Tag: Stiglitz

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M.I.T. Faculty Skit, Playing Monopoly at Lunch, 1986

 

It has been a while since I have added an artifact to the MIT economics skits wing of the Funny Business Archives here at Economics in the Rear-view Mirror. Apparently the following script was a, if not the sole, late-20th century MIT faculty skit not written by Robert Solow. I can believe that. In any event, today’s post is further grist to the mill for social historians of economics.

Again a grateful tip of the hat to Roger Backhouse is in order.

__________________

1986 FACULTY SKIT

(Skit opens with Dornbusch, Fischer, Diamond, Eckaus and McFadden seated around MONOPOLY board. Farber is standing alongside, watching the game. Fisher and Hausman are in the wings to make walk-on appearances).

ANNOUNCER: One of the most important unwritten rules in the Economics Department is that no one but Bob Solow writes the skit. This year, Bob reportedly outdid himself and wrote a sitcom in which Bob Lucas is struck by a blinding light while driving to work and transformed into a neo-Keynesian. The skit, titled “I’m OK, You’re OK,” follows Lucas’ attempts to explain why he is estimating Phillips curves to Lars Hansen and Tom Sargent.

Unfortunately, Bob is unable to be with us tonight, since he is delivering the presidential address to the Eastern Economic Association in Philadelphia. When we opened the envelope marked “SKIT” which Bob left for us, we were surprised to discover only a copy of his presidential address. We suspect he had a somewhat bigger surprise when he opened his envelope in Philadelphia. [Address published as “What is a Nice Girl Like You Doing in a Place Like This? Macroeconomics after Fifty Years” Eastern Economic Journal, July-September 1986]

We were of course scared skitless when we realized our predicament, and we were tempted to re-run some of the great Solow skits of the past. There was the 1974 Watergate Skit, in which Paul Colson Joskow testifies to Senator Sam Peltzman that he would run over his grandmother to get a t-statistic above two. There was the 1978 Star Wars skit, in which Milton Vader and his minions capture the wookie Jerrybaca and hold him captive in the Chicago Money Workshop. And in the incredible 1973 MASH skit, Hawkeye Hall and Trapper Jerry Hausman find Radar Diamond and Hot Lips Friedlaender cavorting in the Chairman’s office. (If that doesn’t give Solow Rational expectations, what does?)

We guessed that you had all seen these re-runs on late-nite channel 56, however, and therefore decided to try something new and provide a partial answer to the age-old question: What Really Goes On in the Freeman Room at Lunchtime on Wednesdays? We now invite you to join us for a brief look at one of these infamous gatherings…

 

MCFADDEN: (Rolling dice). “Who owns Oriental Avenue?”

DORNBUSCH: Me. That’s six dollars.

FISCHER: My turn? (Rolls dice). Damn. Inflation tax again; Here’s ten percent of my cash balances. I passed go, didn’t I?

DIAMOND: Uh huh. Here’s $186 dollars.

FISCHER: I should get $200.

DIAMOND: Not since Gramm-Rudman. Everything’s reduced seven percent across the board.

DORNBUSCH: My turn. (Rolling dice). Four. (Reaches over and moves marker).

ECKAUS: No way, Rudi—you just moved six places. No overshooting in this game. (Hands Dornbusch Chance card)

DORNBUSCH: Ah. Go directly to Brazil. Do not return until the day classes start.

HAUSMAN: (Walking in from side of stage) How come you guys are playing MONOPOLY? I thought you usually played RISK…

DIAMOND: Oliver [Hart] took that game home. You know, his contract calls for RISK-sharing…

HAUSMAN: Can you believe the graduate students scheduled the skit party for the Friday before income taxes are due? The only people who’ll come are graduate students and people like theorists who file 1040 EZ’s. (walks off)

(FISHER walks in)

DIAMOND: (Rolling dice). My turn. Oriental again. Six more dollars for Dornbusch.

FISCHER: That’s a pretty profitable property, Rudi.

FISHER: How many times do I have to say it! You can’t possibly tell that from accounting numbers! (Pause). Why don’t we ever play fun games, like Consultant?

ECKAUS: I hear Jorgensen and Griliches play that all the time up at Harvard. Maybe you should give them a call.

FISHER: They’re never around.

DIAMOND: Of course not, Frank—that’s how you play consultant.

(FISHER exits.)

FARBER: Speaking of Harvard, how are we doing on graduate recruitment this year? I heard there was some Princeton scandal.

DIAMOND: The AEA put them on probation for recruiting violations. People could look the other way when they offered prospective students money and cars, but this year Joe Stiglitz promised to write a joint paper with all entering students.

FARBER: They’re really giving out cars?

DIAMOND: Sure. Yugo’s.

FARBER: All I got was a motorcycle…

MCFADDEN: Harvard and Princeton have been dumping all over us. Every prospective student has heard that Jerry Hausman cashed in his Frequent Flyer miles for a 727. And some even know that Marty Weitzman has a Harvard offer.

FISCHER: Well, that offer was certainly no surprise. The Harvard deans read THE SHARE ECONOMY and decided they should hire more workers.

DIAMOND: Still, we’re getting the best students. This morning I signed a Yale undergrad by offering him Solow’s office. I figured Bob can share E52-390 with Krugman, Eckaus, and Farber next year. But what happens when we run out of river-view offices?

FARBER: How’s Harvard doing on recruiting?

ECKAUS: Not too well. They’re on a big kick to look relevant. Mas-Collel’s going nuts—Dean Spence has a new rule that any agent in a theoretical model has to have a proper name. Andreu’s having real problems with his continuum papers…

MCFADDEN: I hear the Kennedy School’s helping their visibility. Have you heard about the new Meese Distinguished Service Medal?

DIAMOND: No. Who’s getting them?

MCFADDEN: Sammy Stewart for Distinguished Relief Pitching,
Martin Feldstein for Distinguished Empirical Work,
Larry Summers for Distinguished Dress,
NASA for distinction in Travel Safety,
Bob Lucas and Bob Barro for Distinguished Plausible Assumptions,
Ferdinand Marcos for Distinguished Contributions to Charity,
and John Kenneth Galbraith for Distinguished Use of Mathematics.

DORNBUSCH: Harvard’s visibility campaign’s paying off. Just last week one of their junior guys hit the cover of PEOPLE magazine with a paper about marriage rates among movie stars.

FISCHER: You read PEOPLE?

FARBER: The National Enquirer had a story about a Harvard student who claimed to have a picture of Jeff Sachs in Littauer. Just like the old days with Howard Hughes…

DORNBUSCH: Perhaps we should return to the game.

(MODIGLIANI walks on).

DIAMOND: My turn again? (Rolls dice and moves piece). Community Chest. (Looking at card) You are elected department head. Lose three turns.

(Someone walks up and hands DIAMOND a telephone message. He stands up.)

DIAMOND: I nearly forgot. I’m scheduled to join Mike Weisbach who is taking a prospective student windsurfing this afternoon. Figured it was the least I could do to convince him we were as laid back as Stanford. Franco—do you want to take my place?

MODIGLIANI: (Sitting down in Diamond’s place) So, what are the new developments on the Monopoly front? [Famous Modigliani paper “New Developments on the Oligopoly Front,” JPE, June 1958] (Pause) Now, which of these pieces is Peter’s?

MCFADDEN: The coconut. [Reference here to Diamond’s coconut model of a search economy.]

MODIGLIANI: My turn now?

FISCHER: No Franco—but go ahead. [presumably a reference to Modigliani’s propensity to talk, and talk, and talk.]

MODIGLIANI: (Rolls dice and moves marker). Chance. (McFadden hands him a card). What is this? You have won second prize in a Beauty Contest, Collect $10? This is NOT POSSIBLE. This year I win only FIRST PRIZES [reference to 1985 Nobel Prize for Economics].

DORNBUSCH: (To audience) Wait till he gets the bequest card… [cf. the JEP Spring 1988 paper by Modigliani that surveys the bequest motive]

FISCHER: Franco, I have a deal for you. I’ll trade you Mediterranean and the Water Works for North Carolina and an agreement that you never charge me rent on either property. If you renege, I’ll order Chinese food.

MODIGLIANI: No deal. But what’s this about Chinese food?

FISCHER: It’s a new thing I learned from Garth [Soloner]—it makes the deal sub-gum perfect.

MCFADDEN: My turn. (Rolls and draws a Chance card). My favorite card: Advance Token to the Railroad with the Highest Logit Probability Value. Let me see which one that is… (pulls out a calculator)

FISCHER: While we’re waiting for Dan to converge, how did we do in junior hiring? Did we get that Princeton theorist?

ECKAUS: No dice. All the Princeton guys told him not to come.

DORNBUSCH: Why?

ECKAUS: They said “Go to Yale, go directly to Yale.”

MODIGLIANI: What about senior appointments?

FARBER: Ask Peter [Temin]. He’s on the Search Committee.

MCFADDEN: (Looking up from calculator). I’m having convergence problems. Maybe we should postpone the game for a few minutes while I run down to the PRIME.

[the image of the last page at my disposal is very blurred, fortunately it is only the wrap-up by the announcer]

ANNOUNCER: As you all know, NOTHING takes a few minutes on the PRIME. So until next year, when the [?] [?] Solow who accompanied Stan, 3PO and R2D2 to [?] the [?] [?] from Chicago returns to produce another skit. Good night.

 

Source: Duke University, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library. Economists’ Papers Archive. Papers of Robert M. Solow, Box 83.

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Courses Curriculum M.I.T. Uncategorized

M.I.T. Student evaluations for first term core micro theory. Bishop, 1966-69

 

The economic theory core courses at M.I.T. during the four academic years 1966/67 through 1969/70 consisted of two terms of microeconomic theory (“Economic Analysis”, 14.121 and 14.122) and two terms of macroeconomic theory (“Theory of Income and Employment”, 14.451, and “Economic Growth and Fluctuations”, 14.452). The instructors for the course by academic year were: 

 14.121 (Term 1) 14.122 (Term 2) 14.451 (Term 1) 14.452 (Term 2)
1966/67 Bishop Samuelson Eckaus

Solow

1967/68

 Bishop Samuelson Domar Solow
1968/69 Bishop Samuelson Domar

Foley

1969/70

 Bishop Samuelson Domar

Foley

A retrospective evaluation survey of these four courses was conducted (probably) sometime in late-1970. The original student responses wound up in Evsey Domar’s files and can be found today in his papers in the Economists’ Papers Archive at Duke University.

In other posts we have the responses for Paul Samuelson’s term of Economic Analysis (14.122), Evsey Domar’s National Income and Employment (14.451) and Robert Solow’s/Duncan Foley’s Economic Growth and Fluctuations (14.452).

In this post we’ll look at Robert Bishop’s course, Economic Analysis (14.451), that covered the topics:

Preliminary view of General Equilibrium
Revenue and cost equilibrium of the firm and industry:

Monopoly and pure competition
Imperfect competition.

Factor-employment equilibrium of the firm and distribution of income.

First I provide the information about the course found in the announcement in the MIT course catalogues that essentially remained unchanged for the years from which the evaluations were solicited. The official course staffing and enrollment data that follow the course announcement confirm that Robert Bishop taught 14.121 in the four consecutive years surveyed. We also learn the names of the instructors who taught the recitation sections for Bishop’s course as well as those of several of the graduate assistant graders. Incidentally, two of his section leaders went on to win Nobel prizes in economics (Stiglitz and Engle)!

Next I include the cover letter for the questionnaire sent out along with a tabulation of responses to the qualitative questions regarding the amount of economics presumed, the amount of mathematics and the balance of the course among the topics nominally covered.

Finally, and very much worth reading!, the interested visitor will find transcriptions of the written student comments concerning Bishop’s course.

____________________

Announcement in the Course Catalogues

 

14.121T Economic Analyis I (A)

[Bishop]
Prereq.: 14.03
Year: G (1) 4-0-8

14.122T Economic Analyis I (A)

[Samuelson]
Prereq.: 14.121
Year: G (2) 4-0-8

General theory of equilibrium under competition and monopoly. Theory of consumer choice, of demand, of the firm, of production and distribution, of welfare economics.
Bishop (14.121), Samuelson (14.122).

MIT. Catalogue 1966-67: p. 289.

page 219:

“ ‘T’ at the end of a subject number indicates that (1) a change has been made in the content or units of the subject or (2) the number was previously assigned to a different subject.

‘(A)’ following the name of a subject indicates that it is an approved subject for a graduate degree…

‘G’ is a graduate subject.

The time distribution of the subject, showing in sequence the units allotted to: recitation and lecture; laboratory, design, or field work; and preparation. Each unit represents 15 hours of work. The total unit credit for a subject is obtained by adding together all the units shown. One unit of recitation or lecture credit, and two units of laboratory or design credit, are each equivalent to one semester hour.”

M.I.T. Catalogue 1967-68: Course number drops T, p. 305

M.I.T. Catalogue 1968-69: Prerequisite for 14.121 changed to 14.04T, p. 310

M.I.T. Catalogue 1969-70:  Prerequisite for 14.121 dropped ‘T’, p. 293.

____________________

Course staffing and enrollments 14.121
First term of 1966-1969

1966: Term I. 3 hours/week. 50 regular students, 5 Listeners.

Professor R. L. Bishop with Instructor J. Stiglitz and Teaching Assistant D. E. Black (grader)

1967: Term I. 3 hours/week 62 regular students, 0 Listeners.

Professor R. L. Bishop with Instructor C. D. MacRae

1968: Term I.  4 hours/week, 62 regular students, 0 Listeners

Professor R. L. Bishop with V. Snowberger (grader)

1969: Term I. 3 Hours/week. 47 regular students, 5 Listeners.

Professor R. L. Bishop with Assistant Professor R.F. Engle (recitation) and J. Herrero (grader)

 

Source: M.I.T. Archives. Department of Economics Records. Box 3, Folder “Teaching Assignments”

____________________

THEORY QUESTIONNAIRE

There are two problems that the theory sequence must continually face if it is going to be as useful as possible. The first of these is adjusting to the changing background of the incoming students. The second is adjusting to the changing needs of students who will use the theory course as background for other courses and research. This questionnaire is an attempt to gather information of the current state of the theory sequence relative to these two questions. The enclosed forms contain an outline of each of the theory courses and asks three questions.

These pertain to each heading in the course outline:

Does the course assume too much or too little economics background in this area?
Does the course use too much or too little mathematics in this area?
Given the overall constraint of time, is this area gone into too deeply or not deeply enough?

For each of the questions there is room to check too much or too little, no check at all to be given if the course is about right. Please put the year in which you took the theory courses at the top of each page. There is also room in each area for more detailed comment. Use this space to be specific on the changes in the given areas which you feel would be improvements—particularly in answer to question 3. Use the space at the bottom of each page to comment on topics that are not on the list, but should appear in the course; or to make other comments we haven’t thought to ask for.

Please return to 52-380 (Miss Pope) before Tuesday, October 21.

 

[Summary from 22 student responses:
of which 2 from 1966-67; 8 from 1967-68; 10 from 1968-69; 2 from 1969-70]

Ec 121: Economic background Math Coverage
Preliminary view of General Equilibrium Too little: 0

Too much: 0

 Too little: 4

Too much: 0

 Too deep: 1

Not deep enough: 4
Revenue and cost equilibrium of the firm and industry:
Monopoly and pure competition Too little: 11

Too much: 0

 Too little: 14

Too much: 0

 Too deep: 4

Not deep enough: 5
Imperfect competition Too little: 5

Too much: 1

 Too little: 8

Too much: 1

 Too deep: 5

Not deep enough: 4
Factor-employment equilibrium of the firm and distribution of income Too little: 6

Too much: 0

 Too little: 12

Too much: 0

 Too deep: 2

Not deep enough: 9

 

From the student comments
Each bullet point from a different student.

YEAR TAKEN: 1966-67

  • Not enough emphasis on distribution theory.

 

YEAR TAKEN: 1967-68

  • Need to emphasize modern production theory rather than Marshallian theory. Neither of the courses [121 nor 122] give any mention to the modern treatments (esp., set-theoretic approach) of this material.
  • Both these courses [121 and 122] are excellent for covering the technical aspects of price theory—but both fail to provide a “total picture” of what price theory is about.
  • 121 spends too much time working out the solution to particular cases and too little time developing tools of analysis more sophis. treated than simple calculus.
  • more general equilibrium needed.
    little or no attention given to disequil
  • In general, I thought both terms [121 and 122], despite their widely differing methods, were quite good.
  • [note from secretary: “not in tabulation—she just gave it to me”]. Math in this part assumed we hardly knew a thing—could have assumed more.
    Preliminary view of General Equilibrium: [not deep enough checked with following comment:] but if this is going to be more thorough, shouldn’t be very first thing taught.

 

YEAR TAKEN: 1968-69

  • Was tedious at times but is worth doing—in fact has to be done. Perhaps the disc. of externalities could be related to Samuelson on pubic goods. And the part on distortions to the HG Johnson-Bhagwati-Ramaswamy literature on this in trade theory.
    Should have also included at least SOME reference to more modern theories of the firm (behavioral etc) and to more recent devs in other parts of micro theory (e.g. Becker on costs of time JPE 1966(?), Stigler et al on information and its costs and Lancaster on consumer theory.
    Imperfect competition: too much on the oligopoly stuff, overly simplified Stackelberg warfare etc.
  • Bishop should make more use of the mathematical techniques applicable to the general case and less of the geometry and prose of special instances. This, I think, would clarify rather than obscure. As it is, one tends to get lost in a mass of detail. Still, however, the course was very useful.
  • Monopoly and pure competition: slight shift of emphasis desirable.
  • General Comment: While analysis of this kind (the entire course) is an enjoyable mental exercise, I feel that its actual practical use for anything but expository purposes is severely limited. At all stages, an attempt should be made to make economics more relevant. At the least, areas of realistic extension and limitations should be pointed out to the class as each topic is considered.
    Factor-employment equilibrium of the firm and distribution of income: done a little too quickly near the end more time should have been allotted.
    Game theory à la Nash…What was presented here was obviously quite complicated, but given such a cursory treatment that it would have best been left out. I feel that more time should have been spent on more basic analyses such as min-max. and espec. an introduction to the practical aspects of game theory.
  • Preliminary view of General Equilibrium: excellent
    Too much oligopoly theory, too much game theory.
  • Factor-employment equilibrium of the firm and distribution of income: Fine in classic sense, yet more of income dist. needed.
  • The last part of the course, that connecting the results of partial analysis of production and distribution with the simple general equilibrium model of the first lectures, seems to me very illuminating and I feel it should be given more emphasis. A posteriori, I would have suggested one lecture less on duopoly and one more on that cost part.
  • I think a more thorough and rigorous treatment of the theory of partial welfare economics (consumers surplus etc) would be very helpful in 121.
    Preliminary view of General Equilibrium:This material should be eliminated from the course, and covered in 122.
    Revenue and Cost equilibrium: covered too slowly
    Imperfect Competition: Never seemed clear. Either cut it down or spend more time on it.
    Factor-employment equilibrium of the firm and distribution of income: More time should have been spent in this area.

 

YEAR TAKEN: 1969-70

  • 121—A good course, not very enjoyable but worthwhile.
  • 121 is an incredibly dull course. And irrelevant.

 

Source:  Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Economists’ Papers Archive. Evsey D. Domar Papers.Box 16, Folder “Student Evaluations (1 of 2)”.

Image Source: Robert Bishop obituary in MIT News, February 13, 2013.

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Economists Exam Questions M.I.T. Suggested Reading Syllabus

M.I.T. Advanced Economic Theory. Uncertainty and Capital Theory. Readings and Exam. Solow, 1965

 

Topics in advanced economic theory in 1965 was taught at M.I.T. by Robert Solow. The topics discussed were uncertainty and capital theory. This post provides information that was found stored in three different folders in Robert Solow’s papers at the Economists’ Papers Archive at Duke University. Together in one place we now have the reading lists for the topics, the final exam questions and even the class list. For the little it is worth knowing, Robert Hall of Stanford and William Nordhaus of Yale were awarded A’s in the course. I certainly hope that their scientific reputations will not be affected by that revelation.

____________________

Spring 1965

14.192 Advanced Economic Theory
I. Economics of Uncertainty

K. Arrow, “Alternative Approaches…,” Econometrica, October 1951.
D. Bernoulli, “Exposition of a New Theory…,” Econometrica, January 1954.
M. Friedman and L. J. Savage, “Utility Analysis…,” JPE, August, 1948, also in Readings in Price Theory.
H. Markowitz, “The Utility of Wealth,” JPE, April, 1952.
I. Herstein and J. Milnor, “An Axiomatic Approach…,” Econometrica, April, 1953.
J. Pratt, “Risk Aversion…,” Econometrica, January-April 1964.
H. Latané, “Criteria for Choice Among Risky Ventures,” JPE, April, 1959.
J. Tobin, “Liquidity Preference…,” Rev. of Econ. Stud., February, 1958.
K. Arrow, “The Role of Securities…,” Rev. of Econ. Stud., April, 1964.
J. Hirschleifer, “Efficient Allocation…,” AER, May, 1964, 77-96 (including relevant discussion)
K. Arrow, “Uncertainty and the Economics of Medical Care,” AER, December, 1963.

Source:  Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Economists’ Papers Archives. Robert M. Solow papers, Box 68, Folder “Reading Lists”.

____________________

Spring 1965

14.192 Advanced Economic Theory
Reading List on Capital Theory

I. Fisher: Theory of Interest, passim.
K. Wicksell: Lectures on Political Economy, Vol. I, Part II and Appendix on Akerman.
O. Lange: “the Place of Interest…”, Rev. of Econ. Studies, 1935-1936.
L. Metzler: “Rate of Interest and…”, JPE 1950, “Corrections”, JPE 1951.
P. Samuelson: “Some Aspects of the Pure Theory…”, QJE 1937
___________: “Rate of Interest under Ideal Conditions”, QJE 1939.
T. Koopmans: Three Essays on the State of Economics, pp. 105-126.
R. Radner: Notes on the Theory of Economic Planning.
E. Malinvaud: “The Analogy between…”, Rev. of Econ. Studies, 1961.
R. Solow: “Substitution and Fixed Proportions…”, Rev. of Econ. Studies, June 1962
________:  Capital Theory and the Rate of Return, Chapters 1, 2.
E. Phelps: “Substitution, Fixed Proportions,….”, International Economic Review, September 1963.
K. Arrow: “…Learning by Doing”, Rev. of Econ. Studies, June 1962.
R. Findlay: “The Robinsonian Model…”, Economica, February 1963 and “Comments” by Robinson and Findlay, Economica, November 1963.

Source:  Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Economists’ Papers Archives. Robert M. Solow papers, Box 67, Folder “14.192 Capital Theory”.

____________________

Final Examination
14.192 Advanced Economic Theory
Spring 1965

  1. Suppose Caius, a Petersburg merchant, has purchased commodities in Amsterdam which he could sell for 10,000 rubles if he had them in Petersburg. He therefore orders them to be shipped by sea, but is in doubt whether to insure them. He is well aware that at this time of year, of 100 ships which sail from Amsterdam to Petersburg, 5 are usually lost. How much wealth must Caius possess apart from the goods under consideration in order that it be sensible for him to abstain from insuring the shipment at a price of 800 rubles? And what fortune should be possessed by the man who offers to provide this insurance in order for him to be rational in doing so? Work out for an arbitrary utility function and specialize to the logarithmic case.
  2. In a perfectly competitive economy, it requires c (X) many years of labor, and nothing else, to build a machine which requires X men to operate it and has a capacity of one unit of output a year. The wage in terms of output is w and is expected to be constant forever. The market rate of interest is r, also constant. For given w, find the competitive equilibrium values of x and r. How does x change with w?
  3. By investing one unit of labor now (at real wage w) you can start a yoghurt-process. T units of time later, by investing one more unit of labor you can collect f (T) units yoghurt and start another identical yoghurt-process. There is a competitive capital market. You intend this yoghurt business to go on forever at the scale of one process. Discuss the determination of the best T, and implications for r and w.
  4. An investor with wealth W must divide it between holding cash, M, and holding one-year bonds in value B, paying interest at rate r. The return of principal is sure but the interest rate is random. Interest income is subject to a proportional tax at rate t. If the investor is a Bernoullian expected-utility maximizer and a risk-averter, how will his holding of bonds respond to a change in the tax rate? Explain the economics of your answer.

Source:  Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Economists’ Papers Archives. Robert M. Solow papers, Box 68, Folder “Examinations and Quizzes”.

____________________

From the Final Grade Sheet

Second Term 1964-65
Subject number: 14.192
Subject name: Economics Seminar
Staff member in charge: [signed] R. M. Solow

Graduate students of economics who were awarded grades
[There were 5 A’s and 7 B’s]:

Bing, Peter C.
Bischoff, Charles W.
Blackburn, Anthony J.
Carter, D. Nicholas G.
Hall, Robert E.
Havens, John J. Jr.
Kamiya, Denzo [Emeritus Professor,Keio Univ.]
Kheir El Dine, H. Miss
Mazur, Michael P.
Moskowitz, Warren E.
Nordhaus, William D.
Schulson, Louis J.

Source:  Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Economists’ Papers Archives. Robert M. Solow papers, Box 68, Folder “Examinations and Quizzes”.

____________________

(Preliminary) Class List

14.192 ADVANCED ECONOMIC THEORY
W 1:00-3:00
Professor Robert M. Solow

Bing, Peter C.
Bischoff, Charles W.
Blackburn, Anthony J.
Carter, D. Nicholas G.
Chacholiades, Miltiades  LISTENER
DeMenil, George F. DROPPED APRIL 13, 1965
Hall, Robert E.
Havens, John J. Jr.
Kamiya, Denzo
Kheir El Dine, H.
Mazur, Michael P.
Moskowitz, Warren E.
Schulson, Louis J.
Suva, Felipe
Wales, Terrence J. LISTENER
Cohen, Malcolm S. LISTENER
Stiglitz, Joseph
La Malfa, Giorgio LISTENER

Note:  William Nordhaus who received a grade in the course was not included in this preliminary class list. Felipe Suva and Joseph Stiglitz appear on this list but were not included in the gradesheet.

Source:  Duke University. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Economists’ Papers Archives. Robert M. Solow papers, Box 68, Folder “Reading Lists”.

Image Source:  Robert Merton Solow at the M.I.T. Museum website.