with colleagues who have expressed Un-Left opinions should be boycotted by the students. That he failed to make such suggestions agrees well with the sapient counsels of moderation which informed his speech.

Very truly yours,
[signed]
Alexander Gerschenkron

AG:dod

Note: For reasons well within this writer’s control, the foregoing epistle has failed to reach the editorial office of The Crimson.

Source: The Hoover Institution Archives. Papers of Gottfried Haberler, Box 12, Folder “GH—Alexander Gerschenkron”.

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Letter from John Kenneth Galbraith

The Harvard Crimson, November 16, 1967

To the Editors of The CRIMSON:

I am persuaded that at some risk of repetition I should be sure that there is no misunderstanding of my recent remarks on legitimate and non-violent forms of student protest as these concern University involvements with military activities. Two or three weeks ago in Detroit I was asked to comment on prospective efforts to obstruct physically the Willow Run laboratories operated on contract by the University of Michigan and engaged, I am told, on development of highly secret materiel for use in Vietnam. I urged not alone the futility but the adverse public effects of such action; I said that a better remedy lay against the Faculty members who ran this enterprise. Students might organize to avoid their classes, i.e., peacefully to boycott them. Last Monday evening at the meeting in the Hilles Library arranged by [Radcliffe] President Bunting to discuss legitimate forms of protest I repeated (along with others) this suggestion and added that this particular one would not be without effect on those who sponsored such work in a university but that it did not have application at Harvard where, wisely, the Administration frowned on secret contracts. I confess that I did not think of the possible application of my suggestion to confidential or secret consulting work or research by individual Harvard professors. A member of the Faculty has since invited the attention of those who are, with sufficient reason, sensitive to the association between the University Community and this war. Additionally, my reference to boycott, which of course means peaceful abstention, was evidently taken to mean some kind of physical action.

I would like to urge in the most earnest possible fashion that there be no effort by anyone, students in particular, to identify and oppose in any manner the individual participation by Faculty members in confidential or secret tasks of the government. There is a radical difference between this varied and individual work and the classified contracts for weapons development which I had in mind. This individual work covers a wide range of matters and much, or most, has no bearing on military activity. Most of it is the work of those Faculty members with the strongest instinct for public service. An effort to discriminate between approved and disapproved work would import into the academic community an improper concern for the extra-curricular pacifists who are so engaged as to those who are otherwise disposed. It could also be a most disagreeable source of tension and suspicion.

As members of the Harvard community will be aware, I am not indifferent to the Vietnam war. I regard it as an appalling tragedy; to no other matter of my adult life have I devoted more effort than to opposing the war. But I would be profoundly and also greatly embarrassed were anyone to take my remarks at Radcliffe as an invitation to any form of opposition to the participants of individual Faculty members, on a public or confidential basis, in government activities. Needless to say, none of this impairs in any way my promise at the Radcliffe meeting to work with concerned Faculty members and students to devise other effective, legitimate and non-violent forms of protest.

John Kenneth Galbraith
Paul M. Warburg Professor of Economics

_________________________

Letter from Thomas Schelling in response to Galbraith’s boycott proposal

The Harvard Crimson, December 5, 1967

To the Editors of the CRIMSON:

While I’ve seen no indication that Professor Galbraith’s proposed boycott of professors who do classified research for the government is going to stimulate a new movement, it does raise important questions about the personal activities of faculty members and the ways they may be involved with the government, and about the appropriate selection of target for protest. May I explain why I think his proposal is probably not workable and, if not workable, objectionable?

Let me first point out that Professor Galbraith did not propose that students boycott those professors whose research is objectionable, nor did he clarify what research would be objectionable. His reference was merely to “classified” research. I’m sure that by almost anyone’s standards of wickedness (Galbraith’s term) some classified research would be found unobjectionable. People concerned about the dissemination of nuclear technology, about the limitation of weapons, even about ways of ending the war in Vietnam, often require classified information to do their work or, at least, have to be exposed to classified information in doing their work and cannot do it unless they are willing to safeguard what the government calls “security.” Even if the character of everybody’s classified research could be ascertained, drawing the line between the objectionable and the unobjectionable, or between what any reasonable man would consider objectionable and what some reasonable men might consider to be in the public interest, would require subjective judgments. (Most classified research, incidentally, is probably unrelated to Vietnam.)

Second, much of the unclassified research that goes on would be objectionable to people who oppose any kind of war-related research; and to exclude such unclassified research would be arbitrary discrimination.

Third, “research” itself is difficult to define. Many faculty members are occasionally consultants or members of advisory boards in various agencies, or participants in government-sponsored conferences, sometimes classified, sometimes unclassified. Whether their influence is benign or malignant would be hard to judge; so would the degree of support or implied approval in attendance at a meeting at which one criticizes a government program or decision.

And if unclassified contributions had to pass the same strict test as classified work, to qualify for boycott or immunity from it, one would have to ask whether an activity like the Peace Corps is to be treated as a propaganda arm of the Johnson administration or as a benign and constructive activity. Again a judgment depends on a complex evaluation of the different purposes that a government program may serve.

Finally, are Faculty members who are unaffiliated with the government in any fashion, classified or unclassified, but who openly support the administration’s policy toward Vietnam, to qualify for boycott? It seems strange to exclude them; but again the line would be hard to draw for those who neither wholly support the conduct or the war nor are wholly committed to one drastic alternative. (It is unclear to me on which side of the line Professor Galbraith would be placed.)

I could go on multiplying the difficulties of finding a reasonable line to draw between the non-university-administered activities of professors that are objectionable and those that are not, whatever one’s standards of wickedness; and, further, I doubt whether there is enough consensus on standards to make it possible to draw an agreed line, even if some people think they know where to draw it. If I’m right about this, any line has to be arbitrary, as Professor Galbraith’s line was arbitrary. (If Professor Galbraith interprets his original proposal as applying only to university-administered research, the line is clearer but only because more arbitrary.)

If, though, the line is arbitrary–if its purpose just to mark out an identifiable target without regard to the nature of the research itself or of the non-research activity–then, aside from the likelihood that an embarrassingly large number of angels will be caught in the netful of devils, there is the question of what is being objected to and what the purpose of the boycott is. The purpose can no longer be described as bringing pressure to bear to get objectionable activities terminated. Rather, it would look–to me, at any rate–as though a boycott were being used to induce a particular group of professors to join a boycott against the government, or to embarrass them for declining to join a boycott.

Whatever my feelings about Professor Galbraith’s protest movement, I resent his proposal that students organize to coerce me into joining it. And I hope nobody stays away from Professor Galbraith’s classes in a vain organized attempt to embarrass him into changing his politics.

T.C. Schelling
Professor of Economics

_________________________

An Academic [Arthur Smithies] in the War
By Seth M. Kupferberg

The Harvard Crimson, May 23, 1975

Edward F. Chamberlin, superintendent of Kirkland House, tells a story about a Kirkland celebration that took place some years back, when Arthur Smithies was House master. Smithies was pouring drinks for the members of the victorious House crew team, starting with the bow man and working towards the stern of the shell, and as he reached the stroke, someone brought word that he had just become a grandfather.

“He kept right on—he just said, ‘Coxswain!'” Chamberlin recalls, chuckling. ‘”Coxswain, take your wine…’ We almost died.”

Smithies–Ropes Professor of Political Economy and a long-time adviser in the Saigon bureau of the Agency for International Development—gave up his mastership—”certainly Harvard’s best job,” he says—last spring. (“You can stay on past 66 as a professor but you have to retire as a master,” he grouses. “It should be the other way around—the brain deteriorates before the body does.”) But the story of the Agassiz Cup celebration still seems characteristic of him—both in content and in style, for a certain kind of sharp, logical humor as well as, perhaps, a certain cheerful indifference to happenings that would excite or upset or change the attitudes of many people. It’s a style, arguably, that found expression in Smithies’s work in Vietnam as well as his praise of the Agassiz Cup winners—and there, it was likely to have larger effects and meanings, since it served a side in an internecine war instead of an intramural regatta.

At the simplest, most straightforward level, the Agassiz Cup story is characteristic because it’s about crew—the sport that in 1929 helped bring Smithies, a 22-year-old Australian law student, the great-grandson of the first Methodist minister in western Tasmania, a Rhodes Scholarship. Finding England “too structured for my taste,” Smithies went on to discover “the fleshpots of the United States” with a Commonwealth Fellowship and a Model A Ford, earn a quick Harvard doctorate in economics, return to Australia briefly to work in its treasury department, then settle in the United States for good.

Smithies accepted tenure at Harvard in 1949—partly “so I could take up rowing again”—and continued to work at budgetary and fiscal economics. He also demonstrated an idiosyncratic kind of firmness—”I’m a believer in strict academic requirements, but for something important, like seat-races, I would make an exception,” he once told a Kirkland House oarsman. In its more political manifestations, many students came to find Smithies’s firmness objectionable. “People used to go around screaming ‘CIA Agent!’ and things at me,” he recalls. For when anti-ROTC students occupied University Hall in April 1969 and opened the files of then dean of the Faculty Franklin L. Ford, one of the letters they released to The Old Mole, the underground Cambridge newspaper that folded in 1970, was from Smithies. Dated December 7, 1967, it read: “The Central Intelligence Agency has instructed its consultants to inform their official superiors of this connection with the Agency. I hereby inform you of my connection of ten years duration. I wish I could, add that there is something subtly interesting or sinister about it.”

The tinge of self-mockery—the impatience of a person who takes certain things for granted, maybe—was typical: the same slight aloofness you sense when Smithies says he spends his free time “rowing boats and toiling in my garden,” as though the joys of domesticity in Belmont, like England, are a little too structured for his taste. But that didn’t stop the CIA letter from kicking up a minor storm.

“The CIA is divided sharply into two parts—covert and overt,” Smithies—who says he was most recently consulted by the agency, regarding a report on the future of the Vietnamese economy, last year—explains now. “For about ten years I’d go down there and review their papers on national economic matters: I’ve never been the cloak-and-dagger type. But naturally they made a big fuss about it,” he concludes, with something close to approval. “That’s good tactics.”

It was partly an exclusive attention to improving tactics—rather than more fundamental questions about the Vietnam war—that the University Hall occupiers and other Harvard radicals objected to in Smithies, even before they discovered his CIA letter, Smithies traces his service as an Agency for International Development consultant, advising the Republic of Vietnam on its fiscal policy and rates of international exchange, to previous foreign-affairs interests that included involvement in administering the Marshall Plan. He says he was regarded as a liberal both as a young teacher at the University of Michigan, where he defended the Michigan Daily‘s right to take leftist editorial stands, and in his early years in the Harvard Economics Department, where Keynesians like him were still an embattled minority.

And he still offers qualified praise for radical economists like Stephen A. Marglin ’59 or other members of the Union of Radical Political Economists—for aiming at a historical perspective on economic systems. “I think if they’d let me I’d be more of an ally than I am,” he says. “I don’t like a narrow concentration on Marx—I think it should also include Weber and people like that. I also and not a socialist, and URPE people generally are socialists—I firmly believe in the mixed economy.” For his part, Marglin says he agrees with Smithies’s stress on “the historical nature of economic theory and the fact that neo-classical theory is not the pinnacle of economic thought.” But he claims that Smithies shares orthodox economists’ bias toward marginal improvements that don’t call basic assumptions into question—”that perspective divides him pretty fundamentally from most URPE people,” he says.

Even setting aside Smithies’s belief in a mixed economy, Marglin’s criticism isn’t too surprising—budgetary economics by definition focuses on evaluating means, not ends, which it takes more or less for granted. Smithies’s book, The Budgetary Process in the United States, begins by calling a description of the ways the government sets its priorities “quite enough for one volume and one author,” and it offers only one assumption about how the budgetary process should end up—that “government decision-making can be improved by the clear formulation of alternatives.” Like his work on the budget, Smithies’s work on Vietnamese fiscal policy took its basic political framework more or less for granted.

And like the Agassiz Cup celebration, it was carried on with a certain quiet bravado, even in defiance of what many people might think of as reflex reactions to human events. Apart from his consulting work for AID—which kept him in.

During the height of campus anti-war activity, Smithies recalls, “People used to go around screaming ‘CIA Agent!’ and things at me.” Saigon most summers—Smithies wrote several reports, comparable to other American economists’ and political scientists’ attempts to improve the Saigon government’s chances and provide scientific descriptions of its progress.

Like these other writers, Smithies’s descriptions often reflected Saigon’s assumptions and interests, and so worked to limit debate in the United States and thus to keep the Saigon government strong. Not all American analysts acknowledged this political effect of their writing, but to many of their critics. It was its most important aspect. For the politics underlying questions of Vietnamese economic development included more even than questions about who should manage development and profit from it. The human, political context AID economists could all but ignore also included the struggle over these questions that was killing people and making them homeless, the struggle in which the government AID belonged to was playing an increasingly dominant part.

In a 1971 report commissioned by the Institute for Defense Analyses, called “Economic Development in Vietnam: The Need for External Resources,” and based on a “planning assumption” of “military stalemate and withering away of the war, a process that can last for a decade or more.” Smithies called for $500 million a year in American aid to the Saigon government “during the next decade,” and $700 million more in financing, preferably from an international consortium of countries, “for the indefinite future.” And while noting some of the bad effects of the war on South Vietnam’s economy—such as an unfavorable balance of trade, governmental corruption, the destruction of bridges and the defoliation of forests—Smithies also took note of countervailing factors, such as “the increase in the expectations of the Vietnamese people,” which he suggested would remain after “the horrors of war” had faded.

“The war has provided Vietnam with paved highways from end to end, with more airfields than it can possibly use, with spectacular harbors, with an elaborate communications system, with power plants, and with potable water in Saigon,” Smithies wrote.” …While it is impossible to make an accurate inventory of the changes in the infrastructure during the war, the impression is inescapable that the plusses greatly outweigh the minuses.” It was the kind of report that led Frances Fitzgerald ’62 to call AID economics “perhaps the ultimate expression of American hubris.”

Today, Smithies—who says he grew to like Saigon very much, despite a “very rarefied atmosphere” that necessitated weekly trips to the provinces for a reminder that there was a war going on—is naturally less sanguine. “Whatever the merits of the cause. I’m deeply disturbed to see the U.S. forced into a position of unconditional surrender under any circumstances,” he says. “And it’s not clear to me that there is still a clear direction to foreign policy.”

“I wouldn’t have gone there unless I thought the objective of a free and independent South Vietnam was a worthwhile one,” he continues, “and it’s fairly obvious that we didn’t pursue that role at all effectively.” Nevertheless, Smithies stresses American advisers’ accomplishments in such areas as improving rice strains—”whatever side you’re on politically, this was a useful thing,” he says—and the importance of combating “the impression that everyone connected with Vietnam was a scoundrel.”

“I think the economic staff there was really doing a good job,” he says. “In the economic and financial areas there were some very good Vietnamese and some very devoted and sincere Vietnamese—extremely able and also extremely patriotic. I can’t say the same for some of the corps commanders—but in the welter of recriminations there’s a tendency to forget what was good.”

* * *

It took just a few days after the Provisional Revolutionary Government’s victory last month for Smithies’s acquaintances to stop asking him, as at least one had the first day, about “the end of those summers in Saigon.” In the burgeoning New England spring, Saigon seemed very far away. It seemed more appropriate to remember smaller-scale settings for imperturbability in the face of exciting or famous or upsetting people or events—the Agassiz Cup celebration, say, or the Kirkland House dinner two years ago at which Smithies gave President Bok a long, pointed introduction, replete with references to “the days when the University was interested in education—before the present administration took office.” (“These occasions can get very stolid if you don’t liven ’em up a bit,” Smithies explains now. “I think one ought to be mildly provocative—what do you think?”)

At most, it seemed in keeping with the intoxicating spring weather to remember Smithies’s 1969 visit to occupied University Hall—the only one by a master, possibly helping to inspire his belief that by playing a “civilizing role,” “the House system vindicated itself in 1969 as I haven’t seen it do before or since.” Smithies says the visit was mostly a matter of bravado, “rather foolish. I suppose,” but he still seems proud of it—he’s supposed to have informed an occupier who called him an administration spy that he had “rather more right to be here than you do.” The occupiers voted to expel Smithies, but they allowed him to speak first. “It was rather reassuring, in a way,” he said, but the occupiers evidently weren’t sympathetic—”all I remember just what he said, but the occupiers evidently weren’t sympathetic—”all I remember is that it was philosophically weird,” one of them said recently.

Meanwhile, Smithies continued to teach macroeconomic theory, scull on the Charles, lunch in the Kirkland dining hall, even be mildly provocative, if only because senior English majors in the House were taking general exams, on such moderately unlikely subjects as the poetry of T.S. Eliot ’10. “My wife and I used to be very fond of Eliot—I think we still are,” Smithies explained later, but at lunch, he didn’t seem so sure.

“But is it poetry–the broad-backed hippopotamus?” he asked his companions, a little quizzically. Then he proceeded to rattle off three or four stanzas: The broad-backed hippopotamus Rests on his belly in the mud; Although he seems so firm to us He is merely flesh and blood…

“Is that poetry–or is it just a jingle?” he asked again. No one offered an immediate answer: things were back to normal.

Steven B. Geovanis

Image Sources:  Left to right. Smithies and Galbraith from Harvard Class Album 1958; Gerschenkron from Harvard Class Album 1957.

Categories
Harvard Suggested Reading Syllabus

Harvard. Course Outline and Readings for Economics and National Security. Schelling, 1960

 

According to the Annual Report of the President of Harvard for 1959-60 the following economic seminar taught by Professor Thomas C. Schelling during the Spring term had only two graduate students officially registered for the course (and they were probably from the Graduate School of Public Administration). In the following year fourteen students were enrolled in the course.

______________________

ECONOMICS 207
Economics and National Security
Spring 1960

READING ASSIGNMENTS

Note: Reading indented items is optional; but all starred items should be looked at even if not read carefully.

GENERAL BACKGROUND

Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research (Arnold Wolfers, Director). Developments in Military Technology and Their impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy, Committee Print, Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, Dec. 6, 1959. Part C, “Technological Developments and the Strategic Equation,” Chapters 1-4, pp. 30-85.

National Planning Association, “1970 Without Arms Control”, A Special Committee Report, Planning Pamphlet 104, May 1958.

Davidon, William C., Kalkstein, Marvin I., Hohenemser, Christoph. “Prerequisites for Nuclear Weapons Manufacture”, in National Planning Association, The Nth Country Problem and Arms Control, Planning Pamphlet No. 108, Jan. 1960, pp. 11-28.

Glasstone, Samuel (ed.). Effects of Nuclear Weapons; Dept. of Defense and Atomic Energy Commission, 1957 edition, pp. 18-33, 90-96, 103-111, 196-202, 209-11, 212-15, 237-8, 345-8, 390-429, 446-54, 524-31, 536-43, glossary p. 544 ff.

 

I. EFFICIENCY IN MILITARY DECISIONS

Hitch, Charles J., McKean, Roland. “Defense as an Economic Problem”, “Efficiency in Military Decisions”, mimeograph.

Morse, Philip M., Kimball, George E. Methods of Operations Research, New York, The Technology Press and John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1951, pp. 1-10, 38-60, 63-67 (scan 67-77), 77-80.

Hitch, Charles J. “Economics and Military Operations Research,”Review of Economics and Statistics, XL, 199-209, Aug. 1958.

Schelling, T.C. “Comment”, Symposium on Economics and Operations Research, Review of Economics and Statistics, XL, 221-224, Aug. 1958.

Hoag, Malcolm. “Some complexities in Military Planning,” World Politics, XI, 553-576, July 59.

Enke, Stephen. “Some Economic Aspects of Fissionable Material,”Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXVIII, 217-232, May 54.

Bowers, Robert D. (Col). “Fundamental Equations of Force Survival,” Air University Quarterly Review, X, 82-92, Spring 58.

Karchere, A. Hoeber, F.P. “Combat Problems, Weapons Systems, and the Theory of Allocation,” JORSA, Nov. 53.

Kahn, H. Mann, I. “Techniques of Systems Analysis,” The RAND Corporation, RM-1829-1, 3 Dec. 58 revised June 57, chapters 1, 2, 3, pp. 1-113.

*   *  *   *   *

Enke, Stephen. “An Economist Looks at Air Force Logistics,” Review of Economics and Statistics, XL, 230-39, Aug. 58.

Fisher, Gene H. “Weapon-System Cost Analysis,” Operations Research. Oct. 56, pp. 558-571.

Mendershausen, Horst. “Economic Problems in Air Force Logistics,” American Economic Review, Sept. 58, 632-648.

*Engel, J.H. “A Verification of Lanchester’s Law,” JORSA, May 54, II.

*Brackney, Howard. “The Dynamics of Military Combat,” Operations Research, VII, 30-44, Jan-Feb. 59.

*Firstman, Sidney I. “A Vulnerability Model for Weapon Sites with Interdependent Elements,” Operations Research, VII, 217-25, Mar-Apr. 59.

Weiss, Herbert K. “Lanchester-Type Models of Warfare,” Proceedings of the First International Conference on Operations Research. ORSA, Baltimore, 1957, pp. 82-99.

*   *  *   *   *

II. COPING WITH AN INTELLIGENT ADVERSARY

Kahn, Herman, Mann, Irwin. “Techniques of Systems Analysis,” Chapter 4, “The Two-Sided War,” pp. 114-131; Chapter 5, “Evaluation and Criticism,” pp. 132-161.

Schelling, T.C. “Assumptions About Enemy Behavior,” Lecture 12 in An Appreciation of Systems Analysis, The RAND Corporation, B-90, 1959. (Mimeograph).

Williams, John D. The Compleat Strategyst, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co. Inc., 1954. Chapters 1 and 2, pp. 1-85. Rest of book optional; suggest scan several of the problems in remaining chapters.

Alchian, Armen A. “The Meaning of Utility Measurement,” American Economic Review, XLIII, 26-50, Mar. 53.

Luce, R. Duncan, Raiffa, Howard. Games and Decisions(New York, 1957), Chapter 2, pp. 2-17, 19-38; Chapter 4, pp. 56-76, 85-87.

Morse, Philip M., Kimball, George E. Methods of Operations Research, “Measure and Countermeasure,” pp. 94-102; “Theoretical Analysis of Countermeasure Action,” pp. 102-109.

*   *  *   *   *

Haywood, O.G. “Military Decision and Game Theory,” JORSA, Nov. 54.

*Hale, J.K., Wicke, H.H. “An Application of Game Theory to Special Weapons Evaluation,” Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, IV, 347-56.

*Dobbie, James M. “On the Allocation of Effort Among Deterrent Systems,” Operations Research, VII, 335-46, May-June 59.

Isbell, J.R., Marlow, W.H. “Attrition Games,” Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, III, 71-94.

*Blackett, D.W. “Some Blotto Games,”Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, I, 55-60, Mar. 54.

Thompson, S.P., Ziffer, A.J. “The Watchdog and the Burglar,” Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, VI, 165-72, June 59.

Caywood, T.E., Thomas, C.J. “Application of Game Theory in Fighter vs. Bomber Combat,” JORSA, III, Nov. 55.

*Antosiewicz, H.A. “Analytic Study of War Games,” NRLQ, II, 181-208, Sept. 55.

Isaacs, Rufus. “The Problem of Aiming and Evasion,” NRLQ, II, 47-68, May-June 55.

Zachrisson, L.E. “A Tank Duel with Game-Theoretic Implications,” NRLQ, IV, 131-38, June 57.

*   *  *   *   *

III. EXPERIMENT AND SIMULATION

Specht, Robert D. “War Games,” The RAND Corporation, P-1041, March 18, 1957.

Thomas, Clayton J., Deemer, Walter L. “The Role of Operational Gaming in Operations Research,” Operations Research, Feb. 57, 1-27.

*   *  *   *   *

Rauner, R.M. Laboratory Evaluation of Supply and Procurement Policies, The RAND Corporation, Report R-323, July 1958.

Thomas, Clayton L. “The Genesis and Practice of Operational Gaming,” Proceedings of the First International Conference on Operations Research; Operations Research Society of America, Baltimore, 1957. Max Davies, et al., eds. pp. 64-81.

Young, John P. “A Survey of Historical Developments in War Games.” Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, Staff Paper ORO-SP-98, March, 1959. (Mimeo, 108 pages plus bibliography.)

*   *  *   *   *

IV. THE STRATEGY OF POTENTIAL FORCE

Schelling, T.C. “The Retarded Science of International Strategy,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 60.

Brodie, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton, 1959. Ch. 1, “Introduction,” 3-20; Ch. 6, “Is There a Defense,” 173-222; Ch. 8, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” 264-304; Ch. 9, “Limited War,” 305-357.

Wohlstetter, Albert. “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs, Jan. 59, pp. 211-234.

Sherwin, C.W. “Securing Peace through Military Technology,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, XII, 159-165, May 56.

Schelling, T.C. “Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War,”Journal of Conflict Resolution, I, 19-36, Mar. 57.

Schelling, T.C. “The Strategy of Conflict: Prospectus for a Reorientation of Game Theory,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, II, 203-264, Sept. 58.

Rapoport, Anatol. “Lewis F. Richardson’s Mathematical Theory of War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, I, 249-99, Sept. 57; Part IV, ‘The Mathematics of Arms Races,’ pp. 275-82.

Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research (Arnold Wolfers, Director), “Developments…” Part C. Chapters 5, 6; pp. 85-97.

Schelling, T.C. “Surprise Attack and Disarmament,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, XV, 413-18, Dec. 59

*   *  *   *   *

Luce, R. Duncan, Raiffa, Howard. Games and Decisions, New York, 1957, Chapters 5, 6, pp. 88-154.

Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research (Arnold Wolfers, Director), “Developments…” etc. Part D, “The Development of Deterrent and Counterdeterrent Strategies,” pp. 98-104. Part E, “The Crisis of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence,” pp. 105-118.

Schelling, T.C. “Randomization of Threats and Promises,” The RAND Corporation, P-1716, June 5, 1959.

Schelling, T.C. “The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance,” Mimeograph, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (no date).

Schelling, T.C. “The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack,” The RAND Corporation, P-1342, revised May 58.

Rathjens, George. Ch. 4, in Klaus Knorr (ed.), NATO and American Security, Princeton 1959. “NATO Strategy: Total War,” pp. 65-97.

Hoag, Malcolm. “The Place of Limited War in NATO Strategy,” Ch. 5 of Klaus Knorr (ed.), NATO and American Security, Princeton 1959, pp. 98-126.

Szilard, Leo. “Disarmament and the Problem of Peace,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. II, Oct. 55.

Kaplan, Morton. “Some Problems in the Strategic Analysis of International Politics,” Research Monograph No. 2, Center of International Studies, Princeton, Jan. 1959.

Kaplan, Morton A. “The Strategy of Limited Retaliation,” Policy Memorandum No. 19, Center of International Studies, Princeton, April 1959.

Kaplan, Morton A. “The Calculus of Nuclear Deterrence,” World Politics, XI, 20-43, Oct. 58.

Burns, Arthur Lee. “From Balance to Deterrence: A Theoretical Analysis,” World Politics, IX, 494-529, July 57.

Burns, Arthur Lee. “The Rationale of Catalytic War,” Research Monograph No. 3, Princeton Center of International Studies, Apr. 2, 59.

Rapoport, Anatol. “Lewis F. Richardson’s Mathematical Theory of War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, I, 249-299, Sept. 57.

*   *  *   *   *

V. ECONOMICS OF DISASTER

Hirschleifer, Jack. “Some Thoughts on the Social Structure After a Bombing Disaster,” World Politics, VIII, 206-227, Jan. 56.

Tiryakian, Edward A. “Aftermath of a Thermonuclear Attack on the United States,” Social Problems, VI, 291-303, Spring 1959.

Enke, Stephen. “Controlling Consumers in Future Wars,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXII, 558-573, Nov. 58

*   *  *   *   *

Bear, Donald V.T., Clark, Paul G. “Which Industries Would Be Most Important in a Postwar U.S. Economy?” (Mimeograph).

Hirschleifer, J. “War Damage Insurance, “Review of Economics and Statistics, May 53.

*   *  *   *   *

VI. EXTREMES AND INTANGIBLES IN SOCIAL CHOICE

Hitch, Charles J., McKean, Roland N. “Incommensurables, Uncertainty, and the Enemy,” (Mimeograph, 39 pages).

Kahn, Herman. “How Many Can Be Saved?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, XV, 30-34, Jan. 59.

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, “Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War,” Summary Analysis of Hearings, June 22-26, 1959.

Committee on Government Operations, “Atomic Shelter Programs,” Thirty-fourth report of the committee, Aug. 12, 1958.

Deer, James W. “Whatever Happened to Civil Defense,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, XV, 266-7 June 59.

Lapp, Ralph. “Local Fallout Radioactivity,” “Fallout and Home Defense,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, XV, 181-86, 187-91, May 59.

Morgenstern, Oskar. The Question of National Defense. New York 1959, Ch. 5, “Attrition, Shelters and Recovery,” 104-133.

*   *  *   *   *

Schubert, Jack, Lapp, Ralph. Radiation: What It Is and How It Affects You, New York, 1957. Ch. 3, 4, 11, 12.

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Radiation and Man. Special Issue, XIV, 1-64, Jan. 58.

The RAND Corporation, Report on a Study of Non-Military Defense, Report R-322-RC, July 1, 1958. 48 pages.

Ramsey, F. A., Jr. “Damage Assessment Systems and their Relationship to Post-Nuclear-Attack Damage and Recovery,” Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, V, 199-219, Sept. 58.

*   *  *   *   *

VII. DESIGN OF EFFICIENT MILITARY INSTITUTIONS

Smithies, Arthur. The Budgetary Process in the United States. New York 1955. Ch. 12: The Defense Budget: Economy and Efficiency in the Defense Program, pp. 278-325.

Lindblom, C.E. “Decision Making in Taxation and Expenditure,” Mimeograph, National Bureau of Economic Research: Conference on Public Finance, April 1959.

Enthoven, Alain, Rowen, Henry. “Defense Planning and Organization,” The RAND Corporation, Paper P-1640, March 17, 59, revised July 28, 59.

Knorr, Klaus. The War Potential of Nations. Princeton, 1956. Ch. 1: “War Potential in the Nuclear Age,” pp. 3-15; Ch. 6: “Wartime Administration,” pp. 99-118; Ch. 7: “The Allocation of Resources,” pp. 119-141.

Schelling, T.C. International Economics, Chapter 30, “Economic Warfare and Strategic Trade Controls,” pp. 487-511.

*   *  *   *   *

Livingston, J. Sterling. “Decision-Making in Weapons Development,” Harvard Business Review, Jan-Feb. 58.

Klein, Burton H. “A Radical Proposal for R and D,” Fortune, May 58, 112-.

Schelling, T. C. Internaitonal Economics. Ch. 31, “Trade Controls and National Security,” 511-532.

Breckner, Norman. “Government Efficiency and the Military ‘Buyer-Seller’ Device,” The RAND Corporation, P-1744, 8 July 1959.

Enthoven, Alain. “Supply and Demand and Military Pay,” RAND P-1186, 30 Sept. 1957.

Cordiner, Ralph. “A Modern Concept of Manpower Management and Compensation for Personnel of the Uniformed Service,” (The Cordiner Report), Defense Advisory Committee on Professional and Technical Compensation, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957.

 

Source:  Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003 (HUC 8522.2.1). Box 7, Folder: “Economics, 1959-1960”.

Image Source: From an internet page of the Rio Theatre in Vancouver.

 

Categories
Exam Questions Harvard Suggested Reading Syllabus Undergraduate

Harvard. Reading list and final exam for course “Conflict, Coalition and Strategy”. Schelling, 1970

 

 

There are undergraduate courses, and then there are great undergraduate courses. Today we have the 49 item course bibliography for Thomas C. Schelling’s “Conflict, Coalition and Strategy” along with its ten-page final examination. This material comes to Economics in the Rear-view Mirror from one of the students who took that course, then Harvard undergraduate, Robert Dohner. I am  generally not jealous of Bob’s Harvard undergraduate education, but I’ll admit there are a good half-dozen economics and politics courses in my own Yale training that I would have gladly traded for that single Schelling semester in 1970. You can all thank Bob Dohner for sharing this memory!

The teaching assistant for the course, James T. Campen, was born 1943. He received an A.B. from Harvard in 1965, M.A. at St. John’s College, University of Cambridge in 1971 and Ph.D. from Harvard in 1976. Campen was active early on in the Union for Radical Political Economics and was on the faculty of the University of Massachusetts at Boston from 1977 where he worked up into his emeritus years.

_____________________

Economics 1030
“Conflict, Coalition and Strategy”
Prof. Thomas C. Schelling
Mr. James T. Campen
Fall 1970

(*Contained in Coop package)

Introduction (13 pages)

  1. *Schelling, T. C., “Strategic Analysis and Social Problems,” Social Problems, Vol. 12 (Spring 1965), pp. 367-379.

 

I. Personal Incentives and Social Organization (56 pages)

  1. Hardin, Garrett, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science, Vol. 162, No. 3859, pp. 1243-1248.
  2. Olson, Mancur, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 1-3,9-16, 53-57,86-87, 132-141.
  3. Luce, R. Duncan and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957), Chapter 5.4, “An Example: The Prisoner’s Dilemma,” and Chapter 5.5, “Temporal Repetition of the Prisoner’s Dilemma,” pp. 94-102.
  4. Demsetz, Harold, “Toward a Theory of Property Rights,” Papers and Proceedings of the American Economic Association, American Economic Review, Vol. 57 (May 1967), pp. 347-359.

 

II. Rules, Restraints, and Conventions (296 pages)

  1. Schelling, T. C., “Some Thoughts on the Relevance of Game Theory to the Analysis of Ethical Systems,” in Ira R. Buchler and Hugo G. Nutini (eds.), Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969), pp. 45-60.
  2. Lorenz, Konrad, On Aggression (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966), pp. 68-84, 109-138. NOTE: Different pages in Bantam paperback, pp. 64-80, 104-132.
  3. Piaget, Jean, The Moral Judgment of the Child (The Free Press, 1965, and Collier Books, 1962, same translator and identical pagination in both versions), pp. 65-76, 94-100, 139-174, 197-232. NOTE: Hardcover editions dated 1932 and 1948 have these pages instead: pp. 56-69, 89-95, 135-171, 195-231. To check: the first selection begins, “Consciousness of Rules: II Third Stage.”
  4. Jervis, Robert, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 18, 90-110, 147-152, 197-205, 216-223.
  5. Schelling, T. C., The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press, 1963), Chapter 3, pp. 53-80, and Chapter 4, pp. 89-108.
  6. Lewis, David K., Convention: A Philosophical Study (Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 5-8, 36-51, 83-107, 118-121.

 

III. Contests and Disputes (123 pages)

  1. Moore, Omar K. and Alan R. Anderson, “Puzzles, Games, and Social Interaction,” in David Braybooke, Philosophical Problems of the Social Sciences (The Macmillan Company, 1965), pp. 68-79.
  2. Langholm, Sivert, “Violent Conflict Resolution and the Loser’s Reaction,” Journal of Peace Research, 1965-4, pp. 324-347.
  3. Galtung, Johan, “Institutionalized Conflict Resolution,” Journal of Peace Research, 1965-4, pp. 348-383.
  4. Goffman, Erving, Interaction Ritual (Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 239-270, “Where the Action Is.”
  5. Skolnick, Jerome H., “Social Control in the Adversary System,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XI, No. 1 (March 1967), pp. 52-70.

 

IV. Formal Processes of Collective Decision (133 pages)

  1. *Steinhaus, Hugo, “The Problem of Fair Division,” Econometrica, Vol. 16 (January 1948), pp. 101-104.
  2. *Farquharson, Robin, “Sincerity and Strategy in Voting,” mimeograph, February 5, 1955, 7 pages.
  3. Schelling, T. C., “What Is Game Theory?” in James C. Charlesworth (ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis (The Free Press, 1967), pp. 212-238.
  4. Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tulloch, The Calculus of Consent (The University of Michigan Press, 1962), pp. 43-62, 131-145, 249-262.
  5. *Schelling, T. C., “Voting Schemes and Fair Division,” multilith, September 1970.
    [Handwritten note: 23 10th line 12th 1.27 s.b. 1.55. A gets 295 instead of 241. B gets 85]
  6. Leiserson, Michael, “Game Theory and the Study of Coalition Behavior,” in Sven Groennings, E. W. Kelley, and Michael Leiserson (eds.), The Study of Coalition Behavior (Holt, Reinhardt and Winston, 1970), pp. 255-272.
  7. Farquharson, Robin, Theory of Voting (Yale University Press, 1969), Appendix 3, pp. 77-80.

 

V. Individual and Collective Bargaining (266 pages)

  1. Schelling, T. C., The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press, 1963), Chapter 2, pp. 21-52, and Chapter 5, pp. 119-161.

[Handwritten note: Hour Exam]

  1. Fisher, Roger, International Conflict for Beginners (Harper & Rowe, 1969), Chapter 3, “Making Threats Is Not Enough,” pp. 27-59.
  2. Walton, R. E. and R. B. McKersie, Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 4-6, 67-125, 310-340.
  3. Ross, H. Laurence, Settled Out of Court (Aldine, 1970), Chapter IV, “Negotiation.” NOTE: Pending appearance of book, mimeograph copy on reserve, entitled “Negotiation.”
  4. *Schelling, T. C., “Communication, Bargaining and Negotiation,” Arms Control and National Security, Vol. 1 (1969), pp. 69-71.
  5. *Rapoport, Anatol and Melvin Guyer, “Taxonomy of 2 x 2 Games,” Papers, Vol. 6, 1966, Peace Research Society (International), pp. 11-26.

 

VI. Violence and Nonviolence (191 pages)

  1. Sibley, Mulford Q., The Quiet Battle (Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 9-10, 55-66.
  2. Hubbard, Howard, “Five Long, Hot Summers and How They Grew,The Public Interest, No. 12 (Summer 1968), pp. 3-24.
  3. Nieburg, H. L., “Violence, Law and the Informal Polity,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 1969), pp. 192-209.
  4. Schelling, T. C., Arms and Influence (Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 1-18, 92-105, 116-125.
  5. Roberts, Adam (Ed.), Civilian Resistance as a National Defense (Stackpole Books, 1968), or The Strategy of Civilian Defense (Faber & Faber Ltd., 1967) (the two versions are identical), pp. 9-13, 87-105, 205-211, 302-308.
  6. Walter, Charles W., “Interposition: The Strategy and Its Uses,” Naval War College Review, Vol. XXII, No. 10 (June 1970), pp. 72-84.
  7. Nozick, Robert, “Coercion,” in Sydney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes and Morton White (eds.), Philosophy, Science and Method (St. Martin’s Press, 1969), pp. 440-472.
  8. Shure, Gerald H., Robert J. Meeker and Earle A. Hansford, “The Effectiveness of Pacifist Strategies in Bargaining Games,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. IX, No. 1 (March 1965), pp. 106-117.

 

VII. Interactive Models: Large Groups (89 pages)

  1. Penrose, L S., On the Objective Study of Crowd Behavior (H. K. Lewis & Company, Ltd., 1952), Chapter 6, “Panic Reactions,” pp. 28-35.
  2. Boulding, Kenneth E., Conflict and Defense (Harper & Brothers, 1962), Chapter 6, “The Group as a Party to Conflict: The Ecological Model,” pp. 105-122.
  3. Schelling, T. C., “Neighborhood Tipping,” Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper No. 100, December 1969.
  4. *Schelling, T. C., “Models of Segregation,” The American Economic Review, Vol. LIX, No. 2 (May 1969), pp. 488-493.

 

VIII. Interactive Models: Two Parties (145 pages)

  1. Boulding, Kenneth E., Conflict and Defense (Harper & Brothers, 1962), Chapter 2, “The Dynamics of Conflict: Richardson Process Models,” pp. 19-40.
  2. Goffman, Erving, Interaction Ritual (Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 97-112, “Embarrassment and Social Organization.”
  3. *Valavanis, Stefan, “The Resolution of Conflict When Utilities Interact,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 2 (June 1958), pp. 156-169.
  4. Schelling, T. C., The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press, 1963), Chapter 9, pp. 207-229.
  5. Boulding, Kenneth E., Conflict and Defense (Harper & Brothers, 1962), Chapter 12, “International Conflict: The Basic Model,” and Chapter 13, “International Conflict: Modifications,” pp. 227-273.
  6. Schelling, T. C., “War Without Pain, and Other Models,” World Politics, Vol. 15, No. 3 (April 1963), pp. 465-487.

 

IX. Randomized Decision (55 pages)

  1. *Schelling, T. C., “Zero-Sum Games,” multilith, September 1970.
  2. Schelling, T. C., The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 175-190, 201-203.

 

Total pages: 1,367

Reading period: To be assigned later [see question 6 in final examination below]

 

Economics 1030
Final Exam
January 22, 1971

There are altogether six questions. The sixth contain several alternatives, according to your choice of reading-period assignment. You are not to answer any five questions out of the six. You may not choose more than one among the alternate forms of question six. Specifically, you may answer the first five questions; you may instead answer any four among the first five and one of the alternates in question 6.

The five questions you answer will be given equal weight and are intended to require about equal time.

  1. Each of the terms, concepts or principles listed on the next page is to be identified by reference to a matrix. Several matrices are provided and are adequate, but you may prefer to construct your own. (There may be more than one matrix shown that illustrates a particular concept; some of the matrices shown may illustrate several concepts. You need not make reference to more than one–your own, or one of those shown.)
    In some cases–marked by an asterisk–you need only identify an appropriate matrix; if, for example, one of the terms were “prisoners’ dilemma,” it would be sufficient to indicate Matrix #1. In other cases–where there is no asterisk–you will have to state clearly just what it is about the indicated matrix that exemplifies the concept; for example, if “promise” were one of the terms listed, you could state that in Matrix #1, if Column had first move, Row could promise first row on condition Column choose column 1, improving the expected outcome from payoffs of 1 apiece to 2 apiece in the upper left cell.

Here are the items to be identified:

    1. warning
    2. inducing move
    3. altruist’s dilemma*
    4. zero-difference game*
    5. Pareto equilibrium
    6. convention*
    7. randomized commitment
    8. dominated strategy
    9. threat-vulnerable equilibrium
    10. social contract*
    11. [a first] alternative concepts of “arms agreement”
    12. [a second] alternative concept of “arms agreement”
    13. Insurance as a bargaining advantage or disadvantage

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

  1. Explain the concept of interposition (Charles Walters, “Interposition: The Strategy and Its Uses”), and compare it with non-violent intervention (Gene Sharp, “The Technique of Non–Violent Action,” or Howard Hubbard, “Five Long Hot Summers and How They Grew”), then examine the strategic similarities and differences between (a) naval-force interposition and (b) tactics used to blockade, occupy or immobilize a campus building.

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

  1. John Stuart Mill argued that even

…if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character, even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were the sheer deduction from the benefit.

Assuming that the hypothesis which Mill discusses is true (that nobleness in itself detracts from individual happiness), under what conditions would you expect individuals to choose to develop noble characters? Discuss with reference to readings and lectures concerning interplay of individual incentives, social organization and moral codes.

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

  1. One of the questions on a makeup examination which you will take tomorrow will be based on either an article by Smith or an article by Jones. Your limited time in the library’s rules make it impossible for you to study both articles. If the exam question is based on the Smith article, you will have a 90 percent chance of answering it correctly if you read Smith, but will surely fail to answer correctly if you read Jones; if the exam question is based on Jones, you will have a 60 percent chance of getting it right if you study Jones, no chance otherwise. You will get the question either right or wrong; no partial credit will be given.
    You want to use your study time to maximize the probability of answering the question correctly. Your examiner will choose the exam question in such a way as to minimize the same probability. Both you and she know all of the information in this paragraph, and both of you are familiar with the basic theory of two-person zero-sum games.

A.

    1. Draw a payoff matrix to illustrate the situation, letting your payoffs be represented by the probability of getting the correct answer.
    2. What will be your strategy in this situation?
    3. What will be the teacher’s strategy be?
    4. If you use the strategy which you indicated in A2, what is the probability that you will get a correct answer?

B.

You suddenly recognize that the librarian whom you will be asking for one of the articles is also your teacher’s secretary, and knows which article the question will be based on.

    1. If you could get the secretary to tell you truthfully which article you should read, what would be your probability of getting the correct answer be? (That is, you are to estimate this probability before asking for the article, on the assumption that the librarian will know the answer and answer truthfully.)
    2. If you felt that the librarian/secretary would answer your question truthfully six chances out of 10 but there was a 40 percent chance the examiner would be told that you tried to cheat, resulting in your receiving an automatic zero on this question (but with no other negative consequences), would asking the library and increase your overall probability of getting credit for the question?

C.

If you knew (and the teacher knew that you knew) that the teacher believed that you would have .7 chance of answering either question, given that you studied the right article, but you alone knew that the chances were 90 percent and 60 percent for the two articles as mentioned above:

    1. What would your strategy be?
    2. What would be your probability of getting the question right?

D

Now consider the situation where you might be able to get the question correct even if you chose the wrong article. The chances of this are 1/5 if the question is based on Smith and 2/5 if the question is based on Jones. (Both you and the teacher correctly understand the situation.)

    1. What is your strategy in this case?
    2. What is the teacher’s strategy?
    3. What are your chances for getting the correct answer?

E.

Consider the same problem as in Part D with one change: you and the teacher both know that he wants you to do as well as possible on the exam.

    1. What is your strategy?
    2. What is the teacher’s strategy?
    3. What is your probability of getting the correct answer?

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

  1. You are one of two students in a small class who have arranged to write a paper in lieu of a final exam. You are certain that the grade your paper receives will depend not only on how much time you spend on it but also on how much time the other student spends on his. Even if the examiner tries to judge your paper on its merits alone he will be unconsciously influenced by how it compares with the other student’s paper.

You estimate…

    1. …that you will lose about 3 grade points on other exams for every 10 hours you spend on this paper;
    2. …that your grade on this paper will be:
      1. 5, 9, 12, 14 or 15 points according as you spend 10, 20, 30, 40 or 50 hours on it,
      2. plus 3, 5 or 6 points if you spend 10, 20 or 30 hours more than your rival, and minus 3, 5 or 6 points if you spend 10, 20 or 30 hours less than your rival.

When you plot a smooth graph of your overall grade, taking all three factors into account–quality of your paper, quality of the competing paper, time taken away from your other courses–you get the following “contours” of your overall net score as a function of the time you both devote to your papers.

The graph is interpreted this way. If you work 30 hours and he does nothing, you get a net score of 9 (i.e., a gross score of 12 for your paper on its merits, plus 6 for superiority, less 9 for the 30 hours taken from other courses). If you both work 30 hours you get 3 (the same 12 on your own paper, less 9 on other courses, and did nothing for superiority). If you work 20 hours and he works 10, you get 6. Every point on the graph denotes a combination of your work time and his; every point has an associated net score for you; points of equal score can be connected by “contour lines” is in the graph. (The dotted lines at 45 degrees represents equal time for the two of you.)

You are quite sure that your rival, whoever he is, has a nearly identical graph when he considers his own grade in relation to the time you both spend on your papers.

  1. Draw your “reaction curve” (otherwise called in Boulding, “partial-equilibrium curve” or “reaction function”), and explain what it means.
  2. Drawing on your knowledge that your rival reaches identical estimates with respect to his own grades, draw his reaction curve.
  3. Locate and characterize any equilibria that occur.
  4. Discuss the likely amounts of work the two of you will do on each of the following alternative assumptions:
    1. Each of you can see the other work–in the library, for example–and can keep count of each other’s time, but you are unacquainted and not permitted to consult each other.
    2. You have no idea who the other student is and no way to monitor the amount of work he does, nor does he know who you are.
    3. You do not know who he is, but are sure that he can recognize you and watches you work in the library, keeping track of how much work you do.
    4. You are well enough acquainted to get together and talk the situation over, reaching an understanding about how much work you intend to do, perhaps reaching a bargain on restraining your competition; but you are not close enough friends to be unselfish toward each other and furthermore you do not know how badly each other may need grade points.

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *

  1. This question is based on the reading period assignment. If you chose one of the following four books answer Part A:

Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society
J. H. Dales, Pollution, Property and Prices
H. L. Nieburg, Political Violence: The Behavioral Process
Carl M. Stevens, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiation

If you chose James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, answer Part B.

If you chose Erving Goffman, Interaction Ritual, answer Part C.

If you chose Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations, answer Part D.

If you chose Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action, answer Part E.

  1. Identify one or more major themes or propositions in the book which you chose is the reading period assignment. Discuss what you consider to be the most more interesting and/or important ways that these themes illuminate the body of Economics 1030 and are in turn illuminated by it. Be specific.
  2. Buchanan and Tullock
    1. Using their concept of “cost,” explain the roles ascribed by the authors to unanimity rule, majority rule, and any other competing alternatives rules.
    2. On what conditions, if any, or with what reservations, would you accept their point of view?
  3. Goffman

Goffman’s book contains the word, “ritual,” in its title, and every chapter involves some analysis of ritual in phase-to-face behavior even though the chapters were originally independent essays. Explain what “ritual” means in this context and identify its role in the following topics of Economics 1030:

      1. Personal incentives and social organization
      2. Rules, restraints and conventions
      3. Contests and disputes
      4. Formal processes of collective decision
      5. Individual and collective bargaining
  1. Jervis
    Define signals and indices, then illustrate the manipulation of indices, and the veracity and ambiguity of signals, by reference to any one of the following sources of signals and indices, which you should examine in some detail:

    1. An advertising campaign
    2. A student’s essay on a final examination
    3. The public relations involved in the year-long process of selecting a Harvard president
  2. Olson
    Most of Olson’s book is devoted to an analysis of the behavior of large groups. How important is group size? In what ways does the behavior of small groups differ systematically from that of larger ones? What are the most important reasons for this?
    With reference to college courses, speculate briefly on the location and significance of the boundary between “small” and “large.”

Source: Personal copy of course syllabus and final examination shared for transcription at Economics in the Rear-View Mirror by Robert Dohner (Harvard, 1974; M.I.T., 1980).

Image Source: From Schelling testifying before a Senate subcommittee on national security in 1966New York Times, Dec. 13, 2016.

Categories
Harvard Suggested Reading Syllabus

Harvard. Principles of Economics. Enrollment, Staffing, Readings, 1947-48

 

The previous post provided transcriptions of the mid-year and end-year final examinations for Harvard’s principles of economics course for the academic year 1947-48. The second-term examination included over fifty multiple choice questions, which appears to me to be the first use of that examination format in the Harvard economics department. Today’s post gives additional information for the course: the course announcements, staffing, enrollment and reading lists. Should I ever come across the printed Course Syllabus: Economics A, I will try to get at least portions of it transcribed.

_____________________________

Course Announcements

Economics Aa. Principles of Economics

Half-course (fall term). Tu., Th., Sat., at 11. Depending on enrolment, sections will also be arranged at other hours. Radcliffe sections will meet Tu., Th., Sat., at 11 and at such other times as the enrolment may justify.
Professor Burbank, Assistant Professor Bradley, Dr. Papandreou, and other Members of the Department.

Economics Aa may be taken by properly qualified Freshmen with the consent of the instructor.

Economics Ab. Principles of Economics

Half-course (spring term). Tu., Th., Sat., at 11. Depending on enrolment, sections will also be arranged at other hours. At Radcliffe Tu., Th., Sat., at 11 and at such other times as the enrolment may justify.
Professor Burbank, Assistant Professor Bradley, Dr. Papandreou, and other Members of the Department.

Economics Aa is a prerequisite for this course.

 

Source: Final Announcement of the Courses of Instruction offered by the Faculty of Arts and Sciences during 1947-48, published in Official Register of Harvard University , Vol. XLIV, No. 25 (September 9, 1947), p. 69.

_____________________________

Course Enrollments and Staffing

[Economics] Aa. Professor Burbank, Assistant Professor Bradley, and Messrs. Brecher, Campbell, M.G. Clark, Duesenberry, Farrell, Fels, Ferguson, Garbarino, Heany, Hunter, Kahn, Meredith, Passer, Powelson, Schelling, Thompson, Ulman.—Principles of Economics (F).

Total 834: 1 Graduate, 52 Seniors, 134 Juniors, 453 Sophomores, 184 Freshmen, 10 Other.

 

[Economics] Ab. Professor Burbank, Assistant Professor Bradley, and Messrs. Brecher, Campbell, M.G. Clark, P. Clark, Cochrane, Eckley, Farrell, Fels, Ferguson, Garbarino, Heany, Hirchleiger, Hunter, Kahn, McClelland, Margolis, Meredith, Morgan, Passer, Powelson, Reynolds, Thompson, Ulman.—Principles of Economics (Sp).

Total 747: 1 Graduate, 57 Seniors, 209 Juniors, 358 Sophomores, 109 Freshmen, 13 Other.

 

Source: Report of the President of Harvard College and Reports of Departments for 1947-48,p. 89.

_____________________________

Course Readings

ECONOMICS Aa
Fall, 1947

Benham and Lutz Economics, American Edition (1941)
Bowman and Bach Economic Analysis and Public Policy (1944)
*Chandler, L. V. A Preface to Economics (1947)
*Federal Reserve System Federal Reserve Charts on Bank Credit, Money Rates and Business
Federal Reserve System Its Purposes and Functions (1939)
Luthringer, Chandler and Cline Money, Credit, and Finance (1938)
*Staff Members Syllabus: Economics A

*To be purchased by the students.

 

PART I. INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS (1 week)
A. THE INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Chandler, Ch. 1, The Scope of Economics 16
Chandler, Ch. 2, Production and Exchange; Their Meaning and Structure 21
Chandler, Ch. 3, Technology and Economics 28
Chandler, Ch. 4, Business Firms 29
Chandler, Ch. 5, Some Implications of the Industrial Revolution 14
103
B. THE COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Chandler, Ch. 8, The Social Control of Economic Processes 20
Chandler, Ch. 9, Laissez-Faire and Competition 18
Chandler, Ch. 10, Competitive Control of Rationing, Price and Production 19
57
PART II. THE NATIONAL INCOME, MONEY, AND PRICES
A. THE NATIONAL INCOME
Syllabus, The National Economy

Ch. 1, National Income

48
48
B. MONEY
Syllabus, The National Economy
Ch. 2, Nature and Functions of Money 4
Ch. 3, The Existing Supply of Money in the United States 1
Ch. 4, The Banking System of the United States 9
Ch. 5, The Federal Reserve Banks and the Money Supply 4
Luthringer, Ch. 6, Quantitative Control of Bank Credit
Fed. Res. System
Ch. 1, A General Outline of the Federal Reserve System 12
Ch. 2, The Service Functions of the Federal Reserve Banks 14
Ch. 7, Federal Reserve Powers and Limitations 11
Ch. 8, Member Bank Reserves and Related Items 9
81
C. MONEY, PRICES AND THE NATIONAL INCOME
Syllabus, The National Economy

Ch. 6, Money, Prices, and the National Income

41
41
PART III. MARKET DETERMINATION OF THE RELATIVE PRICE OF CONSUMER GOODS AND SERVICES (4 weeks)
A. MARKETS
Benham, Ch. 2, Markets, omit Appendix A. 21
B. CONSUMER DEMAND
Benham, Ch. 3, Demand 16
Benham, Ch. 4, Price with a Fixed Demand, pp. 71-74 4
Benham, Ch. 5, Changes in Demand 11
31
C. THE BUSINESS FIRM—COST AND REVENUE
Bowman and Bach, Ch. 4, The Unit of Business Enterprise 15
Syllabus, Value
Ch. 1, Problems of the Firm 17
Ch. 2, Problems of Production, Real Input and Real Output 16
Ch. 3, Problems of Production: Money Costs and Money Returns 18
66
D. THE INDUSTRY—DEMAND AND SUPPLY
Bowman and Bach
Ch. 14, Pure Competition and the Law of Supply and Demand 9
Ch. 15, The Firm and Short-run Market Adjustments, pp. 216-220 4
Ch. 16, Long-run Price and Output Adjustments 14
27
E. MODIFICATIONS OF COMPETITION
Chandler, Ch. 12, Competition Today 27
PART IV. PUBLIC CONTROL OF MARKETS (2 weeks)
Bowman and Bach
Ch. 26, Foundations of Power 29
Ch. 27, Some Monopolistic Price Policies 17
Ch. 28, Public Policy Attacking Restraints of Trade in Business 18
Ch. 29, Public Utility Regulation 21
Ch. 56, Agriculture: A Case Study 31
Chandler, Ch. 13, Laissez-Faire Today 21
137

 

ECONOMICS Ab
Spring 1948

Benham and Lutz Economics, American Edition (1941)
Bowman and Bach Economic Analysis and Public Policy (1944)
Committee for Economic Development Taxes and the Budget
*Hoover, C. B. International Trade an Domestic Employment
*League of Nations Economic Stability in the Post-War World (1945)
Slichter, S. H. Basic Criteria Used in Wage Negotiations
Slichter, S. H. Trade Unions in a Free Society
*Staff Members Syllabus: Economics A
Twentieth Century Fund How Collective Bargaining Works
Williamson and Harris Trends in Collective Bargaining
Witte, Edwin Labor-Management Relations Under Taft-Hartely Act
*U.S. Dept. of Commerce The United States in the World Economy

*To be purchased by the students.

 

PART V. THE MARKETS FOR FACTOR SERVICES
(15 sessions including Part VI)
A. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING FACTOR COMBINATIONS
Review Syllabus: VALUE
Ch. I—Problems of the Firm 16
Ch. II—Problems of Production 16
Ch. III—Problems of Production 18
50
B. GENERAL THEORY OF DISTRIBUTION
Syllabus: DISTRIBUTION
Ch. I—Definitions 3
Ch. II—General Theory of Distribution 15
Benham & Lutz
Ch. 18: Rent 13
Ch. 17: Interest 31
62
C. PERSONAL DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME
Class Discussion: No assignment
PART VI LABOR ORGANIZATION AND LABOR MARKET
Bowman & Bach
Ch. 30: History and Philosophy of Trade Unionism 16
Williamson & Harris
Ch. 1: What is Collective Bargaining 8
Ch. 2: Bargaining Agencies for the Workers 11
Ch. 3: Employer Bargaining Agencies 11
Ch. 4: Union Recognition 14
Ch. 5: Collective Agreements 11
Ch. 6: Wages 17
Slichter
Sections I and II: Basic Criteria Used in Wage Negotiations 34
20th Century Fund
How Collective Bargaining Works 47
Slichter
Trade Unions in a Free Society 31
Witte
Labor-Management Relations Under the Taft-Hartley Act 22
222
PART VII. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF MARKETS AND FINANCE
(7 sessions)
Benham & Lutz
Ch. 25: The Theory of International Trade 22
Ch. 26: Balances of Payments 10
Ch. 27: Free Exchange Rates 10
Ch. 28: The Gold Standard 22
Ch. 29: Exchange Control 8
Ch. 30: Import Duties and Quotes 9
The United States in the World Economy
Summary and Recommendations 26
Ch. 1: The Setting of the Problem 9
Hoover
Ch. 1: The Determination of National Policy and National Trade 17
Ch. 2: The International Monetary Fund 16
Ch. 3: The Problem of International Loans and Investments 19
Ch. 4: The Newer Forms of Trade Barriers 15
Ch. 5: Our Tariff Policy 15
198
PART VIII. PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM
(7 sessions)
Bowman & Bach
Ch. 46: Introduction to the Public Economy 11
Ch. 47: Public Expenditures 13
Ch. 48: Public Revenues: Taxation 26
Ch. 49: Taxation (continued) 29
C.E.D., Taxes and the Budget
II. Tax Program for Nineteen-Fifty-X 25
III. Tax Policy for 1948 5
Bowman & Bach
Ch. 50: Fiscal Policy and the National Income 18
Ch. 51: Social Security 16
143
PART IX. PROSPERITY AND DEPRESSION
(7 sessions)
Section I: The Nature of Depressions
League of Nations: Economic Stability in the Post-War World
Ch. 1: The Nature of Depression 16
Ch. 2: Types of Depression 5
Bowman & Bach
Ch. 44: General Business Fluctuations 24
League of Nations: Economic Stability in the Post-War World
Ch. 4: The Strategic Role of Investment 26
Ch. 5: Depressions and Primary Production 11
Ch. 6 International Spread of Booms and Depressions 23
125
Section II: Anti-Depression Policies
League of Nations: Economic Stability in the Post-War World
Ch. 7: Regulation of Total Expenditure 9
Ch. 8: Constituents of national Expenditures 6
Ch. 9: Private Consumption Expenditure 10
Ch. 10: Private Investment 17
Ch. 11: Credit Policy and the Stabilization of Total Expenditure 10
Ch. 12: Public Expenditure and Fiscal Policy 26
Ch. 13: Foreign Investment 12
Ch. 14: Employment and Inflation 14
104

 

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in economics, 1895-2003 (HUC 8522.2.1). Box 4, Folder “1947-48, (1 of 2)”.

Image Source:  Harold H. Burbank in Harvard Class Album, 1934.

 

 

 

Categories
Economists Harvard Transcript

Harvard. Graduate Course Record. Thomas Schelling, 1946-49

Included in the materials from the 1949-50 hiring search for someone to teach in Columbia College was a mimeographed fact-sheet/transcript for 28 year old Thomas Schelling together with a departmental statement provided by the Chairman of the Harvard Department of Economics, Harold Burbank. I think we can be pretty sure that both items were attached to a letter Burbank sent to Angell dated December 14, 1949 in which Tobin and Schelling were discussed with supporting data (cf. Appendix C in the Hiring Committee’s Report of January 9, 1950 that clearly provides information on Tobin from the same letter).

Interesting to note perhaps is (i) the future Nobel laureate did not get short-listed by the search committee and (ii) “his interest is mainly in the national income, fiscal policy approach” might have been a contemporary euphemism or dog-whistle for “Keynesian economist”.

In any event, I am delighted whenever I find the complete graduate course records of Ph.D.’s. I have filled in the names of the instructors for the respective courses based on the Harvard President’s Reports.

____________________

Thomas Crombie Schelling

Address: Program Division, ECA-OSR [Economic Cooperation Administration, Office of the Special Representative (Administration of the Marshall Plan)], 2 Rue Saint Florentin, Paris, France

Born: April 14, 1921, U.S.

Married: Yes

Degrees:

A.B., 1944, University of California (Highest honors)

A.M., 1948, Harvard University

Experience:

1941-43         American Embassy, Santiago, Chile

1945-46         U. S. Bureau of Budget, Fiscal Division

1946-48         Teaching Fellow, Harvard

1948               Elected to Society of Fellows, resigned September, 1949

1948-              ECA, Copenhagen Paris

 

Courses:

Summer 1946

Ec. 201 (Reading)                 Satis.

Fall 1946-47

Ec. 103a (Adv. theory [Schumpeter])         A+

Ec. 104b (Math. Ec. [Leontief])                    A+

Ec. 148a (Int. Tr. Sem. [sic, 148a was Fiscal Policy Seminar with Williams and Hansen])        A-

Spring 1946-47

Ec. 103b (Adv. Theory [Schumpeter]))      A+

Ec. 121b (Statistics [Frickey]))                     A-

Ec 148b (Int. Tr. Sem. [sic, 148a was Fiscal Policy Seminar with Williams and Hansen]))       A-

Summer 1947

Ec. 201 (Reading)     Satis.

Fall 1947-48

Ec. 102a (Adv. Theory [Leontief])   A+

Ec. 133a (History [Usher])               A-

Ec. 161a (Ind. Org. [Alexander and Crum])           A+

Spring 1947-48

Ec. 102b (Adv. Theory [Leontief])   Exc.

Ec. 133b (Ec. History[Usher])          A

Ec. 162b (Ind. Org. [Mason])           Exc.

Fields of study: Economic Theory, Industrial Organization, Money and Banking, Statistics, write-off, Economic History; special field, Business Cycles

Generals: Passed April 7, 1948 with a grade of Excellent Minus

____________________

[Supporting Statement
by Chairman of the Harvard Economics Department,
14 Dec. 1949(?)]

Schelling came to us immediately after the war with a quite extraordinary record in his undergraduate work at Berkeley and an outstanding war accomplishment in the Bureau of the Budget. His intellectual work with us was of the highest order, so high indeed that he was recommended for the Society of Fellows and accepted by them. However, Schelling saw fit to accept a position with the E.C.A. and at the end of the first year elected to stay with that organization even at the expense of resigning his fellowship. I have not heard from him directly but I understand that he intends to take his degree this spring and will be available.

The members of the staff most familiar with Schelling’s work—Hansen, Harris, and Smithies—regard him as one of the very top students we have had at least in the last ten years. I believe those mentioned will recommend him without qualification. It is true that his interest is mainly in the national income, fiscal policy approach, which I believe is one of the areas in which you are least interested, but he certainly is capable of working in theory and perhaps in other areas as well.

Very sincerely,

[signed]

H. H. Burbank

 

Professor James W. Angell
Columbia University
New York 27, New York

____________________

Source: Department of Economics Collection, Columbia University Archive. Box 6, Folder: “Columbia College”.

Image Source: Harvard Kennedy School Magazine, Summer 2012.

Categories
Columbia Courses Economists Harvard Transcript

Columbia. Search Committee Report. 1950

This report is fascinating for a couple of reasons. The search committee understood its task to identify “the names of the most promising young economists, wherever trained and wherever located” from which a short list of three names for the replacement of Louis M. Hacker in Columbia College was selected. Organizationally, Columbia College is where undergraduate economics has been taught so that teaching excellence, including participation in Columbia College’s legendary Contemporary Civilization course sequence, was being sought as well as was potential for significant scholarship. Appendix C provides important information on James Tobin’s graduate economics education. In a later posting, I’ll provide information on others in the long-list of seventeen economists identified by the search committee.

___________________

January 9, 1950

 

Professor James W. Angell, Chairman
Department of Economics
Columbia University

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Committee appointed by you to canvass possible candidates for the post in Columbia College that is made available by the designation of Professor Louis M. Hacker as Director of the School of General Studies submits herewith its report.

As originally constituted, this committee was made up of Professors Taylor, Barger, Hart and Haig (chairman). At an early stage the membership was expanded to include Professor Stigler and from the beginning the committee had the advantage of the constant assistance of the chairman of the department.

In accordance with the suggestions made at the budget meeting in November, the committee has conducted a broad inquiry, designed to raise for consideration the names of the most promising young economists, wherever trained and wherever located. In addition to the men known personally to the members of the committee, suggestions were solicited from the authorities at other institutions, including Harvard, Chicago, California and Leland Stanford. By mid December, scrutiny of the records and publications by the committee to the following seventeen:

 

Name Suggested by
Alchian, Armen A. Haley
Bronfenbrenner, Martin Friedman
Brownlee, O. H. Friedman
Christ, Carl L. Angell
Dewey, D. J. Friedman
Du[e]senberry, [James] Stigler
Goodwin, Richard M. Burbank
Harberger, J. H. Friedman
Ho[s]elitz, Bert Friedman
Lewis, H. Gregg Hart
Machlup, Fritz Stigler
Nicholls, William H. Stigler
Nutter, J. W. Friedman
Pancoast, Omar Taylor
Schelling, Thomas Burbank
Tobin, James Burbank
Vandermeulen, D. C. Ellis

[p. 2]

The meeting of the American Economic Association in New York during the Christmas holidays offered an opportunity to meet many of the men on the above list and to make inquiries regarding them. As a consequence, it has been possible for your committee to make rapid progress with its appraisals. Although the committee is continuing to gather information and data, it is prepared at this time to make a series of definite recommendations, with a high degree of confidence that these recommendations are not likely to be greatly disturbed by its further inquiries.

It is the unanimous opinion of the members of your committee that the most eligible and promising candidate on our list is Martin Bronfenbrenner, associate professor of economics at the University of Wisconsin, at present on leave for special service in Tokyo.

Should Bronfenbrenner prove to be unavailable the committee urges consideration of D. J. Dewey, at present holding a special fellowship at the University of Chicago, on leave from his teaching post at Iowa. As a third name, the committee suggests James Tobin, at present studying at Cambridge, England, on a special fellowship from Harvard.

Detailed information regarding the records of these three men will be found in appendices to this report.

Bronfenbrenner, the first choice of the committee, is 35 years old. He received his undergraduate degree from Washington University at the age of 20 and his Ph.D. from Chicago at 25. During his war service, he acquired a good command of the Japanese language. He taught at Roosevelt College, Chicago, before going to Wisconsin and undergraduate reports of his teaching are as enthusiastic as those of the authorities at Chicago. He happens to be personally well known to two of the members of your committee (Hart and Stigler) and to at last two other member of the department (Shoup and Vickrey), all four of whom commend him in high terms.

The following statement from Hart, dated December 6, 1929, was prepared after a conference with Friedman of Chicago:

“Bronfenbrenner is undoubtedly one of the really powerful original thinkers in the age group between thirty and thirty-five. He has always very much enjoyed teaching; my impression is that his effectiveness has been with the upper half of the student body at Roosevelt College and at Wisconsin. He is primarily a theorist but has a wide range of interest and a great deal of adaptability so it would not be much of a problem to fit him in somewhere [p. 3] in terms of specialization. He would do a good deal to keep professional discussion stirring in the University. My impression is that he tends to be underrated by the market, and that a chance at Columbia College might well be his best opportunity for some time ahead. The difficulty is, of course, that there is no chance of arranging an interview; though Shoup and Vickrey, of course, both saw him last summer.”

In a letter dated December 15, Shoup wrote as follows:

“I have a high regard for Martin Bronfenbrenner’s intellectual capacities, and I think he would fit in well in the Columbia scene. He has an excellent mind and a great intellectual independence. In his writings he sometimes tends to sharp, almost extreme statements, but in my opinion, they almost always have a solid foundation, and in conversation he is always ready to explore all sides of the question. When we had to select someone to take over the tax program in Japan, after the report had been formulated, and oversee the implementation of the program by the Japanese government, it was upon my recommendation that Bronfenbrenner was selected. He arrived in Japan in the middle of August and his work there since that time has confirmed me in my expectations that he would be an excellent selection for the job, even though he did not have very much technical background in taxation. I rank him as one of the most promising economists in his age group in this country, and I should not be surprised if he made one or more major contributions of permanent value in the coming years.

“He has gone to Japan on a two year appointment, after having obtained a two year leave of absence from the University of Wisconsin. My understanding is that on such an appointment he could come back to the United States at the end of one year, provided he paid his own passage back. It might be possible that even this requirement would be waived, but I have no specific grounds for thinking so. I believe the major part of his work with respect to implementing the tax program will have been completed by next September. If the committee finds itself definitely interested in the possibility of Bronfenbrenner’s coming to Columbia, I should not let the two year appointment stand in the way of making inquiries.”

The breadth and rang of his interests recommend Bronfenbrenner as a person who would probably be highly [p.4] valuable in the general course in contemporary civilization and the quality of his written work suggests high promise as a productive scholar in one or more specialized fields.

Your committee considers that the appropriate rank would be that of associate professor.

Respectfully submitted,

[signed]

Robert M. Haig

 

______________________________

Appendix A – Martin Bronfenbrenner

The following data regarding Bronfenbrenner are taken chiefly from the 1948 Directory of the American Economic Assoication:

Born: 1914

Education and Degrees:

A.B. Washington University, 1934
Ph.D. University of Chicago 1939
1940-42, George Washington School of Law

Fields: Theory, mathematical economics, statistical methods, econometrics

Doctoral dissertation: Monetary theory and general equilibrium

Publications:

“Consumption function controversy”, Southern Economic Journal, January, 1948
“Price control under imperfect competition”, American Economic Review, March, 1947
“Dilemma of Liberal Economics,” Journal of Political Economy, August, 1946

Additional publications:

“Post-War Political Economy: The President’s Reports”, Journal of Political Economy, October, 1948
Various book reviews including one on W. I. King’s The Keys to Prosperity, Journal of Political Economy, December, 1948, and A. H. Hansen’s Monetary Theory and Fiscal Policy, Annals

Additions to list of publications circulated, January 9, 1950

“The Economics of Collective Bargaining”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, 1939.
(with Paul Douglas) “Cross-Section Studies in the Cobb-Douglas Function”, Journal of Political Economy, 1939.
“Applications of the Discontinuous Oligopoly Demand Curve”, Journal of Political Economy, 1940.
“Diminishing Returns in Federal Taxation” Journal of Political Economy, 1942.
“The Role of Money in Equilibrium Capital Theory”, Econometrica (1943).

______________________________

Appendix B – D. J. Dewey

On leave from Iowa.

In 1948 studied at Cambridge, England.
1949-50, at Chicago on special fellowship.

Bibliography:

Notes on the Analysis of Socialism as a Vocational Problem, Manchester School, September, 1948.
Occupational Choice in a Collectivist Economy, Journal of Political Economy, December, 1948.

Friedman and Schultz are highly enthusiastic.

Statement by Hart, dated December 6, 1949:

“Friedman regards Dewey as first rate and points to an article on ‘Proposal for Allocating the Labor Force in a Planned Economy’ (Journal of Political Economy, as far as I remember in July 1949) for which the J.P.E. gave a prize as the best article of the year. I read the article, rather too quickly, a few weeks ago and it is definitely an imaginative and powerful piece of work. How the conclusions would look after a thorough-going seminar discussion, I am not clear; but the layout of questions is fascinating.”

______________________________

Appendix [C] – James Tobin

Statement by Burbank of Harvard, dated December 14, 1949:

“We have known Tobin a good many years. He came to us as a National Scholar, completed his work for the A.B. before the war and had advanced his graduate work very well before he went into the service. He received his Ph.D. in 1947. Since 1947 he has been a Junior Fellow. He was a teaching fellow from 1945 to 1947. He is now in Cambridge, England, and will, I believe, begin his professional work by next fall. Since Tobin has been exposed to Harvard for a very long time I believe that he feels that for his own intellectual good he should go elsewhere. I doubt if we could make a stronger recommendation than Tobin nor one in which there will be greater unanimity of opinion. Certainly he is one of the top men we have had here in the last dozen years. He is now intellectually mature. He should become one of the handful of really outstanding scholars of his generation. His interests are mainly in the area of money but he is also interested in theory and is competent to teach at any level.”

Data supplied by Harvard:

Address:    Department of Applied Economics, Cambridge University, England

Married:   Yes, one child

Born:          1918, U.S.

Degrees:

A. B. Harvard, 1939 (Summa cum laude)
A.M. Harvard, 1940
Ph.D. Harvard, 1947

Fields of Study: Theory, Ec. History, Money and Banking, Political Theory: write-off, Statistics

Special Field: Business Cycles

Thesis Topic: A Theoretical and Statistical Analysis of Consumer Saving

Experience:

1942-45 U.S. Navy
1945-47 Teaching Fellow, Harvard University
1947- Junior Fellow, Society of Fellows

[p. 2 of Appendix C]

Courses:           1939-40

Ec. 21a (Stat.)                  A
Ec. 121b (Adv. St.)          A
Ec. 133 (Ec. Hist)            A
Ec. 147a (M&B Sem)      A
Ec. 145b (Cycles)             A
Ec. 113b (Hist. Ec.)       Exc.
Gov. 121a (Pol.Th.)         A

1940-1941

Ec. 121a (Stat.)                A
Ec. 164 (Ind. Org.)          A
Ec. 20 (Thesis)                A
Ec. 118b (App. St.)          A
Math 21                             A
Ec. 104b (Math Ec.)       A

1946-47 Library and Guidance

Generals:       Passed May 22, 1940 with grade of Good Plus
Specials:         Passed May 9, 1947 with grade of Excellent.

 

Data from 1948 Directory of American Economic Association:

Harvard University, Junior Fellow

Born:                1918

Degrees:           A. B., Harvard, 1939; Ph.D., Harvard, 1947j

Fields: Business fluctuations, econometrics, economic theory, and mathematical economics

Dissertation: A theoretical and statistical analysis of consumer saving.

Publications:

“Note on Money Wage Problem”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1941.
“Money Wage Rates and Employment”, in New Economics (Knopf, 1947).
“Liquidity Preference and monetary Policy”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 1947.
[pencil addition] Article in Harris (ed.), The New Economics, 1947.

______________________________

Source: Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library. Department of Economics Collection, Box 6, Folder “Columbia College”

Image Source: The beyondbrics blog of the Financial Times.