As surprising as it might sound, the Harvard economics department couldn’t always get whom they wanted (Theodore Schultz). As a consequence we are able to observe an aggressive strategy employed by a member of one side in the departmental hiring dispute. Professor John D. Black attempted to play the rebound in re-pleading his case for John Kenneth Galbraith’s appointment to a newly established professorship. Indeed by writing directly to the Provost, Black could have been charged with at least an additional count of “working the ref”. The episode is well summarized in Richard Parker’s biography of Galbraith (John Kenneth Galbraith: his life, his politics, his economics, pp. 226-227). Still, there is nothing quite like the pleasure of watching sharp elbows at work in the service of intradepartmental politics as revealed in the complete letter posted below. Black was not afraid to push nativist buttons in referring to anti-Galbrathians among his colleagues: “European clique” (cf. Haberler in 1948 on Galbraith vs Samuelson), “the monetary-fiscal policy axis” and “gaudy Keynesian trappings”.
A cynical nose can detect more than a whiff of a self-serving plea to strengthen the prospects of Black’s own field and style of research.
Archival note: Parker refers to a copy of the letter in Black’s papers with the Wisconsin Historical Society, this post is based on a copy of the letter I found in Galbraith’s papers at the JFK Presidential Library.
Economics in the Rear-view Mirror provides the outlines and exams for Black’s courses on the marketing of agricultural commodities from 1947-48).
____________________
December 22, 1947
Provost Paul Buck
University Hall
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Dear Provost Buck:
As you are no doubt aware, it was I who last year nominated Galbraith for the joint professorship to the School of Public Administration and in the Department of Economics. It was my judgment at that time that in view of his experience in public affairs and acknowledged great ability he surely should be considered for this position. The voting last year confirmed my judgment surprisingly. Excluding Schultz, to whom the appointment was offered, and Tinbergen from the Netherlands, he ran neck and neck with Yntema for top place in all of the balloting, with Samuelson next, and Smithies in seventh place. Tinbergen owed his strength to the European clique in the Department of Economics (by no means all European born), who have a European idea of the function of a university, und would have been a misfit in this appointment.
The voting of course reflected in large measure the conceptions of the voting members as to the needs of the appointment. A majority of my colleagues in the Department of Economics thought of it in terms simply of getting another high-grade technical economist, with little thought for the needs of the School of Public Administration. To meet this situation, I prepared and read at one of last year’s joint meetings on the appointment, the following statement, which I now I now submit anew, as still describing the conditions of the appointment:
The decision as to an appointment in economics at this time raises the whole question of the future of the Graduate School of Public Administration and its meaning for the Departments of Economics and Government.
The first point to make under this head is that the two departments named, without the Graduate School of Public Administration, are destined to become conventional departments in these fields, not distinguishable from similar departments in other universities, except for probably having better faculties than most of them. Even the latter distinction could easily fade in the next decade or two. With the Graduate School of Public Administration working with them, they both have possibilities of becoming super-graduate departments, by building on top of the usual graduate offerings in these fields a type of advanced graduate instruction that deals with problems of the sort that arise in the higher levels of policy-making in government. The seminars now given are well worth while from this point of view, but they fell much sort of realizing their possibilities. The two departments therefore very much need the Graduate School of Public Administration. It offers them a real opportunity to achieve greatness and become important influences in our national life. On the other hand, the School can get nowhere without the regular graduate work of the two departments as a foundation. The School and the two departments should therefore work closely together, each helping the others at each step in their advancement.
This means looking at a problem, such as that of the new appointment, as a common problem, and asking the question what kind of an appointment now will promote best the progress of the departments and the School?
Before answering this question, we need to go back and consider the basis on which the School was conceived. Those who formulated the program for the School finally settled down on training in policy-making as the great opportunity for a school of public administration at a university like Harvard. They exhibited a kind of prescience and inner wisdom in so doing that would almost seem like a miracle except for the fact that it did grow almost inevitably out of the situation.
In the two or three years following the founding of the School, much actual headway was made in realizing the objective of training for policy-making. The program of the School and it method made a strong impression in government circles and in the world of education. Since then, the School has lost considerable of the advantage of such a splendid start. If it does not take hold with vigor again and press forward along the lines laid out, it will lose it entirely in five or ten more years and become nothing more than a minor adjunct of the two conventional departments of the University. This the departments themselves cannot afford to let happen. Neither can Harvard University.
Looking at the present problem in this light, there can be no doubt that the great weakness in our present situation is in persons qualified to train advanced graduate students in policy-making, who have the aptitude for it as well as the background. The interests of the departments are in such an appointment at this time. The training in policy-making, comparatively speaking, is not suffering now, and will not suffer for several years, because of deficiencies in the preliminary graduate training needed as a foundation for it.
Also needing to be considered are important and somewhat similar relations to other departments of Harvard University, particularly to the Graduate School of Business Administration, to the Law School, and to the new Department of Social Relations. The School can add something of high importance to each of these if its seminars in the policy-making function are adequately developed; and in turn its contribution will be much enriched by what workers in these fields have to offer.
An appointment at this time of one new professor qualified as indicated will not of course take us far alone the way we need to go. But it will make a good start. We shall need mainly two things in addition: A. Additional research funds for the different seminars — to be used in employing research associates, financing field work, statistical laboratory work, etc., B. Some appointments wholly on the faculty of the School. Funds for both of these, especially the first, can be obtained if sought in earnest.
In conclusion, it should be stated that the School has made a start exactly along the right lines. It does not need in the least to back up and take a fresh start, but instead only to pick up what it has and go forward with it.
You, Provost Buck, do not need to be told that since I made this statement, the School has done exactly what I was hoping for. Almost certainly now at least three of the major seminars of the School will have research projects combined with them, each with small staffs of research associates. Steps are being taken to bring the School into effective working relations with the Law school and the Department of Social Relations. The need for an appointment that will strengthen its instruction in the policy-making function has in consequence become even more urgent then it was a year ago.
When it came time to offer nominations again this year, I felt that in view of the strong vote for Galbraith last year, surely he should be considered again. The third men in the top three this year, Smithies, has been substituted for Samuelson by those who supported Samuelson last year, apparently for two reasons: one, they now admit Samuelson’s shortcomings in the policy role, and consider Smithies a better candidate from this point of view; two, they expect to have Samuelson appointed to the full professorship now vacant in the Department of Economics. There seems to be more general acceptance than year ago of my conception of the needs of the appointment.
It has been necessary for me to make this last statement because it is the basis for the most important factor in the whole situation as it now develops, namely, that to appoint both Smithies and Samuelson at this time would further unbalance the work in economics at Harvard in the direction of the monetary-fiscal policy axis, since both of these men work mainly along these lines. The simple fact of the matter is that the men working in money and banking, fiscal policy and international trade, plus a few (in theory mostly) who vote with them on appointments, already constitute a voting majority in the Department of Economics. (You will remember that they did their utmost to prevent Dunlop’s appointment two years ago.) To add one more to this axis at this time would be highly unfortunate. It is, of course, not their voting which is most important — it is the narrowing effect which they have on the teaching and research in economics at Harvard. Those two appointments would contribute more than usual to such narrowing, since they are Keynesians in addition.
Of course none of these in this axis considers that he is narrow. In their discussions, to be sure, they draw in all phases of the economy. But they organize it all in terms of a single framework of reference. They pour it all, as it were, through one narrow funnel, and do some sieving in the process. As to how much they may mislead themselves in so doing, — and unfortunately some of the policy-makers of the nation; we have had abundant evidence in the past two years.
We can be reasonably certain that within ten or fifteen years, the Keynesian system of economic thinking will have been pretty well taken in stride. It would be unfortunate if at that time Harvard found itself with a faculty in economics too largely clothed in outworn habiliments. The economies of that day will have a different cast then the pre-Keynesian; but it will have lost much of its gaudy Keynesian trappings.
One of the first stories told me about Harvard when I arrived in 1927 was of President Eliot’s having been asked why Harvard University’s Department of Psychology had never developed a “school” of thought in that field, as had the Departments of Cornell and Columbia, and of his having answered that if he had discovered that his Department of Psychology was becoming dominated by one school of thought he would have hastened to appoint the strongest man he could find of an opposing school.
Of course this last point is no argument for the appointment of Galbraith. It is merely an argument against appointing Smithies if Samuelson is going to be appointed to the Department of Economics — and the pressure for Samuelson’s appointment is very strong in the Department of Economics.
I do not propose to present any strong affirmative arguments in support of Galbraith’s appointment. I nominated him because I believed that he should at least be considered. It has been the votes of my colleagues that has put him in the running, and I prefer that they tell you their reasons. I would not want him appointed if in their judgment, and that of the ad hoc committee, he is not the strongest man for this joint appointment.
I say this even though I would hope that if Galbraith were appointed he could spare a small fraction of his time to helping me give the two year courses which I now give in Commodity Distribution and Prices (ordinarily called Marketing.) Even though I am now giving these two courses, with the help of one-fifth of the time of an annual instructor, in addition to three full year courses in the Economies of Agricultura (with help of part of the time of one visiting lecturer) besides supervising a score of doctor’s theses, I shall manage somehow if I can get some other regular help with the three courses in the Economics of Agriculture.1
____________
- The undergraduate course in marketing had 90 students in the fall term, and the graduate course had 12 plus 8 auditors. This course was offered to Harvard undergraduate in 1946-47 for the first time, except for sone special instruction in food marketing given to armed service prospects during the war. The graduate course has been given since 1933.
____________
It may also be of interest that 12 of the 120 Ph.D’s reported as conferred in Economics in the United States in 1946-47 (12 months) were to candidates writing theses under my direction. (See September 1947 American Economic Review.)
There have, however, been some statements made about Galbraith in faculty discussions that must be commented upon in the interest of truth and sound decision. It has been said of him that he is “not a highly competent technical economist.” All this means is that he has published no articles in which he has applied methods of statistical and mathematical analysis, to the development of refinements of economic and monetary theory. I have no doubt of Galbraith’s ability to do this when this is the important thing for him to do. The simple truth is that a man of his breadth of comprehension is likely to find himself mainly absorbed in dealing with broad fundamental economic relationships; and this is especially true in times as disturbed as those in which he has been doing his writing. When asked, in the summer of 1947, to read a paper on the current economic situation, I entitled this paper “Fundamental Elements in the Current Agricultural Situation,” and I wrote as follows:
“The day and the hour seem to call for analysis in terms of broad fundamentals. This is no occasion for the refinements of theory and their application; but rather for over-simplification and over-emphasis on a few vital elements. Something of accuracy is lost in consequence; but this is not relatively important in the emergency that confronts us. There are wild horses loose in the world and the first task is to bring them to leash. Later we can break them to the plow and the cart.”
This statement is truer today than it was in 1942. If any economist of today is turning out articles or books presenting analysis of refinements, he is doing it because he lacks real power of analysis of the larger issues of the day, or as a by-product of such analysis, or as relaxation from the steady grind of his regular job. No doubt some of Smithies’ articles fit into these latter descriptions. Galbraith’s writings of the past ten years have covered the larger aspects of a very broad range of subjects.
Another criticism has been that he is not a good speaker. It is true that he often speaks haltingly when extemporizing. He needs time to find the exact word he wants. But he writes excellent papers, and reads them very effectively. (John Williams reported at a recent faculty meeting that his paper and Ed Mason’s were the outstanding papers at a full meeting in Philadelphia. His paper at the Atlantic City meeting in December 1946 was an outstanding performance.) In fact, he has become a very effective writer. To have a man in the Graduate School of Public Administration who can write as effectively as Galbraith on public questions of the day will be a highly valuable asset.
It needs to be added that he is effective in the classroom in spite of halting for a word now and then. The secret of this is that he has an uncanny sense for the vital points in a classroom discussion the same in analyzing public issues, and for putting these in their proper perspective. He is also a very stimulating influence among students in private discussion.
Rating higher in my scale of values than in those of many other academicians is capacity. Some of my colleagues do twice as much teaching, research and writing as some others, and do it fully as well or better. Galbraith has demonstrated a high order of capacity.
The other adverse report concerning Galbraith is not so easy to analyze. It is that he does not handle public relations well, nor even his relations with colleagues and subordinates. Surely a man of Galbraith’s type needed a man of different sort to work alongside him and handle the difficult public relations of OPA. And surely Leon Henderson was not that man. He was less apt at it even than Galbraith. The public relations man for OPA had to say “No” very often; and Galbraith does not have the ease of manner for such an assignment. Given time enough to plan for it in advance, he is able to differ with his colleagues and associates in a pleasant and gracious manner; but not in haste and under pressure, and especially when some body is trying to “put something over”.
No doubt a factor in his relations with others has been his urge to get on with the job and not waste too much time talking about it. I must confess a kinship with him in this respect. He no more than I should be assigned task a with many administrative decisions.
On this point, I am ready to predict without any hesitancy that Galbraith’s relations with his colleagues in the School and in the Department of Economics, should he receive this appointment, would be more congenial by a wide margin then those now generally prevailing in these departments; also that in the role of a Harvard professor, his relations with the public and with government officials would be unusually cooperative and friendly.
Perhaps a word is in order as to why I did not vote for Yntema. Most of all, I do not want to take a chance on either of two things (1) that he will prefer to continue with his present job, thus postponing our filling this appointment for another year: (2) that he will accept the appointment, but will want to continue a tie-us with CED that will remain his main interest. We cannot afford any more such tie-ups. Second, he seems to be so well fitted to his present assignment that I do not believe he would fit ours.
Very truly yours,
John D. Black
Source: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. John Kenneth Galbraith Papers. Box 519. Series 5. Harvard University File, 1949-1990. Folder: “Correspondence Re: Appointment of JKG as Professor of Economics. 12/22/47—3/22/50”.
Image Source: Professor John D. Black in Harvard Class Album 1945.
