From 1898-1902 a U.S. federal government inquiry, The Industrial Commission, analogous to the English Royal Commissions, sought to provide a review of modern market structures and labor market regulations to provide a factual basis for economic policy recommendations. This post provides links to the full set of volumes produced by the committee during its brief existence along with articles written at the beginning of the Commission’s inquiries and upon their conclusion.
Simon Newton Dexter North (Member of the Industrial Commission, chief statistician of the 1900 census, becoming director of the new Census Bureau in 1903) described the mission of the Industrial Commission (ex ante)
It is this new and strange industrialism that the [Industrial] Commission is called upon to study, to analyze and to interpret, in the light of all the wisdom it can gather from those who are participating in it.
The study takes on two phases, distinct and yet so closely associated and interwoven, that at many points they are inseparable. One is the legal, the other the sociological phase. The act commands the Commission to inquire into and report upon the status of industry before the law in the several States of the Union…
…[The Industrial Commission] has appointed Professor Jeremiah W. Jenks, of Cornell University, as its expert agent to study the question of industrial combination and consolidation from the economic point of view, and to collate and analyze the facts in their bearing upon prices, upon the wage earning class, upon production, and upon the community as a whole.
E. Dana Durand (successively editor and secretary to the Commission from October, 1899, until its dissolution) wrote (ex post):
The rise of the trusts was probably the chief ground which led to the establishment of the Industrial Commission by act of Congress of 1898. Problems of labor had also been conspicuous during the years immediately preceding. But, in order that every class of the discontented might feel that their case was receiving due consideration, the Commission was empowered “to investigate questions relating to immigration, to labor, to agriculture, to manufacturing, and to business…”
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,
BY SIMON NEWTON DEXTER NORTH,
A MEMBER OF THE COMMISSION.
(1899)
The bill creating the United States non-partizan Industrial Commission was many years pending in Congress, was once vetoed by President Cleveland, and was signed by President McKinley, June 18, 1898. It took on divers forms at different stages of its incubation, and as finally passed authorized a commission of nineteen members, nine of whom were appointed by the President from civil life, the other ten being members of Congress,—five Senators appointed by the Vice-President, and five Representatives appointed by the Speaker. In making their appointments, the latter chose largely from the membership of the Labor Committees of the two houses. The President went into all walks of business life, and three of his nine appointees are recognized as representatives of organized labor.
There is no precedent in the United States for a body so incongruously made up. The injection of the Congressional element into the Commission is due to the reluctance of Congress to delegate its own functions. By claiming a majority of the Industrial Commission, Congress compromised with its old-fashioned prejudices. Experience has already proved that the Commission must rely almost wholly upon the presidential members for the routine work. The claims upon a Congressman’s time are so-absorbing, that absenteeism has chiefly distinguished their connection with the Commission thus far. But the membership from Congress has already proved itself valuable in an advisory way, and this service will increase in importance as the Commission approaches the formulation of results. The mixed organization has its precedent in several of the English Royal Commissions, and it will keep this body closely in touch with Congress.
The object of the Industrial Commission, as broadly stated in the act creating it, is “to investigate questions pertaining to immigration, to labor, to agriculture, to manufacturing and to business,” and, as a result of its investigations, “to suggest such laws as may be made the basis of uniform legislation by the various States of the Union, in order to harmonize conflicting interests and be equitable to the laborer, the employer, the producer and the consumer.”
This reads like a wholesale commission to reform the industrial world, to invent the missing panacea for the ills that afflict mankind, to point out the royal road to universal contentment and prosperity which the world has sought in vain since the days when “Adam dolve and Eve span.” But that is the superficial view of the matter. Recognizing the obvious and impassable limitations upon the work of the Commission, there remains a field of effort which is not merely important, but may be said to have become imperative. There come times in the onward march of industrial civilization, when it is necessary—if one may be pardoned a wholesale mixing of metaphors—to pause and take account of stock; to strike a balance between conflicting interests; to take an observation by the sun, and determine with accuracy the direction in which the craft is sailing. The most famous precedents for the establishment of such a commission of inquiry are those furnished by Great Britain. At least three Royal Commissions on labor, the last one appointed in 1891, have been put “to inquire into the questions affecting the relations between employer and employed, …. and to report whether legislation can with advantage be directed to the remedy of any evils which may be disclosed, and if so, in what manner.” The reports of these bodies, apart from any remedial legislation which may have sprung from them, accomplished a tremendous service to industrialism, in clarifying the situation and teaching both employer and employee how far the world had advanced beyond the conditions which prevailed in industry at the opening of the century, when the factory system was young and perfected machinery had not yet worked its magic transformation. The report of the Commission of 1891, in particular, may be described as the most important publication on the labor question that has yet been written. Its effect upon the economic literature and thinking of the day is beyond measurement.
It is doubtful if the United States Industrial Commission can produce a report at all comparable to this in character and importance. But it has an opportunity at once splendid and unique. It has a field of investigation that is almost unexplored by any such governmental authority. It is true that Congressional Committees have constantly entered upon it, as in the case of the Abram S. Hewitt Committee and the so-called Blair Senate Committee, both of which printed great volumes of testimony, but neither ever made any report. These Congressional investigations have been haphazard and incomplete, for the reason that the time of Congress is engrossed in other matters, and politics has been inseparable from the work, in the nature of things. From whatever cause, it remains the fact that there has never yet been any systematic attempt to officially investigate and report upon the changed relations of capital and labor in the United States, and the adaptability of our national and State laws to the new industrial conditions which have arisen in consequence.
Moreover, the time appears to be peculiarly opportune. We are not simply on the turn of the century, but at a point of new departure in American industry. Emerging from a long period of depression, victorious in a brief but glorious foreign war, we are apparently entering upon a commercial and business expansion without parallel in our annals. We are forcing our manufactured goods into the world’s markets with a sudden success that surprises ourselves, and startles our foreign competitors. We have long been in the habit of manufacturing on a larger scale than commonly prevails elsewhere, as M. Emile Lavasseur has pointed out in detail; but we are entering now upon an era of combination and consolidation, involving a revolution in the economic conditions of production, the far-reaching effects of which can neither be seen nor imagined. We have reached a point of perfection, in the organization and solidarity of the labor of the country, which is fast substituting collective bargaining for the individual contract in our great industries. Labor saving machinery is becoming more perfect and more omnipotent every day, and electricity is creating a new mechanical revolution no less portentous than that which came with the introduction of steam. Causes and effects are everywhere visible. undreamed of ten and twenty years ago. It is this new and strange industrialism that the Commission is called upon to study, to analyze and to interpret, in the light of all the wisdom it can gather from those who are participating in it.
The study takes on two phases, distinct and yet so closely associated and interwoven, that at many points they are inseparable. One is the legal, the other the sociological phase. The act commands the Commission to inquire into and report upon the status of industry before the law in the several States of the Union. Here is a phase of industrialism to which Congress has never paid any attention, and which is unique in the United States. In Great Britain, where Parliament legislates in both large and small affairs for the whole kingdom, the same factory laws apply equally in all parts of the country, and one manufacturer can get no advantage over another by changing the location of his mill. The same is true of France and Germany. But in this country, there has been growing up very rapidly during the last twenty-five years, in our great manufacturing States, a heterogeneous body of labor laws, so called, which aim at supervision, by the Government, of the relations of employer and employee Under the operation of these laws the conditions governing manufacturing enterprise have been profoundly modified. Competition in industry has grown so close, that the economic effects of this legislation are now recognized as an important factor in production.
The diversity of the labor legislation of the several States is almost startling. There are no two States of the forty-five, in which the conditions governing industry, so far as they are regulated by the State itself, can be described as at all similar. Examining all these laws, in all these States, noting their points of variation and contradiction, they impress us as a legal farrago, lacking the most rudimentary elements of a uniform system, such as should prevail in a country which boasts equality of rights to all its citizens. To illustrate by obvious instances, the laws fixing the hours of labor for women and children in manufacturing establishments, vary from fifty-six in New Jersey, fifty-eight in Massachusetts, sixty in other New England States, in New York and Pennsylvania, to 72 in southern and southwestern States. The age limit at which children can be employed in these establishments varies from fourteen to thirteen, twelve and eleven, until it strikes certain States where there is no legal limit whatever. The employers’ liability laws are as wide in their provisions as the continent itself. Factory inspection is enforced with varying stringency in half a dozen States, and entirely omitted in the rest. Such instances of discriminating legislation are beginning to tell in the reinvestments of capital and the relocation of industries. They reveal an unequal development which demands an intelligent effort in the direction of unification.
In one sense it is a situation beyond the power of regulation. Congress cannot interfere, for these are matters that appertain strictly to the States. The most the Industrial Commission can do is to supply an analysis of these conflicting statutory provisions and a report of the actual operation of the various labor laws, upon which it can base recommendations showing which of them can be adopted with advantage by such States as do not now possess them. The first step in the direction of intelligent unification will thus have been taken. The rest must be left to time and public opinion. The current will at least have been set in the right direction, and we may hope for the ultimate upbuilding of the semblance of a national code of labor laws, under which the working classes can be assured that they are receiving, so far as the State can determine it, the same treatment and consideration, whether they live and work in an Eastern State or a Western State, and the employer can feel sure that the laws which regulate his business are sufficiently alike to give no legal advantage to any competitor anywhere in the Union. The work of the Industrial Commission, so far as I have above outlined it, may be compared to that of the Statutory Revision Commission of the United States, a body consisting of commissioners from the several States of the Union, which aims to bring about a like uniformity in the general statutes of these States, and which has accomplished some tangible results since it was first organized. The Commission has taken an important step looking toward general co-operation in the work of the two bodies, by securing as its advisory counsel Mr. F. J. Stimson, of Boston, who is the secretary of the Statutory Revision Commission, and who is well known besides as a student of labor legislation and the author of text books on the subject.
I do not wish to be understood as being over-sanguine of the results that are likely to follow the work of the Commission in the field of uniform labor legislation among the States. That the work it has been set to do in this field is necessary and important cannot be intelligently questioned. But the obstacles that oppose any immediate results, except of an educational character, are formidable almost beyond the point of exaggeration. Foremost among them may be stated the essentially different civilizations which prevail in the United States. The conditions of life and of labor are not the same in Massachusetts and in South Carolina, and cannot be made the same by any laws which human ingenuity can devise. The one State has carried her factory laws to an extreme which leads her capitalists to cry out that they are being smothered to death under restrictive legislation; the statute books of the other commonwealth are practically free from all such laws. The difference is due to scores of causes operating divergently through a century, and it may be that another century will pass before co-equal conditions assert themselves. A single potent cause largely controls the economic conditions of the problem as between the two communities. In one State the factory windows are open the year round; in the other artificial heat must regulate the temperature of the mill more than half the time. The influence of climate extends to the quality and quantity of food the operatives must eat, to the clothing they must wear, and thus to the wages they must earn. It even affects the age of puberty, and creates a different standard for the age limit in child labor. It would be absurd to say that one Procrustean system of labor legislation is or can be equally applicable, in all its details, to the northern and the semi-tropical communities. Moreover, it is plain that the valid argument against uniformity which climatic conditions present, will be effectively utilized to resist legal enactments looking toward uniformity, from selfish considerations of a local character. So long as freedom from restrictive legislation, coupled with certain other advantages, tempts Northern capital into South Carolina, for investment in cotton manufacture, there is an influence at work more potent than the pressure of public opinion from other parts of the Union. So long as localities can successfully tempt manufacturing establishments into their midst, by offering bounties in the form of exemption from taxation, they are likely to continue to extend these bribes, however desirable they may admit it to be, as an abstract proposition, that taxation shall be uniform throughout the United States. When we take cognizance of the differences in taxation which exist to-day between nearby States and localities, and their causes, we best understand the hopelessness of any movement which aims at establishing exact equality of condition in this country.
In the matter of the hours of labor, the possibility of uniform legislation appears equally remote. This is the question which, more than any other, is just now close to the heart of organized labor in the United States. The sociological argument upon which the trades-unionist bases his demand for an eight-hour day is tremendously reinforced by the demonstrated fact that improved machinery is capable of producing in all staple lines of goods faster than the consumption of the world can dispose of the product. Equally true is it that the argument for a shorter working day is stronger in a hot and debilitating climate than in the North; as a matter of fact, it is only in the Northern States that the movement has made any headway.
Again, the presence of great masses of colored labor in the South presents another phase of the problem which is certain to grow more troublesome and more insistent as time passes. It is a body of labor which accepts lower wages than white labor, and is constantly pushing itself into new fields of competition with white labor. The negro problem, in its political phase, is the perplexity of this generation: its industrial phase is to become the perplexity of the next.
And so we say that each great section of our great country must be left to work out its own problems in its own way, and in keeping with the peculiar environment of each. The country is too big for a strait-jacket. But all parts of it can learn from the experience of other parts, and the Industrial Commission can be of service by increasing the general knowledge of the industrial methods which prevail under such diverse conditions.
Growing directly out of this phase of the work is the study of the relations at present existing between capital and labor,—the sociological side of the question, as contrasted with its legal side. Here the Commission already finds itself enveloped in a cloud of conflicting theories, of ill-digested facts, and of antagonistic interests. The Commission is not likely to forget that it does not possess the philosopher’s stone, and has no insight into this insoluble world problem, which has been denied to other and wiser students. Nevertheless, it sees certain directions in which it can hope to render a useful service.
In the first place, it recognizes in itself a sort of safety valve for the country. People who suffer wrongs, whether real or imaginary, always feel better when they are allowed an opportunity to ventilate them before some recognized governmental authority where they are insured a respectful hearing and a certain degree of consideration. It was a large part of the purpose of Congress, in creating this Commission, to establish a quasi-tribunal, or national forum, if you please, before which anybody and everybody who thinks he has a wrong to expose or a panacea for existing social or economic evils, can appear and state his case. Congress has little time and less taste for such things. It is the chronic complaint of social reformers and professional agitators, that they can get no hearing at the hands of the Government. Nothing helps toward the evaporation of discontent so much as an opportunity to give utterance to it. Recognizing this trait in human nature, the Commission is prepared to listen to everybody who may choose to present himself at its headquarters in Washington, for the purpose of exposing evils or suggesting remedies. Later on, it will probably send sub-commissions to the chief cities to give a wider opportunity to be heard. In the meanwhile, its mail is already loaded with communications from all parts of the country, in which the writers propound their views with freedom and fullness. An expert will digest this material, and separate the wheat from the chaff. On its own initiative, the Commission will summon comparatively few witnesses, confining its invitations to persons who can shed some valuable light, through study and experience, upon the conditions of our industrial life. One hundred such picked witnesses can furnish more material for its reports than a thousand men drawn at random from the ranks. Organized labor will be represented before the Commission by the chiefs of its great representative bodies,—the flower of the working class,—the leaders who have been studying conditions and moulding the opinions of their unions for the better part of their lives. On the other hand, in selecting “captains of industry” to explain the employers’ side, men will be chosen who, by the immensity of their enterprises, the length of their experience, or the peculiar success which has attended their relations with their employees, may be assumed to know something which ought to be generally known. Out of such a crucible should come a consensus of judgment similar to that of the British Royal Commission, which was remarkable as an exact statement of the points at issue between the two forces of industrialism, of the arguments by which each side reinforced its contentions, and of the points at which agreement had been reached, or seemed to be gradually coming within reach.
A similar statement based upon ascertained facts, is much to be desired in the United States. It will certainly show that immense progress has already been made in certain sections of this country, and in certain of its great industries, toward the peaceable adjudication of the chronic dispute about wages and the conditions of employment. It will show that the situation, however hopelessly pessimistic it may outwardly appear, is full of signs that labor and capital, instead of drifting farther and farther apart, are gradually learning not only the necessity, but the methods, of keeping together. The country as a whole is only dimly cognizant of the progress that has been made, in many industries, in the matter of collective bargaining, in the adjustment of wages on the basis of sliding scales, determined after the fullest interchange of definite information as to costs, profits, and general industrial conditions. The upshot of the whole matter is, in its last analysis, that the great underlying cause of strikes, lockouts, boycotts, and the great bulk of recurring labor disputes, is ignorance,—ignorance on the part of both employer and employed, as to the exact status which must always determine whether wages are properly adjusted. If the Commission can make this fact appear, if it can bring it effectively to the attention of those who chiefly suffer in consequence of it, it will have performed a service to the country worth a million times its cost in dollars and cents. This, in a word, is the chief function of the Commission. It is in its capacity as a great educational machine that its best results are to be anticipated.
I have indicated above some of the chief problems with which the Industrial Commission has been called upon by Congress to deal. In truth, the whole gamut of modern ills is embraced in the single sentence of the law which we have quoted above. When it was first brought face to face with the shoreless sea of inquiry upon which the Commission was launched, some of its members were tempted to think that Congress might have been perpetrating a gigantic joke, in proposing that nineteen men, chosen at haphazard from our seventy millions, should sit down together and mark out a short cut to the millenium. But they went to work in good faith to see how these matters might be segregated. Their first discovery was that they naturally divided themselves into four grand groups, and, accordingly, the Commission separated itself into four sub-divisions of five members each, which have respectively to deal with problems peculiar to Agriculture, to Manufacturing and General Business, to Mining, and to Transportation. Composed of members of each of these sub-commissions, they made a fifth, called the sub-commission on statistics, to which they intrusted the important task of collecting and classifying the mass of material already at hand, in the shape of government and other statistics, reports, etc., relating to these various questions. The Commission does not propose to duplicate any of the official statistical and other information already available for its use. Literally, millions of dollars have been expended in the collection and publication of these data. Having thus segregated its work into four groups, the Commission has further defined it by putting out, for each sub-commission, a typical plan of inquiry, patterned somewhat after the syllabus of the British Royal Commission, and suggesting in outline the topics with which the several investigations may concern themselves. These topics run in number from fifty up to a hundred or more, many, however, being duplicates of each other, where the topics appertain equally to two or more fields of inquiry, as trades-unionism, immigration, education, etc. A dozen or less of these topics are big and portentous enough to occupy the entire time of the Commission for the two years to which its life is limited. Take, for example, the non-competitive employment of convict labor, options in grain and produce selling, sweat shops and their regulation, not to mention the larger questions to which reference has already been made. As its work develops, the Commission will find these big topics crowding the minor ones to the rear, and it will avoid the danger which comes from attempting to cover so much ground that none of it can be covered thoroughly.
As a case in point, the creation of the Commission was contemporaneous with the epidemic of industrial reorganization and consolidation now sweeping over the country. The manner in which it deals with this question will determine the country’s judgment upon the entire work of the Commission. It understands that it must handle it fearlessly, intelligently and exhaustively. It is preparing to approach the subject in a manner quite different from the haphazard treatment it has thus far received at the hands of Congressional and Legislative Committees. It has appointed Professor Jeremiah W. Jenks, of Cornell University, as its expert agent to study the question of industrial combination and consolidation from the economic point of view, and to collate and analyze the facts in their bearing upon prices, upon the wage earning class, upon production, and upon the community as a whole. Professor Jenks enters upon the work with the advantage of many years of special study of the question, in connection with his economic teaching. Under his guidance, the Commission will seek to present a definite summary of the causes, methods and results of this industrial phenomenon. Certainly there is no information of which the country is quite so much in need. Almost before we have been able to realize what was going on, the manufacturing industry of the United States has been transformed from the competitive to the monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic basis. We are to-day face to face with conditions without precedent in history, which set at naught all the time-honored maxims of political economy. It is impossible to exaggerate the effect upon the future life of our people, and upon our social and political institutions. Neither is it possible to reverse or to suspend the experiment. In defiance of the frantic efforts of Legislatures to check their progress or to embarrass their operations, these Goliath combinations have already seized upon the great staple industries of the country; they represent to-day a capitalization,—including the water injected,—nearly equal to the whole amount of capital reported to the Eleventh Federal Census as employed to carry on all the big and little industries existing in 1890. What has been done cannot be undone,—until such time at least as it shall undo itself in what now appears to be the inevitable reaction. But it is plain that a definite governmental attitude toward them must be formulated. A mass of abortive laws encumbering the statute books of many States has failed to stop the consolidation of industrial plants. The time has come when some method for their effective regulation must be devised. The Industrial Commission has here a rare opportunity to render a service vital to the future welfare of the country. It may fail utterly to meet the situation. It will not be surprising if it does, because it now seems one that can only be left to its own solution. On the other hand, if it shall be able to work out some definite and effective method of dealing with this modern force of non-competitive capitalization, it will have justified its creation, though it should accomplish nothing else.
I have endeavored to give some hint of the modern Pandora’s box from which the Industrial Commission is expected to lift the cover, and some ground for belief that the hope it seeks to find at the bottom of the box will not prove altogether elusive. I accept its existence as a recognition of the fact that the well-being of the humblest citizen of the Republic is the first concern of the government. Much remains to be done in fulfilment of the promise upon which this great nation was founded, the promise of the preamble of the constitution, “to establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, . . . promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” Summing up our experience, we must all agree that while these great blessings have abided with us, as with no other people on the globe, yet there is always opportunity for the more complete realization of each of them. We cannot too often or too strenuously try, by too many expedients, to remedy even those ills inherited from the ages, which most persistently defy the humanitarianism of civilization. We may easily make the mistake of assuming that legislation is the cure-all for each and every social evil. A wise old saw says that “that country is the happiest which is governed the least.” But wiser still is the remark of Sir Arthur Helps, that as civilization grows more complex, the necessity for governmental regulation of the relations of men increases correspondingly. Paternalism in government is a term many of us have been brought up to abhor. Nevertheless, we are compelled to realize that organized society, as represented in the Government, acquires new responsibilities with every new advance in civilization. First among these responsibilities is a knowledge of the facts of every day life among the masses of our people. No price can be too high to pay for it. And if the Industrial Commission can add to the general knowledge we have of these conditions, and thus prepare the way for some improvement in them, however slight, it will have justified its existence.
S. N. D. North.
Source: S.D.N. North. The Industrial Commission. North American Review (June, 1899), pp. 708-719.
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The Reports
of the Industrial Commission.
Vol. 1. Preliminary report on trusts and industrial combinations. [Jenks, Durand & Testimony] 1900.
Vol. 2. Trusts and industrial combinations. Statutes and decisions of federal, state, and territorial low [prepared by Jeremiah W. Jenks], together with a digest of corporation laws applicable to large industrial combinations [prepared by Frederick J. Stimson] (1900).
Vol. 3. Report on prison labor (1900).
Vol. 4. Report on transportation (1900).
Vol. 5. Report on labor legislation [Prepared by Frederick Jesup Stimson, Victor H. Olmstead, William M. Stewart, Edward Dana Durand, and Eugene Willison] (1900).
Vol. 6. Report on the distribution of farm products (1901).
Vol. 7. Report on the relations and conditions of capital and labor employed in manufactures and general business (1901).
Vol. 8. Report on the Chicago labor disputes of 1900, with especial reference to the disputes in the building and machinery trades (1901)
Vol. 9. Report on transportation (second volume on this subject) (1901).
Vol. 10. Report on agriculture and agricultural labor. (1901).
Vol. 11. Report on agriculture and on taxation in various state (second volume on agriculture) (1901).
Vol. 12. Report on the relations and conditions of capital and labor employed in the mining industry (1901).
Vol. 13. Report on trusts and industrial combinations (second volume on this subject) (1901).
Vol. 14. Report on the relations and conditions of capital and labor employed in manufactures and general business (second volume on this subject). (1901).
Vol. 15. Reports on immigration and on education (1901)
Vol. 16. Report on the condition of foreign legislation upon matters affecting general labor [prepared by Frederick Jesup Stimson] (1901).
Vol. 17. Reports on labor organizations, labor disputes and arbitration and on railway labor (1901).
Vol. 18. Report on industrial combinations in Europe [prepared by Jeremiah W. Jenks] (1901).
Vol. 19. Final Report (1902).
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THE UNITED STATES INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION;
METHODS OF GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATION.
By E. DANA DURAND.
(1902)
[Note: The author was successively editor and secretary to the Commission from October, 1899, until its dissolution.]
ECONOMIC investigation by special government commissions in England and the United States seldom result directly and immediately in important legislation. The problem which such a commission usually attacks is a broad one, which no one really expects to solve in any general way; not, as often happens in Continental countries, a specific one for whose solution more or less definite schemes have already been proposed. The cause of such an inquiry as that of the British Royal Commission on Labor or of the Industrial Commission is perhaps vague dissatisfaction with existing conditions. The people want to find out “where they are”: or the government or a political party tries to show that it is “doing something about it,” possibly with the desire to avoid committing itself too definitely. Pending the investigation it may readily happen that the people become more accustomed to the conditions which give rise to it, and perhaps rightly decide that the attempt to enact innovating legislation will result in worse ills. The report of the inquiry itself is likely to confirm them in this conclusion. Its chief value in that case lies in its mirroring of existing conditions and in furnishing facts as a basis for minor enactments from time to time in the future. It may readily happen, however, that ultimately, through the slow influence of such a report on public opinion, important reforms will be brought about.
The rise of the trusts was probably the chief ground which led to the establishment of the Industrial Commission by act of Congress of 1898. Problems of labor had also been conspicuous during the years immediately preceding. But, in order that every class of the discontented might feel that their case was receiving due consideration, the Commission was empowered “to investigate questions relating to immigration, to labor, to agriculture, to manufacturing, and to business,” — in fact, practically the entire field of industry. The wide and indefinite scope of the inquiry was undoubtedly a great hindrance to its thoroughness in any field. At the same time the Commission restrained the desires of various individual members to extend its investigations even more widely than was actually done, and it will be found that it covered some subjects with very considerable thoroughness.
The Industrial Commission consisted of five members of the House of Representatives and five of the Senate, selected by the heads of those bodies respectively, and of nine persons appointed by the President. Only the latter were salaried. Naturally, the members of Congress, with their many other duties, were able to take little part in the investigations proper and comparatively little in deliberating on conclusions. Several of them, who apparently felt only very slight interest in the work, practically never at tended at all: others, though deeply interested, could attend but rarely. The original bill for creating the Industrial Commission, as drawn by Hon. T. W. Phillips, later its vice chairman, did not provide for Congressional members; but doubtless because of a certain jealousy on the part of Congress, or fear lest it might seem to be divesting itself of its prerogatives, the measure was amended by the Senate. The presidential members of the Commission sat from ten to twenty-five days each month, except during summer; but several of them, having important business interests, were necessarily quite irregular in attendance, especially when oral testimony was being taken.
The main body was divided into sub-commissions on Agriculture, Mining, Manufactures and General Business, and Transportation. Investigation of labor problems fell chiefly to the sub-commissions on Mining and Manufactures, while the trust problem was reserved to the entire Commission. It was the duty of these sub-commissions to plan the general lines of investigation, to select witnesses, and to make preliminary suggestions as to conclusions. They did not act to any great extent independently, nor did they ordinarily sit separately in taking testimony. This latter function might well in large measure have been left to the sub-commissions, especially if the number of really active members had been slightly greater. This was the practice of the British Labor Commission. Often, moreover, the Commission as a whole spent much time on other matters that might with entire safety have been left to the smaller bodies. Nevertheless, the sub-commissions served a very useful purpose, as experience showed.
Following the lead of Congressional committees, the Industrial Commission started out with the almost exclusive employment of the method of oral testimony. Only considerably later did it enter at all extensively upon the policy, early advocated by a few of the members, of making use of existing sources of information and of direct field investigations. Almost to the end the taking of testimony continued to occupy most of the time of the commissioners; and such testimony, with reviews and digests of it, takes up fully four-fifths of the space in its reports. But, during the last two years of the Commission’s term, experts were increasingly employed to make investigations on particular topics, as well as, in some instances, to aid in selecting and questioning witnesses. Indeed, the Commission is unique, so far as our own country is concerned, in the extent to which it called in the assistance of university men and trained investigators. *
[*See on this point note in Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. XVI. p. 121.]
The results of this expert work have been notable. Various governmental departments, State and national are constantly pouring forth statistical and descriptive, information as to industrial matters. In many cases these masses of material are not adequately summarized. Still more seldom are they properly interpreted. But, even were this done in the original sources, the number of documents is so great that there is much need of bringing together from time to time the results secured by different authorities. By compiling, analyzing, and interpreting such material for the benefit of the members of the Industrial Commission and of the public, the expert agents were able to render most useful service. Similarly, much information from unofficial but authoritative sources was made available. Some of the specialists, moreover, made original investigations, under the direction of the Commission, by means of printed schedules and of personal interviews, methods which may, if properly employed, secure a much wider basis of data than can be obtained by oral testimony before a body of men.
Investigation through oral testimony of witnesses, however, while it is beset with many difficulties, often yields results not obtainable in any other manner. The experience of the Industrial Commission is interesting on this point. It is difficult for such a body to secure proper witnesses. Much knowledge of men and of conditions. is required to ascertain what persons are best fitted to testify on a given subject. Some of those requested to appear are very loath to do so from pressure of other business or from unwillingness to make disclosures. Much diplomacy may be necessary in securing their attendance; and even this is often unsuccessful, as the Industrial Commission found in several important in stances. The Industrial Commission was given by law “the authority to send for persons and papers, and to administer oaths and affirmations.” This could be interpreted as implying compulsory power of subpœnaing witnesses; but, as neither penalty nor procedure was specifically provided, the Commission did not care to test the matter formally. To be sure, actual resort to coercion would cause so much ill-feeling on the part of the witnesses concerned, and of other possible witnesses, that it would usually be unwise. But a definite compulsory power in the act could in some cases have been used advantageously as a “moral influence.” On the other hand, it is difficult for a body like the Industrial Commission to shut out persons whose evidence is valueless, those who enjoy a junket at government expense or who have some pet personal or local grievance of no general significance.
When a witness is once brought before the inquisitors, the difficulty is only begun. Proper questioning is a fine art. Most satisfactory usually are the witnesses who are themselves economists or investigators, who know what they ought to say and are glad to say it. The questions and criticisms of a group of men in such a case often serve admirably to bring out points more clearly than the witness would do, even in a carefully written paper. But with a witness who has something to conceal, who does not know what is wanted of him, or who is unskilled in expressing himself, the path of the questioner is devious and thorny. A high degree of expert knowledge regarding the matters on which the witness is expected to testify becomes essential. The questioner must know precisely what he wants to draw out. He must follow the witness closely, press him at every turn, seeking further explanation of every doubtful point, criticising and investigating every erroneous or contradictory statement or argument. Yet, so far as possible, the resentment of the witness must not be aroused; for that is the surest way to close his mouth.
Unfortunately, too often the members of the Industrial Commission showed themselves lacking in the degree of skill needed. A common mistake of the questioner was to assume that the people knew what he personally happened to know; another, to feign a familiarity with the subject that he did not actually possess. Many a witness, — a great labor leader, for example, — who would willingly have given a mass of valuable information if skilfully questioned, was allowed to deal merely in ill expressed generalities or in insignificant details. Too often doubtful statements and opinions were permitted to go unchallenged, or questions which the witnesses should have been compelled to answer fully and accurately were omitted or evasively answered. In many cases, confusion resulted from the interruption of one line of questioning by another, an almost inevitable result of the number of interrogators.
On the other hand, oral testimony has many advantages, and the Industrial Commission probably compares most favorably with other similar bodies in its success with this method. Its reports on trusts and transportation, for example, are storehouses of valuable facts and opinions, presented, in many instances, by men of great prominence and familiarity with practical affairs. A dignified government body, sitting formally, can secure evidence from many men who do not ordinarily put their knowledge and their views before the public, and who would give little heed to a single interviewer, even though representing the government. Such men can often throw a flood of light on points that can be but little understood by sur face investigation. They can present facts and arguments which throw new light on the questions at issue. Even a witness who is unwilling to testify, or who aims to mislead, may be forced by searching interrogation to make many important admissions. Few witnesses before such a body as the Industrial Commission will decline absolutely to answer a direct question, since to do so is likely to be interpreted in the most unfavorable light; and comparatively few will make positively false statements. Thus the representatives of the trusts who appeared before the Commission not merely presented their side of the case, — a side which had often been misunderstood, — but in many in stances their evidence showed more clearly than that of outsiders the existence of abuses. The testimony of Messrs. Havemeyer, Moore, and Duke, are cases in point.
It is a great advantage to have the questioning of witnesses conducted by a body of several members. Their number lends dignity, and leads the witness to answer more fully and carefully. Each member, moreover, differing from the others in motive, point of view, and methods of thought, may contribute by his questions to draw out some facts or opinions that will be useful. The best results were obtained by the Industrial Commission, ho ever, when the questioning was chiefly in the hands of one skilled person, either some commissioner specially familiar with the subject, or, as with many witnesses on trusts and on transportation, one of the expert agents, while the other commissioners supplemented the interrogatories here and there merely. The practice of certain investigating bodies in employing a lawyer to aid in questioning witnesses was not followed by the Industrial Commission, perhaps wisely in view of the nature of the subject. But the presence of one or more acute lawyers among the members of the board itself would have strengthened it greatly in taking testimony, as well as in other regards.
Thorough summaries and indexes seem so obviously requisite to the usefulness of a huge mass of material that it is only because in past publications of Congressional commissions and committees these conveniences have been almost wholly lacking that their presence in the reports of the Industrial Commission deserves mention. The Commission was generous in employing trained economists and indexers for this work, and whatever there is of value in the reports has been made reasonably accessible. Each volume of testimony has a full digest, from one-fourth to one-sixth the length of the original evidence. This aims to present concisely, under logically arranged topics, all the important facts and opinions brought forward by the respective witnesses individually. A much shorter review of evidence gives, practically without subjective criticism, the main results of the testimony, grouping together those who present similar facts and views, but bringing out clearly the fundamental points of difference. The reviews and digests both refer to the pages of the testimony. A somewhat elaborate index of the full evidence and another of the review and digest are printed in each volume; while in the final report is a general index covering all the reviews and digests, as well as all special reports and investigations.
Only two among the first eighteen volumes of the Commission’s reports contain conclusions and recommendations by the Commission itself, these being mainly reserved for the Final Report. The wide-spread interest in the trust question led the Commission in March, 1900, to present a brief preliminary report of recommendations. This report was repeated, but with great additions, in the Final Volume. The action of the Commission was doubtless a necessary concession to Congress and the people; but it would have been desirable to avoid such premature expression of conclusions, if possible. Early in 1900, moreover, a volume, prepared by Mr. F. J. Stimson, summarizing existing labor legislation in the United States, was published. This contained a brief report of the Commission itself, with recommendations based rather on a study of the laws in the more advanced states than on an investigation of conditions. So far as direct recommendations for legislation are concerned, the Final Report merely contents itself with quoting the language of the earlier volume. While these recommendations are reason ably satisfactory, it seems unfortunate that the extensive investigations of labor conditions at home, and of foreign legislation, made by the Commission during the latter half of its existence, should have contributed nothing to them.
The Final Report is an extensive and elaborate document. The several broad divisions of the Commission’s inquiry are taken up separately. Under each division is presented a voluminous review of facts and opinions, followed by a very concise series of specific recommendations. It is probable that these longer reviews will have ultimately more influence on legislation than the specific recommendations. Several of them are exceedingly valuable. They are not merely critical summaries of the investigations in the previous volumes; but they bring in much new material from other sources, and they contain much discussion of principles and proposals. In fact, while they are denominated reviews, they really involve conclusions as to many important matters, either directly stated or easily deducible from the criticism of opposing arguments.
The first drafts for these reviews in the Final Report were prepared, for the most part, by expert agents of the Commission who had been previously engaged in investigations along the respective lines. *
[* It may not be inappropriate here to mention the experts to whom these original drafts in the Final Report were primarily due. In several cases, however, there was a considerable degree of co-operation between different persons in the material on a single subject. The introductory chapter on the “Progress of the Nation” was chiefly drafted by John R. Commons and Kate Holladay Claghorn; the review on “Agriculture,” by John Franklin Crowell; “ Mining,” by E. W. Parker and the secretary; “Transportation,” by William Z. Ripley; “Manufactures, Trade, and Commerce,” by the secretary and Robert H. Thurston; “Industrial Combinations,” by J. W. Jenks; “Labor,” by John R. Commons, Charles E. Edgerton, and the secretary; “Immigration,” by John R. Commons; “Taxation,” by Max West; “Irrigation,” by Charles H. Litchman, a member of the Commission.]
This was a necessary and natural method, which adds to the credit of the commissioners who followed it, rather than detracting from it. It is, indeed, scarcely conceivable that such extensive reports should be drafted out of hand by a body of men, especially men who are not specialists and who cannot give all their time to the work. The commissioners spent three or four months, however, in going through these reviews in detail, and statements or arguments which did not commend themselves to the majority were modified, sometimes very radically. Unfortunately, some of the members of the Commission were not able to at tend these discussions very regularly. The amount of time spent on some of the more controversial subjects, especially industrial combinations, necessarily shortened the deliberations on other topics. The result is that most of the reviews in the Final Report still represent mainly the work of the experts who first drafted them. Although a majority of the commissioners doubtless gave them a fair amount of thought before concurring, it is probably safe to say that several of the reviews are more “progressive” in tone — if one may use a vague word — than any committee or commission of Congress would be likely, strictly on its own initiative, to make them. The review on Labor is a conspicuous illustration. It is partly for this reason that the letter of transmittal of the Final Report states that the signatures of the commissioners apply to the recommendations only, and that no particular member is necessarily committed to the statements or reasoning in the reviews. Had the field covered been less enormous, had there been more time saved from the taking of evidence for considering the Final Report, the reviews might in the revision have been made to embody still more essentially the conclusions of the commissioners themselves.
As already stated, the recommendations proper are brief and bald, without argument or details. To its recommendations on immigration and on convict labor the Commission appended, as somewhat tentative suggestions, fully drawn bills. It was probably wise, on the whole, in not yielding to the desire of two or three of the members that the same should be done regarding all subjects. There was no sufficient reason to expect that Congress or the State legislatures would take very immediate action on most of the proposals. Detailed bills would have become out of date in many features before serving as a basis for actual laws. Objection to minor matters in such bills might have hindered due consideration of the fundamental proposals. Moreover, the committees of Congress usually prefer to draft their own bills; while as between the various States there are such differences of conditions, and such variations in the methods of phrasing and carrying out legislation that uniform bills would have been of less service. On the other hand, it seems that much might have been gained by presenting a moderate amount of argument in immediate conjunction with the recommendations, and still more by describing and dis cussing with reasonable fulness the methods of applying practically the broad principles of legislation suggested. As it is, the reader must often search with considerable care in the long reviews to find the arguments in behalf of the proposals; and his mind may be full of unanswered queries as to the actual application and working of the policies proposed.
Hon. T. W. Phillips, the original framer of the bill creating the Industrial Commission, had in mind a body which should virtually draft for the convenience of Congress a complete industrial code, — a deliberative rather than an investigating commission. While this plan in its entirety would, perhaps, scarcely have been practicable, even with the most expert organization of the Commission, it seems unfortunate that the Commission went so nearly to the opposite extreme, subordinating recommendation to inquiry. The recommendations proper, however, being short, received very thorough consideration by the commissioners (except by some of the members of Congress); and their merits and defects are to be ascribed primarily to the Commission itself. The expert agents, of course, had no little influence in regard to some of them. It was they who usually prepared the first drafts. But the drafts followed the general views of the majority of the commissioners. They were, moreover, subjected to extensive modification at its hands. Many new proposals were inserted, and others omitted.
One result of the method of procedure described is that the recommendations of the Industrial Commission are not always consistent with the immediately preceding reviews. The fact that different members, and usually more members, might be present at the time of discussing the recommendations than when the reviews were considered was a further occasion for discrepancy. In some cases, when a great change had been made in the recommendations proper, the commissioners did not take the pains or absolutely did not have the time, as the end of the term drew near, to make the earlier views conform. Thus a large part of the review on the subject of immigration is virtually an argument in favor of the educational test, yet finally a majority of the commissioners decided not to recommend such a test. The recommendations on labor questions, which were prepared early in 1900 and repeated in the Final Report, naturally enough present some, though on the whole not very serious, inconsistencies with the review prepared late in 1901.
The most conspicuous illustration of such discrepancy between review and recommendation is with regard to railway pooling. The discussion in the review, drafted by Professor W. Z. Ripley, had been considered with unusual thoroughness by the Commission in fairly well-attended sessions, but was finally left by them largely as submitted. It was a strong argument in behalf of permitting pools, subject to the supervision of the Interstate Commerce Commission as to rates. A brief paragraph to the same effect was contained in the original draft of the recommendations, but during the discussion later it was bodily omitted without any modification of the argument in the review. It is curious to note, as indicating the rather slipshod methods of such bodies in their deliberations, for similar occurrences are not uncommon among Congressional committees, — that several of the members of the Commission who were present when the recommendations on transportation were being discussed, declared, after the publication of the report, that they had not been aware of the omission of the paragraph, and that they still believed a majority of the members favored pooling.
It is natural enough, perhaps, that the recommendations of the Industrial Commission should not even be, in every instance, consistent with themselves. The conclusions of a body composed of many members, diverse in views and motives, must necessarily involve much of compromise. This at times appears in the presentation side by side of the positions of different individuals or groups which are irreconcilable at bottom, though perhaps not on the sur face. Sometimes inconsistency arose, probably more from carelessness and failure to perceive it than from compromise. The recommendations of the Commission on trusts present a case in point. The discussion of proposed legislation which directly precedes the recommendations really belongs with them, and is essential to understand them. It was worked over with the greatest thoroughness by the commissioners. This discussion shows clearly that existing anti-trust legislation has been ineffective, criticises it for not employing the remedy of publicity rather than attempting directly to destroy combinations, and admits the impracticability of satisfactory legislation by forty-five States and four Territories regarding matters which are almost always largely of interstate concern. The general remedy on which most stress is laid is publicity; yet side by side with this among the recommendations appears another, “that combinations and conspiracies, in the form of trusts or otherwise in restraint of trade or production, which by the consensus of judicial opinion are unlawful, should be so declared by legislation uniform in all jurisdictions.”
Another result of the attempt at compromise between opposing views of commissioners appears in the colorlessness of some of the material in the reviews and recommendations. While it is appropriate enough for an investigating commission to present the arguments on both sides of disputed questions, it fails to perform the duty for which it was created when it suggests no positive conclusions on important matters, and does not even adequately criticise the opposing positions. This fault seems to lie in much of the Commission’s discussion of the facts concerning industrial combinations in the Final Volume, — a discussion which was worked over by the members themselves at great length, and is attributable mainly to them. The statements as to the advantages and disadvantages of trusts, and their effect on prices, are so general and indefinite or so carefully balanced that they quite fail to convey any impression as to whether the Commission thinks there are positive evils to be remedied or not. The absence of specific illustrations on these points, based on the investigations of the Commission itself, is conspicuous. The recommendations of the Commission regarding combinations, however, atone for the flatness of the discussion in the review; for, despite some inconsistencies, they seem more vigorous and sound than could reasonably have been expected from such a body at this time.
In fact, taking the recommendations of the Industrial Commission as a whole, they will probably appear to the majority of economists remarkably sane and liberal, decidedly superior to those of most Congressional committees and public investigating bodies in the United States. Indeed, the Commission is much more definite and forceful in its recommendations than the British Labor Commission. A greater degree of unanimity was secured by the American than by the English body, greater than could perhaps have been anticipated. The Commission’s investigations brought much new light to its members as well as to the general public, — light which constantly forced them more nearly into agreement with one another and with other thoughtful men throughout the country. The differences still remaining at the close of the inquiry led naturally to many prolonged and often acrimonious debates; but the compromises reached were, the writer believes, fairly satisfactory to most of the members, and in most cases they involve neither inconsistency nor colorlessness. The recommendations on each broad subject were separately signed. Two or three Democratic members of Congress declined to sign any of the reports for political reasons. They alleged that the entire work of the Commission had been colored with Republicanism, a charge which, naturally enough, contained an element of truth. They designed to leave themselves free to attack any Republican measure which might be supported on the basis of the reports. But several other Democratic members of the Commission signed the recommendations, as did members who, while Republicans, had been widely opposed to the majority on many questions. Only a few qualifying opinions and dissents as to particular points were appended to the signatures by individual members or groups, so that, on the whole, the recommendations must be considered essentially unanimous.
It is with much diffidence that the writer ventures now a few suggestions, based on the experience of the Industrial Commission, regarding the proper methods of conducting such governmental investigations. The form of organization and the procedure will, of course, properly vary with the nature of the task to be accomplished. What we have to suggest refers more particularly to inquiries into economic problems, and to those which are designed specifically to form a basis for legislation, involving not merely the securing of data, but the suggestion of conclusions and recommendations.
It would seem natural that such an investigation should proceed on the basis of a clear distinction between technical inquiry and deliberation, and should provide more or less distinct machinery for each function. The task of deliberation may well be given to a thoroughly representative body of citizens. The members of this body should recognize that they are not specially fitted to secure economic information in detail. In the ascertainment of facts they should confine themselves mainly to directing the broad lines of work and selecting competent experts to carry it out.
Economists need no argument in behalf of the proposition that this is an age when only specialists can obtain the best results in the investigation of industrial facts. Success requires the constant and concentrated attention of a man familiar by previous training with the sources of information and the methods of inquiring into and judging the significance of data. Recognition of this need of expert service is fortunately growing among our national administrative and legislative officers, and, though perhaps less rapidly, among those of State and local governments as well. A body such as the Industrial Commission might well, at the outset, map out its field thoroughly, and select experts to work it for facts systematically and comprehensively. Immense amounts of information may be compiled from existing official documents, trade journals, publications of trade organizations, etc., from correspondence and from personal interviews. The Commission should insist that such information be brought into logical and concise form, accessible to its members and to the people, and that, wherever possible, a brief summary should accompany each expert report.
In some cases much might be gained in efficiency and economy if a special investigating commission should be given authority to request, or even to require, the co operation of existing government bureaus in securing data. Such bureaus may possess machinery ready to hand, and skilled employees to do field and clerical work. If assistance of this sort is required, the commission would naturally have to be empowered to direct part of its expense appropriation to the bureau furnishing the
service.
The success of the technical investigations of such a commission may be greatly promoted by a thoroughly competent secretary or other chief executive officer. The great value of the work done by Mr. Geoffrey Drage for the Royal Labor Commission shows the possibilities of such a position. The secretary should not merely be qualified to manage the clerical force, attend to the correspondence, and supervise the publication of reports, but he ought properly to be a highly trained economic investigator. Such a secretary could often save expense by himself directing relatively unskilled assistants in collecting needed material. He should be able also, under the direction of the Commission, to exercise a considerable degree of supervision over the work of the various special experts. He might make suggestions of value as to methods, even to specialists far more familiar with particular fields than himself. Especially could he aid in co-ordinating the investigations, avoiding gaps and overlapping. It seems important that, so far as possible, all the experts should have a common headquarters, in order that they may frequently consult with the commission and with one another, and that economy in office administration may be promoted.
Here will doubtless be raised the question, What remains for the commission itself to do, if so much is assigned to expert investigators? Some will complain that the function of the expert is unduly magnified. Others will seriously suggest that we go further, and that deliberative functions as well be assigned to specialists, to statisticians, and economists, eliminating lay members from the investigating commission altogether. This latter proposal would be quite as objectionable as the old plan of intrusting the entire work to politicians, lawyers, and business men, without expert training in economic lines. Not the least important consideration is that legislators and the people generally will have more confidence in conclusions reached by a representative body of citizens than in those of professional economists alone. And this feeling is, on the whole, well founded. Where deliberation on questions, of general principle is required, the judgment of several intelligent persons from various walks in life persons having differing interests, views, and habits of thought — is likely to be safer than that of any expert or group of experts. The specialist may easily become blinded to the wider aspects and bearings of his subject. In planning and directing broadly the technical investigations, a body of non-professionals will serve a most useful purpose. Above all, in reaching conclusions and making recommendations on subjects which involve the well-being of great classes having widely different interests and views, the judgment of a thoroughly representative body is required. Its decision may not conform to strict economic theory or to ideal justice, but it will be likely to be a compromise more nearly acceptable to all classes. At the same time the opinions of their expert investigators may well be consulted constantly by the members of the commission in reaching their conclusions. If the commissioners recognize clearly the limits, and at the same time the exceeding importance, of the functions which they can properly perform, they will feel no false shame in giving large place to the professional investigator.
An important result of such a division of labor as has been suggested would be that the commissioners themselves, freed from the task of investigating details, would have more time to give to thorough deliberation on fundamental matters. In many cases, indeed, the system would relieve the members of the necessity of giving more than a moderate amount of time to the commission work. Somewhat extended sessions at the outset for laying plans and at the close for gathering in results would be necessary. But during the interval the commission might need to meet only occasionally to consult and direct its experts and to take testimony. As above indicated, the method of oral testimony possesses great value for certain purposes, and requires the presence of a body of several members. But no huge mass of oral evidence would be needed by a commission which made adequate use of expert service. Witnesses would be called chiefly to elucidate particular points found by the special investigations to need explanation or to present authoritatively the views and desires of great groups in the community. The leading part in the questioning would usually be taken by some expert, who should have prepared himself for it as the lawyer does for trial. It may be noted also that the time required from the members of the commission might often be greatly lessened by proper reliance on committees.
By reducing the quantity of work required from commissioners, its quality would be vastly improved. When a large part of the time of the members is demanded, only men of comparatively small income or of unimportant interests can usually afford to accept appointments at·the salary offered. In consequence, too often the positions go to place-hunters, to whom the moderate salary is an important consideration. If he felt that by no means all of his time would be required, the astute lawyer, the successful manufacturer, the powerful labor leader, the great financier, men to whom salary was a matter of little concern,-might be induced to become a member of an investigating commission. It must be confessed that even thus the prospect of getting much service from the really most prominent representatives of the various industrial interests is not flattering. We have comparatively few men who have retired after successful past experience, and far too few who, while yet active, care enough to serve the public and to win the honor which such service brings, to spare even a modicum of their time from money-getting. But in the direction suggested lies probably our greatest hope of gradually drawing more official service from leading men of affairs.
The questions as to the proper number of members of an investigating commission, their compensation, and the duration of their term, will of course depend largely on the nature of the subject of inquiry. If the problem is such a fundamental one as that of railroads, or of trusts, or of the relations of capital and labor, it is essential that the commission should be thoroughly representative of all interests, and should have ample time for its work. An investigation of trusts, for example, by a body which should not contain one or more representatives of the great combinations, and one or more spokesmen of their competitors, as well as men standing for the consumers and the investors, must be adjudged inadequate. Equally desirable would seem the presence of a trained lawyer and a trained economist upon a board which is to consider industrial questions regarding which legislation is sought.
It may be seriously questioned whether it is wise, in many cases, for the legislative body to place any of its own members upon a commission which is also to contain other citizens. Such legislators cannot usually be expected to give as much of their time to the commission as its other members; yet naturally they will want to exercise a powerful influence on its conclusions, and will take positions which, had they the light which the others have gained, they would have learned to abandon. Members of legislative chambers in such a commission, moreover, will find it difficult to divest themselves of that partisan attitude towards questions which is part of their daily atmosphere. The chief advantage of such a mixed body is that, if the legislative members agree in the conclusions, they will be able to defend them later on the floor of the legislature itself. But, unless there is good reason to believe that they will themselves enter thoroughly into the investigations and deliberations of the commission, this gain is more than offset by the disadvantages. Committees composed exclusively of members of the legislature will find ample scope in dealing with more particular and less fundamental problems than are assigned to such a special commission. It will naturally be their duty also to deliberate further regarding the actual measures proposed by the investigating commission.
Thus far we have had reference particularly to temporary commissions established to inquire into some special subject or group of allied subjects. Such a temporary body ought to have a definite and fairly limited field. A general inquiry into all industrial problems, such as was set before the Industrial Commission, is evidently too broad to be satisfactorily conducted in any limited time. It is, however, often suggested that the federal government, and perhaps some of the States as well, should establish a permanent commission or council to advise the legislature and the administration regarding economic questions. Such a body has been proposed by various persons in connection with the new Department of Commerce and Industry, for the creation of which bills have recently been introduced in Congress.
To secure the greatest efficiency in official investigation of industrial matters, it would be highly desirable to bring together into one department all the statistical and other bureaus now chiefly concerned with such questions, and to give to this department authority to secure the proper co-operation of other departments which incidentally obtain valuable economic data. An Industrial Council would find its natural position as the immediate adviser to the head of such an industrial department, with perhaps more or less power of direction as well as of counsel. It would be its function to suggest to existing bureaus subjects and methods of investigation, to co-ordinate their work, to supplement it from time to time through special experts and through oral testimony, and, above all, to deliberate regarding conclusions from the facts and to make recommendations to the legislature. The council could be given wide latitude in determining what problems to take up; but it could also be directed by the legislative body from time to time to make investigations or recommendations on particular topics. If we should deem it wise to follow the precedent of European countries in leaving to administrative officials much discretion as to the application in detail of general principles laid down by the legislative branch, such an industrial council would naturally be called upon to adopt ordinances to this end or to approve those issued by other officers.
Should a permanent body with such wide-reaching powers be established, it would evidently be necessary to make its membership larger, and more thoroughly representative of the various economic interests and groups, than in the case of a commission having a special subject of inquiry. To secure the best men, the amount of time of attendance required would have to be kept small. This might be accomplished by large use of committees, and by relying much on the expert heads of bureaus and on special experts.
To the present writer such an industrial council seems to offer ultimately great possibilities for good. Several European countries, such as Prussia, Austria, France, and Belgium, have established bodies having more or less of this character; and they appear to have worked fairly well. To be sure, it must be recognized that a body of this sort, relying on the service of those who find their chief employment and interest elsewhere, is in danger of degenerating into a mere form, or else of falling under the control of small groups of faddists or of those having some ulterior motive. Undoubtedly, a small board of, say, half a dozen members, would possess superiority in mere efficiency of administration and in promptness and unanimity of decision, as compared with a large council. But the growing complexity and importance of industrial problems, and the probably increasing divergence of interests among different groups and classes in the community, make it constantly more necessary that, in deliberation on such matters there should be wide representation of the people.
The time may not be ripe for such methods of attacking our economic problems. But the growing demands on the time of members of legislative bodies and of administrative heads of departments are likely to render the need of division of labor imperative at some not far distant time.
Source: E. Dana Durand. The United States Industrial Commission; Methods of Government Investigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 16, No. 4 (August 1902), pp. 564-586.
Image Sources: Simon Newton Dexter North portrait from the U.S. Census/History webpage. E. Dana Durand. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division. Washington, D.C. 20540. Images colorized by Economics in the Rear-View Mirror.